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This study attempts to present the relations between discourse and ideology in 
debates taking place in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. It uses critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) and the Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) to ground 
the theoretical claims in the idea that Shiite members of parliament (MPs) in 
the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ discursive strategies 
differently from Sunni MPs. To test this hypothesis, the research aims first to 
observe whether, and if so how, the Sunni parties and the Shiite party employ 
discursive devices and strategies differently to achieve three ideological goals: 
attempting to gain political advantage discursively in parliamentary debates on 
topics related to dissent control and political freedom; manoeuvring the 
definitions of self and others in the contexts of dissent control and political 
rights; and manipulating the law to support one’s party’s and/or sectarian 
affiliation’s ideological stances about dissent-controlling laws and the 
definition of political freedom and political rights. The second aim of the 
research is to explore whether and how the use of discursive devices and 
strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain.  
The research critically analyses excerpts on dissent control and 
personal freedom from the Hansard of the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives. The research first marks discursive devices used by MPs. It 
then identifies discursive strategies. 
The research detects three major discursive strategies that are fulfilled 
by using the devices and called them ‘corroborating by information’; 
‘intensifying grievance’; and ‘centralising pride and dignity’. The analysis 
shows that some discursive devices are used more intensively, though not 
exclusively, under certain strategies. The research also notes that the Shiite 
party, Al Wefaq, employs the strategy of intensifying grievance more often 
than other strategies. The Al Wefaq members demonstrate more tendency 
toward objecting than do the other parties to the dissent control in Bahrain. 
The research relates this tendency to the ideologies of Shi’ism as a religious 
and political institution that heavily relies on the ideology of protest and the 
feeling of injustice and discrimination. Finally, the research provides a 
preview of the use of identified strategies during the unrest that started in 
Bahrain in February 2011. 
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In this research, the transliteration (or Romanisation) system I follow is that 
of the American Library Associations-Library of Congress (ALA-LC). Below 
are the letters used in the Romanization of Arabic (Barry 1997:10–11):1 
 




b. Vowels and diphthongs 
 
 
One change I make in my transliteration is that I use the same symbol ā for 
both ā and á since they are pronounced exactly in the same way. 
  




1. For the use of alif to support hamzah, it is simply omitted. 
 .tāʾ marbūṭah in the construct state is Romanised ة .2
3. To avoid complexity, I do not transliterate proper names of people or 
places as I will be using them a lot in my research and will simply 
spell them as they are usually spelled in English by local users. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The Parliamentary members of the Bahraini Council of Representatives, 
which was established in 2002, are either affiliated to political parties or 
independent members. In the second legislative period in 2006, the three 
political parties that secured seats in the Council were Al Wefaq, Al Minbar 
and Al Asalah, the former being a Shiite party and the latter two Sunnis, 
something that strongly characterises the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives as a field of sectarian ideological struggle. This ideological 
struggle over power is represented most perceptibly in language through 
debates, newspaper reports and releases, interviews, public lectures and so 
on. This research is interested in exploring the discursive strategies 
employed by the different political parties in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives in their ideological struggle over power specifically in 
political debates held in the parliament.  
There are several reasons why the Bahraini Council of Representatives 
makes a particularly interesting topic of study. The elections for the first 
parliamentary legislative session in Bahrain in 2002 faced a call for a 
boycott by four parties: the Al Wefaq, Amal, Wa’ad, and the National 
Democratic Action Society. Both the Al Wefaq Party and the ‘Amal (Islamic 
Action Society) Party are Shiite parties;2 Wa’ad is the National Democratic 
Action Society with socialist and Arab nationalist orientations; and the 
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Nationalist Democratic Rally Society is attached to the Iraqi Ba’ath party. 
This boycott allowed Al Minbar and Al Asalah, both Sunni political parties, 
to dominate the parliament, leaving few seats for other independent 
candidates. However, with the Shiite political parties joining the elections in 
2006, the second legislative session witnessed a furious competition for 
seats. Out of a total of forty seats, the Al Wefaq party, the Shiite party, won 
17 seats, whereas the Al Minbar Party and the Al Asalah Party, the Sunni 
parties, won seven and eight seats respectively, leaving only five seats for 
two other blocs and three for independent candidates (see Table 1).  
 










The domination of Islamic parties in all legislative sessions was expected in 
Bahrain. The second legislative period (2006-2010) in particular has been 
very much characterised by sectarian division. Bahrain is the only Arab 
 
Political Party 
Distribution of Seats 
Number Percentage 
a. Sunni Parties 15 37 
 Al Minbar 7  
 Al Asalah 8  
b.  Shiite Parties 17 433 
 Al Wefaq   
c. Other secular parties 5 12 
 Wa’ad 1  
 Future Block 4  
d. Independents 3 8 
 Total 40 100 
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country with such a strongly explicit diverse presence of sectarian blocs in 
the parliament, to the extent that their presence exceeds the presence of any 
other type of assemblage (i.e. 32 seats for three Islamic parties to 8 for all 
others), something that gives the sectarian division a prominent and explicit 
political existence that cannot be overlooked. Securing a place in the 
parliament has given the winning Islamic political parties more 
‘perceptibility’, more capacity and more credence, or, in other words, they 
have gained more ‘ideological power’.  
One major point that is taken in this research is that discourse is 
important. That is because in order to convey their aims to the public and to 
listen to the public’s demands, opinions and complaints, the MPs make 
contact with the public through various means: their individual surgeries, 
mail correspondence, emails and blogs, the radio and the television, local 
public speeches, informal gatherings, participating in programmes and 
activities, etc. All these involve discourse as the ‘conveyer’ of the message, 
or, in other words, the ideology. Each of these has different social, political 
and ritual settings and consequently, has different ideological settings and 
different reciprocal power relations and representations. For example, when 
speaking in parliament, the MPs are supposed to address the Speaker of the 
Council in discussion and debate and not other MPs. However, these sittings 
are reported to the public in various ways: almost all are broadcast live on 
the local radio station, a summary of the sessions is broadcast on national 
television, and a large part is reported to the public in local newspapers by 
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journalists who attend the general debates. Bayley and Vicente maintain that 
although ‘parliaments constitute closed and elite discourse communities … 
politics does not take place in a void and it can thus be presumed that 
Members of Parliaments (MPs) are aware of speaking to a wider audience 
than that of their peers’ (2004: 237). Since their membership in the 
parliament is dependent on ‘public consensus’, the MPs are likely to pay 
particular attention to what they say (ibid.). This gives the sittings an 
important role as a way of delivering the group ideology to the public and as 
an opportunity for the public to make judgments about MPs and groups. 
A second point the research takes is that Bahrain is a special case for 
studying discourse. In other Arab countries where sectarian divisions are 
reflected in the political parties, there is a greater division into smaller 
groups, each of which is better defined by its political vision rather than by 
sectarianism. In Lebanon, for example, the religious divide is very strong, 
but the party that won the largest number of seats in the 2009 elections, the 
Future Party, won a total of only 26 out of 128 seats. This is only just above 
20% of the seats, something that so far has made it impossible for a single 
party to be dominant. Additionally, many of the political parties in Lebanon 
have members from different religious affiliations, although some affiliations 
are more prominent in certain parties. In the current Bahraini political 
parties, on the other hand, the three dominating parties have a distinct and 
exclusive sectarian affiliation. A third important difference is that the 
Lebanese Parliament has an assigned quota for the number of members from 
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each religious affiliations. Table 2 shows how representation is distributed in 
the current Lebanese Parliament according to the Taif Agreement signed in 
1989. 
 
Table 2: Lebanese Parliament Seat Allocation 
Confession No. seats 
Maronite 34 
Greek Orthodox 14 
Greek Catholic 8 
Armenian Orthodox 5 
Armenian Catholic 1 
Protestant 1 
Other Christians 1 





Total Muslims 64 
Total 128 
(from Parliament of Lebanon 2002). 
 
In contrast, there is no such arrangement in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives and the candidate for each electoral district depends on 
winning votes. This makes competition fiercer and gives elections a stronger 
ideological significance, as there are no guaranteed seats for any sect or 
affiliation. 
 In this research, as the data demonstrate, the Council faces a difficulty 
in reaching an agreement about defining and specifying when an act or law 
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is constraining political freedom and when it is actually controlling dissent. 
This makes the problem the research is addressing an activity of a social 
nature as it is further elaborated under the third stage of the analytical 
framework explained in Section 3.10.2.  
 
1.2 Research Hypothesis 
The overt and strong sectarian construct of the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives makes it a scene of a strong sectarian divide, and, 
accordingly, of ideological divide and struggle. Motivated by my interest in 
the ideological struggle over power that is conveyed through language in the 
debates of the Bahraini Council of Representatives, I employ textual analysis 
to explore if there are discursive strategies in which different discursive 
devices (such as rhetoric, emotive speech, framing and reframing, avoiding 
answering questions, etc.) are used in debates in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives.  
Thus, this research hypothesises that the Shiite MPs in the Bahraini 
Council of Representatives employ strategies differently mrrm Sunni MPs. If the 
Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ 
strategies differently from Sunni MPs in parliamentary debates, then this 
indicates that a speaker’s political and religious affiliation will affect his or 
her discursive choice strategies. The research hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that the structure of the Bahraini Council of Representatives 
reflects the social, ethnic and religious groupings existing in the country. 
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The hypothesis is also based on the fact that social, ethnic and religious 
construction in the Bahraini community is noticeably diverse (see Section 
2.3). This is because previous research shows how such social and ethnic 
groupings have a strong tendency to be reflected or performed in linguistic 
and discursive differences (see Section 2.2.1).  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
Noticing that debates and arguments over dissent control and political 
freedom repeatedly created a point of sharp division between the stances of 
the Sunni parties on the one hand and the Shiite party on the other hand in 
the parliamentary sittings, I chose to test the hypothesis above using 
excerpts on this topic from the official transcriptions, i.e. Hansard, of sittings 
at the Council of Representatives as the source of my main data to reach the 
following aims: 
a. observing whether, and if so how, the Sunni parties and the Shiite party 
employ discursive devices and strategies to achieve the following ideological 
goals:  
 attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the 
parliamentary debates on topics related to dissent control law and 
political freedom. 
 manoeuvring the definitions of self and others in the contexts of 
dissent control law and political rights.  
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 manipulating the law to support one’s party’s ideological stances 
about dissent-controlling laws and the definition of political freedom 
and political rights. 
 
I then used the findings of the goal above to take a further step and perform 
a critical reading of ideologies by: 
b. exploring whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies 
reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
To set boundaries for the processes of collecting and analysing data,  
among different political discourses, I focused on one genre only: the 
political debates held in the Council of Representatives. I also limit my 
research to excerpts from the second legislative period in the Council of 
Representatives from the beginning of December 2007 until the end of April 
2010. The excerpts taken from Hansard are on the topic of dissent control in 
relation to political freedom and human rights. This was, interestingly, the 
legislative period when the strongest sectarian divide was present, as the 
first legislative period was boycotted by the Shiite parties and thus was 
dominated by Sunni parties.4 
 Another boundary I set is whose intervention to analyse, as I only 
present a critical discourse analysis of the interventions of MPs in these 
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excerpts. I thus leave out any other interventions, i.e. those by ministers and 
other government representatives, after briefly mentioning the content.  
 
1.5 Significance of the Study  
There has been no thorough academic research on either the language of the 
Bahraini Council of Representatives or political language in Bahrain. Work 
on linguistics in Bahrain has often refrained from discussing politics and has 
mostly been directed towards in-class English language teaching and 
learning issues, language acquisition, and language usage in social contexts 
or in the newspapers or printed materials. It is hoped that this research, by 
providing an in-depth analysis, will provide information that could be the 
basis for further academic research on political language in Bahrain. 
Providing such an analysis will be of great significance because the 
parliament is a relatively new experience in the democratic practice in 
Bahrain. In addition, the explicit sectarian-based division of dominant 
political parties and the absence of an allocated number of seats for each (as 
explained above in 1.1) are features that make the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives a very interesting subject of ideology studies and religious 
identities in general, something of which the sociolinguistic perspective in 
particular forms an important aspect. 
Another further significance of this study can be understood from 
Sacks’s rrder at all prints’ view; Emanuel Schegloff (1992: xlvi) explains that 
order is not ‘present only at aggregate levels,’ but ‘in detail on a case by 
10 
 
case, environment by environment basis’, which subsequently means that a 
culture does not only have an overall presence but is found at detailed levels 
of a culture (ibid.). Accordingly, a study of the parliamentary sittings, as a 
level of the Bahraini political culture, should reflect and manifest the 
political and religious tendencies in Bahrain while maintaining its 
individuality as a study of a certain topic in a certain context. 
 
1.6 Definitions of Key Terms 
1. Text and discourse: the two terms ‘text’ and ‘discourse’ are used 
distinctively. I use the term ‘text’ to refer to written excerpts, whether 
they are complete linguistic units or smaller but comprehensive parts 
of linguistic units. ‘Discourse’ is, thus, ‘the whole process of social 
interaction of which text is just a part’ (Fairclough 1989: 24). 
Understood in this way, a discourse covers excerpts (i.e. texts), the 
process of producing and interpreting them, relevant information 
about events and interlocutors and their relations, and any relevant 
background information about incentives, events or other texts that 
can be linked to the text being analysed. 
2. Ideology: in this thesis, the term ‘ideology’ is used to mean ‘a set of 
political beliefs about how society ought to be and how to improve it, 
irrespective of whether those ideas are true or false or good or bad’ 
(Adams 2001: 2). 
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3. Context: I follow van Dijk’s definition of context in limiting it to 
‘those properties of the communicative situation that are relevant’ for 
the production or the understanding of discourse (2009b: 4, emphasis 
in original).  
4. Islamic and Islamist: I use the adjective ‘Islamic’ to describe any 
person, movement or matter related to Islam and Muslims. Unless 
quoting directly, I do not use the adjective ‘Islamist’ because of its 
negative connotations, often being associated with fundamentalism.5 
5. The terms ‘Council of Representatives’, ‘Parliament’, ‘House of 
Commons’, ‘Lower House’, ‘House’, and ‘Council’ are used 
interchangeably. In the same way, the term ‘representative’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘a member of parliament’ and its abbreviation 
‘MP’. 
6. I use the term ‘Bahrain dialects’ as the general term to cover all local 
Arabic dialects in Bahrain, which are divided into two major groups: 
the Bahrani dialect and the Bahraini dialect. I realise that having the 
two terms, ‘Bahraini’ and ‘Bahrani’, distinguished by one letter, is 
potentially confusing, but these are the local terms used in Bahrain. 
Some research refers to the first as the Shiite (or Shi’a) Bahrani and to 
the second as the Sunni Arabic, but unless I am quoting others, I do 
not use the latter terms because of their inaccuracy, as the dialects are 
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originally related more to ethnicity than to sectarian affiliation, as is 
explained in Section 2.2.4.  
7. Excerpt and Extract: I use the two terms ‘excerpt’ and ‘extract’ 
differently to facilitate realising what I am referring to. I use ‘excerpt’ 
to refer to the full portion I cite from Hansard as a complete 
intervention and ‘extract’ to refer parts of the excerpts. I provide the 
complete excerpts in the appendix and use extracts from them to refer 
to precise discussed instances within an excerpt. 
 
1.7 Acronyms used in the research 
Some of the major abbreviations that are used in this research are the 
following: 
1. BHD:  Bahrain dialect, a term to cover both Bahrani and Bahraini 
dialects used by Bahraini people.6 
2. MP:  Member of Parliament. 
3. CDA:  Critical Discourse Analysis. 




1.8 Layout of Research 
This research is based in the field of sociolinguistics and employs analysis of 
discourse as a tool and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a perspective to 
achieve its goals through a sociocognitive approach (SCA). 
In the next chapter, I provide a background that aims at 
contextualising the complex topic of the political language of the Bahraini 
Council of Representatives. In order to do so, Chapter 2 first highlights the 
role of politics in Islam and sketches the sectarian division between Sunnis 
and Shiites in the field of politics. It then examines the social, sectarian and 
ethnic composition of Bahraini society. After that, it sheds light on the topics 
of identity and power, and shows how they are entwined and how they 
interact with language and religion. The chapter briefly discusses the subject 
of emotions and their role in discourse, and then presents the discursive 
strategies that are observed and considered in the analysis of the research 
data. Finally, the chapter presents the discursive devices and explains the 
difference and relationship between devices and strategies. 
In Chapter 3, on the methodology of the research, I illustrate the 
features and objectives of CDA and SCA to show how they are appropriate to 
address the objectives of the research in order to test the hypothesis. I also 
explain the procedure of collecting data from Hansard of the second 
legislative period of the Bahraini Council of Representatives and why I chose 
political rights and freedom and dissent-controlling laws, topics which were 
raised extensively in that legislative period, as the theme I traced in Hansard 
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to analyse in this research. I also explain my selection and use of newspaper 
articles which are directly related to the analysed excerpts to provide a 
context for the excerpts.  
Chapter 4 is the heart of this research. The collected data are analysed 
in the light of the background information and according to the procedure 
explained in the methodology chapter. The analysis is based on illustrating 
the discursive devices employed to demonstrate how these devices work 
together to fulfil discursive strategies. I also use synchronous newspaper 
reports and press releases on the topics of relevant Hansard excerpts to 
create a more contextualised and intertextual analysis. In the analysis, I take 
note of the language usage and the strategies employed in each excerpt and I 
look for any significant evidence of struggle over power and of religious 
identity and ideology. Collected data are then analysed against theories of 
power and identity in the light of CDA and SCA. In the process of analysing 
the ideological struggle over power, I found three major discursive 
strategies: corroborating by information, intensifying grievance, and 
centralising pride and dignity. 
Chapter 5, entitled Readings into Ideology, is a second level of 
analysis. At this level, I aim to show any correlations that can be found to 
relate the different elements of my hypothesis – sectarian affiliation and 
choice of strategies – so that I can test the research hypothesis. In order to 
achieve this, I discuss how the findings presented in Chapter 4 relate to the 
concept of group versus individual identity, ideology and struggle over 
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power, particularly that of Al Wefaq, whose MPs’ interventions in the chosen 
extracts happen to be more numerous than those of Sunni MPs. I discuss 
how this supports or refutes the research hypothesis. At the end of this 
chapter, I briefly illustrate how the findings of the research correlate with 
the recent upheavals in Bahrain, which started in February 2011. 
The last chapter summarises the research and its major findings and 
draws conclusions from the analysis. It makes some suggestions for further 




CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter sheds light on five aspects that together to form the basis for 
understanding and analysing the data in hand in order to test the research 
hypothesis. Since the politics in Bahrain has taken a clear sectarian turn and 
divide, the chapter begins with description of politics in Islam, followed by a 
section presenting Bahrain as a scene of political struggle over power, 
introducing the ethnic, linguistic, social and political structures in Bahrain. 
The third section discusses the notions of power and explains how identity 
interplays with it. Then, attention is given to emotions and their role in 
discourse. Finally, this chapter presents the discursive devices that are 
identified in the analysis in order to establish and detect the major 
discursive strategies followed by participating MPs in the examined data. 
 
2.2 Political Islam and Politics in Islam 
2.2.1 Language and religion, sects and ideologies 
Carrasco and Riegelhaupt maintain that in many cultures, language and 
religion are inseparable, something which makes religion an essential 
element in discussing the sociology of language (2006: 259). Explaining how 
linguistics and religion meet, Wolf (2006: 42) maintains that ‘religion as a 
cult … , i.e. the social practices built upon religious beliefs, involve language 
to a considerable degree. To that extent, these beliefs and practices are open 
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to (linguistic) analysis.’ He also points out that ‘lexical frequency is 
indicative of socio-cultural patterns’ (ibid.: 43). Joseph explains that: 
 
[f]or any given language, there is not just a single cultural tradition it 
represents, but several, in some cases many, including perhaps 
religious ones, legal ones, ones formed for purposes of teaching and 
learning, logical or philosophical ones, and ones formed by modern 
linguists of various theoretical leanings (2004: 35). 
 
In Bahrain, as in many other Muslim communities in general and Arab ones 
in particular, religiously-loaded phrases and expressions are very common, 
even more so in spoken than in written language, and most of them have 
become phatic expressions. As Rosowsky notes, the Qur’an’s language ‘has 
entered common parlance’ in the Arabic-speaking world (2006: 313).  
 
2.2.2 Key issues in the construction of politics in Islam 
There are four key issues in the theoretical foundation of Islamic ideology 
that directly affect its relation with politics. These key issues can be 
summarised in the following points: First, to most Muslims, Islam presents a 
total ideology, as ‘a belief and law (‘aqida wa shari’a), religion and state (din 
wa dawla)’ and a system of values for spiritual and temporal affairs (din wa 
dunya)’ (Merad 1981: 38). This belief makes consulting and referring to 
Islamic principles and legislations an expected move among politicians and 
parties with religious and sectarian affiliations.  
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The second key issue forming ideology in Islam is that the Qur’an, 
which is believed by Muslims to be the revelation of God/Allah to His 
Prophet Mohammed, and the Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed 
(or Sunnah, to cover the sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammed), 
who is believed to be the last prophet sent by God to mankind, are the two 
major sources agreed upon by Muslim movements and ideologies including 
contemporary ones. The Qur’an has a single version used and read 
throughout the world and is cover-to-cover accepted in Islam to be the Word 
of God. As for the Hadith, the available collections are categorised, following 
strict criteria, in authenticity-level groups ranging from the strongest and 
most fully accepted to the weakest and even the rejected ones. 
The third and fourth points are very crucial to this research. It can be 
noted how they manifest in discursive choices made in political language of 
sectarian affiliations. The third key point is that there is a major political 
division between Sunni and Shiite,7 the two major sects in Islam, on the 
matter of authority and leadership, something which is at the core of the 
Sunni-Shiite conflict. Sunni believe that the Prophet Mohammed died 
without naming a successor, leaving it to be decided amongst Muslims 
themselves. Under the Sunni doctrine, leadership (imāmah) is possible for 
any Muslim with religious and leadership qualities. Shiites, on the other 
hand, believe that the Prophet Mohammed did name a successor, his cousin 
Ali bin Abi Talib, and that the other companions of the prophet betrayed his 
will after his death and assigned Abu Bakr Al Siddiq as leader. Sunnis 
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believe that Ali bin Abi Talib did not seek to become the first Caliph after 
the death of Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) and that Ali himself was among the 
companions of the prophet who agreed on Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr was the first 
man who converted to Islam, he was the oldest among the companions, he 
was the prophet’s companion in his hijrah (immigration from Mecca to 
Medina), and he was the one that the Prophet Mohammed asked to lead 
Muslims in prayers in the Prophet Mosque during the prophet’s illness 
shortly before his death. Shiites, on the other hand, believe that the 
descendants of Ali and his wife Fatima Al Zahra’, the daughter of the 
Prophet Mohammed, are the only ones eligible for imāmah, something which 
makes all other forms of leadership or government illegitimate.  
The fourth point is how controversy is dealt with, something which 
controls the perception of proposed or available options. Issues regarding 
legitimacy and the legitimisation of controversial issues are first referred to 
the major sources, the Qur’an and the Hadith (or Sunnah), and when no 
clear-cut answer is found, the major and prominent imams use ijtihad,8 i.e. 
‘the application of rational efforts to the methods of interpreting the 
sources’, to come up with an agreed legitimacy on the subject matter being 
questioned (ibid.: 38–39). Under Sunni doctrine, no one apart from the 
prophets is protected from erring or sinning and all human beings including 
imāms are fallible; therefore, their decisions, acts and interpretations are 
revisable, refutable and not final. Different interpretations are expected to 
result from different human readings, which can result in various, but 
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usually parallel, fatwas (legal and religious rulings and responses of scholars 
to inquiries); the laypeople are expected to choose the fatwa most intelligible 
to their understanding and circumstances. On the other hand, Sachedina 
(1988: 90) explains that the sources of spiritual authority in Shiite Islam, 
who are considered to be the proof (hujjah) of God, are infallible and are 
capable of interpreting the Qur’an by special personal knowledge given to 
them, making them similar to prophets in this respect. Shiite Muslims are 
more likely to have more individual decisions made by individual imāms 
based on their personal endowments or interpretations. The concept of 
ijtihād is a centre point of many fatwas in Shiite doctrine. However, unlike 
Sunnis, Shiites have the concept of taqlīd, by which every Shiite Muslim is 
obliged to choose a single marjiʿ (referee) whom he or she follows in any 
matwā that is needed. This means that a layperson may not choose to accept a 
matwā from one marjiʿ and another matwā from another marjiʿ. Shiites go to 
the extent of ruling that if one does not follow a specific marjiʿ, then all one’s 
deeds are deemed unacceptable by Allah (God). 
From the four key points above, it becomes clear that Islamic 
perspectives and sectarian variations are strongly present in ideological 
stances and consequently in the choices made and perspectives presented by 
Islamic affiliation. Therefore, this presence should inform discourse choices, 
and the research attempts to identify these variations (see Objectives of 




2.2.3 Ideological evolution in the Muslim world 
More than a quarter of a century ago, Ismael and Ismael were already 
maintaining that ‘popular Islamic political activism has become a dynamic 
force in Middle East politics,’ demonstrating a salient and discernible 
capacity for motivating the masses (1985: 134–135). A chief characteristic of 
political ideology in Islam is ‘the inherent pluralism and diversity of Muslim 
politics—that is, […] the impossibility of a single theory to account for 
political Islam’ (Mandaville 2007: 1, emphasis in original). If we take the 
major key issues in Islam mentioned in the section above into account and 
see how they can apply to politics, we can see that Islamic politics, as Asad 
(1993: 1) explains, has features that make it impossible to apply the 
European secular division between religion and politics to Islam. Mandaville 
gives three reasons why this is so. He first mentions that the ‘Muslim world 
witnessed its own version of debate regarding the status of reason versus 
pure revelation as sources of knowledge some five centuries before this took 
place in the West’ (2007: 10). He explains that these debates ‘gave way to a 
sharp distinction between knowledge concerning morality and law, as seen 
not amenable to reason or rational thought, and the realms of science and 
technology’ (ibid). The second reason, according to Mandaville (ibid.: 11), is 
that there is no religious hierarchy in Islam, at least not in the Sunni 
mainstream, who make up 90% of all Muslims, and this absence of 
institutional authority leaves the call for reforming Islam without a target at 
which to aim. The third point Mandaville (ibid.: 12) draws attention to when 
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contrasting Islam and Christianity in this aspect is that in Islam, the concept 
of tawhid (oneness) puts emphasis on ‘the totalizing sovereignty of God.’ This 
spiritual-temporal unity has always been essential in Islam. ‘[T]he failure of 
the political institutions to realize this unity’ (Ismael & Ismael 1985: 127) 
beside the growing economic, political and cultural conflicts in the Islamic 
world (ibid.: 139) initiated the contemporary Islamic political movements or 
activism. This political activism moved Islamic legitimisation from being 
viewed as a cultural imperative that is used as an apolitical tool to a political 
imperative in itself (ibid.: 128). 
Merad (1981: 39–40) believes that one of the most dominant themes 
in contemporary Islamic ideology is the theme of asala9 (authenticity), which 
is a form of nostalgia for the past when the Muslim world was under Islamic 
and Qur’anic legitimacy. This theme, however, can create a feeling of being 
threatened by ‘external aggressions, essentially those of the Western cultural 
models’ (ibid.: 40). He adds that the ideological implications of asala may 
also ‘help construct a political and social order’ that inspires ‘critical 
tendencies towards the established order’ (ibid). Merad highlights that the 
apologists and religious debaters often ‘intermingle political and religious 
debates’ in the Muslim world, and in some cases, the principal purpose 
behind this can be ‘the affirmation of the dominant ideology and the 




ideological debates use different theses according to the subject of the 
debate, and whether they are of the progressive, traditional or 
fundamentalist type. The progressive (or revolutionary) ideologisation 
of Islam emphasises the values of liberation, community and 
distribution, whose adherents attempt to find its corresponding 
concepts in the ethics of original Islam. In the ideologisation of the 
traditional type, its advocates insist on the values of piety and 
obedience, which are most compatible with the authoritarian and 
conservative regimes (ibid. 43–44). 
 
He explains that ‘government-inspired’ publications and essays illustrate this 
tendency to reflect compatibility with authority (ibid. 47n.).   
Across the Islamic world, there have been what can be described as 
‘revivalist or renewalist (tajdidi) trends … from the mid-eighteenth century’ 
(Mandaville 2007: 43). Revivalism calls for going back to the roots of Islam, 
while renewalism (or reformism) focuses on ‘external challenges’ (ibid. 43). 
Two important landmarks in the contemporary Sunni political evolution are 
the emergence of the Salafī movement in Saudi Arabia and the emergence of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Salafī is a major revivalist movement; it 
acquired its name from the Arabic word, salaf, meaning predecessors, and 
refers to the companions of the Prophet Mohammed. This trend or 
movement was established by Mohammed Abdul Wahhab (1703–92) and is 
seen as ‘the standard orientation of much of the religious establishment in 
present day Saudi Arabia’10 (Mandaville 2007: 43). What provoked Abdul 
Wahhab most was finding ‘the laxity of the society in which he grew up – its 
neglect of the prescribed rites and prayers, its promiscuity, its tolerance of 
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superstition’ (Mortimer 1982: 60). He was greatly influenced by Ibn 
Taymiya, a follower of Ibn Hanbal. The latter established one of the four 
major schools of the Sunni sect; however, ‘Abdul-Wahhab was opposed to 
any of the schools being taken as an absolute and unquestionable authority’ 
(ibid.: 61). On the other hand, a major figure in the reformalist trend is 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who called for employing philosophy and science in 
reviving Muslim nations. Al-Afghani believed that how Islam strengthened 
Muslims and helped them rise as a nation and state in the first place was by 
awakening philosophical awareness in them and only then awakening other 
fields of knowledge (Mandaville 2007: 44–45).  
Although Sunni Islamic movements in Bahrain have no actual 
organisational links with similar movements elsewhere, they sympathise 
with many of them as can be perceived from occasional mentioning of other 
movements in some sermons and talks. The Salamī and Muslim Brotherhood 
movements have had their effects on Bahraini religious revivalism, but 
again, as with most adapted ideologies and trends, the principles and 
objectives have been ‘acclimatised’ to Bahraini social and political 
backgrounds. This is reflected in the tendency of Bahraini Sunni 
‘religiousness’ to be more lenient and tolerant than in many parts of the 
Middle East. The two founders of the movements above are barely known to 
the new generations and hardly mentioned by the older generations among 




Within every single Muslim community, there is rarely agreement 
about what how Islam is activated in politics. This is due to diversity a 
difference among Muslims with respect to politics. Mandaville (2007: 105–
106) believes that within the Islamic political stances, the ‘Islamists’ differ 
from Muslim democrats in that the former refer more to Shari’a in their 
choices and decisions. The Muslim democrats, on the other hand, ‘do not 
seek to enshrine Islam in politics’ (Nasr S.V.R. 2005: xx). As for 
differentiating Muslim democrats from the other conservative parties, 
Mandaville (op. cit.: 106) suggests looking ‘to the social bases of 
membership, recruitment, and mobilization.’ 
As for Shi’ism, it has three main branches: Twelvers (or Ja’faris), 
Ismailis and Zaidis. Two major revivals of Shi’ism that have had a direct and 
prominent effect on the Shi’a recent history are the establishment of the 
Safavid dynasty and the Iranian revolution. The Safavids, often but 
inaccurately viewed as an equivalent of Twelvers, are a dynasty that in the 
early 1500s took power over what is now Iran. The Safavid dynasty is 
named after its establisher, Ismail Al-Safawi,11 a Twelver Shi’a who was the 
key figure in the conversion of Iran from Sunnism to Shi’isim (Ward 2009: 
43). Twelvers, also known as Ja’farī Shiites or Imam Shiites, mainly follow 
twelve Imams (religious leaders) who are descendants of Imam Ali and his 
wife Fatima Al Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammed. The 
Twelvers consider that believing in Imamah, i.e. that Allah appointed these 
twelve Imams to be followed, as a pillar of Faith. The first Imam is Ali 
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himself, followed by his son Al Hussain, and the twelfth is Mohammed ibn 
Al Hassan, known as Al Mahdi (i.e. the Guided One) who, according to 
Shiite doctrine, was born in Iraq in 868 and was hidden by Allah in a cave. 
It is believed that he will come back with Christ. The Sunnis, on the hand, 
believe that Al Mahdi has not been born yet and will be an average person 
(i.e. with a normal life span) among Muslims, who will fight alongside Christ 
when he returns.  
When it comes to contemporary Shiite political evolution, the 
revolution and the resulting establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
1979 was a prominent divergence in the revival of Shi’ism as a political 
power. S. V. R. Nasr (2007: 138) states that the Iranian Shiite revolution was 
received with great pride among Shiites worldwide, and energised Shiite 
politics in many countries including Bahrain. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
led by the USA, is considered a major triumph for Shiites, as they succeeded 
in what the Iranian newspapers called the Nasrallah-Sistani-Khamenei axis, 
the Shia crescent (ibid.: 184). Nasr explains that the ‘gains made in Iraq’ 
have led to a Shiite revival that has created consensus among Shiite 
governments and movements. Nasr mentions three implications of this 
revival: first, the strengthening of religious and cultural ties among Shiites in 
the region are stronger; secondly, the gains in Iraq have encouraged further 
Shiite demonstrations in the region to gain more political power; and 
thirdly, the inter-Shiite religious and cultural ties have become stronger and 
thus ‘sustain[ed] gains in power’ (ibid.: 179). He explains that 
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Iraq has set a chain reaction that will play differently in Lebanon, 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but the overall result will almost certainly 
be greater Shiite power and more manifest cultural and religious ties 
across the crescent from Lebanon to Pakistan (ibid.).  
 
The need to maintain the gains and to expand them to include other areas 
meant that the Shiite needed to work with the USA on its plans in the 
Middle East (ibid.) 
 
2.3 Bahrain as a scene of Political Struggle over Language 
2.3.1 Population composition of the Bahraini community 
The Bahraini community is complex and consists of several ethnic groups. 
This is not surprising if one considers two major factors. The first is the 
central and strategic location of the archipelago of Bahrain in the Arabian 
Gulf, very close to Saudi Arabia on the west and Iran on its east, and its 
being a transit centre for trade and travel throughout the history of 
mankind. The second factor is that Bahrain, as defined by its current 
boundaries, is a very new country, dating back only to the ending of the 
British protectorate in 1971. Before that, this archipelago had always been 
part of much larger territories and kingdoms. Controversy over nationalism 
is a recurring feature of many debates in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives. In fact, it is a major area of disagreement between several 
political parties and the government, and it has repeatedly initiated riots and 
conflicts in the country. The topic is also repeatedly brought up in debates 
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dealing with other issues, especially by the Al Wefaq Party. There is always 
a tendency to frame Bahraini citizens in particular ways so as to exclude 
certain people. There are also repetitive attempts to involve the issue of 
naturalisation in discussions of disorder in the country, and examples of this 
will be seen in the some of the chosen excerpts. Anderson (1983: 13–14) 
maintains that nationality (or nation-ness and nationalism) are artefacts and 
that they were founded towards the end of the eighteenth century. He cites 
Kemiläinen (1964: 10, 33 and 48–49), who noted that the word 
‘nationalism’ only started being widely used towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. Anderson (ibid.: 14) also explains that theorists of 
nationalism have often been confused by three contradicting facts of the 
concept of ‘nation’: (a) its being historically modern vs. being ancient in the 
eyes of nationalists, (b) its formal universal acceptance as a socio-cultural 
concept vs. its sui generis characteristics when assigned to a people, and (c) 
the political power of nationalism vs. ‘its philosophical poverty and even 
incoherence’. Anderson defines the concept of ‘nation’ as ‘an imagined 
political community – and imaged as both inherently limited and sovereign’ 
(ibid.: 15).  
The cosmopolitan nature and historical construct of Bahrain make it 
very difficult for any current residents to claim rightfully to be the ‘original’ 
habitants of the country, although there have been many attempts to prove 
one group or another as the more rightful ‘owners’ of the land. The vast 
majority of Bahraini people can trace back their origins to Central Arabia, 
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the Eastern coast of Arabia, Southern Iraq, Western Persia, or other parts of 
current Iran, and some to Pakistan or India. Additionally, many families 
have a history of taking foreign wives, especially Indian and Iranian wives. 
There are also more recent international marriages with European and Asian 
wives, but marrying and bringing in Indian and Iranian wives is the most 
common form of marriage with non-Arabs in the history of Bahraini 
families.  
The four major ethnic and religious groups in the Bahraini 
community, who have been living on this archipelago since before its 
independence from Britain in 1971 are known as the Arabs, the Huwala, the 
Baharna, and the ʿAjam. The former two are Sunnis and the latter two are 
Shiites.12 It is easy to see the ethnic and linguistic resemblance of each group 
to other ethnic and linguistic communities around Bahrain. When it comes 
to ethnicity, the Arab Bahrainis have more in common with either central 
Arabia or the southern half of the western coast of the Arabic Gulf and 
Oman.13 The Huwala or Hewala (singular: Holi) are still linked to Arab-
Iranian (in certain families Arab-Persian) mixed families who resided on and 
moved between the western and eastern coasts of the Arabian Gulf until 
modern frontiers restricted their movements. Their existence on the western 
coast of the Arabian Gulf is mentioned in Dutch documents dating back to 
the late 1600s.14 They are originally Arabs who emigrated from Arabia to the 
Persian coast of the Arabian Gulf at different periods of Islamic conquests. 
They mingled within Persian society and intermarried with the Persians. In 
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the late 19th and early 20th century, many Huwala moved to the eastern 
coast of the Arabian Gulf and the western coast, mostly the southern part, 
and most intensively to the Emirates,15 Bahrain,16 Qatar and Kuwait before 
national borders restricted their movements.17 While Bahrain converted to 
Islam in year 629 until Qarmitians18 conquered Bahrain in the early decades 
of the tenth century (Lapidus 2002:107). This is when Shiism began 
spreading in Bahrain and the surrounding region. However, the oldest Shiite 
Cleric in Bahrain was Shaikh Maytham Bin Ali Al-Bahrani, a leading Twelver 
Shiite theologian, who passed away in 1280. The vast majority of Baharna 
are ethnically and linguistically linked to families residing in Southern Iraq 
who have moved to Bahrain and Al-Hasa, the northern half of the western 
coast of the Arabian Gulf. The ʿAjam, on the other hand, are of Iranian 
origins, though not necessarily Persian. 
Due to space limitations, I do not intend to give further details about 
the origins of the various groups in Bahraini society in this part of the 
research. However, I must point out that the debate over which of the four 
groups are the original habitants is very fierce, especially between the Arabs 
and Buharna. I also need to point out that there are other smaller Bahraini 
groups, including those who long ago came from India, Yemen, and even 
longer-settled Arab Jewish residents, all of whom have no conflicts or 
problems of integration. However, there are many newly naturalised families 
who have arrived in the last twenty years from Syria to serve in the Armed 
Forces. Such immigration is not particularly unusual, since the same is 
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happening in many countries, including the UK. However, in the case of 
naturalised Syrians, there has been a lot of resistance and rejection from 
most Bahrainis, especially the Shiite movements, who repeatedly bring up 
the issue of naturalisation as a fault and as a part of a political strategy 
carried by the government to marginalise the Shiites of the country. A new 
term came up to label those people as mujannasīn, plural of mujannas, i.e. 
‘the naturalised’.19  
This ethnic diversity in Bahrain is also reflected in a dialectical and 
accentual divergence and variety, something that I explore further below. 
 
2.3.2 Bahrain Language 
Although the dialectal and accentual varieties do not interfere with the 
discursive analysis carried out in my research, I provide the following brief 
introduction to Bahrain language and dialects to familiarise readers with an 
important aspect of the Bahraini culture, as language is the interface of 
interaction and the conveyer of ideology. Accordingly, it is useful for the 
reader to have a glimpse of the linguistic variety to understand how the 
ethnic and, often, sectarian affiliation can be present in (or concealed by) 




2.3.2.1 Standard Arabic, dialects and accents 
Many linguists differentiate between the terms ‘accent’ and ‘dialect’ by 
assigning the former to pronunciation, and the second to the lexis (grammar 
and vocabulary) (Thomas et al. 2004: 134). Gregory and Carroll (1978: 12) 
explain that ‘[a]ccent normally refers to articulator and acoustic features of 
language while dialect [refers] to the totality of lexical, grammatical and 
phonological features. Dialect therefore incorporates accent but remains 
distinct from it.’ This distinction is adopted in this thesis. Gregory and 
Carroll (ibid.), add that dialect ‘can be thought of as the user’s macro-
linguistic identity defining him in terms of birthplace, class, education and 
age’. However, there are some reservations about dialect defining class and 
education, although this might have been acceptable in the West and in the 
Arabian Gulf countries until two decades ago (noting that Gregory and 
Carroll’s book was published in 1978). The economic boost in Bahrain of the 
eighties resulted in fundamental changes in both access to education and 
income but at variant and diverse levels. This, in turn, has led to a 
fundamental restructuring of the class order. This is not to say that dialects 
have no social-assigning or positioning role, as within every community 
there is an approximate upper, middle and lower class based on 
stereotypical or prejudged criteria.  
Oakes (2001: 91) states that the term ‘dialect’ is problematic for two 
reasons: for being ‘very socio-politically loaded … reinforcing the inferior 
status of minority groups’ and because the term suggests that there is a 
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standard form of language, and this gives way to ‘the suppression of 
linguistic variation in favour of linguistic uniformity.’ This, nevertheless, is 
not the case in Bahrain for two major reasons: first, because dialects are part 
of regional and sectarian identities, while Standard Arabic (SA) does not 
belong to any particular regional or sectarian group. One reading of the role 
of dialects in Bahrain can be that of Joseph (2006b: 166): 
 
Sectarian splits in Islam came to be associated with dialectal 
differences in Arabic, just as splits with Christianity would do. It is 
extremely unlikely that any of these alignments in belief and language 
were accidental. Members of the various sects needed and wanted to 
be able to recognise one another, and to identify members of other 
sects, and they adopted various ways of doing this, from circumcision, 
to distinctive clothing and ornaments, to rituals such as the sign of 
the cross or bowing to the east for prayers. In such a semiotically 
charged context, language could hardly fail to play its part. 
 
On the other hand, SA, at least in Bahrain, has never been associated with a 
sect or group and has been the most unmarked form of language. SA has 
been associated mainly with written language, education,20 the news and 
other formal uses of language. Generally speaking, people in Bahrain, even 
the illiterate, do understand spoken SA at least at the receptive level 
(listening and reading), such as watching the news on the TV or listening to 
the radio. Of course, those who are more educated have access to more 
vocabulary, yet SA is not considered problematic in Bahrain.  
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Secondly, in some Arabic-speaking countries, such as Egypt and 
Lebanon (see Suleiman 1996), the battle between SA and local dialects has 
been fierce. This, however, has never been an issue in Bahrain, and 
‘replacing’ SA with a dialect has never occurred to anyone. Nevertheless, 
Bahraini dialects (BHDs21) are occasionally used in written texts as a source 
of humour, e.g. in local caricatures, and as an attempt to present less 
formality on some local TV shows. This is not to say that the SA used 
nowadays is identical to ancient classical Arabic, but the changes have 
occurred more gradually and as a result of being affected by the spread of 
successful Arabic publications that do not significantly diverge from the 
usual SA. Instead of fighting SA, the desire to ‘modernise’ and ‘elevate’ one’s 
language competency in Bahrain has always been associated with either 
learning another language, mainly English, or shifting to another language, 
again very often English. This is evident in the common perception among 
laypeople who perhaps too often measure the success or the distinction of a 
school by how fluent and native-like a student becomes in English rather 
than any other academic achievements. The local dialects have never 
occurred to most Bahraini communities as possible alternatives, as they have 
not been perceived as languages by themselves nor have been felt to be 
separated from SA. It is very likely that Bahrain’s multicultural nature and 
its having been a trade transit centre for centuries have helped found a 
general acceptance and expectance and expectation of multilingualism, 
which has always diminished the urge to have one particular language 
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chosen to cover all aspects of life. The linguistic community in Bahrain is 
familiar with people mastering a language and having a second language 
with a lower level of competence, whether the pair of languages is Arabic 
and Persian, Holi and Arabic, Arabic and a pidgin variation of Urdu or 
Hindi, amongst others. 
This is not to say that Bahraini society still looks up to SA, as more 
and more Bahrainis are abandoning it and replacing it with English, 
believing that English will serve them better at the level of modernisation 
and education, and this view is facilitated by the spread of foreign and local 
private schools, where Arabic language classes are kept to a minimum, 
resulting in Arabic, i.e. both SA and BHDs, shifting to the level of a second 
— sometimes a third — language for younger generations, who 
simultaneously choose to communicate amongst themselves in English, and 
some of whom even communicate with their parents in English. As for daily 
life, English does serve them well as, in most fields of work, English is 
expected to be known, while Arabic is often more of a bonus than a 
requirement. 
Although standardisation has not been a source of differentiation or 
discrimination in Bahrain, the dialects themselves have been perceived by 
the Bahraini community to have a kind of ranking; those dialects indicating 
different religious sectarian divisions have become major marked features, 
and the ones referring to the regional origins have a less hierarchical role. 
The role of the dialect as markers has more to do with categorising the 
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interlocutors according to origin rather than ranking them. As in mundane 
life, it is possible to detect sectarian and regional orientations from the 
accents and dialects of MPs in the Council of Representatives, often with the 
sectarian accent being the most perceptible. While the Council is per se a 
speech community with shared norms, it can be subdivided into smaller 
speech communities on the basis of dialectal varieties.  
 
2.3.2.2 Bahrain dialect variations 
Although this research is not interested in examining the differences 
in dialects in collected data, it should useful to familiarise the reader with 
BHDs as part of the historical and political structure in the country. Dialects 
are an important component of one’s group identity; it defines and 
categorises an interlocutor with a speech community. Corder (1973: 53) 
explains that ‘[a] speech community is made up of people who regard 
themselves as speaking the same language; it needs have no other defining 
attributes.’ Wolf’s definition of speech community concurs with this 
definition: he describes a speech community as ‘a group of people that feels 
connected through the use of the same language or language variety’ (2006: 
43). These views make the perception and the self-image of the interlocutors 
the most fundamental criterion for defining a speech community. 
 Applying these definitions of speech communities, the members of 
the Bahraini Council of Representatives can be perceived as forming a major 
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speech community unified under SA first of all, and then subdivided by 
BHDs. BHDs can initially, depending on their linguistic uniformity levels, be 
divided into the BHDs of Sunnis and the BHDs of Shiites, as they are notably 
distinct for the historical and cultural reasons that were demonstrated in 
more detail in the previous section. Still, within each Sunni and Shiite 
subdivision, there are further divisions, but these are accents rather than 
separate dialects. 
To understand dialectical variations in the Gulf region, it is useful to 
first understand the habitants of the area and how they moved around to 
construct what is now the Gulf region. Ingham (1982: 7) divides North 
Arabia into three central zones: Najd;22 Southern Iraq and Khuzistan;23 and 
the Gulf coast of Arabia. He suggests three factors affecting the dialect 
geography of this area: (a) the continuous immigration from the central 
areas to the outer ones, (b) ‘the existence of permanent centres of 
civilisations in these areas’ throughout historical changes, and (c) the waves 
of immigration from Southern Mesopotamia to the coastal area (ibid.). 
Although nomads’ grazing areas changed with ‘the change of power in the 
area,’ they have tended to stay relatively stable over the last two hundred 
years (ibid.: 9).  
The immigration of nomadic groups from central Arabia to the settled 
lands seems to have had an obvious effect on dialect geography (ibid.: 11). 
Ingham (ibid.: 22) explains that the immigration of groups of nomads to the 
settled areas had an effect on the spread of the ‘linguistic features’ of the 
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immigrants and on the ‘subsequent adaptation’ by the population. The 
nomads of Najd found the coastal region and southern Iraq more attractive 
when they needed to visit settlements to buy supplies since these areas were 
well connected with the outside world; this was one of the factors that 
encouraged them to travel repeatedly to these zones, creating more 
connections with the sedentary populations there (ibid.: 23). Ingham states 
that the Al-Hasa region,24 alongside Shatt Al Arab,25 has long been a 
destination of immigration from central Arabia, the Syrian region and Iran 
(ibid.: 34). He also states that there has been one-way marriage between 
Arab tribesmen in Khuzistan and Persian women (ibid.). This one-way 
marriage has also occurred between the Holīs and Bahranis and Iranian 
women being brought into the Bahraini culture.  
When it comes to dialects of the Gulf region, most of the articles and 
books referring to them seem to distinguish two in particular: the Bahrani 
dialect and the Najdi dialect. However, this fails to encompass the reality. 
First of all, I would like to stress that the Najdi dialect has never been a 
dialect of Bahraini peoples. It recently received some attention when Nabti 
poetry became popular among the youth, but this has been more of a ‘trend’ 
or a wave that was imported from neighbouring countries with large Najdi 
populations, such as parts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and parts of the 
UAE. In fact, there are large numbers of urban people who have long lived 
on the western coast of the Arabian Gulf and who are neither Nomads nor 
Baharna; these have dialects that are different from both the Najdi and 
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Bahrani. If we take the more general features, the rest of the urban dialects 
of the western coast of Arabia can be divided into two distinct groups: the 
one spoken in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, and the one spoken in the UAE. I 
would prefer to use the popular term Khaleeji (the Arabic adjective from the 
word Khaleej, meaning Gulf) for the dialect used in Bahrain by the non-
Bahrani, which is also used in Kuwait and in Qatar. However, in Kuwait and 
Qatar, Shiites also speak in the same dialect as Sunnis. As with any dialect, 
the Khaleeji dialect varies among these countries and even within each 
country. Still, the dialects spoken in these three countries are more similar to 
each other than different.  
The Khaleeji dialect in Bahrain is known as Bahraini. It would not be 
accurate to call it ‘the Sunni dialect’ or the ‘Sunni Bahraini’; neither would it 
be accurate to call the Bahrani dialect ‘the Shiite dialect’ or ‘Shiite Bahraini’. 
First of all, the labels ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shiite’ are not locally used to identify 
dialects or accents in Bahrain or in the Gulf and the two labels are used only 
to refer to religious affiliations. Instead, ‘Bahrani’ and ‘Bahraini’ are the 
commonly used descriptions for the dialects and for ethnic differentiation; 
that is because the dialects are more ethnologically rooted than religiously. 
However, to distinguish the Bahraini dialects as opposed to Bahrani dialect 
from the more general term ‘Bahraini dialect’ that covers all the Arabic local 
dialects in Bahrain, I call the latter the ‘Bahrain dialect’, and call the two 
main branches the ‘Bahraini dialect’, or BHD, and ‘Bahrani dialects’ to make 
it easier to understand to which I am referring. There is, for example, a 
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considerable number of Shiite Bahraini people, more particularly in 
Muharraq city, who are known as Banānī and Ḥiyāyīch26 (or Ḥiyyāch) and 
who speak Bahraini with a Muharraqi accent exactly as the Sunni Bahrainis 
in that city do. So they are Bahrani and Shiite but do not speak Bahrani. 
Apart from this, there are many individuals whose dialects do not refer to 
their religious sect affiliations, such as some Bahranis who converted to 
Sunnism, and other Bahranis who chose to speak in Bahraini dialect without 
changing their religious affiliation. Additionally, Shiite people of Iranian 
origins, known as ʿAjam, pl. of ʿIjmī, speak the dialect of Arabic that is 
spoken in their neighbourhood, whether it is Bahrani or Bahraini. On the 
other hand, the Huwala of Bahrain who speak Arabic do so only in Bahraini 
and never Bahrani.27 Each of the Bahrani and the BHDs has a varying 
spectrum of dialects, especially the Bahrani dialects. In this section, 
however, and for the purpose of providing a general insight, I discuss only 
the most common dialects which, as Bahraini society gets more and more 
intertwined, tend to move towards dropping words that are very specific to 
one particular dialect and adapting the more popular ones. 
Al-Qouz (2009) carried out a trend study of Arabic in Bahrain. In 
trend studies, ‘comparable but different samples of individuals are 
questioned at two or more points in time’ (Weston & Ruggiero 1978: 133). 
Holes (1995: 275) mentions that an ‘inter-communal’ dialect has emerged as 
a result of constant contact between the Shiite and the Sunni speakers in 
Bahrain in the capital city, Manama. He explains that this dialect ‘seems to 
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have acquired the role of a neutral standard for both Sunni and Shia 
speakers, both in out-group contexts and contexts of public speech’ (ibid.). 
Al-Qouz (2009) builds on this finding and discusses whether this inter-
communal dialect has had any permanent effects on the dialects of the Shiite 
and Sunni youth of Manama. She detects five linguistic variables: sect, age, 
socio-economic class, type of schooling and gender (ibid.: 83). When the 
researcher asked her Shiite informants why they spoke ‘Sunni’ very well, 
they replied that it was only ‘ordinary Bahraini (Arabic)’ (ibid.: 286). This 
view of what is classified by many researchers as Sunni dialect as ‘ordinary’ 
is interesting and worth considering, but it is beyond the scope of my 
research to examine this matter in detail. However, it can instantly provide a 
glimpse into a standardisation tendency of Bahraini dialect, at least by the 
youth of Manama.  
 
2.3.2.3 Borrowed vocabulary in Bahrain dialects 
The Gulf region in general and Bahrain in particular have been very open to 
and interactive with other cultures. Bahrain’s central location has made it 
very cosmopolitan. This interaction has affected some local words, and many 
borrowed words have become part of the Bahrain dialect. The words have 
been adapted and become so familiar in Bahrain dialect that most speakers 
do not even realise their origins, despite their being very different from the 
equivalent SA word. Some examples of such borrowed words are: jūtī 
42 
 
(meaning shoe, borrowed from Hindi), bānka (meaning fan, borrowed from 
pānka, which is Persian), badqīr (which is a construction in traditional Gulf 
coastal houses that allow cold breezes into the house, borrowed from 
Persian; the original word is badqīr), dirīsha (from Hindi, meaning window), 
kashma (meaning glasses from the Hindi word chushma). There are also 
many words in the local dialects that have been borrowed from English, 
especially ones related to driving, mechanics and equipment. Some examples 
of very popular words related to driving are signair (meaning indicator lights 
of the car from the word signal), rāmsaid, (meaning ‘wrong side’ if a road is 
one-way), and raiwas (from reverse). Some examples of tools and equipment 
are ispāna (from spanner) and skidraiwal (from screw driver). 
Besides, there are some words that are not only pronounced with a 
distinct dialect, but are also very different from their equivalents in SA. Such 
words may be also borrowed from other languages and adapted into 
everyday language like the ones above. However, so far, there does not seem 
to be a known source for those in Table 3 and I would categorise them 
separately as local dialect words. 
 
Table 3: Bahraini words that differ from their classical equivalents 
Standard Arabic Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
mādha waish shinow what 
ḥalaq ḥalag tirchiyyah earrings 
qiṭṭ sannūr qatow cat 
sijjadah zūliyyah zūliyyah carpet 
yatadhammar yitḥalṭam yitḥalṭam (he is) whining 
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2.3.2.4 Bahrain dialects and standard Arabic 
Apart from distinct words, there are also phonological differences. The 
strongest distinction between the two Bahraini and Bahrani dialects lies in 
intonation patterns. Additionally, many vowels are pronounced noticeably 
differently in the two major dialects in Bahrain. I shall not present details 
here, first, for reasons of space, and secondly because my data is written 
texts without any intonation or vowel variations marked. For a recent 
detailed account of the differences between dialects and the changes at both 
lexical and phonological levels in Manama, see Al-Qouz (2009).  
In this section, nevertheless, I provide only an illustration of the other 
differences between the two major dialects, the different pronunciations of 
consonants between Bahraini and Bahrani dialects. There are consonants 
that are pronounced differently from how they are pronounced in SA, either 
in one of the two BHDs or in both. Although a consonant can come at the 
beginning, middle or end of a word, I give examples only of consonants at 
the beginning of words in order to make it easier to identify the consonant 
and compare the pronunciations. 
 
A main shift in all BHDs is altering the ḍ ض sound with a ẓ ظ. This alteration 
is common in several Arabic dialects. The former is the most complex 
phoneme in Arabic, being pronounced with one side of the tongue, either 
left or right, placed against the edges of the upper teeth. This is why in many 
Arabic dialects it is either replaced with the phoneme ẓ, which is 
44 
 
pronounced from the tip of the tongue touching the edge of the upper front 
teeth. Some examples are given in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Pronunciation of ḍ in Bahrain dialects 
Standard Arabic Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
ḍuḥā ẓaḥah ẓaḥah late morning  
ḍabāb ẓabāb ẓabāb fog 
ḍaym ẓeim ẓeim guest 
 
In addition, in many cases, but not all, k is pronounced as ch in BHDs. There 
are times when this is done in Bahrani but not as frequently as in Bahraini 
dialect, as shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Pronunciation of k in Bahrain dialects with alteration 
Standard Arabic Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
kam cham cham how much/many 
kabid chibid chabid liver 
kilāb klāb chlāb dogs 
 
However, this is not done in all words. Some examples of k pronounced 
without alteration are presented in Table 6. I cannot find any particular 








Table 6: Pronunciation of k without alteration in Bahrain dialects 
Standard Arabic Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
kitāb ktāb ktāb book 
kalām kalām kalām speech 
kursīy kursīy kirsaeiy chair 
 
Also, the Bahrani dialect makes changes to certain phonemes: d and dh are 
both pronounced as d, while the th and f are pronounced as f. In Bahraini, 
these consonants are pronounced as they are in standard Arabic (SA). Some 
examples of this alteration are listed in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Pronunciation of th and dh in Bahrain dialects 
Standard Arabic Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
 th into f th without alteration  
thalātah malāmeh thalāteh three 
thūm mūm thūm garlic 
 dh into d dh without alteration  
dhubābah dubbaneh dhubbāneh a fly 
bathinjān badinjān bathinjān aubergine 
 
It is worth mentioning that merging the th and f is becoming less frequent 
among the Bahrani people, especially the younger generations. There is a 
tendency now to distinguish the two phonemes as th and f. In the study of 
dialect change among the Bahraini youth of Manama, Al-Qouz (2009: 183) 
confirms that the th  f merger has almost been levelled out.  
Additionally, Bahraini dialect changes the j into a y in most words but 
not all, but when it comes to Bahrani speakers, they are divided between 
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those who alter the j to a y and those who do not (e.g. Bahrani people from 
Duraz, Daih and Ras Rumman areas in Bahrain make the alteration). Some 
examples are provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Pronunciation of j in Bahrain dialects 
Standard Arabic Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
rajul rajjāl rayyāl man 
jamal jamal yimal camel 
jāb jāb yāb (he) brought 
 
Another difference in the pronunciation of consonants is that of the sound q 
 in Bahraini dialect, this sound is changed into a j in some words and into .ق
a q in others. In Bahrani dialect, however, it is changed only to q and never 
to j (see Table 9). In SA, the g sound does not exist; hence the alteration of q 
to a g does not create any confusion for listeners who are familiar only with 
other Arabic dialects. 
 
Table 9: Pronunciation of q in Bahrain dialects 
Standard Arabic Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
 q into g q into g   
qamar gamar gumar moon 
qumm gūm gūm get up 
qaraṣ garaṣ giraṣ (it) stung 
 q into g q into j  
qalʿah galʿah jalʿeh castle 
qalīl galīl jilīl28 little/ few 




Besides, it is very common in Bahraini dialect to change the gh sound to g 
(see Table 10). However, in SA, g and gh sounds are two distinct phonemes 
and replacing one with another is very likely to change the meaning of the 
word. For example, qarīb means a relative or nearby, while gharīb means a 
stranger. The verb qafala means (he) locked, while the verb ghafala means 
(he) became unwary. The local interlocutors depend on the context to 
distinguish the minimal pairs in such situations. 
 
Table 10: Pronunciation gh as q 
Standard 
Arabic 
Bahrani Arabic Bahraini Arabic English 
    gh without alteration         gh into q  
ghubār ghbār qbār dust 
ghuyūm ghyūm qyūm clouds 
ghīrah ghīrah qīrah jealousy 
 
The distinct pronunciations presented above show that Bahraini 
interlocutors convey their ethnic and – often though not always – their 
sectarian affiliation through dialectal differences, which are more distinct 
than mere vowel pronunciation variations. The research is interested in 
finding out if there are more discursive differences that can be related to 
sectarian ideological differences (see research hypothesis and goals in 




2.3.3 Sectarian political conflicts in Bahrain 
Bahrain is an ancient settlement. It has been open to trade and functioned as 
a connection point between the east and the rest of the old world. The 
family of Al Kahlifa, the current ruling family and a branch of Bani Utbah 
tribe, entered Bahrain in 1783 and the first ruler was Ahmed bin 
Mohammed Al Khalifa. Before Al Khalifa, Bahrain was ruled by different 
reigns and states, many of whom where Arabs and some Holīs; sometimes 
Bahrain was under Persian rule and at other times under Portuguese forces. 
The vast majority of the citizens in Bahrain are Muslims, divided 
between Sunnis and Shiites. Almost all of Shiites in Bahrain are Twelvers 
(more on Twelvers and Shiaism ideology in  2.2.3), and this includes the 
Arab Bahraini Shiite (Bahranis) and the Iranian Bahraini Shiites (ʿAjam). 
There are controversial publications and articles about which sect, that is, 
Shiite or Sunni, is more ancient in Bahrain and this conflict in history has a 
role in the present sectarian political conflicts; the sectarian division is seen 
not only as a split in belief but also as an indicator of intrusion (the Shiites 
seeing Sunnis as intruders and themselves as indigenous residents and vice 
versa, the Sunnis seeing the Shiites as intruders.) Of course, the need to 
claim to be more ancient is often urged by competition over jobs, land, and, 
most importantly, authority. Bahrain is a small country, with an area not 
exceeding 665 square kilometres and a rapidly growing population that 
currently exceeds one million (51% nationals, 49% non-nationals). This 
means that the population density has exceeded 1,500 people per square 
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kilometre. The actual density is higher since the southern part has no 
residential areas. Although this is not the generator of the sectarian conflict, 
it is worth bearing in mind as a crucial part of the context of this conflict. 
The ancient and complex demographic composition of Bahrain helped 
different ethnic and religious groups live together with minimum conflicts 
for a long time. The political movements in Bahrain varied in their nature, 
some were linked to Arab nationalism, others defined themselves as leftists, 
Bahrain also witnessed a wave of communism, and some Islamic movements. 
The Sunni Islamic movement known as, or at least resembling, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, was probably the first organised modern Islamic movement in 
Bahrain. It started in the 1950s, and at that time, the movement was not 
much welcomed by the government, and some restrictions were placed on 
them. Islamic political participation, like any political participation, was 
seized and limited for long periods, and consequently, the Sunni Islamic 
organisations were forced to limit their activity to charitable work. Any 
interest in politics rapidly diminished among most of Sunnis, while it grew 
gradually stronger among Shiites. 
The Shiite Iranian Revolution in 1979 was received with great pride 
among Shiites worldwide (S. V. R. Nasr 2007: 138) and this was true in 
Bahrain as well. Nasr (ibid.) describes it as follows: 
 
The revolution … awakened the Shia. They became bolder in their 
demands for rights and representation, secure in the belief that 
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Khomaini would support them and that they had a model for political 
activism which would succeed in challenging authority.  
 
Following the Iranian Revolution, Shiite politics ‘began to stir’ in many 
countries in the Middle East, among which was Bahrain (ibid.: 139). Nasr 
explains that 
 
Shias started to abandon Arab nationalism or leftist ideologies to join 
the ranks of avowedly Shia political movements — many of which 
received financial and political support from Tehran — in order to 
push for specifically Shia agendas (ibid.). 
 
Nasr mentions the Al Wefaq Party of Bahrain among the movements that are 
supported by Tehran (ibid.); but the Al Wefaq Party itself denies being 
connected with Tehran. Nasr notes that ‘Shia demonstrations, riots, and 
violent clashes with ruling regimes occurred in various parts of the Middle 
East’ among which was ‘a failed coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981’ (ibid.) by 
an Iranian organisation known as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain, which tried to overthrow the government and assassinate the then 
ruler, Shaikh Essa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the father of the current King. The 
attempt was detected and stopped. However, the Islamic Front carried out a 
series of bomb attacks in Bahrain. Several riots, sit-ins, demonstrations and 
strikes were carried out by Shiites, almost exclusively Bahrainis (Arab 
Shiite), not ʿAjam Shiite. In the same decade (i.e. the 1980s), a petition was 
signed by a group of Shiites, Sunnis and other nationalists demanding 
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reforms and more democracy in Bahrain. This, however, led to the arrest of 
several Shiite and Sunni clerics.  
The country witnessed a quiet and peaceful period after that, but still 
with limited freedom of speech, until the events of the 1990s raised some 
tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Bahrain, creating a feeling of distrust. 
In 1995 in particular, wide disturbances and demonstrations, and the 
vandalism of both private and government properties took place. The 
participants in the upheavals were then only Shiite revolutionists; they 
carried the flag and symbol of Hezbollah in their demonstrations and sit-ins. 
However, Nasr considers their actions as a call for political reform that the 
government of Bahrain labelled as ‘Shi’a plots’ (ibid.: 156). The movement 
demanded the overthrow of the government, and the ruling family and was 
strongly associated with Tehran through slogans, banners and expressions 
related to Hezbollah’s and Iran’s religious leaders. Many were arrested and 
some leading Shiite and liberal figures were deported. The arrests did not 
last long, as the Emir pardoned the detainees after petitions and requests 
were addressed to him by the detainees and their families. 
Up to then, many Shiites had felt that the government, being a Sunni 
government itself, favoured Sunnis. At the same time, many Sunnis had felt 
that the government took them for granted and thus ignored them and their 
problems and concentrated on satisfying Shiites on the one hand and the 
international media and powers on the other. Several Sunnis who spoke up 
were arrested and prosecuted as traitors. Citizens showed extreme caution 
52 
 
regarding what they said in relation to government and people in power, 
even in social gatherings and in the media. However, a dramatic shift 
toward democracy came when Shaikh Hamad bin Essa Al Khalifa became 
the ruler after his father’s death in 1999. Rapid reform has taken place since, 
starting with the release and pardon of all political prisoners, allowing 
deported ones to return, and giving more freedom of speech to the media, 
politicians and the public. Another major step has been establishing the 
Bahraini Parliament and running free elections that were monitored by local 
and international NGOs. However, some did not see the latest reforms as 
sufficient and considered them as failing to address their demands. While 
most Sunnis, even the previously anti-government ones, perceived the 
changes positively as a right step in the right direction, many Shiite political 
parties did not.  
The establishment of the Bahraini Parliament has created a new level 
of tension, more of a competition, between the Shiites and the Sunnis at the 
political level. While the conflict in the 1990s was more between the Shiite 
movements and the government, with the Sunni citizens caught in the 
middle with no political representatives, the Parliament created a new 
interface between political powers. The Sunnis have gained a political voice 
and position, but they have started to be viewed by the Shiite movements as 
a ‘pro-government’ movement, creating a new battle front for the Shiite 
movements. This has been the case despite the fact that the Sunni parties do 
not classify themselves as such, but on the contrary, find themselves 
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independent from and at certain levels and in certain issues in opposition to 
the government. Since the parliamentary experience started, both sides have 
put much effort into proving how the other side is ‘wrong’ and not to be 
trusted with political governance.  
 
2.3.4 The Bahraini Parliament 
2.3.4.1 Establishment of the current parliament in Bahrain 
On 6 December 1973, the late Amir Shaikh Essa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the 
ruler of Bahrain, ratified the Constitution of the State of Bahrain, which 
stipulated the setting up of the National Council (Council of Representatives 
2007: 9). The following day witnessed the first elections in the country, and 
the number of voters was 27,000 (ibid.: 10). However, the National Council 
was dissolved on 26 August 1975 by the Amiri Decree No. (14) of 1975 
(ibid.: 11). This was due to conflicts and tension growing between the 
government and a number of the members of the National Council (Ismaʿīl 
2005: 70). 
On 20 December 1992, the late Amir Shaikh Essa bin Salman Al 
Khalifa issued Amiri Decree No. 9 of 1992, under which the Shura Council 
(i.e. Consultative Council) was established. This council ‘serves as an 
advisory body to assist the Government in achieving the National goals’ 
(Council of Representatives 2007: 12). In November 2000, King Hamad bin 
Essa Al Khalifa, who succeeded his father the late Amir Shaikh Essa bin 
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Salman Al Khalifa, issued a plan to establish the National Action Charter. A 
referendum, which was included in the charter, took place on 14 and 15 
February 2001 and 98.4% of voters voted in favour of this charter (ibid.: 
14). On 14 February the following year, the King approved amendments to 
the constitution, by which the name of the country was changed from the 
State of Bahrain to the Kingdom of Bahrain, and his title was changed from 
the Amir to the King of Bahrain (ibid.: 15). 
Then, on 14 February 2002, a constitutional amendment was made, 
as a result of which the Shura Council became one of two constitutional 
authorities in Bahrain alongside the House of Parliament (or the Council of 
Representatives) (ibid.: 12) and these two councils came to represent the 
legislative power in the kingdom29 (ibid.: 22). These two councils are 
respectively parallel to the Upper House or House of Lords and the Lower 
House or the House of Commons that together form the UK Parliament. 
The Shura Council and the Council of Representatives are each 
formed of 40 members. While the members of the former are appointed by 
the King himself, the members of the latter are elected by citizens in general 
elections (ibid.: 22) by which the public choose their representatives. The 
Bahraini Council of Representatives consists of five permanent committees: 
(a) Legal Affairs and Legislation Committee, (b) Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
National Security Committee, (c) Legal and Legislative Affairs Committee, 
(d) Services Committee and (d) Public Utilities and Services Committee. In 
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addition, occasional temporary committees are set up to handle specific 
issues and investigations.  
 
2.3.4.2 Islamic identity of the Bahraini Council of Representatives  
As in many other Muslim-majority countries, Islamic identity is an affirmed 
feature of Bahrain’s national character. The National Action Charter (see 
above in  2.3.4.1) states in Chapter 2, under the Government System, Article 
3: ‘Islamic Shari’a and legalisation: Islam is the religion of the state. Islamic 
Shari’a is the principal source of legislation’ (National Action Charter of 
Bahrain 2001: 20). Islamic identity is openly declared as the religious 
identity of the country, although in many ways, the legal system shares more 
aspects with secularism than with Islamic systems. The democratic 
movement in Bahrain witnessed a major transformation when the Bahraini 
Parliament was established in 2002. Among the four political parties that 
successfully secured places in the second legislative session in 2006 were 
three that declare themselves to be Islamic parties: Al Minbar and Al Asalah 
(both Sunni parties), and Al Wefaq (a Shiite party). The Sunni parties won 
15 seats and the Shiite 14, something that meant that 80 per cent of the 
seats were won by Islamic parties. 
The Council holds weekly sittings every Tuesday, and occasionally, 
when required, additional sittings are held and these are called extensional 
sittings. An agenda of each sitting is set to the MPs in advance and the 
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Council is expected to follow the agenda and any other topics should be 
proposed for following meetings. The debates held in the sittings of the 
Council are recorded and documented. The printed document that records 
the speeches and conversations at each meeting of the Council of 
Representatives is called ‘Hansard’. 
 
2.3.4.3 Procedure for producing Hansard 
The procedure followed in transcribing and documenting the parliamentary 
sittings uses the system employed in the Shura Council, which was 
established in 1992. I interviewed Mr Hamad Mohammed Al-Hadhrami, the 
Director of Committees Affairs,30 Bahraini Council of Representatives, in 
order to understand the procedure. Al-Hadhrami (2009) explained the ten 
steps carried out in documenting the parliamentary sittings. 
 SA is the official language. Hansard aims to maintain accurate 
records of the points raised and of debates in the sittings held in the 
Bahraini Council of Representatives. The debates and speeches are mostly 
written in SA. As some of the speeches in the Council of Representatives are 
spontaneous, the order of the words in Hansard may sometimes have to be 
changed without changing the meaning and content in order to make the 
phrase more understandable. This is because those who attend the meeting 
may understand the original wording but people who read Hansard later on 
may find some of the language incomprehensible. Sometimes, there are 
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colloquial words or expressions that have no suitable equivalent in SA, and 
at other times, there are colloquial or vernacular expressions or phrases for 
which the standard equivalent does not carry the corresponding social 
meaning; such cases are noted down between parentheses as they were 
uttered. At the beginning, the Directorate of Committee Affairs strived to 
avoid colloquialisms in Hansard, but in order to maintain an accurate record 
of the actual speeches and debates, they began recording many words just as 
they were uttered, including English words, and Hansard has been moving 
closer to the wording used by the speakers. 
A sitting is documented in the format of Hansard in ten steps, as 
follows: 
 
1. An audio and video record of each sitting is made, and each of 
these recorded sittings is divided into 15-minute clips. 
2. A technician receives the 15-minute clips, follows the audio and 
video clips on a computer and transcribes the dialogue in SA.  
3. The technician hands the text to the ‘editor of Hansard’, who holds 
at least a bachelor’s degree. The editor verifies that the typed text 
matches the audio version, checks that each section or dialogue is 
tagged with the name of the correct person, and revises language 
mistakes (diction, grammar and style). 
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4. A third member of staff, known as the ‘corrector’, revises the text 
once more without referring to the audio recording. This person 
has a high degree of proficiency in Arabic. 
 
The four steps above are accomplished on the day of the sitting, and these 
steps often continue until nightfall; if a sitting takes longer than usual, the 
above work is carried out on the following day. 
  
5.  Assembly: clips are then collected and integrated into a single 
text, and an index of speakers is added. Any reports that were 
mentioned or referred to in the sitting are saved on a CD that is 
attached to the printed text. These attachments are also made 
available in the Office of the General Secretary of the Parliament 
and on the website of the Parliament. 
6.  Five or six copies of Hansard are printed out, and they are 
distributed to the President of the Parliament, the General 
Secretary, the Assistant to the General Secretary for Committees 
and Sittings, and the Director of the Sittings, and one or two 
copies are shared by the Head of Hansard, Hansard Supervisor 
and some editors (the senior and most qualified ones).  
7. Twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the distribution of copies, 
they are collected from the parties mentioned above, and checked 
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for any amendments or alterations that might need to be made. 
Then a copy of the amended Hansard is given to each MP. 
8. In the following sitting, the second item on the agenda is ‘the 
ratification of Hansard’. MPs can request further amendments or 
corrections and vote on them. 
9. The final revised version of an amendment is then passed to the 
General Secretary and the President of the Parliament for 
signature and formal adoption.  
10. A certified copy of Hansard is sent to the Official Gazette.  
 
Hansard is saved electronically and a final version is printed and kept in the 
Parliamentary Library, and at the end of each legislative period of 
Parliament (four years), volumes and CDs are issued for the whole period. 
The full volume is saved on encrypted sites to prevent it from being 
penetrated or changed. 
According to Mr Khalid Abdullah Ebrahim (Ebrahim 2009), Head of 
Hansard and Meetings, when an MP is speaking, his or her speech is given 
priority, and any marginal comments made by other MPs that do not affect 
the meaning or the direction of the speech, such as laughter and 
interjections, are normally not recorded. He explained that the same is true 
for extraneous expressions or comments by the MP delivering a speech in his 
or her turn, such as humorous comments or those of an extremely rude 
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nature, and Bahraini expressions and idioms that do not affect the purpose 
or the meaning of the speech. He also explained that grammatical mistakes 
by the speakers are corrected. Ebrahim does not approve of this editing and 
explains that this rephrasing system delivers the message in detail but 
reduces the individual aspects of the speeches or conversation, especially 
personality and language competence that should be reflected in the records. 
Apparently, however, the transcription procedure is moving toward less 
editing and Hansard is becoming more reflective of the actual speech. 
 
2.4 Power and Identity 
2.4.1 The Concept of Power 
Joseph explains that although in everyday life the term ‘politics’ is used in 
association with ‘what politicians do [and with] affairs of the state’ (2006a: 
2, emphasis in original), there is a still broader usage of the word in 
vernacular phrases. He explains that the word ‘politics’ is used in both its 
‘narrow and broad sense,’ whereas the broader sense includes any situation 
in which unequal powers interact (ibid.: 3). Kramarae, Schulz and O’Barr 
(1984: 10–11) choose to distinguish between the two terms ‘politics’ and 
‘power’, considering the former to be etymologically associated with state or 
government and using power as a more inclusive term. Wrong (1979: 21) 
presents the definition of power as being ‘the capacity of some persons to 
produce intended and foreseen effects on others’. However, I query whether 
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the effects can be limited to those intended, and I suggest that the scope be 
widened to include ‘unintended’ effects under the definition of power, 
particularly in language issues.  
Fairclough (1989: 1–2) explains that ‘sociolinguistic conventions have 
a dual relation to power: on the one hand they incorporate differences of 
power, on the other hand they arise out of – and give rise to – particular 
relations of power.’ He defines the relationship between power and language 
by linking the two to ideology: ‘the exercise of power, in modern society, is 
increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the 
ideological workings of language’ (ibid.: 2). Fairclough (ibid.: 33) explains 
that the people who have power exercise it and maintain it by either 
physical coercion or by winning others’ consent, the latter being exercised 
through language, which is the power form that concerns this research. 
Fairclough emphasises that ‘[p]ower relations are always relations of 
struggle’ (ibid.: 34, emphasis in original). 
 
2.4.2 Power, Ideology and Language 
Along the lines of the theories of discourse and power articulated by 
Foucault’s The Order of Things In this thesis (1970), ‘power’ is perceived as ‘a 
systematic and constitutive element/characteristic of society’ (Wodak & 
Meyer 2009: 9), which is the stand taken by CDA (see Section 3.4.1 for more 
on CDA in). The common-sense usage of the notion of ideology ‘is generally 
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pejorative’ (van Dijk 1998: 1). This is because the traditional approaches to 
ideologies viewed them as false beliefs that others have and that are used to 
deceive. Ideology in these approaches was associated with dominance and 
power (ibid.: 2). Van Dijk explains that ‘contemporary versions of the 
Marxist idea of the combined socio-economic and symbolic power of elite 
groups’ continue to be applied by many approaches (ibid.: 3). He asserts that 
the concept of ideology started to become less pejorative in the second part 
of the twentieth century; it began to be defined as ‘political or social systems 
of ideas, values or prescriptions of groups or other collectivities, [that] have 
the function of organizing or legitimating the actions of the group’ (ibid.: 3). 
Van Dijk sees ideology as best understood in the ‘conceptual and disciplinary 
triangle that relates cognition, society and discourse’ (ibid.: 5, emphasis in 
original). He (ibid: 6) asserts that ‘although discourses are not the only 
ideologically based social practices, they certainly are the most crucial ones 
in the formation of ideologies in their social reproduction.’ He adds that 
participants in discourses are not only listeners and speakers or writers and 
readers, but also ‘social actors who are members of groups and cultures’ and 
that ‘[d]iscourse rules and norms are socially shared’ (ibid.). Accordingly, 
Van Dijk views ideology as ‘the basis of the group shared social and mental 
representations (ibid.: 8 & 10). He emphasises that ideologies are not only 
an instrument of dominance, as ‘there are also ideologies of opposition or 
resistance, or ideologies of competition between equally powerful groups, or 
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ideologies that only promote the internal cohesion of a group, or ideologies 
about the survival of humankind’ (ibid.: 11). 
Fairclough (1989) explains how power, ideology and language are 
linked. What he terms a ‘social group’ is what in this research is viewed as a 
political group, since I have chosen to expand the sphere of the term 
‘politics’ to include all forms of interaction among unequal powers. The 
explanation summarised below can also be applied precisely to politics in 
the narrow sense, which is meant to be used in this research for the 
interactions in sittings of the Bahraini Council of Representatives being 
observed. Stressing the role of discourse in politics, Chadwick maintains that 
(a) ‘politics is a linguistic practice,’ and that (b) including related discourses 
is essential to understand any political practice (2000: 288–9). As for the 
role of language in politics, Bayley explains that ‘the activities of a 
politician… are all fundamentally linguistic activities’ (2004: 8). Politics, 
thus, is a linguistic art, and political struggles are discursive struggles, a 
struggle among ideologies. Fairclough (1989: 84) explains that common 
sense is, to a large extent, ideological. He asserts that:  
 
Ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible. If one 
becomes aware that a particular aspect of common sense is sustaining 
power inequalities at one’s own expense, it ceases to be common 
sense, and may cease to have the capacity to sustain power 





Fairclough explains that the diversity in ideologies results from ‘the 
differences in position, experience and interests,’ something which in turn 
creates ‘ideological conflicts … in terms of power’ (ibid.: 88). He stresses 
that ‘ideological struggle pre-eminently takes place in language’ and explains 
the relationship between ideological struggle and language as follows:  
 
The struggle over language can manifest itself as a struggle between 
ideological diverse discourse types, … [i.e. diverse] conventions, 
norms, codes of practice underlying actual discourse. …What is at 
stake is the establishment or maintenance of one type as the dominant 
one in a given social domain, and therefore the establishment or 
maintenance of certain ideological assumptions as commonsensical 
(ibid.: 90, emphasis in original). 
 
Ideology, thus, is embodied through language, and in this process, conflicts 
and struggle between ideologies arise. Ideologies, however, are activated by 
people who feel related to them, or in other words, by people who ‘identify’ 
with them.  
 
2.4.3 Identity  
Castells asserts that identity involves a ‘process of self-definition from the 
point of view of actor’ and he argues that identities can sometimes be 
defined by dominant institutions, but they are not considered identities 
unless the defined group ‘internalise’ them and accept them to define their 
social meanings (1997: 7). Castells defines his use of the term ‘meaning’ in 
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the context of identity as ‘the symbolic identification by a social actor of the 
purpose of her/his action’ and proposes that ‘in the network society, … for 
most social actors, meaning is organized around a primary identity (that is 
an identity that frames the others), that is self-sustaining across time and 
space’ (ibid). However, I do not entirely agree with the last phrase — ‘that is 
self-sustaining across time and space’ — as it pushes into the background the 
way an actor’s primary identity is prone to change across time and space, 
though often arduously and minimally. Also, which identity is pushed 
forward as the primary one in a certain context is neither consistent in 
different circumstances nor throughout one’s life. I do agree that a primary 
identity essentially retains most of its main and distinguishing 
characteristics, some of which are more strongly projected than others at 
certain times and stages of life, and that primary identity is in interaction 
with the other dominant characteristics of the other identities, but this does 
not prevent change. Greatbatch and Dingwall (1998: 131) maintain that 
identities produced in a talk are not maintained throughout a talk, and 
participants in ‘talk-in-interaction’ change the identities ‘even within a single 
turn at talk.’  
Many sociolinguists and sociologists agree that identities are 
constructed (cf. Joseph 2004: 6, Castells 1997: 6–7). Bruter (2005: 15) 
maintains that ‘the emergence of a new identity’ does not conflict with ‘pre-
existing components’ of an individual identity. According to Bruter (ibid.: 
10–11), sociolinguists distinguish two types of identities: personal (some also 
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call this individual, e.g. Joseph 2004 and Castells 1997) and social (also 
called group identity, e.g. Joseph 2004). Bruter (ibid.) describes the personal 
identity as ‘inductive’, ‘affective’, ‘centred on the individual and extending 
towards the rest of the world’, an identity that is made up of networks 
within families and people who share one’s cultural upbringing. As for social 
identity, he (ibid.: 10) describes it as deductive, based on ‘a set of references 
to pre-existing social groups, feelings of belonging to characteristics that 
“make a difference” in the society in which the individual lives.’ However, 
terming the two groups as ‘personal’ versus ‘social’ may be misleading, as 
one’s personal identity is a social construction, and accordingly, the term 
‘group’ identity instead of social identity may be more appropriate. Joseph 
(2004: 37) mentions two opposite but interlinked ways in which identity can 
be recognised: ‘identity-as-sameness is principally recognised through 
contact with what is different, while identity-as-uniqueness is established 
largely through the intersection of identity-as-sameness categories.’ To a 
certain extent these two ways match the definitions of group identity and 
individual identity respectively.  
For many sociologists, political identities come under group identities 
as an ‘extension’ of these; however, Bruter does not agree with this and 
argues that political identities are distinct identities by themselves, despite 
having characteristics of both personal and social identities at the same time. 
Political identities are affective like personal identities, while, at the same 
time, they have feelings of belonging to a pre-existing group like social 
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identities (2005.: 10). Bruter (ibid.: 11) accordingly distinguishes between 
two hypothesised components of political identities: he labels the personal 
aspects of them as ‘civic’, and the social (or group) ones as ‘cultural’. He 
explains that a cultural perspective would measure ‘the sense of belonging a 
citizen feels towards a particular political group,’ while the civic perspective 
would measure ‘the identification of citizens with a political structure, such 
as a State, which can be defined as the set of institutions, rights, and rules 
that preside over the political life of a community’ (ibid.: 12). Bruter, 
nevertheless, asserts that, usually, the cultural and civic components of 
political identities are ‘almost impossible … to distinguish, because in many 
cases, the dominant “State” and “Nation” of reference are super-imposed’ 
(ibid.: 12–13). As an explanatory example of this, he points out that most 
Scots consider themselves to have a dual identity: Scottish/British, while for 
most English people, Englishness and Britishness are considered to be similar 
(ibid.).  
In his study of European mass identity as a national and political 
identity, Bruter (2005: 4–5) recommends that a researcher in the field of 
identity take on one of two ‘perspectives’: he defines the first as a ‘top-down’ 
model, which basically asks who should be considered in the identity in 
question ‘in terms of geography, politics, culture, and what the natural limits 
of “European” [or the identity in question] are.’ The second model is ‘bottom 
up’, which appears to conform more to the folkloristic study of language, 
taking into account who feels they belong to that identity. The first model is 
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of a more cultural nature while the second is of a more civic nature, and the 
choice between them is recommended to be made according to the nature, 
questions and purpose of the research (Bruter 2003 cited in ibid.). The 
‘bottom-up’ approach, as in Anderson’s imagined communities (1983), 
conforms to the theories of identification, where there is no identity unless 
an individual thinks of himself or herself as part of that identity; while the 
‘top-down’ approach, which in turn conforms to ‘identity-recognition’ 
theory, assumes that there are pre-exiting identities with certain 
characteristics and in which an individual ‘recognises’ his or her relevance 
(Bruter 2003: 13–14).  
Identities seem to have ‘elastic’ boundaries, which are significantly 
affected when new mass identities emerge. Considering the role of the 
emergence of American identity in establishing the American States as an 
example, Bruter (2005: 4) asserts that, historically, such a success is due to 
the emergence of ‘common ideals, common interests, and a set of favourable 
political circumstances.’ These may also describe the mutual grounds of 
many other mass identities, such as religious and sectarian mass identity.  
Van Dijk (1998: 118) explains that when a group ideology is formed, 
this ideology in turn forms the group identity. He explains that self-
representation ‘is a gradually constructed abstraction from personal 
experiences (models) of events’ and that part of this self-representation is 
‘inferred’ from how others treat us or what they say about us (ibid.). 




a reference to a person’s social identity is also a reference to their 
membership of a specific category. ... [C]ategory terms may be used 
to invoke activities or other attributes which may be expected or 
considered appropriate for people to whom the category term is 
applied (by themselves or others). Conversely, a description of 
someone’s activities may be used to invoke their category 
membership. 
 
Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995: 53) state that ascription can be a form of 
social control in that once one’s affiliation is assigned; then one’s ‘actions, 
beliefs, opinions,’ etc. are very likely to be expected to conform to what is 
ascribed and believed about that category of that individual, something that 
in turn will ‘provoke a sense of social injustices’ (ibid.). It also is important 
to note that different groups may still not share the same group identities 
even if they have the same social activities, symbols, settings or 
organisations. This is because each group attaches them to totally different 
meanings, and this makes group identity intersubjective in the same way 
personal identity is (van Dijk 1998: 125).  
Muhawi (1996: 56) summarises three different ways of looking at 
identities from three different perspectives: (a) in the fields of anthropology 
and sociology, the terms ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation states’ are often used; (b) 
core linguistics and sociolinguistics use ‘speech community’, and this term is 
similar but not identical to the term ‘performance’ presented by Barth (1969 
cited in Muhawi, ibid.); and (c) the third field is that of folkloristics, who use 
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‘folk groups’. Muhawi (1996: 56) points out that these ways of defining 
identity are not identical but ‘interdependent’. By checking Muhawi’s 
definition against Bruter’s dichotomies, it is clear that Muhawi’s 
categorisation is based on a group (or cultural) perspective rather than on a 
personal (or civic) one. It is worth noting that the boundaries of these 
different definitions given by Muhawi are not rigid. For instance, one may 
be associated with a certain ethnic group from a certain perspective and 
then reassigned to another, depending on which characteristics (often 
stereotypical ones) are intended to be projected. As with speech 
communities, bilinguals or multilinguals can, for example, choose not to 
speak one of the languages or can shift from one language to another in the 
social network. An example of this can be the many Holī families resident in 
Bahrain whose inter-group language used among family and close friends 
was Holī; they then shifted to Arabic and limited the use of Holī to 
conversations with older generations who rejected the shift. As for the third 
way of looking at identity, i.e. folk identity, it is very dependent on how 
people as groups evaluate and define themselves and others as groups or 
individuals with certain references. This folkloristic definition of identity is 
affected most by various external factors, whether social, political, regional, 
religious, etc.  
In this thesis, the major perspective of identity that will be built on is 
that of speech community, as a sectarian division is also projected in a 
linguistic division. The Arabic language first unites the whole Bahraini 
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community as one language community, and then dialects subdivide it, and 
accents subdivide it even further. It is difficult, however, to talk about one 
way of defining identity (i.e. as a speech community) without taking the 
other two (as an ethic group and as a folk identity) into consideration and, 
thus, these other two perspectives are continuously and deliberately 
mentioned and discussed whenever appropriate in this research. 
To demonstrate how these three perspectives are entangled, it is 
interesting to consider these two definitions: Corder’s definition of a speech 
community as being ‘made up of people who regard themselves as speaking 
the same language’ (1973: 54, emphasis in original), and Bruter’s definition 
of a citizen’s political identity as ‘his sense of belonging to politically 
relevant human groups and political structures’ (2005: 1). These two 
definitions are heavily based on what people think, i.e. on a more folkloric 
perspective, but again, it is difficult to define a speech community 
objectively. Oakes (2001: 20) considers Corder’s definition to be based on 
socio-psychological factors, which in turn are moulded by socio-political 
factors, such as ethnic identity and nationalism. This relates the matter to 
issues of ethnic identity and nationalism, and it takes us back to the 
ethnological view of identity.  
A given community can be divided into speech communities either on 
the basis of social or geographical variation. If social factors are taken into 
consideration, then subdivisions are known as linguistic varieties. 
Sociolinguistic variation can include, for example, ‘a speaker’s socio-
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economic class, sex, age, ethnic group, etc.’ and these variations, despite 
‘challeng[ing] the homogeneity of a given language … rarely lead to the 
emergence what can be considered as separate languages’ (Oakes 2001: 18). 
As for geographical variation, speech communities are divided by what is 
known as ‘dialects and regional accents.’ However, as Oakes (ibid.: 18–19) 
explains, the term ‘dialect’ is ‘socio-politically loaded’ as it suggests the 
inferiority of certain groups on a linguistic basis. Regional accents are 
another way to divide a speech community geographically, but on a smaller 
scale.  
Regarding the fluidity of social identities, van Dijk (1998: 121) 
explains that: 
 
Just like personal identity, social identities may change. Whereas 
some basic (ideological) principles may remain more or less identical 
over a relatively long period of time, the more specific social 
representations, such as attitudes, may adapt strategically to social 
and political change. 
 
This means that identity is dynamic, making it more of a ‘process’ of 
‘identification’ than a state, while what is relatively stable is the ‘collectivity 
of people’ (ibid.). Van Dijk (ibid.: 123) states that, while ideologies are 
‘limited to the cognitive realm,’ group identities can be characterised by 
collective action, institution rituals, and group-identifying symbols, such as 
uniforms, flags, buildings, and prominent historical events that serve as ‘a 
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collective memory.’ These are rather an ‘expression or enactment’ of the 
ideologies (ibid. 26, my emphasis). He explains that by extending the notion 
of group identity to elements, it becomes ‘as comprehensive and vague as 
that of culture.’ All this makes group identity ‘a very fuzzy notion’ that has 
both strict and broad perspectives (ibid.: 124). As for discourse, it plays a 
role in forming and reproducing group identity at two levels: intergroup 
discourse, such as in meetings and teaching, and intragroup discourse, such 
as when group members present, legitimise or defend themselves (ibid.: 
125).  
In Marxism, ideologies and groups are related to the notion of ‘class’, but 
in present-day academic discourse, the notion of groups tends no longer to 
be based on socio-economics (ibid.: 140). ‘Ideologies are acquired, 
confirmed and changed by social actors as members of groups, and as a 
function of the goals and interests of such groups’ (ibid.: 141). Van Dijk 
mentions five criteria of ‘groupness’ or for defining a social group, and 
distinguishes them from social categories. The criteria can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
 A group must have some continuity beyond one event (ibid.). 
 A group has one or more shared problems, concerns or interests, 
which can be (a) objective ones, whether social, political or 
economic, and (b) cognitive or affective ones (ibid. 143). 
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 The members of a group ‘have affective feelings of belonging to the 
group’, or, in other words, ‘they share social representations’. The 
continuity and reproduction of a group is often dependent on 
individual or group acts that are based on the shared social 
representations of the members. This confirms ‘that groups are not 
merely a societal construct, but also constituted mentally through 
shared representations’ (ibid., emphasis in original). 
 A group has ‘a social conflict, struggle or any other kind of interest-
based opposition’ with one or more other groups (ibid.: 145, emphasis 
in original). The shared problems, concerns or interests may make the 
group members become ‘mutually dependent’ and may motivate them 
‘to act collectively to overcome their plight’. With conflicts among 
groups, the dominant one(s) will try to develop an ideology that 
serves to keep it dominant, and it may ‘develop an ideology as a basis 
for its attitudes, opinions, practices and discourses of resistance or 
opposition’ (ibid.: 145). 
 A group has a degree of institutionalisation, and this excludes 
ephemeral social categories, such as socio-biological ones (ethnic 
groups, sex groups, age groups, etc.) or socio-economic ones (the rich 
and the poor, etc.) (ibid.: 156). 
 
In any group, there can always be members who deviate from their ideology, 
which means that the notion of group can ‘sometimes be distinct from its 
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individual members’ (ibid.: 147). This means that ‘groups may have 
attributes that are not necessarily those of (all) their members’ (ibid.). 
However, ‘a group “has” an ideology if most of its members share most of 
the propositions that define such an ideology’ or what can be called ‘the set 
of “essential” or “core” ideological propositions, namely those that are the 
specific, defining or prototypical fundamental beliefs of a group’ (ibid.: 148). 
If, nevertheless, only a small number of members share the core ideological 
propositions, then this results in ideological decline or change (ibid.: 149). 
Still, group members do not necessarily have to be explicitly or consciously 
aware of these ideological properties (ibid.: 150). Additionally, it is not 
enough that the members consider themselves part of a group, but how 
others perceive them also counts (ibid.: 151).  
At the level of the role of institutions in constructing and affecting 
identities, Bruter (2005: 167) construes the following from the results of 
empirical tests he conducted:  
 
When it comes to the formation and evolution of political identities, 
institutions and people both undoubtedly matter. Thanks to the 
combination of experimental and time-serial evidence, it has been 
shown that symbolic campaigns are efficient in stimulating the 
emergence and consolidation of a new political identity. It has been 
underlined that the way we are informed about the outcomes of a 
political project has an influence on our propensity to identify with it. 
It has even been demonstrated clearly that, the very existence, 
survival, and consolidation of a set of political institutions 
participates in the generation of its own identity, that is, to the 
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reaction of civic identification of the citizen under its rule with the 
political community. This, however, should not make us lose sight of 
the subtle interaction that results from institutions trying to influence 
increasingly cynical citizens. 
 
This relation and constant interaction between an institution’s identity and 
the public makes political power a two-way interaction between political 
institutions and the public, with each having a significant effect on the 
other.  
 
An important term in relation to ingrouping and outgrouping is Othering. 
Lévinas (2003: quoted in Zuckemann 2006: 244) explains that othering is 
the status of being the awareness of the Other initiates, by which the identity 
of self is realised, and this consequently leads to empowering oneself with a 
sense of unity with similar religious or national groups. This realisation, 
thus, as many other ideologically group shared model (or semantic 
representation) can be reflected in discursive choices a speaker makes. 
 
2.5 Emotions in Discourse 
2.5.1 Generalities 
Identity (both personal and group), discourse and ideology all include 
feelings and emotions as an essential feature. Political language as other 
language genres can get emotive. Emotions can be revealed in, and even 
suppressed by, language. Religions and cultures also vary in how they 
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perceive and deal with emotions. This makes emotions a mutual theme 
running through identity, discourse, ideology and culture. Emotive speech 
can be a discursive device that either fortifies or weaken an interlocutor’s 
stance. Weigand (2004: 9) maintains that human beings are ‘inevitably 
influenced by emotions.’ Plantin maintains that unlike mood, which is ‘a 
stable, long-lasting disposition … unrelated to an external, definite stimulus,’ 
emotions are ‘passive, secondary to an arbitrary emotion-inducing event, 
provoking an emotional state that fades away more or less quickly’ (2004: 
266). Stamenov explains that the function of emotion is ‘to signal to the 
organism in an unmediated way where it finds itself on the road which leads 
from a desire for some object stimulus to its gratification’ (2004: 180). 
There was an attempt in the 1970s among linguists to deconstruct 
language into ‘simple atomic predicates which were supposed to make up 
the whole meaning’, an attempt that disregarded emotions and individuals. 
This has drastically changed, and terms like ‘individuality, probability, 
principles, and performance have replaced the terms of generality, fixed 
codes, rules, and system’ (Weigand 2004: 3). The study of emotions has gone 
through various stages in different cultures and different scientific fields, 
ranging from total neglect as a non-scientific subject, to it being seen as a 
by-product of human physical activities, and to it being considered as the 
actual motivation of all other cognitive and physical human activities (for a 
succinct account of historical shifts, see Lindholm 2005: 30–38 and White 




2.5.2 Variables affecting emotions 
White (2005: 242) points out that ‘the history of emotion theory is largely 
one of oscillation between binaries of mind–body and nature–culture.’ 
Weigand emphasises that ‘[t]he framework for investigating human 
communicative behaviour … has to include all possible variables, social, 
cultural, personal, which have the power to influence human actions’ (2004: 
7). Different cultures perceive the expression or suppression of feelings 
differently, and this does not exclude what can be considered to be the 
commercially initiated perspective of controlling emotions, which expect, for 
example, the air hostess always to smile and be cheerful regardless of how 
she actually feels. Controlling emotions can involve suppressing the way one 
feels and projecting indifference on the one hand, or forcing an exterior 
expression of another feeling that contradicts one’s actual feeling, on the 
other hand (Lindholm 2005: 38–39). Lindholm (ibid.: 40) stresses that: 
 
physiological and evolutionary evidence … indicates emotions are not 
infinitely malleable, not totally cognitive, nor completely rational; nor 
is the quest for power the only motivation of human beings. … [T]he 
drives that impel them do have some autonomy, force, and structure 





Lindholm (ibid.: 42) maintains that ‘the psychological substance out of 
which mixtures [of emotions] come is universal’ but there are still both 
individual and cultural variations affecting ‘the specific colorations and 
intensities’ of these emotions. He asserts that these differences are culturally, 
historically and structurally motivated while ‘resting upon common psychic 
ground’ (ibid.: 43). Damasio (2000: 57) also maintains that emotions are 
both biologically and culturally shaped. He explains that the role of culture 
in shaping emotions comes in three parts: shaping ‘an adequate inducer’ of 
each emotion, shaping how such emotions are expressed, and shaping ‘the 
cognition and behaviour which follows the development of an emotion’ 
(ibid.). White (2005: 242) affirms that many approaches to emotions have 
taken an individual-centred methodology; however, he sets out to identify 
the limitations of this methodology, and instead proposes the concept of 
emotion institution, which stresses ‘the mutual influences’ of psychology, 
culture, and what people say or do on emotions (ibid.). He explains that 
‘emotions are also located within wider spheres of ideology and political 
structure’ (ibid.: 243), something which gives emotions a social dimension. 
White stresses ‘the significant role played by socially organized activities in 
facilitating (and creating) culturally meaningful forms of emotion’ while, 
simultaneously, putting emotions ‘“at risk” of being redefined or transformed 
as they are manifest in communicative routines and practices’ (ibid.: 243). 
Bazzanella (2004: 60–61) lays equal stress on both cultural and individual 
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variations of emotions by explaining that there are cross-cultural variations 
and intracultural ones.  
Weigand (2004: 10) asserts that emotions are internal states that are 
motivated by one’s ‘expectations and needs’ from other human beings or 
from the world. She also states that ‘[e]motions are always present and 
cannot be switched off. They are integrated with other abilities’ (ibid., 
emphasis in original). Accordingly, politics and the struggle over power are 
emotionally loaded no matter how much one tries to present them 
objectively. Weigand also adds that reason has ‘modest’ controlling power 
over emotion. 
Emotions are triggered and motivated by context. To understand how 
this works, it is important first to understand the status of context, whether 
it is something that is already there or is created differently in every 
individual setting. Bazzanella explains that while sociolinguists consider 
context a priori, in psychology and artificial intelligence it is considered to 
be activated (2004: 58). Bazzanella (ibid.: 58) ‘integrates’ the two approaches 
as two levels of context. She calls the first the global level in reference to 
‘the external components of the context’ and says that it corresponds to a 
priori features, i.e. sociolinguistic parameters such as age, status … social 
roles of participants … [and] the general experience resulting from the 
interplay of culture and social community (ibid.). She calls the second level 
the local level, which ‘corresponds to the parameters that are selected 
because of their relevance to the space/time/person localisation and to the 
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linguistic interaction itself …; it is activated and constructed in the ongoing 
interaction as it becomes relevant’ (ibid.). She explains that local context can 
result in the same person reacting differently at different times to the same 
or similar ‘external inputs’ (i.e. what she calls the global context) (ibid.: 59). 
Being dynamic in that sense, the local context affects the production of an 
emotion, its intensity and its duration (ibid.). The two levels of context 
actually work simultaneously and together, but it would be useful to 
distinguish between them for analytic purposes (ibid.: 62). Bazzanella 
explains that sincerity communicates a given emotion to the audience in 
different ways depending on the purpose of needing to communicate this 
emotion: 
 
[I]n situations such as talk shows, emotions are displayed rather than 
expressed. A scalar continuum could be drawn from expressed 
emotions (i.e. actually felt in a given, everyday situation) to displayed 
(i.e. shown more than felt, …), to reproduced (such as in theatre, 
where the actor behaves as if he really feels the emotions), to fictitious 
(i.e. pretended emotion), up to various degrees of lying/deceiving. The 
‘sincerity condition’ varies according to the different kinds of 
emotion, and the interaction involved is of course affected by it 
(Bazzanella 2004: 67, emphasis in original). 
 
Stamenov argues that emotions are a stimulus of behaviour (2004: 180); 
however, experiencing ambivalent emotions makes it difficult to choose 
between two contradictory behaviours and, accordingly, ‘[b]eing ambivalent 
means first and foremost being behaviourally in trouble’ (ibid.: 181). 
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However, when one expresses a feeling towards something that actually 
opposes one’s real feelings (e.g. saying that a lecture was fantastic while 
deep inside feeling it was boring), then this is related to ambivalence but is 
essentially called euphemism, face-saving etiquette or hypocrisy (ibid.: 186–
187).  
 
2.5.3 Emotions affecting language 
In explaining when and how emotions affect utterances, Weigand (2000: 13–
14) asserts that ‘it is not the word which has a meaning by definition but the 
speakers predicate with words how they perceive and construct an image of 
the world. … Isolated words are often considered polysemous. Polysemy 
however is a problem of theory not of language use.’ 
Čmejrková maintains that ‘[a] political debate as any kind of 
exchange may be dominated either by a referential function or by emotional 
and expressive functions’ (2004: 51). She emphasises that  
 
in ritual communication of political debates we should be aware of 
ritual masks determined by institutional roles of their participants. … 
An adequate account of emotive communication needs to consider that at 
the discourse level of interaction, emotional as well as unemotional choices 





Thus, the absence of expressing emotion is as vital and significant as not 
expressing emotion, and consequently, emotions are involved in political 
discourse even in the most impassive and bleak discourses. However, while 
some discursive structures and wordings of parts of excerpts being analysed 
may present some instances of emotive speech, it was not possible to 
illustrate when emotions were supressed or hidden. It is important to note 
that in order to stress the fact that failing to recognise an emotive aspect or 
expression does not deny their presence. Still, an analyst, nevertheless, will 
always have a number of examples in which emotions are expressed or 
reflected in discursive choices that he or she can build upon. To be able to 
examine emotions and how they are expressed or not expressed in 
parliamentary debates, carrying out an analysis of audio and video records 
would be required. This is in order to include voice pitch, intonation, 
overlap, speech speed, facial expressions and gestures alongside textual 
analysis. 
Emotional reactions can result from breaking norms (Walrod 2004: 
210). That is because the ‘foundational’ nature of norms makes them 
subconscious, which results in their being adhered to ‘scrupulously’. If any 
norms are violated, this leads to a ‘strong emotional reaction’, resulting 
sometimes in physical violence, but more often in normative discourse, such 
as ‘a scolding, a grievance, or an argument’ (ibid.). This makes normative 
discourse an instance of ‘the interconnectedness of language and emotion’ 
(ibid.: 207).  
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Normative discourse is used to ‘influence behavior, opinions, or 
beliefs of others’ (ibid.: 210). Walrod explains that normative discourse is 
based on concepts of ‘should’, ‘ought’ or ‘must’, and this varies among 
cultures and languages, depending on ‘the system of values’ and ‘norms’ 
governing these cultures or languages (ibid.: 211). He contends that when 
we utter an evaluation, we are expressing opinions that ‘imply a 
prescription, i.e. an implicit “ought”’, as ‘[e]ach prescription necessarily 
implies an evaluation’, but that when we utter this prescription then that is 
an imperative (ibid.).  
 
2.6 Discursive Devices and Discursive Strategies  
2.6.1 Generalities 
In this research, I differentiate between discursive devices and discursive 
strategies. I use the term ‘devices’ to describe the smaller and more phrase– 
or expression–specific units which serve to fulfil a strategy. Devices can be 
detected in isolation, but strategies require comprehension of the larger 
picture, the context and the purpose of the bigger linguistic unit being 
studied. Kettell (2010: 769–790) defines discursive strategies as ‘the way in 
which agents frame and present particular themes, issues and arguments 
with a view to shaping the context of political debate, whether in the media, 
political institutions or elsewhere.’ In the context of political debate, 
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discursive strategies have ‘multifarious’ aims, which can be one or more of 
the following: 
 
to provide a common interpretation of the main problems and 
challenges faced, to set out a coherent explanation of goals and 
objectives, to seek to justify and legitimise political action for the 
pursuit of these ends, and to persuade and mobilise support, as well 
as undermine, challenge and otherwise call into question opposing 
arguments (ibid.). 
 
A discursive device, in contrast, is a discursive or linguistic tool with a 
specific goal or intention that is fulfilled in the specific utterance, i.e. a 
phrase or sentence, in which the device is used. A discursive device, often 
but not necessarily always, alongside other discursive devices, can be used to 
serve a larger discursive strategy. Accordingly, a discursive strategy is a 
scheme or a plan that employs various discursive devices to execute an 
ideological goal. A device, hence, can be identified more instantly at the 
analysis stage, while a strategy is identified when the ‘full picture’ is 
synthesised. Different combinations of discursive devices can be used to 
create different discursive strategies. Thus, the same device can be used in 
different, even contrasting, strategies.  
Since the data used in the analysis are in the form of text (for more 
discussion about how the data were chosen, see Section 3.9), the focus will 
automatically be on the linguistic features of the examined discourses (also 
see definition 1 in Section 1.6 for the difference between discourse and text, 
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and the first paragraph in Section 1.4 for the position of extra-linguistic 
content in this research). In this thesis, I cover I range of linguistic acts, 
moves and styles to make my list of devices. I mainly focus on the following 
discursive devices: 
 shift between local accents and classical Arabic 
 emotive speech  
 framing and reframing  
 quoting other sources  
 humour 
 discourse markers 
 
in addition to six of the broader list of devices observed by Socio cognitive 
Approach (SCA)31 (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 28–29): 
 
 lexical style 
 local semantic moves (such as disclaimers) 
 speech acts 
 rhetorical features 





The first two discursive devices, shifting between local dialects and standard 
Arabic and emotive speech, have already been introduced in Sections  2.3.2 
and 2.5 respectively. Rhetoric, style and speech acts are briefly introduced 
below, and the analysis section provides ample space for them to be 
elaborated. When it comes to the propositional structure, I mean the 
conceptual structure, or, to put it simply, the meaning of the utterances 
regardless of its syntactic structure. Propositional structures are explicit and 
may convey mental representations, though not necessarily. However, they 
are useful ‘may … be ideologically controlled’ (van Dijk 1995b: 258). In this 
research, propositional structures are taken into account and used to 
understand how a speaker constructs his or her utterances on the basis of 
mental schemata reflecting ideological beliefs; however, the term itself is not 
mentioned in the analysis. As for the other ones, they are identified in the 
analysis chapter itself when instances of such devices occur. The reason why 
these devices are only briefly introduced in the present chapter is that more 
details are given when instances of these devices are illustrated in Chapter 4, 
where further and more specific explanations are provided as the excerpts 
and the instances require. What is required first of all is a brief introduction 






2.6.2 Arabic Language Rhetoric  
The major rhetorical devices in the Arabic language are the following: 
 
 the use of repetition  
 the use of synonyms 
 the employment of examples and illustrations 
 the choice of suitable vocabulary 
 the variation of styles between statement-making, questioning, 
exclamation, and denunciation 
 the choice of strong and appropriate locations for pausing (Aljarim & 
Ameen 1999: 16. My translation). 
 
Of course, none of these features is unique to Arabic, but their frequency in 
distributing varies amongst and defines different rhetorical cultures. 
Determining the location of short pauses within a speech by an individual 
was not possible in this research, since it deals with written text that does 
not mark pauses. Still, the point at which a speaker chooses to end his or her 
speech or intervention is considered. Other devices which I observed are 
added to my own more comprehensive list of discursive devices in 4.1, at 
the beginning of the Analysis Chapter. 
The use of figures of speech, or description and imagery, is a powerful 
device that has branched and detailed subdivisions in Arabic. This branch of 
language rhetoric is called ʿilm albayān البيان علم  (for more details, see ibid.: 
18–141), while the study of sound patterns is another field known as ʿilm 
albadīʿ البديع علم  (ibid.: 236–270).  
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In this research, I focus on the former, ʿilm albayān, and since the data 
were translated from the original texts, this automatically excluded sound 




Style, being how the content is said or communicated, is an important 
discursive device that can reflect information beyond what the content 
communicates. Social styles are important resources for making ‘different 
sorts of personal and interpersonal meaning’, and what is most significant 
for linguistic style is the process (i.e. ‘how people use or enact or perform 
social styles for a range of symbolic purposes’) rather than the product 
(Coupland 2007: 3). In interviews, there are moments when a speaker is 
more relaxed and thus speaks less carefully; in such moments, the speaker 
will use more features of his or her local style than he or she would in other 
parts of the interview. This is what Labov calls ‘stylistic variation’, referring 
to ‘the differentiation of speakers by their social status’ (1972: 110). 
The discussion of styles or social styles covers a broad spectrum of 
language features. Coupland (2007: 2), for example, believes that dialects 
are social styles. A brief presentation of dialects in Bahrain is provided in 
Section ‎2.3.2 above. Style is a broad term and can cover a number of 
linguistic features, including grammar, tone, imagery, etc. In this research, I 
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choose to focus on lexical style, which is concerned with vocabulary use. I 
present rhetoric devices as separate discursive devices.  
 
2.6.4 Speech acts 
Speech acts are the functions of utterances. Some examples of speech acts 
are request, permission, complaint, command, statement, exclamation, etc. 
They differ from the structure. For example: ‘You haven’t told me what 
happened’ has the structure of an affirmative statement, but it has a function 
of a request, requesting the addressee to tell the speaker what happened. 
Weigand believes that there are three speech acts related to emotions: 
constructive speech acts can be used to state one’s feeling, declarative ones 
can be used to ‘create social relationships by declaring emotions’, and 
expressive speech acts can be used to ‘emphasize an overwhelming emotion’. 
Expressive speech acts are often signified though the grammatical structure 
and the intonation of the utterance. In addition to these speech acts that 
convey emotion, a statement can be accompanied by emotion without 
actually referring to any emotion. Sometimes, however, intonations are not 
clear enough. In such situations, rules and generalisations do not work any 
longer, and ‘[p]rinciples of probability, inferences and suppositions’ of the 
motivation behind the utterances can be useful32 (2004: 16–17). 
 Although I include speech acts as an importance discursive device, 
there is almost no direct mention of them as such. This is because all the 
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sentences in the excerpts being analysed have speech acts assigned to them. I 
occasionally mention comparing and contrasting as a speech act particularly 
when it is relevant to constructing an image of oneself and others, of 
identities. The other devices I detect also have speech acts of their own, as it 
will be clear in the analysis chapter. Thus, I only mention functions within 
my analysis where and when appropriate without mentioning the term 
‘speech acts’. 
 
Above, I have provided some insight into what I have called discursive 
devices. Regarding the discursive strategies, they are presented and 
explained in Chapter 4, the Analysis Chapter, since this allows me to use my 
actual data to motivate and illustrate them, rather than setting them out a 
priori. This way, the devices are the starting point of the analysis and the 
strategies evolve with analysis. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have presented an overview of the research topic to present 
both a theoretical background and a context for my analysis. Since politics is 
a linguistic practice, when religious or sectarian perspective is adopted, then 
the ideology of that religion or sect is expected to be manifested in the 
political discursive practices. The Bahraini Council of Representatives should 
not be an exception; however, there is no academic evidence of such 
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manifestation of sectarian ideology in political language and the discursive 
strategies. In order to test if there is a difference between the discursive 
strategies used by Sunni parties and those used by Shiite parties in the 
Council, I provided a theoretical and historical background to the topic. I 
have first of all shown how according to the Islamic perspective, politics is 
an inseparable aspect of Islam and thus politics gets evaluated by and 
measured against Islamic principles and values when a party has an Islamic 
basis. This has been the theological argument for the existence of a 
difference. However, it had to be tested impartially by critically analysing 
actual excerpts from the debates held in the Council. I thus moved to 
presenting the sectarian and ethnic structure of Bahrain to set the scene of 
the analysis. I have presented a preview of the sectarian structure and the 
varieties of spoken Arabic in Bahrain and how it is considered a marker of 
ethnic and, often, sectarian affiliation of interlocutors. Understanding that 
the Council represents members of the same speech communities as in 
mundane life, I have then explained the historical background of the current 
parliament and how Sunni and Shiite movements interacted with and 
reacted to it.  
 I have then presented a theoretical background of major concepts that 
are essential to grasp the ideological struggle for power in the excerpts I 
analyse in this research. These major concepts are power, identity, ideology, 
emotive speech and discursive devices. Such information should help trace a 
pattern in the examined excerpts and accordingly test the hypothesis by 
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comparing and contrasting discursive strategies employed by the political 
parties at the Council and how sectarian ideological constructs prevail in 
them. With all this information in mind, the methodology of this research 




CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction 
Having established a background of the key areas and concepts that are 
related to the research problem in the previous chapter, in this chapter, I 
elucidate the methodology followed in selecting, collecting and analysing 
the data in this research.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the theoretical framework 
adapted in the methodology of the research, explaining the features of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a perspective and Sociocognitive 
Approach (SCA) as an approach and how they serve to meet the objectives 
of this work. The chapter then explains how the research hypothesis was 
developed and how the choice was made to focus on the theme of dissent 
control and political freedom in the course of data analysis. After that, the 
chapter shows how different sources of data, i.e. excerpts from Hansard and 
reference to sittings or relevant events from local newspapers, are linked to 
provide a better understanding of the context and the topic. The chapter also 
explains the importance of continuous feedback between the data collection 
and the data analysis and how this contributed to developing the research. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The topic of the Bahraini Council of Representatives and the role of its 
religious or sectarian identities is so complex that a single perspective 
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isolated from other fields of study cannot properly inform research. This is 
because political ideologies and power relations can be studied from 
different academic perspectives, such as politics, sociology and history. My 
thesis mainly, but not exclusively, approaches the topic from a 
sociolinguistic angle, and this perspective allows for related interpretations 
and explanations from other fields – particularly politics, psychology and 
theology – and while grounding the analysis in language data. 
This research has Hansard of the Bahraini Council of Representatives 
as its main source of data. It analyses linguistic units in order to present a 
reading of the prominent political identities in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives by analysing how language is employed in the struggle over 
for power. The basic perspective this research adopts is that of CDA. A major 
aspect of CDA is that it is ‘problem-oriented’ and ‘interdisciplinary’ (Wodak 
& Meyer 2009: 2). In the study of the Bahraini Council of Representatives, 
CDA is most suitable since its three focal concepts are ideology, power and 
critique (ibid.:1). From CDA many approaches have evolved, each 
constructed from a different viewpoint of how ideology and power can be 
critically observed and analysed. Among these approaches is SCA, which was 
proposed by Teun van Dijk. SCA combines social representation theory and 
mental representations (i.e. context models). In this research, I adopt SCA, 
which proposes, and strongly supports, that cognition mediates between 
discourse and society, whereas many other CDA approaches focus on society 
and discourse alone (van Dijk: 2009a: 64). 
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‘Discourse’ and ‘text’ are key-terms that are repeatedly mentioned in the 
research. Since the definitions of discourse and text vary from one discipline 
to another – and even from one approach to another – I would like to 
present the definitions that my research adopted in accordance with SCA 
and my methodology. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 2) use the term ‘text’ to 
cover both written and spoken text and stress the unity of meaning: ‘[a] text 
is best regarded as a SEMANTIC unit: a unit not of form but of meaning’ 
(emphasis in original). They use the term ‘discourse’, on the other hand, to 
refer to ‘the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part’ 
and which also includes the interaction (a) between the process of 
production and the process of interpretation and (b) between the context of 
production and the context of interpretation’ (Fairclough 1989: 24–25). This 
way, discourses are ‘unique occurrences involving particular social actors in 
a particular setting and context’ (ibid.: 24). For example: ‘I object’ can be 
difference discourses, each occurring in a different setting (e.g. in the 
Bahraini Parliament, in the British Parliament, in a company) and different 
context (e.g. a regular meeting, during one’s turn, as an interruption of 
someone else’s turn) by and among (or addressed to) different social actors 
(e.g. by a certain MP addressing the Speaker of the Council, by another MP 
to the same Speaker, among a certain group of MPs and journalists or at the 
attendance of a minister or a delegation). The utterance can be shouted or 
murmured, can be a reaction to a proposal, to a law draft or to an 
intervention, for example. Each change in the sitting, context or social actors 
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creates a unique occurrence and thus a new discourse. The definitions of text 
and discourse provided by Fairclough above are suitable for this research 
except for one point: I find it controversial to use the word ‘text’ to also 
cover spoken forms of language, as this contradicts the common use of the 
word ‘text’. Hence, I use it to refer to written units of language alone, 
whether it was something that was originally produced as written or if it 
was a transliteration of spoken experts. This way, the data I am dealing with 
in this research are all texts, whether originally produced as texts, i.e. 
originally written, transliterated spoken excerpts, or translated ones.  
When it comes to the term ‘discourse analysis’, ‘[d]iscourse analysis 
focuses on the systematic account of the complex structures and strategies of 
the text and talk as they are actually accomplished (produced, interpreted, 
used) in their social contexts’ (van Dijk 1998: 198). Titscher, Meyer, Wodak 
and Vetter (2007: 147) maintain that ‘the notion of “discourse” is more 
informative and relevant than the term “text”.’ Within these lines, the term 
‘discourse’ in my research covers a wider scope than the term text; it covers 
the following: 
 
 the language unit in question, whether spoken or written, 
 the context it appears in and with, and 
 any institutional conducts, whether social, cultural, political, 
religious, language specific or organisational, that constrain or shape 
the production and interpretation processes of the linguistic unit. 
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With these points in mind, I next shed light on how CDA can be useful in 
analysing political discourse. In the following sections, I present an overview 
of CDA to show how it is related to the objectives and hypothesis of this 
thesis in relation to a struggle over power. I provide details about SCA, 
which is one of the approaches that adapt the perspective of CDA, to show 
why it is a suitable approach for the research data and for fulfilling the 
research objectives. 
 
3.3 CDA as a perspective 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA), or Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), is a 
vast field with multiple approaches and uses. Some scholars prefer one term 
to the other while others distinguish between the two. Van Dijk (2009a: 
62ff), for example, prefers CDS to CDA, as he finds CDS more general, 
including both critical theory and critical application, and it does not limit 
itself to critical analysis. He adds that ‘[t]he designation of CDS may also 
avoid the widespread misconception that a critical approach is a method of 
discourse analysis’ (ibid.: 62). He explains that:  
 
CDS is not a method, but rather a critical perspective, position or 
attitude within a discipline of multidisciplinary Discourse Studies. 
Critical research makes use of a large number of methods, both from 
Discourse Studies itself, as well as from humanities, psychology and 




This wider description fits my research purpose and objectives well as an 
analysis of a political text requires bringing together the social, linguistic, 
historical and psychological aspects related to the text in hand; that said, I 
use CDA as the general and more comprehensive perspective to stay in 
accordance with most publications and research work in the field. I use the 
term CDS only when quoting directly. This is to keep the terminology in this 
research in line with the most common use in the literature reviewed on this 
topic. 
 However, many authors tend to classify CDA as a method of text analysis 
(cf. Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter 2007), so it is hard not to view it as 
such. I thus suggest an intermediate way of looking at the matter by 
considering CDA as a group of overlapping methods that have a mutual 
stance and share common features (for more details, see Section ‎3.4), 
something that makes CDA more of a movement that generates theories and 
applications.  
The term ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ itself ‘is far from implying a 
homogenous method within discourse analysis’ (Titscher et al. 2007: 144). 
However, in essence, the CDA perspective, first of all, has a desire to serve 
the community with the analysis or studies carried out. Secondly, methods 
under CDA follow theoretical sampling in collecting and analysing data (for 
more details see the upcoming sections). A third major difference between 
CDA and Discourse Analysis (DA) is that, unlike DA, the major interest of 
CDA is not the linguistic units per se but the social phenomenon of which the 
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discourse is part (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 2). With three central concepts in 
CDA: power, ideology and critique, CDA is interested in ‘de-mystifying’ 
ideology and power (ibid.: 1). 
This breadth of the topic makes it unfeasible to include a 
comprehensive account of CDA in the literature review carried out for this 
research. Therefore, in this chapter, I limit myself to information related to 
my research objectives and suitable for the data I am analysing. 
 
3.3.1 CDA and politics 
My research is interested in exploring ideological power relations in 
parliamentary debates (see research objectives in Section 1.3), and CDA’s 
perspective proves to be very relevant to politics, as will be evident from this 
section. CDA is based on the concept that some discourses and texts ‘may be 
unjust’ and that the task of CDA is to expose this ‘discursive injustice’ (van 
Dijk 2009a: 63, emphasis in original text). Fairclough emphasises that ‘in 
human matters, interconnectedness and chains of cause and effect may be 
distorted out of vision. Hence “critique” is essentially making visible the 
interconnectedness of things’ (1985: 747). Van Leeuwen (2006: 293) 
maintains that being critical implies making one’s own position explicit and 
not apologising for being critical. Wodak and Meyer (2002: 9) explain that 
‘[b]asically, being “critical” is to be understood as having distance to the 
data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, 
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and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research.’ This explains the 
importance of ideology for CDA as a mediator between language and 
different institutions (ibid.: 10). Van Dijk (1998: 191) objects to reducing 
ideologies to discourse and discourse analysis. This is because ideologies are 
not only processed and reproduced by language use and communication, but 
also by ‘social and semiotic practices other than text and talk.’ However, text 
and talk have properties that ‘allow social members to actually express or 
formulate abstract ideological beliefs,’ while semiotic codes do not convey 
opinion and meanings as explicitly and accurately as naturally occurring 
language (ibid.: 192, emphasis in original).  
Politics have always been a battlefield for ideologies, battlefields in 
which discourse is a very crucial instrument. Howarth and Stavrakakis 
(2000: 2–3) state that:  
 
[d]iscourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are 
meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by historically 
specific systems of rules. … [M]eaning depends on the orders of 
discourse that constitute its identity and significance. … Each 
[discourse] is a social and political construction that establishes a 
system of relations between different objects and practices, while 
providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify. … 
[A] political project will try to weave together different strands of 
discourse in an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as 




Howarth and Stavrakakis (ibid.: 5–6) also mention that discourse theory 
does not limit struggle in societies to class order, and considers ‘all 
ideological elements in a discursive field contingent’ (ibid.: 6).33 Thus, 
discourse analysis is seen to be interested in key political concepts such as 
hegemony, antagonism, and dislocation (ibid.). Howarth and Stavrakakis 
also maintain that discourse theory does not fully separate ‘socially 
constructed meanings and interpretations’ from ‘objective political 
behaviour and action,’ emphasising that ‘meanings, interpretations and 
practices are always inextricably linked’ (ibid.: 6). Accordingly, the task of 
discourse analysis is to record and explain historical and social changes 
‘using political factors and logics’ (ibid.). Howarth and Stavrakakis add that 
discourse cannot completely detach itself from the world it is trying to 
interpret because it focuses on ‘the creation, disruption and transformation 
of the structures that organise social life,’ and this in turn means that the 
division between objectivity and subjectivity in social sciences is more 
blurred than used to be thought (ibid.), making it difficult to completely 
distinguish facts from values (ibid.: 7). 
Wodak and Meyer mention that CDA is used to refer to an analysis 
that looks at ‘the larger discursive unit of text’ as ‘the basic unit of 
communication’ (2002: 2). They explain that CDA is ‘fundamentally 
concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural 
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested 
in language’ (ibid.). CDA should pay attention to discourse as both ‘the 
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instrument of power and control’ and as ‘the instrument of the social 
construction of reality’ (van Leeuwen 2006: 193). In order to better 
understand and extensively analyse these relationships and better see the 
bigger picture, CDA recommends interdisciplinarity. 
 
3.3.2 Interdisciplinarity in CDA 
The concept of interdisciplinarity is very important to CDA because ‘it aims 
at investigating complex social phenomena which are inherently inter- or 
trans-disciplinary and certainly not to be studied by linguistics alone’ 
(Wodak 2007: 5). Van Leeuwen (2006: 3) explains that there are three 
models of interdisciplinarity: centralist, pluralist and integrationist.  
Briefly, the centralist model is ‘the relation between different 
autonomous disciplines’ in which each discipline considers on the one hand 
itself, its theories and its method central, and on the other hand, its relation 
to the other disciplines as a space to overlap and to obtain support for their 
positions (ibid.: 3–4). Under this model, many disciplines have developed 
well planned methodologies which, on the one hand, encourage ‘disciplined’ 
thinking, but on the other hand, discourage consulting other disciplines’ 
methods when their central methodologies fail (ibid.: 5).  
In the second interdisciplinary model, the pluralist, the problem 
becomes the axis of research. The model aims to make use of different 
disciplines simultaneously ‘as equal partners’ while each discipline maintains 
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its autonomy in the way it operates (ibid.). Triangulation, in which more 
than one method is used to verify results, is often used in the pluralist model 
(ibid.: 6). However, the way each discipline contributes to the ‘holistic 
approach’ is not always explained (ibid.: 7). This approach can be used in 
edited volumes, conferences or research projects.  
Like the pluralist model, the integrationist model focuses on the 
problem instead of on the method and brings various disciplines together 
(ibid.: 7). However, this model, unlike the pluralist, requires ‘team work’ in 
which the disciplines brought together are seen as ‘interdependent’. This can 
lead to change the way these disciplines work and this can be felt as a 
threat, leading to ‘a lack of depth and methodological rigour, a risk of 
amateurism and eclecticism’ (ibid.: 8). When it comes to discourse analysis, 
however, integration is very important because there are many expressions 
or elements that the methods of discourse analysis alone cannot explain 
(ibid.: 13). Discourse analysis requires integration with other disciplines, 
mainly social theory, ethnography and history (ibid.: 10). More details on 
how discourse analysis relies on these disciplines can be found in van 
Leeuwen (ibid.: 10–14). Van Leeuwen asserts that we should not limit 
ourselves to one discipline at the beginning of the research, because this can 
make the outcome of the research biased; he explains that we should ensure 
that the team consists of people who have both a good theoretical 




In the light of van Leeuwen’s categorisation of interdisciplinary, the 
model of this research is best described as a centralist. The main disciplines 
approached are sociolinguistics and linguistics while remaining open and 
receptive to any relevant data, readings and analyses from other disciplines 
as long as they serve the research without destruction or confusion. I 
achieved this by keeping my analysis open to political, social, psychological 
and theological input (i.e. from journals and other references) where they 
help to better understand the discourses in hand.  
 
3.3.3 Common dimensions of CDA approaches 
According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2), there are at least seven ‘common 
dimensions’ among the various approaches to CDA, which are as follows:  
 
 an interest in naturally occurring language use 
 a focus on large language units instead of isolated words or sentences 
 going beyond language grammar to include actions and interactions 
 paying attention to non-verbal aspects of discourse 
 taking into consideration the socio-cognitive and interactional aspects 
of language 
 studying the functions of contexts of language in use 
 including a wide variety of language use and grammar in analysis 




My research takes these dimensions into account in that its data are 
instances of naturally occurring language use. By ‘natural’ language, I refer 
to ‘human’ language – in contrast to artificial or constructed languages (i.e. 
programming languages or auxiliary languages) –that occurs without the 
intervention of researchers. Being natural does not necessarily mean being 
spontaneous (see more about spontaneity of language analysed in this 
research in the last paragraph of Section 3.9). The second feature, focusing 
on large language units, also applies to my data, since I take full language 
units that cover a discussion or exchange over a topic or issue and make sure 
to start and end my excerpts where the topic starts and ends respectively. 
Additionally, actions and interactions, whether described in Hansard or in 
relevant newspaper articles, are major focal points in my research as is 
apparent in the analysis chapter and as my set of strategies reflects. 
When it comes to non–verbal aspects of discourse, although these are 
a common dimension, not all CDA analyses include them, as this depends on 
what type of data is being analysed. In my research, I am dealing with 
written transcriptions that have a very limited amount of non-verbal actions 
mentioned in them. I am thus limited to what is mentioned in Hansard 
excerpts alone (e.g. any mentioning of someone leaving his or her seat or 
pointing at someone or something) whenever available. 
Context is a crucial element of my analysis, and each excerpt is 
analysed in relation to any associated social, political, historical and/or 
107 
 
religious contexts. My interest in the context consequently is reflected in the 
wide variety of language use, and this is again reflected in my chosen 
definition of context and my list of discursive devices (listed in Section 2.6). 
 
3.4 Features of CDA 
3.4.1 A critical perspective 
Wodak and Meyer clarify that ‘critical’ does not necessarily mean negative 
and that ‘[a]ny social phenomenon lends itself to critical investigation, to be 
challenged and not taken for granted’ (2009: 2). CDA is critical in two 
senses: first, critical as established by the Frankfurt School; and secondly, in 
the ‘tradition’ of critical linguistics (Titscher et al. 2007: 144).  
Geuss (1981: 55–56) explains that the Frankfurt School distinguishes 
between scientific theories and critical theories on three levels: first, while 
the goal of scientific theories is the ‘successful manipulation of external 
world,’ critical theories aim at ‘emancipation and enlightenment’ and freeing 
people from hidden coercion in order to enable them to realise their true 
interests. Secondly, scientific theories have ‘objectifying’ as their logical and 
cognitive structure (i.e. a distinction is made between the theory and the 
object to which the theory refers). On the other hand, critical theories are 
‘self-reflective’ or ‘self-referential’ in the sense that the theory is always part 
of the object being examined. Thirdly, each of the two types of theory 
requires a different kind of confirmation; whereas the scientific theories 
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‘require empirical confirmation through observation and experiment,’ 
critical ones are cognitively acceptable if they survive deep and complex 
evaluation. 
When it comes to the second sense of ‘critical,’ i.e. the sense shared 
with critical linguistics, then the critical perspective of linguistics has 
emerged ‘as a reaction to contemporary pragmatics’ and the ‘quantitative 
correlative sociolinguistics of William Labov’ (Titscher et al. 2007: 145). I do 




One distinct feature of CDA is ‘intertextuality and interdiscursivity,’ which is 
achieved by analysing the relation of an examined text to other texts 
(Titscher et al. 2007: 166). Intertextuality means that a text can be analysed 
in the light of an analysis of other texts, and observations and analyses can 
be linked, compared and contrasted in order to better understand and better 
describe the findings of a piece of research or an analysis. This concept is 
deemed crucial in CDA because the concept of context makes language a 
social interaction by relating it to and explaining it by ‘other communicative 
events that are happening at the same time or that have happened before’ 




3.4.3 The triangle of society, cognition and discourse 
Hodge and Kress (1993: 1) maintain that, besides being concerned with the 
relation between language and mind, linguists must give equal attention to 
the relation between society and language ‘since language is so distinctly a 
social phenomenon.’ To present the theoretical framework that CDA employs 
to study ‘the discursive reproduction of power abuse,’ van Dijk explains how 
CDA plays a role in what he describes as ‘knowledge management’ (2005a: 
87). He explains that ‘the maintenance and legitimation of domination’ is 
not achieved through ideology alone but also through knowledge 
management (ibid.: 87-88). He explains that knowledge, which he views as a 
cognitive device (ibid.: 76), is ‘a necessary interface between society and 
discourse’ (ibid.: 87) and, accordingly, knowledge cannot be defined ‘as 
personal beliefs, but as social beliefs certified, shared and hence discursively 
presupposed by the members of epistemic communities’ (ibid.). 
However, while knowledge is not personal but shared, the context 
model has both a social dimension to it, being affected by ‘communicative 
representations,’ and a personal dimension, being affected by ‘individual 
personal experiences, aims and interests of language users’ (ibid.). Thus, 
language is both ‘inherently social’ and has personal variations; this duality 
can explain the ‘interface’ between the macro aspects of discourse (social, 
political, cultural) and its micro aspects (individual variation) (ibid.). Van 
Dijk explains that if knowledge is defined as shared beliefs, then people who 
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have access to public discourse, such as politicians, professors and priests, 
are capable of influencing ‘people’s knowledge formation’ (ibid.: 88). 
Van Dijk assumes that knowledge has ‘a specific status as a cognitive device’ 
(ibid.: 76), and explains three forms of abuse of the contextualised 
knowledge by the elite (ibid.: 89). The first form is presumptions held by the 
elite about people knowing certain matters in which the elite believe (ibid.: 
88). Each of these assumptions has ‘social conditions, consequences and 
biases.’ This is because, normally, these assumptions are made by the elite 
about the knowledge of ‘average’ people, and by average people they mean 
well-educated ones exclusively. Often, presumptions made by the elite or the 
authority are taken for granted and are not verified or tested (ibid.: 88). 
These presumptions reflect ‘opinions or prejudices’ rather than knowledge, 
but are used by the elite to ‘manipulate’ people ‘into accepting such biased, 
ideologically based beliefs’ as knowledge. The second type of abuse of 
contextual knowledge of the cognitive device is to assume the opposite. In 
this case, there are presumptions about the audience not sharing the 
knowledge of the elite and accordingly being treated as ignorant. This 
presumption is based on polarising one self’s ‘positive image’ from the 
others’ ‘negative image’ (ibid.: 89). The third kind of abuse that van Dijk 
introduces is the assumption that only elite discourse can ‘convey’ 
knowledge. Although this is not entirely wrong, ‘[i]n this case presuming 
ignorance of the audience is not just a question of infravaloration, but rather 
an example of the corresponding process of supravaloration of the self as the 
111 
 
only instance of “truth”’ (ibid.: 89). These three types of abuse can 
inevitably be found in political speeches and debates, but their repetition, 
density and explicitness may vary depending on various factors affecting the 
interlocutor’s presumptions as the analysis of the excerpts is expected to 
reflect.  
 
3.5 Approach: SCA 
3.5.1 Social Cognition 
SCA looks at discourse as having two inseparable facets: social and mental 
(or cognitive). Since my research takes the term ‘discourse’ to cover a whole 
social interaction, it is important to understand the social facet as perceived 
by SCA. The social facet draws on social representation theory, which was 
originally developed by Serge Moscovici in 1961. Since then, this theory has 
become central to many psychological activities (Marková 1998: 371). Social 
representation refers to ‘a bulk of concepts, opinions, attitudes, evaluations, 
images and explanations which result from daily life and are sustained by 
communications’ (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 25–26). They are specific to social 
groups and are dynamic and constantly changing (ibid.: 26). Van Dijk values 
‘the fundamental importance of the study of cognition (and not only that of 
society) in the critical analysis of discourse, communication and interaction’ 
(ibid.: 64). Van Dijk elsewhere calls the duality using one term: social 
cognition, which he defines as ‘the system of mental representations and 
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processes of group members’ (1995a: 18). He explains that only through the 
‘integration’ of these two aspects may the analysis reach ‘descriptive,’ 
‘explanatory’ and ‘critical adequacy’ (2009a.: 66). By this, van Dijk creates a 
discourse-cognition-society triangle in the analysis of communication and 
interaction (ibid.: 64). However, he stresses that this approach does not 
suggest that ‘discourse and cognition are outside society,’ but are, instead, ‘an 
inherent part of society’ (ibid. 66, emphasis in original). SCA is interested in 
observing which ‘shared social representations are being expressed or 
presupposed by discourse’ (ibid.: 78).  
The members of a group ‘have affective feelings of belonging to the 
group’ or, in other words, ‘they share social representations.’ The continuity 
and reproduction of a group is often dependent on individual or group acts 
that are based on these shared social representations of the members (van 
Dijk 1998: 143, emphasis in original). This means utterances, actions, 
reactions, etc. and all other forms of social representation is how a group is 
maintained, and when these forms of expressing social representations stops, 
the group will have lost that group or mass identity. Van Dijk suggests that 
groups, besides being ‘a societal construct,’ are ‘constituted mentally through 
shared representations’ (ibid.: 143). Social representations are collective 
elaborations ‘for the purpose of behaving and communicating’34 (Moscovici 
1963: 251), and this is something that makes them similar to encoded 
conditionals or assumptions (or presumptions) that treat particular inputs in 
a certain planned way. However, social representations are dynamic and can 
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and do change as the influences that form them change, such as historical 
and social conditions. This may result in new, modified formulas. Taking 
into account these two definitions of discourse and social representations, 
then, social representations are embedded in discourse, which in turn is a 
comprehensive and inclusive process. Social representations surface in 
linguistic and behavioural actions within the process of discourse. In a single 
discourse unit,35 there can be several social representations relating to 
different ideas, opinions, attitudes, etc. The social representations occurring 
in the discourse can belong to one or more social groups and subgroups. In 
this way, the same discourse in which a number of interlocutors are 
participating can consist of various social representations that can be 
perceived differently. When this research, for example, attempts to explore 
to what degree the social representations of ‘political freedom’ and ‘dissent 
control’ concord or contradict on the basis of sectarian political affiliation of 
the interlocutor. Some linguistic instances, which are among the discursive 
devices my research examines, that can be used to observe social 
representations are ingroup and outgroup definitions, self-portrait, and 
framing and reframing techniques. Each of these discursive devices reflects 
an opinion, attitude, an evaluation, an explanation or an image of a member 
of a group or of a group. 
Each social representation consists of a combination of mental 
representations, which in turn are smaller units, more like the input of the 
formulae (i.e. of the social representations). They are units that are coded 
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with semantic properties. The attention that SCA gives to mental 
representations also makes individual cognition important in analysing 
collective thoughts and ideologies. Van Dijk (2009a: 64) assumes that 
cognition mediates between discourse and society. Cognition can be defined 
‘as a set of functions of the mind, such as thought, perception and 
representation.’ Although SCA focuses on social and cognitive interaction, it 
does not assume that CDA should be ‘limited’ to them, but only shows more 
interest in these two interfaces36 (ibid.: 65). Cognition is relevant in my 
research, as my hypothesis (see Section 1.2) aims at testing whether and 
how ideological differences, which are differences in axiomatic beliefs, have 
major effects on the production and perception of discourses. These 
differences in cognition are assessed by assessing differences of perception 
and representations that are expressed discursively. This is again why 
linguistic instances need to be analysed by accumulating information on the 
topic in hand by employing intertextuality and context to understand 
interlocutor’s perception and perspective in relation to the topic being 
analysed.  
Of course, at the cognitive level, there is no measurable, definite way 
to see how words, concepts and experiences are stored in the brain. There 
are a few theories, such as the theories that assume the existence of 
networks between lexical entries and the theories that assume that lexical 
entries are arranged in sets according to semantic features. However, not 
being able to measure mental representations directly and the fact that there 
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is no ready access to them does not make them less important and does not 
prevent them from playing a major role in forming interlocutors’ ideology 
and stances. Sometimes, the effects of mental representations, or at least 
what are assumed to be their effects, are reflected in language, attitude, 
actions and reactions. Since my research data are linguistic, the excerpts can 
be used to indicate manifestations of these representations and will depend 
on the analysis of rhetorical devices, speech acts, emotional speech, etc. to 
give a retrospective look at what mentally encoded ideas and opinions 
‘could’ have generated in this specific language usage. The inferences made 
are tentative and not absolute. This is because the process of speaking 
consists of transferring concepts and ideas between the interlocutors. Those 
ideas and concepts are assumed to be affected in one way or another by 
certain mental representations. The listener or the reader re-codes then these 
into other concepts and interpretations of the mental representations behind 
them. This interpretation can carry considerable insight, which can be 
reinforced by other indicators or signs in the same excerpt or other excerpts 
that lead to the same readings. 
Having briefly presented the theoretical aspects of SCA, I assert that 
SCA is an appropriate approach for analysing my data and suitable for 
achieving my research objectives for several reasons:  
 The topic of struggle for ideological power in a political 
setting, i.e. the Bahraini Council of Representatives, is very 
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dependent on context, which is a major concept in SCA (more 
details on context in SCA is below). 
 My comparison and contrast aims to find if there are 
significantly different discursive strategies used by different 
political parties in their struggle over power rather than 
comparing and contrasting individual strategies. This means it 
is concerned with ideologies, which have both a social and a 
cognitive dimensions, a duality that SCA asserts. 
 To link the use of discursive devices to ideology means that in 
this research I assume that there is a considerable number 
linguistic instances that can be used as a window into 
understanding ideological stances. SCA believes that there are 
‘forms of interaction which are in principle susceptible to 
speaker control, but are in practice mostly not consciously 
controlled’ (Wodak & Meyer 2009a: 29). This means that 
ideological stances eventually surface in discourses.  
 
3.5.2 Context in SCA 
In the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, many researchers in the fields of 
social sciences and humanities started showing more interest in social or 
contextual approaches than in focusing on the ‘formal study of sentences, 
discourse, speech acts, interaction, communicative events or mental 
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processing’ (van Dijk 2008: 13). Context represents ‘the interface between 
language and discourse, on the one hand, and social institutions, society, 
politics and culture on the other hand’ (van Dijk 2009b: x). As clarified in 
the definition section above, the concept of context covers the 
communicative situations that affect the production and the understanding 
of discourse (ibid.: 4).  
The same content will have ‘very different functions while uttered in 
different situations’ (van Dijk 2008: 5) and this makes each context a unique 
experience formulated for a certain communicative situation (ibid.: 16). The 
participants in a particular discourse are engaged in defining it in a way that 
is relevant to them, something which makes context subjective (van Dijk 
2009b: 5). This subjectivity suggests the mediation of mental representations 
of contexts, which can be called mental models (ibid.: 5). A model can be 
defined as ‘a subjective representation of an episode’ that gets stored in the 
long-term memory with one’s personal experiences, which are affected by 
one’s own interests, emotions, perspectives and other personal elements 
(ibid.: 6). This means that, like mental models, contexts are dynamic and 
undergo constant updating and adaptation (van Dijk 2008: 18). However, 
despite being subjective, these models are not entirely personal, as they have 
‘social inter-subjective dimensions’ to them, based on shared knowledge and 
shared beliefs, i.e. on social representations. The ‘intersubjective’ property of 
these models helps create mutual grounds of understanding among 
participants in a discourse (van Dijk 2009b: 6). This means that ‘contexts are 
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not some (part of a) social situation, but a subjective mental model of such a 
situation’ (ibid.: 7, emphasis in original). 
Another concept that becomes important in the discussion of context 
in SCA is that of ‘contextualising’. Contextuality can be defined as ‘making 
inferences about [one’s] definition of the communicative situation,’ with 
which others involved in the context may or may not agree (van Dijk 2008: 
2): ‘[T]he notion of the context is the broadest in CDA, since this explicitly 
includes social-psychological, political and ideological components and 
thereby postulates an interdisciplinary procedure’ (Titscher et al. 2007: 166). 
 
3.6 Criticisms of CDA and SCA 
As with any theory or approach, CDA has not avoided criticism. A major 
recurring criticism of CDA is that it focuses on certain texts and fails to 
present a comprehensive picture of the situation being handled. However, as 
long as excluded text units are not left out deliberately in order to mislead 
the audience or readers or knowingly to conceal some facts or perspectives, 
the relatively narrower focus is justifiable. That is because it is meant to 
allow higher precision and concentration. Hence, the urge to focus on 
controversial or intriguing discourse or on text units is a meaningful strategy 
to reach or try to reach CDA’s objective: enlightening and empowering the 
people affected by the issue discussed.  
Additionally, although the concept of social representations is central 
to SCA and has been theoretically elaborated repeatedly by van Dijk, it is 
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first of all difficult, if not impossible, to pin down precise social 
representations at the practical analytical level in texts and discourses, but 
only manifestations and reflections of their workings. The concept has also 
been extensively criticised by many academics for being vague and 
overlapping with other concepts. Potter and Litton (1985) present a detailed 
discussion of what they consider are the problems or difficulties underlying 
the theory of social representations. The four problems as they put them are: 
 
 the relationship between groups and social representations; 
 problems of consensus and the level at which social 
representations are shared; 
 the operation of social representations within particular 
contexts of use; 
 the role of language in social representations. 
(ibid.: 81) 
 
To take a step toward to constructing an applicable method instead of 
getting caught in debates, I next present the research approach and use my 
findings and observations in the pilot study to construct a research method.  
 
3.7 Pilot Study 
At the beginning of this research, I set a broad research question: how is 
language used by different religious parties in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives to convey and enforce their ideological power? I then 
attended a couple of parliamentary sittings. Below are some of my 
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observations of language use on the sittings held on 5 October 2008 from 
9:30 to 12:20, which then resumed at 1:00 p.m. I left the session at 2.20 
before it had finished.  
The purpose of randomly attending some sessions was to acquaint 
myself with the setting of the Bahraini Council of Representatives debates 
and to take notes on language use in order to be able to specify an area of 
interest or a theme, or note anything that would help focus my research 
objectives. In the sittings I attended, I noted the following: 
 
 Standard Arabic (SA) is the official language in the Parliament and 
the prepared speeches and comments are all in SA.  
 In speeches that have not been written in advance, SA is still mainly 
used, especially for the core discussion, conversations and for less 
emotional comments. 
 During parliamentary debates, SA is dominant but with minimal, if 
any, use of word-end ḥarakāt.37 Competence in using word-end 
ḥarakāt is positively associated with other elements of the SA 
competence of the speaker, as the more language-competent the 
speaker is, the more ḥarakāt are used. 
The SA language competence of some MPs is much higher than 
others, and this is notably used as (a) ‘an instrument of situation 
management’ (Suleiman 2004: 11), and (b) a chance for a quick, mild 
mock of other’s mistakes, but this nevertheless seems to demonstrate 
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power and appears to indirectly assert who has the upper hand in the 
parliament. 
 There is a level of ḥarakāt that cannot be avoided, and these are the 
types of ḥarakāt that appear with the word’s letters other than the last 
letter, not only as an addition to the last letter of the words. One 
example of this that was used in this session is: the words يدين مستف
mustamīdīn and مستفيدون mustamīdūn, both of which are the same Arabic 
word. The choice between them depends on which part of speech 
they appear as (i.e. grammatically). Another example from this 
session is kalimatā كلمتا   and kalimatay كلمتَي  ; again these are the same 
Arabic word and, again, the choice is based on the grammatical 
function of the word. With these words, there is more chance of 
making mistakes, and the more spontaneous the speech, the more 
prone to error their usage becomes. In this parliamentary session, the 
first word was used in a spontaneous comment by an MP who made a 
‘grammatical’ error in his choice (he chose the former form, مستفيدين  
mustamīdīn, when the grammatically correct form was the second, 
 mustamīdūn), but this mistake in spontaneous speech either  مستفيدون
passed unnoticed or was considered at least ‘permissible’. With the 
second word, another MP commented on its being misused in the 
item under discussion. He said that the form that should be used was 
 kalimatā and tried to justify this with an كلمتا  kalimay instead of  كلمتَي
incorrect grammatical explanation. Several other MPs immediately 
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saw that his explanation had nothing to do with that word form and 
laughed. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Bahrain dialects (BHDs) have words whose 
equivalents in SA are very different, as وايِد wāyid or واجد wadjid in BHDs for 
 شلون jiddan in SA (‘a lot’, and ‘very’ respectively), and  جدا   kathīr and  كثير
shlown for كيف  kayfa (how). Still, although these are noticeably avoided in 
official and major communications, a considerable number of the MPs still 
pronounced some SA words in a different way that belonged neither to SA 
nor to BHDs, but was more like the word spelled as an SA word and 
pronounced with a Bahraini accent. This sometimes resulted in a new 
pronunciation of the word, but one that would be fully understandable to all 
SA speakers; at other times, the resultant pronunciation was identical to 
pronunciations of those words in Arabic dialects other than Bahraini, such as 
pronouncing kayfa as kaif, a pronunciation used in many other Gulf dialects, 
including Saudi and Omani dialects. 
 
 Interjections are almost always in BHDs, such as يعني  yaʿni (i.e. ‘which 
means’), and  ِشسمه shismah (i.e. ‘whatsitsname’ or ‘whatshisname’).  
 Brief humorous comments and socialising comments almost always 
follow a clear pattern:  
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o Mostly in BHDs when an MP is making the comment, usually 
accompanied with a smile, a change in tone and a change in 
the head direction. Examples:  
 After MP Abdulhalim Murad discussed the requirements 
for a broker’s job in the item being examined, he added 
as a final sentence: أهم شي يعرف يعد الفلوس aham shay yʿarf 
yaḥsib il mlūs, i.e. the most important thing is that he can 
count money.  
 In discussing a proposal for a student fund, the phrase 
 ṭawīlul madā, i.e. long-distance, was used to  طويل المدى
describe instalments to be paid by students taking out 
loans. A side comment in BHD was:  ,طويل المدى؟ ليش
؟صواريخ   ṭawīlul madā? leish, ṣrwārīkh? i.e. ‘Long-
distance? Why? [Are they] missiles?’  
o Mostly in SA when the Speaker is trying to impose order but in 
a friendly and humorous way, he accompanies his SA 
comments with a smile, often dropping his head and looking 
up toward the MPs over his reading glasses; after a short pause, 
the comment is made at a pace slower than his usual speech. 
He is well received and the MPs always take such comments 
positively. Examples:  
 م فيِه األصابع وليس اللسانالتصويت تُستخد   attaṣwīt 
tustakhdam mīhil aṣābiʿ wa lyysal lisān, i.e. ‘in 
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voting, fingers are used and not the tongue’ (asking 
the MPs to stop side discussions and to press the 
buttons in front of them to register their votes). 
This is a rather interesting reversed use of SA, in 
which the Speaker lowers his authoritative 
supremacy by using it in a humorous way. 
  
 Scorn and disapproval are almost always expressed in BHDs, and 
Bahraini idioms and expressions are intensively used for this. Here, 
the meaning behind the BHD expression is often, but not always, 
unfamiliar to the other SA speakers. Examples:  
 PM Ebrahim Al Hadi, objecting to reducing some 
penalties, ends his talk with the comments: ( بنكون
 .binkūn baṣṣarnā ʿalaihumil barāʾah, i.e بّصرنا عليهم البراءة 
‘we will have shown them [the way to claim] 
innocence.’ 
 
As can be seen from the examples above, although SA is the official language 
of the Parliament and is the one that is consciously and deliberately given 
priority over BHDs in presenting and discussing the agenda, BHDs still have 
great value in the MPs’ communication. The language spoken in the Bahraini 





a. implicit agreement on omitting the end ḥarakāt when using SA and 
overlooking mistakes with inter-word grammatical ḥarakāt in spoken 
discussions (although the latter is taken seriously in the written forms 
of paper work both produced or discussed by the Parliament) 
b. the presence of a strong Bahraini accent, or the Bahranisation of the 
pronunciation of SA (as explained above) by the vast majority of the 
MPs, each of whom applies his or her own dialect (notice that in 
Bahrain itself there are several dialects, which fall mainly into a 
division between speakers of Bahraini dialects and speakers of 
Bahrani dialects. Further details are in Section 2.3.2) 
c. BHD expressions and phrases are frequently and repeatedly used 
without any objection or hesitation, but they are increasingly 
associated with subjectivity as they are almost always used with 
personal and emotional articulations (whether positive or negative), 
and with more sociable and more affable expressions. 
 
However, because I was taking notes manually, I could not make comments 
about discursive devices or comments on any other language use that would 
be helpful in writing a critical discourse analysis. I therefore realised that it 
would be much more useful to get either a video or audio recording or to get 
detailed transcriptions of the sittings. I structured my method accordingly 
(see Section 3.8‎3.8).  
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I also noted that the reaction and level of interaction differed from 
one party to another in some political themes, as sometimes members of Al 
Wefaq would be more interactive and, at other times, Al Minbar and Asalah 
would be more interactive. This observation supported the theoretical 
background I had been collecting on political power, language and religion. 
Together with the theoretical background, these observations motivated the 
research hypothesis (see Section 1.2). The pilot study also necessitated 
setting a list of discursive devices, at least a provisional one, to start with 
when analysing the data (the discursive devices are listed in Section 2.6). 
The pilot study also drew my attention to the importance of humour and 
emotions in the political discourse in Bahrain, features that I had not 
considered as discursive devices before. 
  
3.8 Method 
This research method drew on the literature on CDA and context theories 
discussed above. SCA does not provide a set of guidelines for doing analysis; 
different methods of analysis of discourse or text can be applied within the 
model’s parameters. The method followed to collect and analyse data was 
based primarily on critically analysing excerpts from Hansard of the 
Bahraini Council of Representatives. There have been many attempts to 





CDA involves a principled and transparent shunting back and forth 
between the microanalysis of texts using varied tools of linguistics, 
semiotic, and literary analysis and the macroanalysis of social 
formations, institutions, and power relations that these texts index 
and construct.  
 
Theoretical sampling is possible because my research, despite it being 
principally deductive, involves both deductive and inductive reasoning. It is 
deductive in that I adopted the theories on power, language and religion and 
set a hypothesis on the basis of the related theoretical background and 
information to the Bahraini society. The research is inductive in that I 
allowed my analysis to reconstruct the methodology on one hand and 
allowed the list of devices to initiate a list of discursive strategies without 
any presumptions on the other hand.  
The method I followed consisted of six steps, each of which considered 
the tools of microanalysis and macroanalysis that were relevant to the 
research objectives. The first stage was setting criteria and procedures for 
choosing data and excerpts suitable for testing the research hypothesis and 
meeting the research objectives. The second step was deciding on the main 
discursive devices, an initial list of devices open to addition and amendment. 
The list then was used to observe and comment on in the analysis while 
finding more devices, something which served to test the hypothesis and 
meet the objectives. After analysing the excerpts in hand, finalising the list 
of discursive devices and illustrating how they were employed in 
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constructing an argument, the next step was looking back to see if there a 
systematic use of devices in a way that it would serve the struggle over 
power in among the different sects. In this research, I call such systematic 
uses ‘discursive strategies’. After the observed discursive strategies were 
identified, the way they were employed by the Sunni parties was compared 
to the way they were employed by the Shiite party in the Council. I further 
explain these steps in more detail the next two sections.  
 
3.9 Data and criteria for choosing data 
As presented in the introduction (Sections 1.2 and 1.3), my research 
hypothesizes that the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of representatives 
employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs in parliamentary debates. Among 
many topics discussed in the Council, I noticed that the topic of dissent 
control and political freedom are raised extensively in the second legislative 
period, 2006–2010. I thus set the research aims to observe whether, and if 
so how, the three political parties discursive strategies to achieve the 
following ideological goals:  
 
 attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the 
parliamentary discussions on political freedom and dissent-
controlling laws  
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 manoeuvring the definition(s) of self and others in the 
contexts of dissent-controlling law and political rights  
 manipulating the law to support a party’s ideological 
stances about dissent-controlling laws and the definition of 
political freedom and political rights. 
 
The second goal was exploring whether and how the use of discursive 
devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. 
 
To test the hypothesis and achieve the set goals, the research used two 
sources of data: the parliamentary Hansard and local newspapers, and below 
I will explain how these data were used.  
 
3.9.1 Hansard 
I first of all needed to obtain records of parliamentary sittings. When I 
started fieldwork in October 2008, the Bahraini Council of Representatives 
was running its second legislative term, which had started in September 
2006. Each legislative term at the Bahraini Council of Representatives is four 
years long. As taking notes manually had proven inadequate, I decided to 
record the subsequent sessions I attended, but the recording quality was 
inferior due to a malfunction in the audio recorder. To avoid such 
unexpected but possible disappointment, I decided to try to obtain access to 
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video or audio recordings made by the Bahraini Council of Representatives 
itself. The last sitting of the second legislative period was held on 26 May 
2009, something which meant that all the agendas, recordings of sessions 
and minutes of this legislative period (October 2006 to May 2009) were 
available and complete. This meant that there was a full ‘unit’ of data to 
examine. 
To build up the background on which the analysis would be based, I 
first browsed the Parliament’s web pages and went through the hand-outs 
and manuals published by the Bahraini Council of Representatives. I chose 
CDA as a perspective and CSA as an approach (more details in Section ‎3.5). 
When I started collecting data, there were two lists on the web page 
of the Bahraini Council of Representatives (the webpage is fully in Arabic 
until the time this research was written): one was summaries of the ten most 
recent regular sittings and one of the ten most recent exceptional sittings. At 
the time, the former was for sittings from 24 March up to 26 May 2009 
within the second legislative period. I went through the available 
summaries, paying particular attention to recurring themes. One theme that 
caught my attention and stirred my curiosity was the conflict in defining and 
reacting to incidents or acts that could be seen as a source of ‘dissent’ to 
some and as a ‘political right’ to others. The definition of these two is 
controversial and largely ideologically determined, as will become clear 
from the excerpts and the subsequent analysis. I looked for discussions 
related to riots, to political freedom, to arrests related to political stances or 
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riots, to government boundaries when it comes to the public’s privacy, to 
penal laws and punishments, to weapons, and to other relevant topics. I 
wrote a list of the dates on which these themes were put forward in the 
agendas of the twenty sittings available online. I was aware that there would 
be indirect references to or indications of the themes elsewhere under other 
items and in other discussions, but since there were no subject indices in 
Hansard, it was not very easy to find these instances. I first tried only to use 
the instances referred to in the agenda. This was not very reliable, as the 
agendas did not match consistently with the content of Hansard (see 
Appendix A to see how the agenda did not match the content). 
I contacted Bahrain Television (BTV) and asked for a list of available 
video recordings of the parliamentary sittings. Each of the recordings I 
received was no longer than 45 minutes, while on average, the actual 
parliamentary sittings were four hours long. When I requested full 
recordings from the Parliament itself, my request was declined on the basis 
of confidentiality. I was, however, allowed access to Hansard in the form of 
soft copies on CDs. The CDs also contained attachments to Hansard 
organised in two files per sitting: one Word document file for the debate 
itself and one attached PDF file relating to that particular sitting. Most of the 
attachments were around 300 pages long with no table of contents or index. 
Despite realising that Hansard is censored in the sense that some sentences 
or expressions are ‘toned down’ or rephrased to sound less vulgar, I decided 




 Suitability of Hansard 3.9.1.1
Hansard is an extensive record and, as the transcriptions are denaturalised 
(i.e. they do not have any notations signalling speed, intonation, pauses, 
overlaps or volume of speech), they are, as such, sufficient for CDA. Hansard 
is suitable source of data for this research. Tracy (1991: 184) explains that 
‘the more deductive […] one’s research approach, the more license a 
researcher has to transcribe broadly; the more inductive [...], the more 
important it is to record a larger number of particulars.’ For this research, 
using a denaturalised transcription style was sufficient, as the focus is on the 
meaning rather than on the phonological aspects that naturalised 
transcription adds to an excerpt. It is true that Hansard of the Bahraini 
Council of Representatives is subject to minor amendments during 
transcription, such as the reordering of words in spontaneous utterances to 
make them clearer, and the addition of some formalities, such as starting by 
thanking the Speaker even if the MP speaking did not do so (Ebrahim 2009). 
Another reason why Hansard is suitable source of data is that the sittings 
were too long to attend fully, which means I would have collected with 
fewer recordings of fewer sittings. Had I chosen to attend sittings, I would 
have inspected a smaller number of sittings in total than I if I had chosen to 
go through Hansard of a complete legislative session. Additionally, 
depending on attending sittings would have been very likely to impede the 
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process of deciding on criteria for choosing excerpts and it would also have 
meant less chance of tracking down a theme through different parliamentary 
sittings.  
There were no subject indices in Hansard itself, and I could not 
anticipate when the themes were mentioned or referred to under other 
topics or debates. Reading the full Hansard was not an option because of its 
length (most records are around 300 pages per sitting), and the agendas 
were neither sufficiently detailed nor fully reflective of what was covered in 
the actual sittings. I therefore decided to go through the archive of the 
Akhbar Al-Khaleej Newspaper reports of the sittings held in that legislative 
period. More on how the newspaper was used to find suitable data is in the 
Section 3.9.2. 
Another reason why Hansard is suitable source of data is that the 
transcripts are becoming more and more accurate, as stated by the Director 
of Committee Affairs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives (Al-
Hadhrami 2009), and they include even colloquial words, expressions and 
foreign words as uttered by the speaker (ibid.). The excerpts I use appear to 
have had minimal, if any, interference. This can be seen from the fact that 
conflicts, repetitions, interruptions, unfinished sentences, non-constructive 
and irrelevant utterances, and even discourteous ones, are transcribed in 
Hansard. I provide some translated instances showing how close the 
transcription is likely to be to the original; these examples would have been 




Example 1: An interrupted speech 
JLF: … There was an agreement -where has Brother MP Sheikh Adel 
Abdulrahman Al-Mu’awdah gone? – that the Chairman of the 
Committee withdraw the proposal for at least one week, … . 
(Hansard of Sitting 14, 29 Jan. 2008) 
 
Example 2: Bad collocations and wrong choice of vocabulary 
KM:  We believe that there are many ways to address political 
situations without getting into security mazes*. Security 
mazes* complicate the situation, they do not offer solutions but 
increase charge*… .38  
(Hansard of Sitting 13, 27 Jan. 2009) 
 
Example 3: Irrelevant jokes using common knowledge  
DS:  Thank you. With bill proposals, there is no discussion and no 
argument, no obscenity or depravity. So we vote for either 
approval or rejection.  
(Hansard of Sitting 14, 29 Jan. 2008) 
 
Example 4: Conflicts and harsh exchanges 
S:  Mohammed Al-Miz’al I will get you out myself– 
MM:  You have no right to. As a council you have no right to. You 
have no right. 
MK: Is it up to you? 
MM:  Shut up– 
MK:  Get out 
(Hansard of Sitting 10, 30 Dec. 2008) 
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Example 5: Incomplete utterances 
MM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course we are with—I mean when 
we talk about banning manufacturing, selling, storing, 
producing, or developing chemical weapons… . 
(Hansard Sitting 16, 12 Feb. 2008) 
 
The data are transcribed and published, but hardly edited at all, and this 
edition has no, or only minimal and occasional, changes. It is also worth 
noting that each MP receives a copy of Hansard of each sitting for revision 
before the following session. In this way, each MP has sufficient time to 
check that his or her speeches have not been twisted in a way that their 
meanings or purposes are affected. This again minimises the possibility of 
biased editing. The minimal editing would, in any case, not fundamentally 
affect the overall content and analysis, since my approach, SCA, is more 
interested in the broader perspective: the practical applications of discourse, 
which facilitate understanding the social representations in the examined 
discourses. 
In this way, Hansard is suitable for my research goals and for testing 
its hypothesis. The analysis of this data contributes to testing the hypothesis 
of the research to find out if the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs when 
participating in parliamentary debates.  
It is true that, as in most parliamentary debates and any political 
language, these data are not spontaneous and are rather planned or semi-
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planned. Nevertheless, even in semi-planned situations, political speeches 
follow or attempt to follow previously set ideological restrictions and 
expectations. This is very characteristic of political speeches, whether read 
out from papers, recited, or given in reply to questions or in interviews. This, 
however, does not make planned or semi-planned discourses less valuable; 
on the contrary, the planning ensures that the speeches reflect or attempt to 
fulfil the ideological conventions and perspectives of the political affiliation 
of the speaker. 
 
 Translation and transliteration 3.9.1.2
The original Arabic excerpts of Hansard are provided in the appendix to this 
thesis, followed by their English translations. Since all the discourses being 
examined were conducted exclusively and entirely in Arabic while this thesis 
is written in English, the excerpts referred to obviously required translation, 
resulting in an inevitable loss of nuance, association, register, ambiguity and 
other significant and crucial aspects of the discourses. However, I aimed to 
limit this as much as possible. In the translated versions, I have tried to 
maintain the style and structure of the original text as much as possible by 
reproducing the same style, the interruptions, the incomplete utterances, etc. 
In the analysis section, I have quoted only the English translation, not the 
Arabic, for convenience as it would be very distracting and difficult to follow 
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if each example were presented in both Arabic and English, especially given 
that I have quoted speeches repeatedly and closely.  
In the English translations of the excerpts, whether in the appendix or 
whenever quoted in the analysis chapter, there are some phrases or 
collocations that were constructed in an improper linguistic structure. I have 
deliberately translated them into a parallel improper structure in English to 
preserve the style, but I have indicated any instance of deliberate ‘bad 
language’ by underlining it and following it with an asterisk. In addition, it 
will be noticed that I use italics in the speeches. If used only for single 
words, then the use indicates stress;39 when with a long, full linguistic unit 
(i.e. a passage) within a speech, preceded by ‘(reading)’, then it is an act or 
proposal that is being read. There are a few speeches by non-MPs that are 
fully italic included in the full excerpts in the appendix, and this is to 
indicate that these speeches, unlike the speeches of the MPs, have had the 
content translated without conveying any other hesitations or mistakes since 
I did not intend to analyse any non-MP speeches in this research. 
 
3.9.2 Using newspapers 
I started with Akhbar Al-Khaleej newspaper because it is the oldest and most 
widely circulated local newspaper published in the Arabic language in 
Bahrain. Again, as there were so many articles relating to the Parliament, I 
decided to go only through the articles that reported the sittings of the 
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chosen excerpts and MPs’ press releases directly related to those chosen 
excerpts, but not articles with views, analysis, criticism or comments on the 
sittings or the MPs. I therefore excluded columns, editorials, extras, features, 
fillers and reviews. In my search for related reports and press releases, I 
started a few months before the second legislative session began in order to 
obtain a fuller picture of the argument expanding over time and see when it 
intensified, regardless of the legislative period’s start and finish. 
I referred to the archive of Akhbar Al-Khaleej, and there was a series 
of files assigned for news and articles about the Bahraini Parliament cut out 
from the newspaper and filed in chronological order. It consisted of news 
reporting the sittings, MPs’ press releases, reportages and columns which 
mentioned the parliament. Among these, I chose to make a record of the 
articles reporting the parliamentary sittings held from June 2007 until 
December 2009. Since regular sittings are held on Tuesdays, the weekly 
report of the sittings is often published on the following day, i.e. on 
Wednesdays, and sometimes two days later, i.e. on Thursdays. The dates of 
all the sittings in which topics related to limiting political freedom or dissent 
control were noted. I found that these topics were discussed more 
intensively in the period from December 2007 to December 2009 (a period 
of two years). I kept a record of what was reported to refer to in the 
analysis. I examined further Hansard records of dates beyond May 2009 
until the end of the Second Legislative Period.  
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I noticed that this intensity was associated with political incidents 
involving riots, clashes with the government and the vandalism of public 
property, something that I have taken into account and presented at the 
analysis stage; it is an important part of the political context of the excerpts 
being analysed. Since the period above started before the beginning of the 
second legislative period, I requested the CD of Hansard for the previous 
legislative period. I then used the noted dates to trace back the exact 
Hansard record of the sittings in which the theme was brought up or 
discussed (most of the time one day before the report was published, but 
sometimes up to three days before).  
When referring to newspaper articles, the reference (issue number, 
page and date) of the articles are given in the analysis. It is important to 
note that, when referred to, the newspaper reports are not to be considered 
in this research as representations of what was stated in the sittings, but 
rather as an illustration of how the issues are covered by the newspapers. On 
the other hand, the press releases made by MPs are a chance for them to 
further express themselves on past and upcoming issues within the 
parliament. The press releases, on the other hand, provide a chance to add 
reactions to and stances on topics, speeches and actions, and to add views on 
either upcoming or past debates. This adds more instances to support or 
challenge the findings and analysis made of the ideological struggle and 
identities in Hansard excerpts. These press releases are an opportunity for 
the MPs to reinforce, reframe, rectify or deny the contents of parliamentary 
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debate. This makes these newspaper excerpts a strong ideological tool that 
the MPs and their parties can use to address the public. In this way, 
reinforcing the analysis of excerpts from parliamentary debate with 
newspaper articles and press releases helped, first, to provide a contextual 
background for the events, and secondly, to cross-examine my readings of 
the ideological goals and motivations.  
 
3.10 Analysing Data  
3.10.1 Major discursive categories analysed  
The hypothesis of the research is that the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini 
Council of representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs in 
parliamentary debates. As mentioned previously, to test this hypothesis, the 
research set its objectives to, first, observing whether, and if so how, the 
three political parties use language to achieve the following ideological 
goals:  
 
 attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the 
parliamentary discussions of political freedom and dissent-controlling 
laws  
 manoeuvring the definition(s) of self and others in the contexts of 
dissent-controlling law and political rights  
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 manipulating the law to support a party’s ideological stance on 
dissent-controlling laws and the definition of political freedom and 
political rights. 
 
The second objective was to explore whether and how the use of discursive 
devices and strategies can reflect the sectarian ideological conflict in 
Bahrain. The topic of identity and ideology in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives language is a major multifaceted issue in Bahrain. As I 
explained in Section 2.2.1, differences in sectarian identities in language 
choices and variations. Therefore, to achieve the objectives of this research I 
searched for and analysed the following discursive devices in the chosen 
data:  
 
 shift between local accents and classical Arabic 
 emotive speech  
 framing and reframing  
 quoting other sources  
 humour 
 discourse markers 
 lexical style 
 local semantic moves such as disclaimers 
 speech acts 
 rhetorical features 
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 propositional structure 
 turn-takings. 
 
This list is based on (a) the analysis made in the pilot study (see Section ‎3.7) 
and (b) the continuous feedback between the analysis and the data. Initially 
I developed a provisional list of discursive devices to detect before analysing 
the excerpts, but the list was adjusted during the analysis process and only 
finalised when the analysis was completed. I also checked my analysis while 
in progress against the list of devices mentioned in Wodak and Meyer (ibid.), 
and chose from their list what could be detected in my excerpts. Among the 
fourteen they listed, I chose six (the latter six in the list above). There was a 
reason for eliminating each of excluded devices. For example, they 
mentioned stress, intonation and hesitation, all of which cannot be detected 
in my excerpts, as the excerpts are in the form of denaturalised 
transcriptions. The authors also mentioned word order and syntactic 
structures, both of which cannot be analysed properly as I am not analysing 
the excerpts per se but a translated version of them, something that means 
the syntactic structure and word order are no longer those uttered by the 
interlocutors. Another mentioned device in Wodak and Meyer’s list is 
repairs, but many of these are not possible to detect because the 
transcription process is unlikely to include self-repairs, which matter most 
here. There were examples of interrupted sentences and repairs marked with 
an editing term such as ‘I mean’ but not instant repairs such as ‘acreo- 
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archaeology’ or hesitation presented in silences or by exclamations such as 
'er' or 'um'. The detected discursive devices, in short, are basically built on 
what the data offer. This two-way move between the list and the analysis is 
part of the process of theoretical sampling, which is followed in CDA (see 
Section ‎3.8 for more on theoretical sampling). 
Based on CDA’s dictum that that language is a way in which the 
people in power exercise and maintain power, and that ‘[p]ower relations 
are always relations of struggle’ (Fairclough 1989: 33-34, emphasis in 
original), in the Analysis Chapter, I searched for a linguistic pattern of 
exercising this struggle over power in the excerpt and found three major 
discursive strategies. Each of the three discursive strategies is a discursive 
tactic at a macro level that employs a number of discursive devices at its 
micro level. My analysis led me to categorise these under the following three 
titles: 
 
 corroborating by information  
 intensifying grievance  
 centralising pride and dignity. 
 
I present further details on discursive devices in Chapter 4 as I analyse the 
excerpts. However, in short, the above three discursive strategies appear to 
encompass the ideological struggle over power in the chosen excerpts, and 
very likely in most of the parliamentary debates in the Bahraini Council of 
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Representatives. The presentation and analysis of the strategies take into 
account the concept that SCA emphasises about the duality of social and 
cognitive facets of discourse. By ‘corroborating by information’, I mean the 
use of facts, statistics, news and any kind of information to empower the 
speaker as someone who knows better or knows more. By ‘intensifying 
grievance’, I mean displaying weakness and possible injustice or 
misunderstanding as a strategy of defence, something that, in return, 
empowers the speaker and the case. ‘Centralising pride and dignity’ is about 
proposing an objection, rejection or demand that is justified by the belief 
that this proposition fulfils either the speaker’s or a referent’s pride and 
dignity. Identifying these strategies and devices was achieved under the 
analytical framework below. 
 
3.10.2 Five-stage analytical framework 
An important point that van Dijk (2009a: 63) stresses is that CDA research 
‘should be accessible, and avoid esoteric style.’ In order to achieve this, I 
have attempted to follow van Dijk in avoiding unnecessary jargon. I also 
followed a research framework that I adopted from Fairclough (2001: 235–
239) in order to make my analysis systematic, and thus accessible. 
Fairclough modelled this framework upon the concept of ‘explanatory 
critique’ presented by Roy Bhaskar (1986). This analytical framework 




Stage 1: Focusing upon a social problem that has a semiotic aspect 
A social problem can be in a social practice: (a) in activities of the social 
practice or (b) in the representation of this social practice (Fairclough 2001: 
236). In my research, the problem is in an activity of a social problem: the 
difficulty facing the Council in reaching an agreement about defining and 
specifying when an act or law is constraining political freedom and when it 
is actually controlling dissent. This is due to the divergence in the perception 
and definition of dissent and, consequently, in its association with political 
freedom by the different political parties. The first research objective aims at 
finding out how various strategies used by different political parties in 
debates over this topic are required to achieve the ideological goals 
mentioned under the first objective of the research. This is because different 
strategies highlight some or all of the following: 
 
 various language competence levels that can be related to individual 
differences or political affiliation differences 
 various priorities and agendas 
 various degrees of attention given to the audience apart from the MPs 
themselves, starting with reporters attending the sittings, to 





Stage 2: Identifying obstacles to the social problem being tackled 
Fairclough (ibid.) explains that the objective of this stage is ‘to understand 
how the problem arises and how it is rooted in the way social life is 
organised.’ He adds that this stage should identify how much context is 
relevant for the analysis (ibid.: 337). In this research, the obstacle to 
reaching an agreement about drawing a line between political freedom and 
dissent that needs to be controlled by law is rooted in the social and 
religious affiliation of the parliament parties. Al Wefaq is a Shiite party 
representing a large proportion of the Bahraini society, having not only a 
distinct sectarian background but also a distinct ethnic, historical and 
cultural background from that of the Sunnis. These differences are succinctly 
presented in Section 2.3. The confrontations of Sunni and Shiite activists and 
oppositions with the law and the government have been different too, and 
the confrontations that are concurrent with the debates also create a 
divergence that widens the gap between the two groups’ perception and 
definition of dissent and, accordingly, its association with political freedom. 
 The political conflict between Sunni and Shiite politicians in Bahrain, 
and the desire of each to gain more power and credence, generates the need 
to be more convincing. The sectarian conflict is historically rooted, and it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to ignore this when analysing parliamentary 
debates in general and linguistic strategies in particular. In the period before 
the parliament was established, there was major conflict between the Shiites 
and the Sunni government, and a number of confrontations between 
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individual Sunni activists and the government. The political structure in the 
Bahraini Council of Representatives could reflect the social, ethnic and 
religious differences among the three political parties dominating the 
parliament. It has become a new ‘battlefield’, with language being its 
strongest weapon. However, the competition over parliamentary seats has 
accentuated the struggle for authority and political power between the two 
sects, in addition to the struggle between each of the parties and the 
government. This is not to say that there was no tension or competition 
between the sects before the parliament was established, but the nature of 
the competition has changed dramatically. Further details of the sectarian 
and ethnical composition are provided in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1.  
 
Stage 3: Deciding if the social order ‘needs’ this problem 
This stage questions whether there is a social order that benefits if the 
problem persists (ibid.: 236). Fairclough (ibid.: 238) explains that the point 
of this stage is ‘to assess the degree to which problems in their semiotic 
aspect are an insuperable part of the social order as presently constituted.’ 
This stage relates to my second research objective, which aims at finding if 
and how the use of discursive devices and strategies can reflect the sectarian 
ideological conflict in Bahrain. This objective, hence, can contribute to 
deciding if the social order ‘needs’ this problem. 
With two major religious groupings in Bahrain, the Shiites and the 
Sunnis, the domination of Islamic parties in both legislative sessions was 
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expected. Bahrain is the only Arab country with such strong, explicitly 
diverse sectarian parties in the parliament, to the extent that they exceed the 
presence of any other type of grouping (32 members for three Islamic parties 
to 8 for all others). This diverse presence gives the sectarian division a 
prominent and explicit political existence that cannot be overridden. As with 
any political party winning seats in a parliament, each of the three Islamic 
parties needs to convey their perception and definition of dissent and 
accordingly its association with political freedom in order to maintain the 
party’s seats in the upcoming elections since the issue is one on which 
parties are actively campaigning.40 Each party is required to demonstrate 
that its choices and perspectives are the most appropriate and most credible 
for the good of the country and its people.  
Who benefits from the persistence of this problem might seem unclear 
at the beginning, but apparently, during the second legislative period, from 
which the excerpts are taken and in which the Sunni and Shiite parties have 
almost equal presence in the parliament,41 each group may hold on to its 
stances and keep the conflict unresolved, hoping that the next, or any 
following, legislative elections will end up with more seats for its party, thus 
allowing that party to impose its perception and definition of dissent and, 
accordingly, its association with political freedom. This topic never fails to 
attract the attention of the laypeople in Bahrain and clearly their stances in a 
very similar way to that division in in the stances of the political parties in 
the Council. Therefore, the political parties are eager about the topic and 
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very persistent and even emotive about exhibiting their ability to force their 
stance in the legislations of the country in order to fulfil an instance public, 
or rather voters’, expectation. 
 
Stage 4: Identifying possible ways past the obstacles 
According to Fairclough, this stage ‘shifts to dialectical logic.’ It examines 
various network practices in order to point out any ‘potentials for change’ in 
the social problem being examined by focusing on gaps, contradictions, 
paradoxes and contradictions in the text (ibid.: 239). In my research, I have 
assumed that there are a number of contradictions between the national, 
human and legal incentives that are used to tackle issues discussed in the 
parliamentary debates on the one hand, and the actual predetermined and 
ideologically rooted motivations of the political parties on the other hand. In 
the analysis, the instances are analysed to show whether a demand, an 
objection or a complaint has more than a legal incentive behind it, such as a 
political or sectarian incentive. Realising such incentives makes it easier to 
accept or reject any demand, objection or complaint more objectively. 
 
Stage 5: Reflecting on the analysis of stages 1 to 4 
Fairclough (ibid.: 236) first points out that this stage is not part of Bhaskar’s 
explanatory critique, but rather an addition that he himself finds vital. He 
explains that a researcher carrying out a discourse analysis is part of the 
network of the social practices he or she is analysing (ibid.: 239). Therefore, 
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the researcher should question if they are ‘an obstacle to their work having 
any significance or value for people located in other social practices,’ and 
examine how the analysis can ‘contribute to emancipatory change’ (ibid.).  
To ensure that I am do not abstain the significance of my own 
research, first, when it comes to the three discursive strategies in the 
ideological struggle over power in the Bahraini Council of Representative 
that I observed, I made sure that the description and specifications of the 
strategies make it possible to track the strategies in other political settings, 
whether in political discourses in Bahrain or elsewhere. Secondly, 
understanding that I am part of the social network and that my personal 
stances and views may limit and direct my analysis, I made sure to include 
certain steps in my analysis to make it more representative and more 
inclusive of the topic in hand. I first analysed all the excerpts that fit the 
criteria for choosing excerpts: being from Hansard and being a transcription 
of what MPs said during the parliamentary sittings. I also used 
intertextuality to support my analysis and show if and how the Sunni parties 
and the Shiite party tend to use certain discursive devices and discursive 
strategies differently. Intertextuality made my analysis less judgemental and 
less subjective.  
The five stages are presented in the data analysis, which is in two 
separate chapters: the first analytical chapter, which is significantly longer 
than the following one, is called ‘the Analysis of Discursive Strategies’. This 
chapter is stage 1 of the above mentioned analytical framework. It focuses 
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upon the social (political) problem. This is carried out by identifying 
discursive devices and how they serve to construct discursive strategies as 
stated earlier. The first stage built a background upon which stages 2, 3 and 
4 could be built. Stages 2 and 3, defining an obstacle, deciding which social 
order ‘needs’ this obstacle and identifying possible ways past the obstacle, 
are presented in the following chapter, entitled ‘Exploring the Ideologies’. As 
for stage 5, it is carried out throughout the analysis. Adhering to the above 
mentioned five stages helped present an explanatory critique, in which CDA 
is interested, and which consequently leads to the fulfilment of the research 
objectives and, thus, the testing of the research hypothesis. 
 
3.10.3 Presenting findings before the discussion 
I have chosen to first present the three discursive strategies and explain what 
I mean by each. I then present the excerpt analyses in chronological order 
and illustrate which strategy is used at which stage as I go on analysing. The 
reason I need to do so is to (a) show how an argument is built up and 
developed as it moves between strategies and devices, (b) show the sequence 
of devices and strategies used, something that is also important and worth 
noting, and (c) use newspaper articles and reports to provide further depth 
to each setting and to mention any relevant reactions or elaborations that 
should help improve understanding of the ideological struggle in the 
Hansard excerpts.  
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The analysis is then taken one step further in a separate chapter, 
Chapter 5, in an attempt to identify and examine the ideological incentives 
of any noted differences in relationship to the sectarian affiliations of the 
speakers. This reading is used to shed some light on the recent unrest that 
started in Bahrain in February 2011 in order to reinforce the analytical 
chapter and the ideological reading. There is some use of extra-discursive 
knowledge mentioned or referred to in the analysis, as I believe that there 
are always links or details that provide the necessary context of the 
discourse and that are influential and relevant to the analysis. This is 
necessary to conform to CDA’s perspective. This way, following two 
analytical chapters take the linguistic findings further to apply a critical 
reading.  
In the conclusion of this research, Chapter 6, I present a synthesis that 
summarizes how and under which circumstances each strategy has been 
used by the political parties in the examined excerpts.  
 
3.11 Truthworthiness of Analysis 
This is qualitative research and the truthworthiness of the analysis is based 
on presenting a logical argument and analysis. In this research, the 
transcribed texts in Hansard and the relevant reports Akhbar Al-Khaleej, a 
major newspapers is analysed. This is not to underestimate the importance 
of non-verbal communication, but delimiting the type of data that is 
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analysed ensures a more extensive and comprehensive analysis within the 
time and word limits available.  
Although I have attempted to be as objective as possible, the idea of 
total isolation of a researcher’s experience and knowledge is not realistic. De 
Beaugrande explains that: 
 
[t]here is no zero degree of uninvolvement for us to leap in prior to 
any understanding of the data, and no zero ideology as our starting 
point where we can build a domain for what is ‘established as 
scientifically correct’. Even the ‘hard sciences’ are discursive 
constructs, modes of communication about what is ‘currently’ said to 
be ‘probably’ correct (2006: 44).  
 
Nevertheless, in order to promote the trustworthiness of this research, I used 
the following two strategies:  
 Researcher as detective: I did not merely make hypotheses or rival 
comments and instead looked for evidence to make the final case 
examined beyond any doubt.  
 Extended fieldwork: the observations were conducted over a period of 
two and a half years, i.e. the second legislative period and a few 
months on either side, until the theme of dissent control in the 
parliament was ignored for a significant period. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES 
4.1 Introduction 
This is the first of two analytical chapters that attempt to test the research 
hypothesis, that the Shiite MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives 
employ strategies differently morf Sunni MPs in parliamentary debates. This 
chapter is the longest and most detailed one, and attempts to fulfil the first 
objective of the research, specifically, observing whether, and if so how, the 
Sunni parties and the Shiite party employ discursive devices and strategies 
to achieve the following ideological goals:  
 attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the 
parliamentary debates on topics related to dissent control law and 
political freedom. 
 manoeuvring the definitions of self and others in the contexts of 
dissent control and political rights.  
 manipulating the law to support one’s party’s ideological stances 
about dissent control and the definition of political freedom and 
political rights. 
 
The same data of this chapter alongside its findings are synthesised in the 
next chapter to present a reading of the ideologies of the political parties 
and the sectarian political conflict in Bahrain.  
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Adhering to the methodology outlined in the previous chapter, I present 
the data analysis in this chapter, which is divided into three sections. I start 
with a short section presenting the three strategies that my analysis led me 
to. Although I observed these strategies while doing the analysis, I introduce 
them before the analysis in order to make it possible for the reader to 
identify them while reading analyses and the excerpts. The three discursive 
strategies are as follows: 
 
 corroborating by information 
 intensifying grievance 
 centralising pride and dignity 
 
These discursive strategies are constructed using a number of the following 
discursive devices: 
 
 shift between local accents and classical Arabic 
 emotive speech  
 framing and reframing  
 quoting other sources  
 humour 
 discourse markers 
 lexical style 
 local semantic moves 
156 
 
 speech acts 
 rhetorical features 
 propositional structure 
 turn-takings. 
 
In the next section, I present the analysis of the excerpts in chronological 
order and, as I move through the excerpts, I point out which strategies are 
used at different stages of the debates. The third section draws conclusions 
from the analysis. The conclusions summarise the use of the three discursive 
strategies by different parties in order to test my research hypothesis and 
meet the research objectives.  
For convenience, I define the excerpts of the parliamentary sittings by 
headings that use keywords to refer to the major topic in that excerpt (e.g. 
condemning a terrorist plot, the arrest of Abdali, eavesdropping, etc.). I 
number them in chronological order and then refer to the source by three 
numbers separated by colons. The three numbers respectively refer to the 
legislative term, followed by the legislative period, and then the session 
number. For example, if an excerpt were from the second legislative period, 
third term, sitting 9, the session would be numbered as 2:3:9. I also give the 
date of the sitting in the headings of the analytical sections and also in 
Appendix B. The line numbers of the exact phrase or word being discussed 
are given in the analysis. The line numbers I use correspond only to my own 
English translations of the excerpts as presented in Appendix B, not to the 
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full Hansard of the sitting or to the Arabic excerpt. The date and page 
number(s) of the original Hansard records from which each excerpt is taken 
are also mentioned and so are the full excerpts in both Arabic, the original 
as in Hansard, and English, my translation.  
 
4.2  Three Discursive Strategies 
Having examined and analysed the Hansard excerpts that I had collected on 
dissent control and political freedom, I traced three major discursive 
strategies used by the MPs in their struggle over ideological power when 
giving speeches in examined parliamentary sittings. I present these three 
strategies under the following titles: 
 
a. Corroborating by information 
In parliamentary arguments, an MP sometimes utilises some information 
that he or she has about the topic not to inform but instead to demonstrate 
that he or she is aware and up to date. A new piece of information or a good 
understanding of a law or certain regulations can, and is expected to, make a 
difference to how a topic is addressed and/or perceived. Additionally, being 
the one who has this piece of information instantly gives more power to this 
person, while simultaneously putting the other person in what I would call a 
‘lower argumentative cachet’ for having ignored, or perhaps missed, that 
piece of information. The same information can be used differently, and 
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corroborating one’s stance with information can range between being gentle 
– even indirect – and being hostile and confrontational.  
The data analysis in the following section illustrates how, in the 
examined excerpts, ‘new’ information that supports an MP’s argument is 
very often used to create a position from which to ‘strike’. The strategy of 
corroborating by information can be frequently used in order to defend one’s 
stand, but is often manifested in the form of an attack. 
Normally, in many political debates, a person employing the strategy 
of corroborating by information is likely perceived to be ‘knowledgeable’ 
and hence in a position of power and control. This is because he or she has 
more space to manoeuvre by employing more logic and rationale to support 
his or her point of view, more opportunity to choose the direction of his or 
her ‘punches’, pushing others into the position of needing to react rather 
than act. An awareness of the advantage that attack has over defence makes 
the use of information to attack others’ stands preferable to its being used to 
defend one’s own stand. MPs who employ the strategy of corroborating by 
information, whether it is done gently or in a hostile way, therefore, 
automatically place their opponents in a defensive position, something that 
consequently reduces the chances of the former being attacked, or that at 
least works as a method of creating a ‘temporary’ distraction.  
The strategy of corroborating by information can sometimes take a 
‘deceptive’ form, in which the speaker sounds as if he or she has too much 
information for the listeners to follow up or understand, making the listeners 
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less likely to argue back, comment or ask for elaboration. Later on, when the 
same utterances are re-examined, especially in their written forms, the topic 
or the argument appears less loaded with meaningful or constructive 
‘information’ than it seemed to be when first heard. This intensity, or 
wordiness, can create a shield to protect the speaker from having his or her 
statement easily argued against or even elaborated on. In the chosen 
excerpts, I noticed that at certain points there were intense uses of jargon, 
compound words, expressions, normalisations and/or complex phrases when 
unnecessary and often in an ineloquent way. Sometimes this wordiness took 
the form of what is known in U.S. politics as filibustering, i.e. the use of 
obstructive long speeches that aims at preventing or delaying approving a 
decision. In the case of filibustering, the wordiness does not necessarily lack 
eloquence or relevance, but it simply hampers decision making or aim at 
preventing or delaying next speakers. I had first categorised this way of 
using information as a separate strategy and called it ‘shielding oneself with 
wordiness.’ After proceeding with the analysis and covering all the excerpts 
in hand, I realised that it is only a form of the strategy of corroborating by 
information and that ‘wordiness’ is employed to fulfil this strategy and 
decided to consider it a form of the discursive device known as lexical style. 
Shielding oneself with wordiness can be viewed as a group of devices 
in the same way that rhetoric is a group of devices. In the excerpts analysed 
in this research, wordiness has been used from time to time by some MPs 
who have elsewhere proven to be eloquent and thus seem to be using this 
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device deliberately at certain points. Sometimes wordiness can sound 
‘serious’ and in other cases it is combined with a sarcastic or humorous 
sense. 
 
b. Intensifying grievance 
Generally speaking, emotions have an important place in Bahraini society, in 
which the ability to express compassion and sympathy is highly appreciated 
and respected. This makes the strategy of intensifying grievance an 
important and intensively used strategy in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives in order to win sympathy, not only of the Council, but also 
that of the laypeople, the voters. This is why intensifying grievance is a 
recurring strategy in the Bahraini Council of Representatives in a way that 
might not be expected in parliaments in other countries. Of course, there is a 
limit to how much grievance is acceptable, and ‘overdoing’ it is likely to 
reverse its effect. 
Showing affection and empathy towards citizens’ suffering and 
difficulties is very important. The Bahraini community expects MPs to 
express the community’s disturbance and grief. MPs do not just talk about 
citizens’ anguish or difficulties as if they are reporting them, but also 
interact with them. Interaction with people’s agony or grief is expressed by 
facial expressions, voice tone (two things that this research cannot capture 
because of the nature of the data), by the discursive devices that MPs 
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employ, i.e. repetitive rhetoric questions, and in the lexical choices they 
make. These choices help communicate MPs’ messages while simultaneously 
stressing their involvement.  
 
c. Centralising pride and dignity 
In the Bahraini community, much thought is given to one’s pride and 
dignity, and these are repeatedly mentioned in discussing problems, 
evaluating proposed solutions and pressing for demands and decisions. 
Preserving one’s pride and dignity is highly regarded as a factor upon which 
decisions are based. Many compromises may be made in order to preserve 
pride and dignity, and numerous problems can occur if one’s pride is 
wounded. I classify this as a strategy per se because, first, it does not fall 
under either of the two previous ones or overlap with them. Secondly, it is a 
strategy that frequently recurs in the MPs’ speeches and strongly affects the 
discursive choices a speaker makes. 
The strategy of centralising pride and dignity is similar to that of 
intensifying grievance in that both are very emotive and are asking for 
something that is considered a right. Throughout the analysis process, I 
carefully observed how the two are constructed, ensuring that they are not 
the same strategy. They proved to be two separate, though associated, 
strategies. They both demand or reject an action, a law, a treatment or such 
like. However, each looks at the matter from a different perspective: when 
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using the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, the speaker is evaluating 
and considering the matter by positioning himself or herself at a level that 
is, to him or her, higher than the target altitude, the standard or the 
benchmark that the discussed matter is required to reach. On the other 
hand, by using the strategy of intensifying grievance the speaker is 
positioning himself or herself at a humble or low position, looking up at a 
target or benchmark.  
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
Having presented the three major strategies that I detected in the excerpts, I 
now present the analyses of excerpts individually, identify which discursive 
strategies are employed in each, and illustrate how various discursive 
devices are used to construct the discursive strategies that aim, in turn, to 
secure or win ideological power in the parliamentary debates. I analyse the 











Table 11: List of excerpts with details 
Excerpt 





1 Teargas 12 Feb. 2008  2:2:16 62–73 
2 Bahraini Detainees Abroad 22 Apr. 2008 2:2:25 a 19–20 
3 Insulting the Government 22 Apr. 2008 2:2:25 b 43–44 
4 Crndemning a ‘Terrrrist’ Plrt 30 Dec. 2008 2:3:10 95–99 
5 The Arrest of Political Activists 27 Jan. 2009 2:3:13 4–6 
6 Big and Small Thieves  7 Apr. 2009 2:3:23 103–104 
7 Eavesdropping 20 Oct. 2009 2:4:3 15 
8 The Arrest of A. Hassan (a) 22 Dec. 2009 2:4:10 6–7 
9 The Arrest of A. Hassan (b) 29 Dec. 2009 2:4:11 6 
10 Censoring a Speech 30 Mar. 2010 2:4:24 78–79 
11 Activating a Punishment Decision 27 Apr. 2010 2:4:28 43 
 
The upcoming analysis is presented in the same order as the list above, 
which is in chronological order, and under the same headings. The full 
excerpts are available under the same headings in Appendix B. 
I now analyse the excerpts one by one, identifying the discursive 
devices used by each speaker and showing how these devices fulfil 
discursive strategies. Every time I first mention an MP in the analysis of an 
excerpt, I mention his or her political affiliation. I also present small tables, 
mentioning the interlocutor(s), to list the devices under the discursive 





4.3.1 Excerpt 1 on Teargas 
From sitting 2:2:16, 12 Feb. 2008 
This is the longest excerpt among the ones I collected for this research. In 
this excerpt, the dialogue concentrates on one particular detail in the law 
that was under discussion: permission to use teargas locally as a riot control 
agent. The discussion was raised in reaction to the report of the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee on the bill on the 
prohibition of developing, producing, stocking and using chemical weapons 
and on destroying them.  
In the excerpt, the discussion starts with a rebuke about delaying the 
report by a Sunni MP. Then a number of MPs, all except one are Shiite MPs, 
express their objection to the use of teargas in local riots. Generally 
speaking, the Sunni MPs and parties seemed to have no problem with the 
riot control law and thus found no reason for it to be reviewed. This is why 
there are no interventions by the Sunni MPs and the only comment was that 
of a rebuke of its being delayed, an indirect way to hint that the law was 
right and correct in the first place an hence no revision was necessary. The 
fact that the law is consistent with international standards and measures42 
makes argumentation rather tough and challenging. The objecting MPs use 
all three of the discursive strategies presented in this research to argue 
against this particular detail. The discussion ends in disappointment for the 
Al Wefaq Party when the report is withdrawn and not rejected, something 
that evokes an emotive reaction. Since the analysis is of this excerpt is very 
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long, I subdivide it into what is more like ‘scenes’ to make it easier to follow 
the development of the debate. 
 
 A reproach: a backgrounded disagreement 4.3.1.1
The report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee 
on the bill proposal on chemical weapons had first been presented to the 
Council two months earlier, but it had then been withdrawn for further 
revision. In this sitting, it is presented again but without any changes being 
made to its original form. In the excerpt, in lines 17–26, MP Sami Ali 
Qamber (Al Minbar) expresses his dissatisfaction over the delay, employing 
the strategy of corroborating by information. Below is MP Qamber’s 
intervention. Table 12 lists the devices and strategies used in this 
intervention. 
 
Table 12: Strategy of MP Sami Qamber in Excerpt 1 





 lexical style: backgrounded 
disagreement through a ‘rebuke’ 
 rhetoric: aporia (raising doubt)  
 
S is the Speaker. 
SQ is MP Sami Qamber from Al Minbar. 
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S:      Are there any comments on the principles and foundations of the  15 
bill? Brother MP Dr Sami Ali Qamber, please. 16 
SQ:   Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have words of reproach on this  17 
topic. This topic was withdrawn from the sitting last December  18 
although the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence  19 
and National Security was ready. And to satisfy the wishes of some  20 
MPs, the issue was withdrawn at the time. I really do not know  21 
what amendments were made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  22 
Defence and National Security that have required almost two months;  23 
there have been no amendments. I demand an explanation from the Chairman 24 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and  25 
National Security about this matter.26 
 
MP Qamber begins his comment with: ‘In fact, I have words of reproach on 
this topic.’ By calling what he has to say a ‘reproach’, something which is 
supposed to be milder than a rebuke or criticism, MP Qamber is avoiding 
having his comment perceived as being too critical. A reproach can be 
considered a backgrounded disagreement, the least hostile and least 
confrontational form of disagreement (more on conflict and disagreement in 
Section ‎4.3.4.1, point e). This establishes a less tense and a less 
confrontational contact with the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National 
Security Committee. MP Qamber uses aporia by doubting any progress in the 
previous two months: ‘I really do not know what amendments were made by 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security that have 
required almost two months’ (lines 21–23). Aporia in such case functions as 
a modest way to understate what the worthwhileness of the two months and 
hinting that the Committee of Foreign Affairs has wasted time. 
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 A combination of grievance and information 4.3.1.2
When MPs from Al Wefaq share their opinion about the law draft in this 
excerpt, their most intensively used discursive strategy is that of 
corroborating by information. This is the most commonsensical strategy 
when arguing against a law, as it is most likely to invalidate an 
internationally accepted law by a verdict that is based on logical and 
‘scientific’ validity in the same way such a law is supposedly issued. 
However, the strategy of intensifying grievance also comes into play as the 
objecting MPs find their argument and rationalisation insufficient to stand 
on a par with an international convention and, hence, they bring in the 
second strategy. 
 
The first speaker from the Al Wefaq Party who raises the issue is MP Khalil 
Al-Marzooq, who has three interventions in this excerpt alone. The strategy 
and devices used in the extract above can be summarised in Table 13. This is 
his first intervention.  
 
Table 13: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq (a) in Excerpt 1 







 quoting other sources: the conviction 
 discourse marker ‘but’ to indicate 
contrast 






S is the Speaker. 
KM  is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 75 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Emphasis on this observation has  76 
been based on the fact that it exists in the International Convention  77 
and it is not included. But article or Item d "some non-prohibited  78 
purposes", d says: "those related to implementing the provisions of  79 
the law, including purposes of local riot control." I believe it is  80 
inappropriate to say that this agreement is to be used for controlling  81 
local riots. This agreement – the Chemical Weapons Convention – to  82 
make an exception is as if to condone domestic riot control to, to  83 
permit the use of ground pepper, I mean teargas, about which the  84 
brothers have talked. I believe that "including purposes of local riot  85 
control" should be deleted. My suggestion is to delete "including  86 
purposes of local riot control" because it is suspicious. This is because  87 
it makes it possible to use riot control agents whether included or not  88 
in the banned substances, such as pepper spray. Thank you. 89 
S:     Thank you, Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please.90 
 
MP Al-Marzooq starts by trying to present his view with a legal frame, 
something which can be classified under the strategy of corroborating by 
information: he first affirms that the connection between the International 
Convention and permitting the use of tear gas. He immediately indicates a 
contrast by the discourse marker ‘but’; he suggests the inappropriateness of 
the discussed agreement on the basis of the fact that it leaves leeway for 
exceptions in using banned substances such as riot control agents. He 
indicates this He states his conclusion, ‘I believe it is inappropriate to say 
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that this agreement is to be used for controlling local riots’ (lines 80–82), 
and the justification he gives is that ‘[t]his is because it makes it possible to 
use riot control agents whether included or not in the banned substances, 
such as pepper spray’ (lines 87–89). By doing so, he is framing the law as 
‘suspicious’ (line 87). This is an attempt to nullify the legality of the law 
article, and humanitarian aspects of the matter, up to this point, have still 
not been raised. 
 
The next speaker is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim. His strategies are 
summarised in Table 14 followed with his intervention.  
 
Table 14: Strategies of MP Ebrahim in Excerpt 1 











 emotive speech 
 using second person singular 
 rhetoric: use of synonyms 
 shift to local dialect 
 rhetoric: exaggeration 
 reframing rioters (or terrorists) as 
residents and as families 
 reframing the affected people as 











S is the Speaker. 
AKE is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     Thank you, Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please.  90 
AKE: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have reservations about the same item, d.  91 
Of course Article 1 excludes non-prohibited purposes. I request  92 
amending the article by deleting section d. If you notice, on page  93 
106 there is a summary of the views of the Ministry of Health. There  94 
are also some reservations from the Ministry of Health about the use  95 
of chemical weapons in fighting riots. That means that there is  96 
an observation and fear*. I mean, from practical experience – of course  97 
not that I participate in riots – Mr Speaker, using teargas is  98 
semi-fatal. It causes suffocation, dizziness and you may trūḥ mīhā.43  99 
You may be killed and could die, especially if teargas is directed  100 
at dense residential areas. This is happening in some areas. There  101 
are other legal instruments. I demand the deletion Article d because  102 
I perceive it as a prohibited use of chemical weapons in riots as it  103 
may lead to death, lead to dizziness. We have children and women.  104 
Sometimes teargas is even used in wrong places in the first place.  105 
There is a law that must be codified so that it is used within the  106 
framework of the law. I have a reservation about this article and ask  107 
for the deletion of section d. Thank you. 108 
S:      Thank you. …  109 
 
MP Ebrahim uses two strategies in this intervention: the strategy of 
corroborating by information and that of intensifying grievance. He first 
follows MP Al-Marzooq’s employment of the strategy of corroborating by 
information when he first employs the device of quoting to fulfil the strategy 
of corroborating by information. He quotes two other sources: first, the 
Ministry of Health and secondly some people who had been exposed to 
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teargas. He mentions the fact that the Ministry of Health has reservations 
about the use of teargas: ‘If you notice, on page 106 there is a summary of 
the views of the Ministry of Health. There are also some reservations from 
the Ministry of Health about the use of chemical weapons in fighting riots. 
That means that there is an observation and fear*’ (lines 93–97).  
Then MP Ebrahim presents evidence to support his case by referring 
to what he calls the ‘practical experience’ (line 97) of people who have 
suffered or know others who have suffered from suffocation or dizziness as a 
result of being exposed to teargas. The indication of ‘practical’ experience is 
where MP Ebrahim starts shifting from the strategy of corroborating by 
information to that of intensifying grievance, a shift that becomes emotive: 
‘using teargas is semi-fatal. It causes suffocation, dizziness and you may trūḥ 
mīhā. You may be killed and could die’ (lines 98–99). The use of the reports 
or narrations of the experiences move from being ‘evidence’ to being a way 
to emphasise the speaker’s distress and sense of injustice. He employs second 
person singular, ‘you’, in listing possibilities to involve the listener, i.e. the 
Speaker of the Council, in the imagined experience, to initiate a sense of 
solidarity. In this sentence, MP Ebrahim uses a strange description of the 
effect of pepper spray when he considers it ‘semi-fatal’ (line 99). As fatal is a 
non-graded adjective, then nothing can be described as ‘semi-fatal’; however, 
he seems to be careful not to call it fatal as there is no confirmed evidence of 
its being so, yet he employs this exaggeration simply to stress his opinion 
about teargas being harmful. MP Ebrahim also employs a third device under 
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the strategy of intensifying grievance when he shifts to BHD to provide a 
short expression: trūḥ mīhā, i.e. be doomed or be ‘a goner’, an expression that 
can also mean to die (in a horrible way, such as because of a severe illness 
or an accident). This shift suggests that the speaker might be becoming 
emotive. MP Ebrahim repeats the same idea two more times when he follows 
the colloquial expression with its synonymous expressions: ‘You may be 
killed and could die’ (line 100). This use of synonyms, which is another 
discursive device employed to fulfil the strategy of intensifying grievance, 
aims to amplify the speaker’s concerns and emotions about the risk of death 
associated with teargas. It can be considered unnecessary repetition, but he 
seems to want to affect the attitude of the listeners and convince them.  
MP Ebrahim then adds a setting for a scene of when teargas might be 
used in which the rioters are reframed as residents and families when he 
follows the previous phrases with ‘especially if pepper spray is directed at 
dense residential areas’ in lines 100–101 and then again with ‘We have 
children and women’ (line 104). He explains that ‘[s]ometimes teargas is 
even used in wrong places in the first place’ (line 105). Here, MP Ebrahim is 
reframing the scene from a conflict between chaotic people and Riot Control 
Forces to a scene of Riot Control Forces petrifying and threatening social 
communities, with a stress on the image of vulnerable women and children. 
This reframing is a fifth device, and the specification adds a humanitarian 
dimension to MP Ebrahim’s concerns. He is portraying the conflict between 
the Riot Control Forces and the people in a residential area and focuses on 
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the idea of women and children being involved in order to provoke emotions 
and concern. 
 
I explained in point c in Section 4.2 how the strategy of collaborating with 
information may be used to delude listeners into thinking that he is 
presenting information. In this excerpt, MP Hassan Ali Sultan, the third 
speaker from Al Wefaq on the issue of using teargas, picks up where MP 
Ebrahim has left off and applies this strategy and loads the utterance with 
wordiness (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15: Strategy of MP Sultan (a) in Excerpt 1 







 lexical style: wordiness 
 avoidance and hesitations 
 quoting others (people affected by 
teargas) 
 emotive speech 
 reframing people affected by 
teargas as victims 








S is the Speaker. 
HS is MP Hassan Ali Sultan from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     … . Brother MP Sheikh Hassan Ali Sultan, please.  120 
HS:   Thank you, Mr Speaker. I regret to say that, from experience, and  121 
I do not assert this, but there is a huge possibility that there are 122 
 deaths – to be precise – that happened in the light of* using teargas.  123 
Not directly, but after some time. Maybe on different grounds we  124 
did not mention, for specific interests and for public accounts*, but  125 
there are elderly people and there are youngsters, after a period of  126 
using teargas in riot control, after some time fatalities occurred*.  127 
All the relatives – I say that I do not assert this and I am trying to  128 
be objective – the relatives point out that the cause of death was  129 
the use of teargas. I therefore request the deletion of this passage from  130 
this article. Thank you. 131 
S:      Thank you.132 
 
MP Sultan starts with several extraneous phrases with self-interruptions 
(incomplete sentences being interrupted by other phrases) before he 
expresses his opinion about teargas causing deaths: ‘I regret to say that, from 
experience, and I do not assert this, but there is a huge possibility that there 
are deaths – to be precise – that happened in the light of* using teargas’ 
(lines 121–123). This complex yet ungrammatical structure seems to attempt 
to add ‘volume’ to the simple and repetitive point MP Sultan is making: that 




When he says ‘from experience’, it sounds as if he is referring to his 
personal experience, but then there is no further elaboration of a personal 
experience and he moves to referring to narrations of relatives of people 
who were affected by teargas while participating in riots. MP Sultan 
attempts to present this ‘experience’ as evidence and elaborates, ‘there is a 
huge possibility that there are deaths’ (line 122–123), but possibilities are 
not the same as factual information. He uses ‘I do not assert this’ twice: once 
in line 122 and another later on in line 128. By doing so, he is showing a 
degree of reluctance about affirming the fact of gas tear being fatal. This act 
of reluctance sounds contradictory with his attempt to present his objection 
as being supported by facts. Then, when MP Sultan wants to mention that 
tear gas caused deaths (line 122–123), he mentions that there were incidents 
that occurred ‘not directly but after some time’ (line 124). Because no deaths 
were proven to be resulting from exposure to teargas, the MP is trying to 
convince the listeners that it can cause death, at least eventually. As MP 
Ebrahim did before him, MP Sultan builds empathy when he reframes the 
setting of using teargas and highlights a vulnerable side of the 
confrontations: children and elderly people ‘there are elderly people and 
there are youngsters, after a period of using teargas in riot control, after 
some time fatalities occurred*’ (lines 126–127). 
MP Sultan reframes the people affected by teargas one more time, but 
this time ambiguously, as innocent victims of others’ interests being 
protected: ‘Maybe for different grounds we did not mention, for specific 
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interests and for public accounts*’ (lines 124–125). This utterance is not 
syntactically well constructed and is incomplete, but it hints that ‘some 
people’ and their interests are being protected by not revealing the side 
effects of teargas, ‘some people’ whom he does not want to identify. This is 
the rhetorical device known as apophasis, that is, mentioning something by 
saying that one does not want to mention it. This hint, however, is a short 
and interruptive attempt to carry out a short shift to the strategy of 
corroborating by information, although ambiguous information, but the 
Speaker of Council stops him. 
 
MP Al-Marzooq takes another turn. This time he uses more devices under the 
same strategy he used earlier: corroborating by information. This is his 
second intervention in this excerpt. He speaks after the Director of the Legal 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who explains how Item d is 
consistent with international conventions. In this intervention, MP Al-
Marzooq starts to sound disturbed and unconvinced by the intervention of 
the Director of the Legal Department, in which he asserted that the use of 
teargas for riot control is in accordance with International Convention on 
Chemical Weapons. MP Al-Marzooq sounds irritated and is becoming more 






Table 16: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq (b) in Excerpt 1 








 indirectly framing the justifications of the 
Director of the Legal Department as illogical 
 rhetoric: using a conditional sentence 
 style: employing a tutoring role: framing 
himself as more knowledgeable 
 style: a tutoring role using inclusive ‘we’ 
 rhetoric: exaggeration 
 reframing rioters as citizens 
 
KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq. 
S is the Speaker. 
 
S:      … Are there any other comments? Brother MP Khalil  155 
Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.  156 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, let us take things logically.  157 
When we say that law enforcement-related purposes and riot  158 
control agents are completely free of banned chemical weapons,  159 
something which means that we do not need to list them in the  160 
law that prohibits the use of chemical weapons, if -and this is a  161 
confirmation*– if the tools of implementing the law are totally free  162 
of chemical weapons, then we do not need to mention them in this  163 
law, [they do not need to] be excluded. If there is any suspicion that  164 
there may be any articles in the law, or in what is required by any  165 
article in relation to law enforcement, even a suspicion that is equal  166 
to a single atom out of a million that there are chemicals, then this  167 
article must be nullified. That is because the process should be  168 
accurate. But not prohibiting agents that contain chemicals or  169 
chemicals that are banned*, then we do not need to add it. If there  170 
is any suspicion, then removing it is a must. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 171 




MP Al-Marzooq begins his second intervention in line 157 with: ‘let us take 
things logically.’ By this move, he is employing the device of framing as he 
presents what he is going to say as taking matters logically. First, he is 
indirectly ‘framing’ and implying that the preceding statements, i.e. the 
justification of the Director of the Legal Department, have been not 
constructed logically, an indirect understating of the response. 
Simultaneously, this move is an attempt to reframe or reshape MP Al-
Marzooq’s discourse into what he presents as the crux of the matter. He can 
be said to be assuming the role of a tutor who has a better understanding of 
the situation, as if he is saying: ‘Fine, you have said enough. Now let us 
listen to what I have to say.’ By this rhetorical move, MP Al-Marzooq is 
trying to take control and refocus the discourse.  
MP Al-Marzooq then employs the use of a conditional sentence to 
support the strategy of corroborating by information. He explains that the 
discussed law, which excludes the prohibition on chemical substances use 
for riot control, should be unnecessary if the substances that the Riot Control 
Forces use are, as claimed by the Ministry of the Interior, harmless and not 
chemical. This time, he employs the tutoring role when he uses the inclusive 
‘we’ to explain how the law can be interpreted: ‘when we say that …, which 
means that we do not need to list them …’ (line 158 and line 160 
respectively) and again in line 163 ‘then we do not need to add it.’ This use 
of the inclusive first person plural, ‘we’, serves to establish a rapport with 
the listeners, including the Speaker of the Council, the MPs and the guest 
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speakers participating in this discussion44. He can be perceived as suggesting 
that this is a group-task, a group-decision, and that ‘we’ all should work on 
finalising it together. It can alternatively be perceived as an emphasis on the 
fact that MP Al-Marzooq and his political party, or he and the Council, have 
a say and a role that are no less valuable or salient than the say and the role 
of the Ministry of the Interior. In either case, he is conveying a message of 
involvement and presence.  
MP Al-Marzooq then employs exaggeration as a rhetorical device: ‘If 
there is any suspicion that there may be any articles in the law, or in what is 
required by any article in relation to law enforcement, even a suspicion that 
is equal to a single atom out of a million that there are chemicals, then this 
article must be nullified’ (lines 164–168). This exaggeration, ‘a single atom 
out of a million,’ is used to evoke a strong feeling of him or his party being 
deeply concerned about details and about the safety and well-being of the 
people. The exaggeration is presented within a conditional sentence; this 
conditional claim is used here as an inference. What the statement is 
actually saying is: ‘There is suspicion of chemicals being involved, in spite of 
it being a small suspicion. Therefore, this article must be nullified.’ 
 
After MP Al-Marzooq, MP Al-Miz’al from Al Wefaq shares his view. He 
builds his argument upon the strategy of corroborating by information, this 
time to construct an image of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, an image of an ‘in-group’ 
and an ‘out-group’. This attempt is a strong argument based on 
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corroborating by information in this excerpt. To achieve this, he employs 
several discursive devices (illustrated in Table 17.) 
 
S is the Speaker. 
MM is MP Mohammed Al-Miz’al from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yusif Al-Miz’al, please. 172 
MM: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course we are with – I mean when we  173 
talk about banning manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing  174 
and developing chemical weapons – we are aware of the consequences  175 
of such an act on a small country such as Bahrain, where there are  176 
dense gatherings in both the capital and other areas. May God  177 
protect all, by His will, from the wickedness of Al Qaeda and  178 
anyone similar or any of their followers should they get access to  179 
a chemical formula and use it in one of these gatherings, God forbid.  180 
But when it comes to discussing the legality of this point, d, if we  181 
go back to, I just want to, Mr Speaker, to link this point so we  182 
understand it. Can we, Mr Speaker, go to Article 3 Item e, which  183 
speaks about the use of – Mr Speaker, can everyone pay heed to me  184 
because this is a very important point...  185 
S:      We are now in Article 1. Do not go to Article 3. 186 
MM: No, no. In order to understand this I need to import a text from  187 
there, because Article 3 e states that "the use of riot control agents  188 
as a means of war: It is prohibited to use riot control agents as a  189 
means of war". If this was not possible, then the law would not have  190 
issued something about it. This means that the means of fighting  191 
riots can be a means of war. When an enemy wants to attack the  192 
sovereignty of the country, the law guarantees that no means of riot  193 
control is used against them. However, the same law allows the use  194 
of means of riot control domestically. We protect external enemies  195 
who attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be  196 
used against a citizen, whatever was the mistake made by the citizen.  197 
This big paradox, Mr Speaker, will place the people who are in  198 
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charge of law enforcement in a very critical position. The country,  199 
the government and we will all be indicted all the time. I request  200 
scrutinising, comparing and contrasting Item d in Article 1 and  201 
Item e in Article 3. Mr Speaker, the risk here is when we issue that*  202 
a substance that is a used in riot control can be an instrument of war,  203 
while we prohibit using it against an external enemy attacking or  204 
invading us. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 205 
S:      Thank you. …206 
 
Table 17: Strategy of MP Al-Miz’al in Excerpt 1 








 lexical style: exclusive and inclusive ‘we’ 
 rhetoric: procatalepsis  
 shifting the frame of terrorists to another 
group  
 speech act: comparing using mitigation and 
intensification 
 rhetoric: sarcasm 
 local semantic move: disclaimer 
 framing others as Al Qaeda  
 outgrouping through othering  
 discourse marker: ‘but’ indicating contrast 
and adding accent on the following 
 rhetoric: figure of reasoning (logos): using 
legal facts  
 speech acts: contrasting articles in the same 
law  
 rhetorical explanation to affect attitude  
 rhetoric: intensifying and mitigating 
 warning: distortion of the image of Bahrain  
 
First of all, it is interesting to follow how MP Al-Miz’al employs ‘we’ in his 
speech and how it moves between the inclusive ‘we’ and the exclusive ‘we’. 
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The first time he uses it inclusively: ‘when we talk about banning 
manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing and developing chemical 
weapons’ (lines 173–175); here he is speaking on behalf of either Al Wefaq 
or the Council. However, he is most probably excluding the guest speakers45 
when he says: ‘we are aware of the consequences of such an act on a small 
country such as Bahrain’ (lines 175–176). The rest of the first person plurals 
that MP Al-Miz’al uses are inclusive and are probably used to show 
involvement in decision making: ‘I just want to, Mr Speaker, to link this 
point so we understand it’ (line 182–183), ‘We protect external enemies who 
attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be used against a 
citizen’ (lines 195–197), ‘we will all be indicted all the time’ (line 200), and 
‘when we issue that* a substance that is a used in riot control can be an 
instrument of war, while we prohibit using it against an external enemy 
attacking or invading us’ (lines 202–205).  
Going back to the intervention, MP Al-Miz’al’s first ‘we’, the inclusive 
one, employs the rhetorical device known as procatalepsis, or what can be 
also described as a disclaimer (a local semantic move). MP Al-Miz’al 
acknowledges the importance of the law against chemical weapons in lines 
173–176: ‘Of course we are with – I mean when we talk about banning 
manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing and developing chemical 
weapons – we are aware of the consequences of such an act on a small 
country such as Bahrain.’ He uses this procatalepsis to shift the frame of 
‘terrorist’ from the Shiite opposition, who are normally associated with riots 
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and clashes and who are the implicit subject of most of the discussions 
revolving around riot control, to another group of indictees, a smaller group 
of Sunnis under arrest for planning a terrorist explosion. This is a disclaimer: 
the good position of Us against terrorism and the bad position of Them being 
Al Qaeda. Although this is not openly stated, it is a hint that is well 
understood in Bahrain by both MPs and a large sector of the laypeople, as it 
made headlines in local newspapers at the time. This had been the only 
incident in which the indictees of a local riot or terrorist act were Sunnis, 
and they had been accused of being ‘inspired’ by Al Qaeda. MP Al-Miz’al 
conducts this shift by saying: ‘May God protect all, by His will, from the 
wickedness of Al Qaeda and anyone similar or any of their followers should 
they get access to a chemical formula and use it in one of these gatherings, 
God forbid’ (line 177–180). This is a new perspective, a different reading of 
who might be threatening the security of Bahrain, a use of ‘othering’. The 
use of othering has a further function: it aims at bringing the speaker and his 
in-group together against the ‘others’, who are often perceived as enemies, 
as intruders or as a threat, even if this other entity did not really oppose or 
threaten the group. In such a case of creating or constructing an enemy, the 
device of othering is a strong device of manipulation.  
MP Al-Miz’al follows this statement with: ‘But when it comes to 
discussing the legality of this point, d, …’ (line 181). The use of ‘but’ here is 
a discourse marker that acts as a contrast and adds an accent on what 
follows. Now, after having established whom he is framing as terrorists, he 
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shifts to discussing the ‘legality’ of using teargas in local riots. Al-Miz’al 
starts here to read the article critically and, to do so, he brings in another 
item from another article, Item e from Article 3, and compares it with Item 
d. This, apparently, seems to inspire some objections from the other MPs. No 
objection or interruption is mentioned in Hansard, but it can be understood 
from MP Al-Miz’al’s asking for attention in lines 183–185: ‘Can we, Mr 
Speaker, go to Article 3 Item e, which speaks about the use of– Mr Speaker, 
can everyone pay heed to me because this is a very important point....’ It 
sounds as if there were side talks or disturbance among the other MPs, 
something which made MP Al-Miz’al interrupt his intervention and ask for 
attention. The Speaker, in line 186, explains that the Council is currently 
dealing with Article 1 Item d and asks MP Al-Miz’al to keep to it. From the 
Speaker’s reaction, it sounds that the side talks or disturbance that rose was 
a result of the MPs objecting to MP Al-Miz’al moving to another article. 
However, MP Al-Miz’al insists that he needs to bring that item in to explain 
his point (lines 187–188). His insistence reflects his confidence in the 
strength of this argument.  
Al-Miz’al then builds a strong argument by comparing and linking 
two items in two different articles under the same law. He denounces how 
the same law is more considerate towards and protective of enemies than it 
is of Bahrainis: ‘We protect external enemies who attack our sovereignty 
from a substance that we allow to be used against a citizen’ (lines 195–197). 
He uses sarcasm to present the notion of protecting the enemies, and then he 
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mitigates the action of the citizen that would expose him to the same 
substance from which the enemy is protected: ‘…whatever was the mistake 
made by the citizen’ (line 197). The verb ‘guarantees’ in the rhetorical 
explanation itself is denouncing how this law provides the enemy with 
security assurances. He adds a further rhetorical explanation based on the 
comparison between this ‘guarantee’ and the permission for using the same 
weapons in local riots: ‘However, the same law allows the use of means of 
riot control domestically. We protect external enemies who attack our 
sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be used against a citizen, 
whatever was the mistake made by the citizen’ (lines 194–197). When he 
adds: ‘…whatever was the mistake made by the citizen,’ he is using 
mitigation to depict a huge gap between the two offences: an external enemy 
invading the country versus a citizen making some fuss in a riot. MP Al-
Miz’al is illustrating two continuums: a significant contrast between the two 
offences, and another contrast between the two approaches to the use of 
chemical weapons against each offence. This is an illustrative presentation 
that strengthens MP Al-Miz’al’s argument. MP Al-Miz’al then brings in the 
issue of the image of Bahrain being affected, which I will elaborate upon in 
the following section. 
 
The next speaker is the Director of the Military Courts, the Ministry of 
Interior. In his intervention, he explains that the teargases are made of 
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natural substances and consist of no chemical toxics. He mentions that 
dropping the item that allows using teargas with local riots would mean that 
the police would use other means, which would be more harmful (see 
Appendix, Excerpt 1 lines 208-221).  
 
MP Haider Hassan Al-Sitri speaks after the Director of Military Courts. MP 
Al-Sitri repeats what was said by the MPs before him (MP Al-Marzooq, MP 
Ebrahim, MP Sultan and MP Al-Miz’al). He does not add any new input or 
arguments but serves as reinforcement. The repetition of an idea in a 
parliamentary setting is called filibustering. Within the repeated content, MP 
Al-Sitri employs a number of discursive devices as presented in Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Strategy of MP Al-Sitri in Excerpt 1 









 rhetoric: filibustering 
 framing affected people as citizens 
 rhetorical question 
 rhetoric: conditional statements 
 procatalepsis 
 lexical style: complex, stylishly awkward 
word compounds  
 framing the law as deceptive  
 
S is the Speaker. 




S:     Thank you. Brother MP Mr Haider Hassan Al-Sitri, please. 222 
HHS: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I think we should seriously consider such  223 
critical topics. What my colleague MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz’al  224 
has said is very clear, that this is forbidden to be used with an enemy  225 
in war, a war with military weapons, killing and fighting. It is allowed  226 
to be used in encountering citizens. Therefore no need for a large 227 
explanation* or a long argumentation. Let us be serious. The concerned 228 
party says that what is being used are natural substances and that thus  229 
there is no need to mention it* in this article of this law. We do not  230 
need to use chemicals in riots, so why do we mention it* here? We  231 
do not need it. What we are using is a natural substance, which is  232 
ground pepper; this is what the concerned authorities said. If this  233 
interpretation is wrong and not true, if we will place it*– then the  234 
explanation is incorrect. If we place it in this law*, then the remarks  235 
of the concerned party are incorrect and are a concealment of the  236 
real substances, which are chemicals and not natural substances.  237 
Thank you, Mr Speaker.  238 
S:      Thank you. …239 
 
MP Al-Sitri starts with the discursive device of framing as did MP Al-
Marzooq in his second intervention. MP Al-Sitri frames his justification as 
being serious when he says: ‘I think we should seriously consider such 
critical topics’ (lines 223–224), something which can imply that other 
perspectives are not serious enough. He makes the same rhetorical move in 
line 228: ‘Let us be serious.’ He also frames the people affected or targeted 
by the teargas as citizens in lines 226–227: ‘It is allowed to be used in 
encountering citizens.’ A last framing MP Al-Sitri makes is that of the law at 
the end of his intervention. The framing is made within his conditional 
statement in lines 235–237 If we place it in this law*, then the remarks of 
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the concerned party are incorrect and are a concealment of the real 
substances, which are chemicals and not natural substances.’ A law that 
conceals a truth would be a deceptive one, and hence, he is suggesting the 
invalidity of the law. 
MP Al-Sitri also uses a rhetorical question in line 230–233: ‘We do not 
need to use chemicals in riots, so why do we mention it* here? We do not 
need it. What we are using is a natural substance, which is ground pepper; 
this is what the concerned authorities said..’ He proposes a question, then 
immediately follows it with an answer. He then uses procatalepsis: he 
anticipates the response to this objection, based on what the Director of 
Military Courts has said earlier: that the substance being used is ground 
pepper, which is a natural substance. MP Al-Sitri immediately answers this 
objection with conditional sentences, which, nevertheless, are not very well 
constructed. The immediate answers in the form of conditional sentences are 
presented next when I present the discursive device of lexical style. 
When it comes to the content of MP Al-Sitri’s intervention, it appears 
that his intervention is a duplicate of what the preceding speakers have 
already presented. This device, filibustering, aims to delay or obstruct 
making a decision that the speaker is not satisfied with. MP Al-Sitri centres 
his reservation on the elderly people and children and individual 
experiences of teargas causing eventual deaths, as in lines 125–127: ‘there 
are elderly people and there are youngsters, after a period of using teargas in 
riot control, after some time fatalities occurred*.’ This is an example of 
189 
 
complex structure and compound words, which I called ‘wordiness’; another 
example of this wordiness found in lines 233–237: ‘If this interpretation is 
wrong and not true, if we will place it* – then the explanation is incorrect. If 
we place it in this law*, then the remarks of the concerned party are 
incorrect and are a concealment of the real substances, which are chemicals 
and not natural substances.’ The same latter example (lines 233–237) 
consists of conditional statements which aim at negating the justifications 
given by the Director of Military Courts.  
 
 Bahrain’s international image as a perspective 4.3.1.3
The strategy of centralising pride and dignity is another strategy that is 
employed in this excerpt to object to the use of teargas for local riots. This is 
achieved through centralising concern about the image of Bahrain. Two MPs 
follow this strategy: the first one is the independent MP Abdul Aziz Abul, 
and second one is MP Al-Miz’al.  
MP Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent MP, is the only MP other than 
those of the Al Wefaq Party who expresses his reservations about the law 
permitting the use of teargas for local riot control. The strategies and the 







Table 19: Strategies of MP Abul in Excerpt 1 







 shift to local dialect 
 discourse marker: a filler 
 emotive speech  
 rhetoric allusion: disturbing historical event  
 rhetorical question  




 warning: possible international indictment  
 
S is the Speaker. 
AA is MP Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent Sunni MP. 
 
S:     Thank you. Brother MP Dr Abdul Aziz Hassan Abul, please. 239 
AA:   Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, in fact, I join everyone  240 
objecting to adding this item under the non-prohibited purposes.  241 
That is because, sallamkallah,46Mr Speaker, as soon as we talk  242 
about chemical weapons, chemical weapons by nature mean  243 
weapons used for military purposes or for the purpose of  244 
exterminating an opponent. I think that chemical weapons are  245 
always characterised with anti-humanitarian qualities, associated  246 
with genocide. When we insert this in our law, and then we mention  247 
them in fighting riots and consider that fighting riots with chemical 248 
weapons is unprohibited, this will tarnish the image of Bahrain! We  249 
send a message to the whole world tomorrow that whenever we  250 
have a riot, we will use chemical weapons, regardless of their  251 
components. This is enough to offend Bahrain. I believe that first:  252 
it sends a negative message indicating that there are bad intentions,  253 
that for any disturbance we may use weapons to which we apply the  254 
title ‘chemical’. So why do we put ourselves in this situation that  255 
essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about the  256 
status of the government, about the status of the state, and about  257 
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citizens being dealt with using weapons? As it happened in Halabcha47.  258 
and then the ruler of the country was indicted and executed for that  259 
reason. I believe it is necessary to shut this door and delete this  260 
article because it opens an illegitimate door for no good reason.  261 
First of all, we do not need at all to talk about chemical weapons in  262 
Bahrain. I believe that the issue is not our concern. We neither  263 
produce chemical weapons, nor, hopefully, will we need them. They  264 
should, a fortiori, be prohibited for fearing that some outrageous  265 
people may use them. However, to get into the issue of riots means  266 
to allow security forces to be accused in future of using chemical  267 
weapons against the people of Bahrain. Why put this topic forward  268 
and open a door? I suggest, like the brothers said, that we write it  269 
off and delete Item e from Article 3, so as not to allow the distortion  270 
of the image of Bahrain or [allow] accusations. Then it will emerge  271 
on the Internet that the government of Bahrain is preparing for the  272 
use of chemical weapons against the citizens whatever disturbance  273 
they are causing. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 274 
S:      Thank you. … 275 
 
MP Abul focuses on two perspectives: the humanitarian perspective, and the 
potential international response to the law allowing the use of teargas in 
local riot control. The first perspective builds upon the strategy of 
centralising pride and dignity while the second upon the strategy of 
corroborating with information. The first perspective, starting on line 242, 
contains at its opening a shift to local dialect: ‘That is because, sallamkallah, 
Mr Speaker, as soon as we talk about chemical weapons, …’ (line 242). The 
phrase sallamkallah consists of two words, sallamka and Allah, meaning 
[may] God protect you. However, the phrase is a common interjection in 
Bahraini dialect used before or instead of mentioning the name or title of the 
addressee as an indication of respect and not meant as a prayer per se. It 
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serves here as a filler and carry no meaning. The first perspective proposes a 
‘general’ humanitarian assumption that suggests, though not overtly, an urge 
to ban chemical weapons: ‘I think that chemical weapons are always 
characterised with anti-humanitarian qualities, associated with genocide’ 
(lines 245–247). The second perspective is concern about the criticism and 
suspicion of the country and its system that the existence of such a law is 
likely to provoke. MP Abul elaborates this point in lines 247–258, using the 
inclusive ‘we’ to generate a feeling of the involvement of the Council in 
distorting the image of Bahrain, and thus evoking a sense of responsibility 
towards distorting the image of Bahrain at the international level: ‘When we 
insert this in our law, and then we mention them in fighting riots…. We 
send a message to the whole world tomorrow that whenever we have a riot, 
we will use chemical weapons…. So why do we put ourselves in this 
situation that essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about 
the status of the government, about the status of the state, and about citizens 
being dealt with using weapons?’  
After suggesting the Council’s responsibility, MP Abul follows this 
with a rhetorical question: ‘So why do we put ourselves in this situation that 
essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about the status of 
the government, about the status of the state, and about citizens being dealt 
with using weapons?’ (lines 255–258). This question suggests that approving 
such a law, without even implementing it, will have negative consequences. 
MP Abul is thus refuting the feasibility of having such an item in the 
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Bahraini law. To enforce the image, he makes a historical allusion: ‘As it 
happened in Halabcha then the ruler of the country was indicted and 
executed for that reason’ (lines 258–260). The allusion to Saddam Hussain, 
the former Iraqi President who was executed, is a very strong and disturbing 
one. 
Additionally, MP Abul employs the metaphor of ‘opening a door’ to 
signify allowing something to happen and affect the course of events. This 
metaphor is used three times, twice in one sentence: ‘I believe it is necessary 
to shut this door and delete this article because it opens an illegitimate door 
for no good reason’ (lines 260–261), and a third time in lines 268–269: ‘Why 
put this topic forward and open a door?’ The metaphor may be inspired by 
the colloquial Arabic idiom  الباب اللي ييك منه ريح ِسّده واستريح il bāb illī yīk minnah 
rīḥ siddah wistirīḥ, i.e. the door from which wind flows, close and relax. The 
image of a closed door that is about to be opened has a further implication: 
that there are some people, organisations or countries who are waiting for 
an opportunity to distort the image of Bahrain, and thus the country should 
not give them the chance to do so. This metaphor is politically loaded. 
Bahrain has been closely observed by many other government and 
organisations for different reasons. On one hand, there has been Iran that 
has repeatedly claimed it as ‘fourteenth province’, and this an old conflict. 
On the other hand, are the oppositions, whether based inside or outside 
Bahrain, who would benefit from flaws. This is an important point and will 




The other MP applying the strategy of centralising pride and dignity in this 
excerpt is MP Al-Miz’al (Table 20). 
 
Table 20: Strategy of MP Al-Miz’al (b) in Excerpt 1 







 framing the law of teargas as paradoxical 
 speech act: warning that the government 
will be affected negatively too 
 
At the end of his speech, presented earlier, after employing the strategy of 
corroborating by information (in his second intervention above), MP Al-
Miz’al makes a third intervention and adds a further dimension to this issue: 
‘This big paradox, Mr Speaker, will place the people who are in charge of 
law enforcement in a very critical position. The country, the government and 
we will all be indicted all the time’ (lines 198–200). This conveys the 
message that not only will this ‘paradox’ be unfair for the people exposed to 
teargas, but will also affect the international image of the country. He is 
demonstrating how this law will also negatively affect the country and the 
government, and suggesting that therefore the government has to consider 
its own interests, too – a second perspective to bear in mind. However, the 
responses of authorities and specialists keep confirming that using teargas is 
considered internationally legal and that there have been no definite 
allegations against it. Even when the Director of Environmental Control in 
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the General Authority for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment 
and Wildlife asks for an amendment to the article to make it clearer and 
more definite, she still does not suggest eliminating it. This leaves the Al 
Wefaq Party’s demand unsupported by any concrete facts from officials 
inside or outside the country. Consequently, the Al Wefaq Party now needs 
to intensify its use of other strategies. 
 
 Disappointment 4.3.1.4
In response to MPs’ objections, the Director of Military Courts of the 
Ministry of the Interior again confirms the fact that all the substances used 
in manufacturing riot control tools are permitted according to international 
conventions (lines 303–306), and that if this item of the law were to be 
cancelled, it would mean that the Riot Control Forces would be obliged to 
use more powerful and more dangerous weapons. Here, MP Al-Marzooq 
makes his third intervention, which becomes particularly emotive and 









Table 21: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq (c) in Excerpt 1 






 rhetoric: using conditional 
statements repeatedly, denouncing 
justifications 
 rhetoric questions 
 rhetoric: using the intensifier 
‘honestly’ to express disapproval 
 emotive speech 
 
S  is the Speaker. 
KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please, a point  275 
of order. 276 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. A point of order, only a clarification. That  277 
is because what the Representative of the Home Office, Brother  278 
Major Hmoud Sa’ad Hmoud, has said needs to be considered. First,  279 
this article does not regulate— or this whole law does not regulate  280 
dealing with riots, so as to say that if you omit this article then  281 
more deadly weapons will be used. The process is then not clear.  282 
Constitutionally or legally, this law is new. First: if this new law now  283 
included practising*, is not this practice codified or something?  284 
This needs to be clarified. Secondly. The second point in this topic  285 
is the use of the word* that if we removed this article while stressing  286 
that, according to what the brother has mentioned at the beginning  287 
of his speech, that all riot control agents being free of prohibited  288 
chemicals, something that we have mentioned and referred to in  289 
the first intervention, if they were free [from prohibited agents]  290 
then we would not need to involve [the topic of] anti-riot here. This  291 
assertion requires the anxiety* that it has caused now, so that its  292 
cancellation would necessitate the use of more lethal materials.  293 
Honestly, this topic requires consideration. To say that if we drop  294 
this article that states that the use of riot control agents and that are  295 
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completely free of dangerous and prohibited chemicals*, if we drop it  296 
then we will have to use lethal weapons, this is threatening us with  297 
a cluster bomb or something similar. I stop here honestly. Thank you,  298 
Mr Speaker. 299 
S:      Thank you. Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi, Legal Counsel,  300 
the Ministry of State for Defence, please.301 
 
MP Al-Marzooq protests against what the Director of Military Courts has 
said. He makes the accusation that the procedure is ‘not clear’ (line 282). He 
expresses his disparagement by mainly repeating the points made by the 
Director of the Military Courts in two forms: conditional statements and 
rhetorical questions, all of which are denouncing and reproving the 
justifications provided. MP Al-Marzooq’s intervention here is to use the 
strategy of corroborating by information. MP Al Marzooq protests using a 
number of conditional sentences, the first of which contains a rhetoric 
question: ‘First: if this new law now included practising*, is not this practice 
codified or something?’ (lines 283–284), ‘if they were free [from prohibited 
agents] then we do not need to involve [the topic of ] anti-riot here’ (290–
291) and ‘To say that if we drop this article…, if we drop it then we will 
have to use lethal weapons’ (lines 294–297). The last conditional statement 
that concludes his speech is followed by an angry comment: ‘this is 
threatening us with a cluster bomb or something similar’ (lines 297–298). 
After this, he immediately signifies the end of his speech with: ‘I stop here 
honestly’ (line 298). The intensifier ‘honestly’ is used to express disapproval 
and dismay. MP Al–Marzooq is applying a strategy of corroborating by 
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information here, putting himself in a stronger, more knowing position, and 
thus his dismay, as can be inferred from his reaction, results from his 
reasoning about the illegality of the law not affecting the legal stance of the 
guest speakers or the report committee. Still, Brigadier-General Abdul 
Rahman Al-Najdi, Legal Counsel, the Ministry of State for Defence comments 
and again confirms the legality of the procedure. 
 
At the end of the debate, MP Adel Al-Mu’awdah (Al Asalah), the Chairman 
of Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Law Committee, comments 
on the debate and the interventions. He also employs the strategy of 
corroborating by information (see Table 22). 
 
Table 22: Strategy of MP Al-Mu’awdah in Excerpt 1 






 discourse marker ‘but’ to indicate a tone 
shift 
 rhetoric: periphrasis: promising to 
consider but not promising to delete the 
article  
 local semantic move, a disclaimer: 
employing periphrasis (rhetoric): 
expressing the endorsement of the safety 
of the public but again not expressing 






S is the Speaker. 
AM is MP Adel Al-Mu’awdah from Al Asalah. 
 
AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course, it is the right of MPs to share  316 
the comments they have and this is an inherent right for them. But 317 
I regret that we reviewed this bill three weeks ago. It was [supposed  318 
to be] two weeks and we postponed till three, and yet we have not  319 
received any comments except on the issue of punishment. I think  320 
now I believe that we will be locked in a vicious circle, and we will 321 
eventually be obliged to withdraw the bill, but now I am asking for  322 
the withdrawal of the bill, but I ask the brothers who have all the  323 
comments to come with all the comments, and to read the law— not  324 
during the sitting but before the sitting. I will arrange a meeting with  325 
the Ministry of the Interior and discuss this, article by article, with those  326 
involved. We are also concerned about the good of everyone and if  327 
there is anything that harms people then we do not want it. If there  328 
is something that benefits the country then we want it. I withdraw  329 
the bill and I ask all the brothers to come with all their observations,  330 
and to authorise some people...  331 
S:     Thank you. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  332 
Defence and National Security has requested the withdrawal of the  333 
project, to carry out further study, and he requests that everyone who  334 
has a proposal or an opinion on the subject to offer it in writing.  335 
Who agrees to return it to the committee?336 
 
MP Al-Mu’awdah employs periphrasis. He starts by acknowledging the 
‘legality’ of the discussion when he says: ‘Of course, it is the right of MPs to 
share the comments they have and this is an inherent right for them’ (lines 
316–317). The use of the intensifier ‘of course’ functions as a device that 
treats something as ‘taken for granted’ or obvious in order to emphasise that 
he agrees with and approves of the MPs expressing their points of view. He 
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then immediately shifts tone, a cancellation of what he has said with the 
discourse marker ‘but’ in lines 317–320: ‘But I regret that we reviewed this 
bill three weeks ago … and yet we have not received any comments except 
on the issue of punishment.’ He explains that comments are inadequate 
unless they are submitted in writing: ‘I think now I believe that we will be 
locked in a vicious circle, and we will eventually be obliged to withdraw the 
bill’ (lines 320–322). The two parts of his statements compose a local 
semantic move, a disclaimer: a positive part about Us accepting others’ 
points of views, with a negative part about Them not submitting any 
objecting in writing. MP Al-Mu’awdah is thus signalling a desire to stop the 
discussion when he adds: ‘I ask the brothers who have all the comments to 
come with all the comments, and to read the law— not during the sitting but 
before the sitting’ (lines 323–325). He requests that the proposal be 
withdrawn and he immediately follows this with an assurance that he will 
follow up the matter: ‘I will arrange a meeting with the Ministry of the 
Interior and discuss this, article by article, with those involved’ (lines 325–
327); by doing this he is actually showing his desire to follow a procedure. 
MP Al-Mu’awdah concludes by demonstrating an endorsement of and a 
concern about the safety of the public: ‘We are also concerned about the 
good of everyone and if there is anything that harms people then we do not 
want it. If there is something that benefits the country then we want it’ 
(lines 327–329). This statement reflects an approval of the motivation, i.e. 
the safety and legality of substances used in riot control, but not necessarily 
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the way this is interpreted or applied. In other words, this is a promise to 
consider the matter further but not a promise to demand the elimination of 
teargas as a riot control agent. In this way, MP Al-Mu’awdah states his 
decision (i.e. the withdrawal), which is not what the Al Wefaq MPs hoped 
and argued long for. 
 
When the Speaker of the Council decides to end the discussion here, MP 
Sultan disagrees and reacts emotively. MP Sultan’s reaction is to the 
conditional promise that MP Al-Mu’awdah has given. The Al Wefaq MPs 
hoped for the proposal to be voted down, in order to eliminate teargas as a 
permitted riot control agent (Table 23).  
 
Table 23: Strategy of MP Sultan (b) in Excerpt 1 
MP Strategy Devices 
Hassan Sultan 
(Al Wefaq) intensifying grievance 
 emotive speech  
 Shift to Bahrain dialect: using 
kinyah to address Speaker  
 a sequence of rhetorical questions  
 
S is the Speaker. 
HS is MP Hassan Sultan from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     Thank you. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  332 
Defence and National Security has requested the withdrawal of the  333 
project in order to carry out further study and he requests that everyone who 334 
has a proposal or an opinion on the subject offer it in writing.  335 
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Who agrees to return it to the committee? 336 
HS:   Abu Muhammad (Mr Speaker), this is a critical thing to say. You  337 
are the first person in the Council to be responsible for it. How can  338 
the people be threatened with deadly weapons? What is this? What  339 
does this mean? 340 
S:      Șalli ʿannebi48 [i.e. Stay calm], and jazaka Allah khair49 [i.e. thank you].  341 
Who agrees with returning it to the committee? 342 
(Majority agree.)343 
 
MP Sultan begins his protest in lines 337 by addressing the Speaker of the 
Council with his kinyah, Abu Mohammed. A kinyah indicates a form of 
closeness and respect, a sort of nickname that is constructed by calling one 
the father or mother of someone, e.g. if one’s oldest son is called Ali, then 
the kinyah of the father and mother respectively is Abu Ali and Um Ali (in 
some dialects, including BHD, Abu is reduced to Bu, so Bu Ali). This type of 
nickname is very popular in Arabic, falling somewhere between the formal 
use of titles with last names and the informal use of first names does. The 
kinyah conveys a lot more respect than the use of one’s first name or 
nickname. At the same time, however, it implies a degree of closeness, of 
intimacy. It is used among friends, family members, and even co-workers. 
MP Sultan is thus placing himself closer to the Speaker than an average 
citizen would. This closeness indicates that the Speaker is approachable. 
What follows is a rebuke, and MP Sultan is trying to keep the rebuke less 
confrontational: ‘Abu Muhammad (Mr Speaker), this is a critical thing to say’ 
(lines 337). This is more likely to initiate a degree of empathy rather than a 
defence. MP Sultan then immediately holds the Speaker responsible for 
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putting himself in his current position: ‘You are the first person in the 
Council to be responsible for it’ (lines 337–338). This is an act aimed at 
involving the Speaker in a decision that may affect the people being exposed 
to teargas. MP Sultan becomes emotive and follows his statement with a 
sequence of three rhetorical questions: ‘How can the people be threatened 
with deadly weapons? What is this? What does this mean?’ (lines 338–340). 
These moves form a strong and intense objection to the fact that no decision 
against using teargas has been made. Instead, the proposal has been 
withdrawn, which keeps the issue open. The response of the Speaker starts 
with the Arabic formulaic expressions ṣalli ‘annebi and jazakallah khair (line 
341) commonly used to mean ‘stay calm’ and ‘thank you’ respectively. The 
latter formulaic expression, however, is sometimes said after an imperative 
or a request to soften it and implicates a polite request. In such a case, like 
in this intervention, it is an equivalent of saying ‘please’. The style of the 
Speaker’s reply may have been affected by the Kinyah use when MP Sultan 
addressed him, resulting in the Speaker’s accommodating himself to MP 
Sultan’s style. 
 
In this long excerpt, using teargas in local riot control, there has been an 
intense contribution from Al Wefaq and only one other MP, namely MP 
Abul, an independent MP. The strategies of corroborating with information 
and that of intensifying grievance have been dominant and the discursive 
204 
 
devices employed varied, with reframing and rhetoric playing major roles, 
but failed to compete with the law that conforms to international standards. 
  
4.3.2 Excerpt 2 on Bahraini Detainees Abroad 
From sitting 2:2:25 a, 22 April 2008 
In this speech, MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, a member of Al 
Wefaq, complains about the status of Bahraini prisoners held captive abroad. 
When discussing this issue, MP Al-Mitghawi mentions that the persistence of 
the problem can stir up demonstrations and chaos. He is therefore indirectly 
relating siht issue to possible disturbances. 
In the excerpt, MP Al-Mitghawi’s approach to the topic mainly 
employs the strategy of centralising the pride and dignity of Bahrainis (see 
Table 24). MP Al-Mitghawi does use the strategy of intensifying grievance, 
but grievance over imprisonment and harm is not as strongly present as that 
of the feeling of wounded pride. This is because his protest does not revolve 
around the arrests themselves but around the lack of proper communication 
and information about the internees, something which is perceived as a lack 








Table 24: Strategy of MP Al-Mitghawi in Excerpt 2 
 
DS is the Deputy Speaker. 
AHM is MP Abdul Hussain Al-Mitghawi from Al Wefaq. 
 
DS:  … Brother MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, please. 1 
AHM:Thank you, Mr Speaker. The wondrous response to the proposal for  2 
returning prisoners— and the purpose is well-known and this proposal  3 
was long time ago. There was a second proposal, which has also  4 
become outdated*. But the response is a descriptive essay, … 5 
 








 rhetoric: mockery and denunciation 
 rhetoric: comparison: criticizing the disgracing 
of Bahrainis in their homeland and considering it 
a reason for them being disgraced abroad  
 rhetoric: sarcasm: criticizing the low level and 
lack of professionalism of communication 
between the Council and the government 
 rhetoric: irony (adverb ‘surprisingly’ to mean 
‘expectedly’) 
 rhetoric: sarcasm about response of the embassy 
 rhetorical question about possible reaction of the 
American Embassy with similar cases 
 style: short shifts to narrative mode 
 rhetoric: aporia (raising doubt)  
 rhetoric: rhetorical question (erotesis), 
presupposing strong negation 
 rhetorical questions 
 rhetoric: suggestive metaphor 




MP Al-Mitghawi repeatedly uses mockery as a device to express 
dissatisfaction and frustration. In line 2, he begins his intervention by 
describing the response that the Council has received from the government 
on the issue as ‘wondrous’, and in line 5 as ‘a descriptive essay’. Both 
descriptions scorn the level and professionalism of communication about this 
issue between the Council and the government. Mockery as a discursive 
device is a very strong and confrontational form of criticism and it will be 
used again in this intervention as seen below. 
 
AHM:…            and  5 
surprisingly, the Bahraini citizen – I feel – if he gets disgraced in his  6 
own country, then, a fortiori, he gets disgraced abroad. Brother  7 
Al-Mirbati has been under arrest for five years, and the proposal  8 
was intended for him. He is now in a country with which we have  9 
security links. Up to now, his relatives have not got or barely get to  10 
visit him, perhaps once a year. Additionally, there are eight  11 
detainees from Bahrain who are now either under arrest in the country  12 
or in one of the neighbouring countries and the reasons for their arrest  13 
are still unknown. They are totally neglected and their families have  14 
not met them. One person met them; he went and got the chance to  15 
meet them but not the rest. …16 
 
MP Al-Mitghawi links what he perceives as disrespect for those Bahraini 
prisoners to the lack of respect for Bahrainis in general in their own country. 
In lines 6–7 he says: ‘Surprisingly, the Bahraini citizen — I feel — if he gets 
disgraced in his own country, then, a fortiori, he gets disgraced abroad’. This 
idea will be repeated later. The use of the adverb ‘surprisingly’ is an irony, 
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as he obviously means to show no surprise in one being less respected 
abroad than in his home country. The sarcastic opening is followed by a list 
of facts in lines 7–16 about the detainees, their families, the contacts the 
Council has made with the Bahraini Embassy, the role of the Council in 
mediating between the relatives and the internees, the families’ inclination 
to protest and the Council’s role in preventing this. Knowing these details 
serves to assert the Council’s full involvement and solicitude, a way of 
confirming being on the side of the public and their representatives. This 
serves to condemn the government further for not being sufficiently 
involved. Within the body of ‘updates’ given in these lines, MP Al-Mitghawi 
comments on the role of the Bahraini Embassy:  
 
AHM: …                 And our embassy says: we are in contact.  16 
The meaning of the word ‘contact’ is unknown! Is it possible today  17 
that a foreign citizen or an American gets arrested in Bahrain and  18 
the U.S. Embassy waits for a moment without releasing him?! We  19 
have eight people, university graduates and secondary school  20 
teachers beside Al-Mirbati. It has been five years now. They are  21 
staying in the midst of other countries’ prisons, no one contacts them  22 
and no one knows anything about them. … 23 
 
In lines 16–17, MP Al-Mitghawi mocks the Bahraini Embassy, which 
confirms that it is in contact with the authorities regarding the arrest cases. 
Al-Mitghawi comments: ‘The meaning of the word “contact” is not known!’ 
By doing so, he is using aporia to actually hint that the ones who claim to be 
in contact do not know how to establish contact or communicate. He is thus 
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criticising their communication and diplomatic skills. To support his idea, in 
lines 17–19, he compares the U.S. Embassy’s most probable reaction in 
similar cases to the Bahraini Embassy’s, using a rhetorical question: ‘Is it 
possible today that a foreign citizen or an American gets arrested in Bahrain 
and the U.S. Embassy waits for a moment without releasing him?!’ This is an 
instance of erotesis, a rhetorical question which presupposes a strong 
negative answer. At this stage, MP Al-Mitghawi changes his mode: 
 
AHM: …                               The pressure is on the  23 
MPs. MPs, what have you done? MPs, our children are arrested.  24 
Every time they want to go out in the streets we opiate them and say:  25 
Do not go out and cause chaos in the streets. Then if chaos starts,  26 
the government will say to us: What are you, MPs, doing?  27 
Do you ask us what we are doing? And the people are asking  28 
us what we are doing. So how to cope? I request the Ministry of  29 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, who are involved in  30 
this matter, to make a fast move. Bahraini citizens are disgraced.  31 
One day in a specific country the Head of the Al Wefaq Party wants  32 
to enter, but gets stopped while he is carrying his authorised passport.  33 
Do Bahrainis stay disgraced in every region while foreigners are  34 
honoured?! Thank you, Mr Speaker.  35 
 
An interesting short shift from the argumentation mode to the narrative 
mode in lines 23–29 and again in lines 32–33 adds some variation in MP Al-
Mitghawi’s style. In addition, the use of reported speech in these lines 
functions as a means of conveying others’ perspectives. In explaining how 
the MPs deal with the relatives’ frustration and anger, MP Al-Mitghawi, in 
line 25, uses a metaphor saying that MPs ‘opiate’ (or drug) them, meaning 
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that the MPs calm them down or reassure them. This is a strongly suggestive 
metaphor. It conveys a powerful message: first of all, the silence and 
calmness of the relatives is temporary; and secondly, as drug brings an 
elusive feeling of calmness while being health wise destructive, the attempt 
to keep the relatives of the detainees quiet without them getting a response 
is, from MP Al-Mitghawi’s point of view, not an appropriate measure to take.  
After that, MP Al-Mitghawi presents a hypothetical assumption of the 
situation getting out of control with the relatives not being attended to: 
‘Then if chaos starts, …’ (line 26). This is an inductive conditional to 
suggest, and hence to warn against, a very probable outburst. He illustrates 
how MPs’ positions are critical as there will be a twofold pressure on them: 
from the government to prevent or stop chaos on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, from the families of the detainees demanding a response and 
some answers: ‘Then if chaos starts, the government will say to us: What are 
you, MPs, doing? Do you ask us what we are doing? And the people are 
asking us what we are doing’ (lines 26–29). MP Al-Mitghawi follows the 
consequent part of the inductive conditional with a rhetorical question: ‘Do 
you ask us what we are doing?’ (line 28) as a reproof, holding the Council 
responsible; something which, according to MP Al-Mitghawi, will have 
resulted from the government failing to respond properly to the people’s 
demands. The stress on ‘you’ in the Arabic original text is achieved by 
sentence structure. He follows this in line 29 by rhetorically asking how he 
or the Council should proceed in such a situation. By this rhetorical device, 
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which is known as aporia, MP Al-Mitghawi is asking the listeners how to 
proceed only for rhetorical purposes, not expecting or waiting for an answer: 
‘So how to cope?’ After that, MP Al-Mitghawi puts forward his demand in 
lines 29–31: ‘I request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the 
Interior, who are involved in this matter, to make a fast move.’ Although this 
is the crux of the matter, MP Al-Mitghawi did not present it at the 
beginning, as it is something the Council has pushed for many times, and 
this time he needed to present the issue more convincingly. 
MP Al-Mitghawi reinforces the key point of his debate again in line 
31, using the disgracing of Bahrainis as an affirmative fact: ‘Bahraini citizens 
are disgraced.’ He then adds another narrative, of an Al Wefaq member 
being denied access to a country (lines 32–33) and then concludes his speech 
by posing another rhetorical question in the form of dubitation (lines 27–
28): ‘Do Bahrainis stay disgraced in every region while foreigners are 
honoured?!’ This rhetorical question aims at triggering a negation from the 
listeners and, hopefully, the government. By provoking ‘no’ as a response, 
MP Al-Mitghawi is simultaneously attempting to provoke the government 
into taking an action that confirms the response.  
With his speech starting with mockery, ending up with a rhetorical 
question, and being filled with objection to the lack of communication and 
respect, rather than with pleas for help, MP Al-Mitghawi is demonstrating 




MP Al-Mitghawi has linked the topic of Bahraini detainees abroad to the 
topic of dissent. He has, in fact, made the concern over (or perhaps the 
warning of) possible chaos and disturbance crucial, and has consequently 
held the government responsible for any possible riots or unrests resulting 
from the lack of clear and possible response. This has been achieved by 
employing the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, in which he almost 
exclusively depended on rhetorical devices. The same strategy is also 
dominant in the next excerpt in responding to a government letter 
addressing MPs, but with a different employment of devices.  
 
4.3.3 Excerpt 3 on Insulting the Government 
From sitting 2:2:25 b, 22 April 2008 
In this excerpt, two MPs, the first from Al Wefaq and the second from Al 
Asalah, object to a letter that was received from the government. According 
to an article in Akhbar Al-Khaleej reporting this sitting (Nasr and Jaber: 23 
Apr. 2008, pp. 12–13), MP Al-Miz’al from Al Wefaq described the 
government as ‘stupid.’50 This description is not recorded in Hansard as MP 
Al-Miz’al asked before the end of the first half of the same sitting for the 
word to be withdrawn (ibid.) In response to this, the government addressed 
a letter to MPs, condemning some of them for what the government 
considers an insult to its prestige. The same newspaper article (ibid.) also 
mentions that the MPs were angered by the withdrawal of the Minister of 
Finance from the sitting, something that the MPs thought should not occur 
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without the minister following the usual procedure expected from a minister 
when desiring to withdraw, as he did not ask for the permission of the 
Speaker or the Head of the Financial Committee as was supposed to (ibid.).  
In claiming their political freedom, both MPs employ the same 
strategy in objecting to this letter: that of centralising pride and dignity. 
Neither of them is apologetic and neither tries to rationalise his or the 
accused MPs’ stance. Instead, they reverse their position from indictees to 
indictors to whom the condemnation gives more power to criticise, as will 
be explored below. 
 
The first intervening MP is an Al Wefaq member, MP Abdul Jalil Khalil 
Ebrahim. His use of strategies and devices are summarised in Table 25. 
  
Table 25: Strategies of MP Ebrahim in Excerpt 3 








 rhetoric: mockery 
 reframing the position of the MPs from indictees 
to indictors 
 reframing ‘insult’ as ‘criticism’ 
 rhetoric: exclamation in a conditional statement 
 inclusion: adding the pride of the Bahraini 
people beside that of the MPs 
 rhetorical question 




 speech act: comparing and contrasting 
 lexical style: wordiness, a blurring comparison 




DS is the Deputy Speaker. 
AKE is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim from Al Wefaq. 
 
DS:    …. Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please. A point of order. 1 
AKE: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I need a clarification from Mr Abdul Aziz  2 
bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel, the Minister of Shura and the House of  3 
Representatives. He is saying that there are MPs who insult their  4 
government. If an MP puts forward a criticism then this is an insult  5 
to the government?! 6 
DS:   No, no. Excuse me, excuse me. He really means the words we are  7 
hearing today and days other than today and which are out of range*,  8 
and that actually impinge on the prestige of the government. I have  9 
alerted the... 10 
AKE: No, I— a comment, Mr Speaker, that there is a difference between  11 
something said during a conversation and something that an MP  12 
says to deliberately insult his government... 13 
DS:   Actually, intentions are not known except by God.14 
In lines 2–4, MP Ebrahim asks the Minister of Shura and the Council of 
Representatives for what MP Ebrahim calls ‘a clarification’: ‘I need 
clarification from Mr Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel, the Minister of 
Shura and the House of Representatives.’ By doing this, the MP is actually 
orienting his speech to reframe the condemned MPs’ statements, changing 
the condemnation from ‘insults’ to ‘criticism’. In lines 5–6, he expresses his 
objection to this condemnation with an exclamation that reproves the 
government for the way in which it perceives a criticism: ‘If an MP puts 
forward a criticism then this is an insult to the government?!’ 
The Deputy Speaker interrupts and explains that these were utterances that 
‘impinge on the prestige of the government’ (line 9). MP Ebrahim responds 
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to this by contrasting two different circumstances or contexts when he says, 
in lines 11–13: ‘there is a difference between something said during a 
conversation and something that an MP says to deliberately insult his 
government.’ This is an attempt to distinguish a criticism, which is supposed 
to be an act of judging, from a disrespectful insult, which is an act of scorn 
and disrespect. However, if the comparison is carefully read, it is not clear 
how the first concept is meant to be presented differently from the second. 
This is the weaker version of corroborating by information, saying in what 
sounds a knowing voice that there is a difference between what is done and 
the accusation; this is when a temporary shift is made to wordiness to 
protect one’s stance. The statement fails to make an appropriate comparison 
and the difference between the two contexts is actually blurred. In the 
statement, there is ‘there is a difference between ...,’ which sets up a 
distinction structurally. However, the substance or content of that statement 
does not sound to present any contrast. Thus, there is a structural contrast 
but there is no substance contrast. MP Ebrahim’s argument about intention is 
cut short by the Speaker commenting that intentions are not measurable 
(line 14), but this response itself makes it clear that shielding oneself with 
wordiness has worked, as the Speaker fails to see that the comparison was 
not valid in the first place. Lakoff mentions that George Bush won over Gore 
by ‘framing issues to his advantage.’ When Gore attacked with figures and 
facts, Bush ‘retaliated’ with his own figures and facts, and to the public, the 
difference was blurred; it was all ‘fuzzy math’ (2002: 398). Thus, framing 
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can be considered to have an influence even when not properly grasped by 
the listener. Having shifted his position from being a defendant to being a 
protester and, hence, an attacker, MP Ebrahim begins striking in the 
following lines: 
 
AKE: The messages that were sent to us today, were not they an insult  15 
to the MPs? Poor proposals, Abdul Rahim Al-Mirbati, they do not  16 
know where he is, in which prison, is not this an insult? I mean,  17 
does the Council deal— actually I am afraid that if I talk the Brother  18 
Minister for Shura and Representatives Councils will withdraw ... 19 
DS:   No, no, he will not withdraw.  20 
AKE: We do not know how to manage a dialogue between us and the  21 
government, Mr Speaker. 22 
DS:   Brother MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad, please.23 
 
MP Ebrahim returns to the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, with 
which he started his intervention, in lines 15–17, where he lists three issues 
that he perceives as a source of insult to the Council: first, the messages the 
MPs have received;51 secondly, the Council’s receiving what he describes as 
‘poor proposals’ from the government, and here he suggests that the 
government understates the Council’s intelligence; and thirdly, the 
government’s failure even to locate a particular Bahraini prisoner. The first 
two points impinge on the pride of the Council, the third on the pride and 
value of a Bahraini citizen. The three points of objection are followed by a 
rhetorical question in line 17: ‘Is not this an insult?’ This question affirms 
the negative: that this is perceived as an insult. 
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Then, in lines 17–19, MP Ebrahim begins another point, but he 
interrupts himself before finishing it: ‘I mean, does the Council deal—
actually I am afraid that if I talk the Brother Minister for Shura and 
Representatives Councils will withdraw.’ This comment functions at two 
levels: first, what he is doing is very close to ‘teasing’, telling the minister 
that he would not tolerate what he is about to say. At a second level, it is 
indirectly conveying the message that what he, the MP, has to say is 
powerful, and perhaps shocking. By these two embedded messages, the MP 
is manifesting his ideological power, how he is on a par with, if not even 
more powerful than, a minister – this minister – and that he can and would 
say something very disturbing to a minister. It is either that MP Ebrahim did 
not say much more after the Speaker has assured him that the minister will 
not leave, or, if he did say anything, then it has been deleted from Hansard. 
The MP ends his speech saying: ‘We do not know how to manage a dialogue 
between us and the government’ (lines 21–22). This statement is an aporia, 
an unreal dubitation that is used as a pun saying the government does not 
converse, and thus he is actually making a further complaint. 
 
Hansard then presents the intervention of MP Halim Murad (Al Asalah), 






Table 26: Strategy of MP Murad in Excerpt 3 






 a sequence of rhetorical questions 
 lexical style to express 
ingroupness: including the people 
of Bahrain to the MPs in being 
insulted 
 foreground confrontation: 
demanding interrogating the 
minister immediately 
 emotive speech 
 
DS is Deputy Speaker. 
HM is MP Halim Murad from Al Asalah. 
 
DS:   Brother MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad, please. 23 
HM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. The minister says that the MPs insult the  24 
government. The minister leaving the Council this way, is not this  25 
an insult to this Council? And therefore an insult to all the people  26 
of Bahrain? This is first. Then the wrong responses that come signed  27 
by the Prime Minister, responses with millions of serious errors, is  28 
not this an insult to the Council? I commend the speech of Brother  29 
MP Hamad Khalil Al-Mohannadi. This minister should be  30 
interrogated, starting at this sitting, because there is no time. Thank  31 
you, Mr Speaker.  32 
DS:   Thank you…33 
 
Hansard does not mention what has happened or what has been said 
between the intervention of MP Ebrahim and that of MP Halim Murad. 
However, it is evident that some information is missing: MP Murad mentions 
in line 25 that the minister has left the Council, and then, in lines 29–30, he 
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refers to MP Al-Mohannadi (Al Asalah), whose intervention is not mentioned 
in Hansard either. It must have been what MP Al-Mitghawi said that made 
the minister leave, and it seems that MP Al-Mohannadi commented in 
disapproval on the minister’s departure. 
In his speech, MP Murad (lines 24–29) conforms to MP Ebrahim’s 
approach, indicting the government for insulting the Council. MP Murad’s 
comments are motivated by the belief that the Council’s pride has been 
wounded, and like MP Ebrahim before him, he is employing the strategy of 
centralising pride and dignity. MP Murad puts forward two instances of what 
he perceives as an insult: the departure of the Minister of Shura and the 
Council of Representatives during this sitting, and the Council’s receiving 
responses from the Office of the Prime Minister that contain many errors. He 
presents both examples in the form of a sequence of rhetorical questions: 
‘The Minister says that the MPs insult the government. The Minister leaving 
the Council this way, is not this an insult to this Council? And therefore an 
insult to all the people of Bahrain?’ (lines 24–27). 
The sequence of rhetorical questions adds a prominent and 
confrontational aspect to the disagreement. To MP Murad, the first insult is 
also an insult to the people of Bahrain. This way he backs up the Council’s 
pride with that of the people of Bahrain, an act of inclusion, which includes 
the Bahraini nation on their side. While MP Ebrahim’s approach had a sense 
of mockery to it, MP Murad’s response sounds more furious and emotive, 
and most probably is affected by the minister’s reaction and departure. He 
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comments: ‘This minister should be interrogated, starting at this sitting’ (line 
30–31), which is too much to expect.  
 
The situation in this excerpt, hence, has developed into a challenge, and the 
MPs turned the accusations against them to accusations against the 
government and the Minister of Shura, and none of the interlocutors 
attempted to present an apology or a justification of what the government 
has considered a form of insult. The MPs regardless to their sectarian 
affiliation seem to agree on a position and agree on that the letter from the 
government criticising their language has violated their political freedom.  
 
 
4.3.4 Excerpt 4 on Condemning a ‘Terrorist’ Plot 
From sitting 2:3:10, 30 Dec. 2008 
One of the tensest encounters on the topic of dissent control in the Bahraini 
Council of Representatives in the second legislative term is found in Excerpt 
4. This is the second longest excerpt in this research. The MPs here use the 
strategy of corroborating by information, which becomes very emotionally 
loaded as they proceed. 
In this sitting, a proposal was made by a group of MPs, all Sunnis, 
requesting the issue of a statement in the name of the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives to condemn an incident of rioting that took place on 17 
December, in which a group of people were arrested for planning an attack 
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with IEDs (improvised explosive devices) in a public place. This coincided 
with the annual holiday for the National Day of Bahrain, on 16 and 17 of 
December. There is strong disapproval of the proposal by Al Wefaq; two 
members of this party, MP Ali Salman and MP Mohammed Al-Miz’al, give 
their feedback and express their reservations. 
In the analysis below, for convenience, the group of MPs who signed 
the proposal will be called ‘the statement group’. The statement group 
consists only of Sunni MPs, although not all of the Sunni MPs. The two MPs 
who declared their objection are Shiites from Al Wefaq. The detainees in the 
incident being discussed are all Shiites.  
Al Wefaq’s argument against the statement follows the strategy of 
corroborating by information. The information is centred around two points: 
(a) the legality of the accusations, articles in the constitution that condemn 
accusing a detainee unless the charges are proven, and (b) a comparison 
between the detainees under question with a parallel group of detainees. 
This extract is one of the most confrontational that the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives experienced in the second legislative period. The mode of 
disagreement in this excerpt reached the most confrontational level of 
disagreement, which can be called ‘foregrounded disagreement’, and stayed 
at that level for a large part of the debate.  
Below, I first briefly present the definition of dispute and types of 
disagreement, and then show how the excerpt is a site of foregrounded 
disagreement. Since it is relatively long, I have divided the analysis into 
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subsections, each bringing together instances of a discursive device used to 
support one’s argument. 
 
 Analysis of the excerpt 4.3.4.1
To implement the strategy of corroborating by information, the two speakers 
from Al Wefaq rely on a number of discursive devices that I group below 
under separate headings. As I am bringing together examples which are 
mostly scattered throughout this long excerpt, I found it difficult here to 
provide the extracts being analysed as I have done in the analysis of the 
other excerpts.  
The three sides who shared their views on the statement in this 
excerpt are the statement group (via a submitting a written proposal), MP 
Ali Salman and MP Al-Miz’al by commenting on the proposal. In this 
excerpt, there are devices employed in the written statement, which relies on 
the strategy of corroborating by information to convey its request. On the 
other hand, both MP Salman’s approach and that of MP Al-Miz’al depend on 
the strategy of corroborating by information too, but have a different view 
and different points to consider as information. Both MPs agree on their 
objecting the statement, but each employs discursive devices differently to 
implement this strategy as will be seen below. The major difference is that 
MP Salman’s strategy relies more on building upon logic and then gradually 
centralising his role and his opinion, while MP Al-Miz’al starts with relying 
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on verifying the legality of the procedure, and then gradually becomes more 
reliant on emotive speech and foregrounded disagreement.  
Beside the discursive device of emotive speech that raised at different 
parts of the interventions of MP Al-Miz’al, a device that becomes more 
prominent as Al-Miz’al proceeds in this excerpt, the other discursive devices 
employed in the strategy of corroborating by information can be grouped 
under the following major headings: (a) in-groupness and out-groupness, (b) 
cheater-detection module as a rhetorical move, (c) framing and reframing, 
(d) metaphor, and (e) lexical style to express foregrounded disagreement, 
under which I also list a group of discursive devices. How the speech 
becomes emotive is illustrated in MP Al-Miz’al’s comments as he proceeds 
and becomes more confrontational. Table 27 summarises the analyses of the 
proposal by the statement group, the interventions of MP Salman and that of 
MP Al-Miz’al. The table is followed by an elaborated discussion of these 
discursive devices.  
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Table 27: Strategies in Excerpt 4 






a. ingroupness and outgroupness expressed through 
 lexical style to compete over patriotism 
 framing the plot as terrorist 
 framing targeted people by the attack as innocents  
 framing Bahrain as ‘our kingdom’ 
 metaphor: homeland for the people of Bahrain 
 
b. framing and reframing the detainees 






a. ingroupness and outgroupness expressed through 
 lexical style: self-definition and othering 
 starting with inclusive ‘we’, moving to the exclusive ‘we’, and then to the singular first person, ‘I’ 
 
b. speech act: comparing the current case with a previous one to express suspecting reliability 
of allegations 





a. ingroupness and outgroupness 
 lexical style to compete over patriotism 
 shifting the frame of ‘terrorist’ to another group 
 lexical choices: using the word waṭan, i.e. homeland 
self-definition and othering: using exclusive ‘we’ when talking about wanting justice 
 
b. rhetoric: aporia and rhetoric questions to express suspecting the reliability of the allegations 
 relying on the duality of doubt and certainty 
 cheater-detection module  
 
c. framing and reframing the detainees 
 reframing them with the neutral term ‘defendants’ and then reframing them as ‘victims’ 
 mistakenly reinforcing negative frames given to the defendants by his opponents 
 
d. rhetoric: metaphors 
 
e. foregrounded argumentation 
 absolutes                 discourse markers 
 emphatics                floor bids 
 flow                         repetitions 
 negations                 lexical second person pronouns 
 
f. emotive speech 
 
lexical second person pronouns 




a. Ingroupness and outgroupness 
Ingrouness and outgrouness in this excerpt were realised by two major axes: 
first lexical style to express patriotism and secondly self-definition and 
othering. 
 
 Patriotism through Lexical style 
This is the first axis. In this excerpt, the overt issue is that of the safety of the 
country. The two groups, the statement group and the Al Wefaq members, 
compete over demonstrating their devotion to the country to prove that 
what they ask for is the right thing to do. The lexical style, i.e. vocabulary 
choice, plays a major role in the competition over patriotism. The proposal 
made was as follows: 
 
…     A proposal to urgently issue a  2 
statement condemning and disapproving of the terrorist plot. Your highness  3 
Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Dhahrani, may Allah guard and protect, we  4 
are pleased to put forward our proposal to urgently issue a statement  5 
condemning and disapproving the terrorist plot that targeted our  6 
Kingdom, and that aimed at upsetting security and stability, and  7 
startling secured and innocent people. We would like to simultaneously  8 
praise the efforts of security services and procedures that prevented  9 
the terrorist incident and the plots of the terrorists.  10 
Suggestion proposed by: 11 
MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa’eedi 12 
MP Hassan Salim Al-Dossari 13 
MP Khamis Hamad Al-Rumaihi 14 
MP Sheikh Nasir Abdillah Al-Fudhalah 15 
MP Dr Abdul Latif Ahmed Al-Sheikh 16 
MP Sami Muhsin Al-Buhairi 17 
226 
 
MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad 18 
MP Latifa Muhammed Al-Qu’rrd 19 
MP Abduallah Khalaf Al-Dossari 20 
MP Sheikh Hamad Khalil Al-Muhannadi 21 
MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Bu-Sandal 22 
MP Essa Ahmed Abu-Almat’h 23 
MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Hadi 24 
MP Sheikh Muahmmed Khalid Ebrahim 25 
 
In the proposal, the statement group demonstrate their loyalty on two levels: 
(a) by supporting ‘the efforts of security services’ in line 9 and (b) by the act 
of othering, when distancing themselves from the detainees whose act they 
label or frame as that of ‘terrorists’: ‘condemning and disapproving of the 
terrorist plot’ in line 3, ‘disapproving of the terrorist plot’ in line 6 and the 
‘terrorist incident’ in line 10. ‘Innocence’ for the statement group is a label 
given to the people who could possibly have been harmed by the plot: 
‘startling secure and innocent people’ (line 8). Now the Al Wefaq speakers 
have an onerous task ahead of them. They need to portray themselves as 
patriots despite opposing the proposal. This cannot be achieved as long as 
the defendants are perceived as being terrorists, so it is necessary for Al 
Wefaq to reframe the defendants convincingly. This attempt is more 
challenging for them than for the statement group, whose stance, after all, 
does not require a detour from the present governmental procedure. Al 




At the level of patriotism, there is the underlying struggle over whose 
country it is and how the country is framed. When it comes to the statement 
group, the use of ‘our Kingdom’ (lines 6–7): ‘disapproving the terrorist plot 
that targeted our Kingdom’ instead of the more neutral ‘the Kingdom’ is an 
instance of this competition over the label of patriotism and ownership. It is 
an emotional attachment and an indirect demonstration of loyalty to the 
present ruling system. It also denotes caring and, consequently, being able to 
make appropriate and constructive choices. Al Wefaq’s members 
participating in the discussion, on the other hand, do not use the word 
‘Kingdom’. Al Wefaq has always presented itself as an opposition party, and 
has always had reservations about the system of monarchy. The phrase ‘our 
Kingdom’ used by the statement group can, therefore, be potentially 
provocative to Al Wefaq. Now the Al Wefaq MPs are faced with the 
challenge of having to invalidate the connotation of an unpatriotic stance 
that will be associated with their rejection of a proposal that claims to care 
for the safety of the country.  
 
To the first MP to comment on the statement, MP Ali Salman (Al Wefaq), the 
topic of patriotism does not rivet his attention. On the other hand, MP Al-
Miz’al builds up upon the topic and expresses his patriotism several times in 
his interventions. Below, I underline the words and expressions MP Al-Miz’al 
uses to convey the message of patriotism, the first being when mentioning 
the arrested cell on 2 February 2003: 
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S is the Speaker. 
MM is MP Mohammed Al-Miz’al from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:      Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yusif Miz’al. 52 
MM: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Previously on 2 February, 2003  53 
a terrorist cell was discovered in this country (balad). It was  54 
trained in Afghanistan, trained in Lebanon. The investigations  55 
revealed a range of weapons: Kalashnikovs, explosives, bullets,  56 
weapons stores, all this and the Council did not use a word to condemn  57 
it prior to the trial. Moreover, the issue has been concealed and  58 
dissolved. I do not know where, in which sea, this topic has been  59 
dissolved and terminated without a trial and without the escalation  60 
that we see in the press, the media, in the street, everywhere.61 
 
He again indicates caring for the country when he speaks of the 
Constitutional law in relation to the detainees: 
 
On what basis are they described as such? Does not  67 
Article 20 of the Constitution of the country (bilād), which you  68 
vowed to respect, state that “The accused is innocent until proven  69 
guilty in a court of law”? Has there been a conviction that allows  70 
you to state that they are not innocent? 71 
 
The facts about the cell and their activity, and about the Constitution and 
what it states about detainees, are associated with the words balad and bilād, 
respectively: ‘a terrorist cell was discovered in this country (balad)’ in line 
54 and ‘the Constitution of this country (bilād)’ in line 68. Balad is the 
singular form and bilād is plural,52 meaning a piece of owned land. Here, the 
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word ‘country’ relates to the idea of the state, with less sense of 
belongingness and ownership. However, as Miz’al’s speech becomes more 
emotive, he repeatedly uses the word waṭan, which means homeland, when 
he warns the country of not being ‘dragged behind charges’; this time, 
‘homeland’ is a metaphor for the nation or the people of Bahrain, not the 
country or the state: 
 
MM: The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the  101 
homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind  102 
charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven  103 
by the judiciary. … 104 
 
And again he emphasises that they, the Al Wefaq Party, cooperate to 
maintain the security of the country, and this time the homeland stands for 
the country: 
 
MM: …      Yes, we have  118 
cooperated and we cooperate, and we are extremely intent on the  119 
security of this homeland, and the safety of this homeland. 120 
 
And one last time he expresses concern about the safety of the country: 
 
MM:You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.  125 




Although there are other synonyms, such as balad and dawlah, which could 
have been used, in the instances above, MP Al-Miz’al chooses to use 
homeland. He uses balad in the first stage of his speech but as he becomes 
more emotive, he shifts to the word ‘homeland’. Whether this shift is made 
consciously or unconsciously, the word ‘homeland’ (waṭan) is an appropriate 
choice because, unlike the other two synonyms, it has the connotations of 
belonging, attachment and settlement. In addition, the word ‘homeland’ is 
used with the metonymic presentation of the people who may make 
judgements about the defendants: ‘The homeland, the whole homeland, 
should not be dragged behind charges that have not been proven by 
judiciary’ (lines 101–104). 
 
 Self-definition and othering 
Regarding the second axis of ingroupness and outgroupness, by Al Wefaq in 
this excerpt, that is illustrated in their forms of self-definition and othering, 
both of which are used repeatedly. The construction of the ingroup and 
outgroup in the speeches of both MP Salman and MP Al-Miz’al is interesting. 
  
Starting with MP Salman’s self-definition and othering, he moves 
from the inclusive ‘we’ representing the Council as a united entity dealing 
with the claims (lines 35–38), to the exclusive ‘we’ when talking about Al 
Wefaq’s stance on the current incident (lines 40–43), and then he even 
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excludes Al Wefaq and focuses on his own stance and authority using ‘I’ 
(lines 43–50). I have underlined the instances in the extract below: 
 
S is the Speaker. 
AS is Ali Salman from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:       … Brother MP Sheikh Ali Salman Ahmed, please. 31 
AS:    Thank you, Mr Speaker. With respect to the brothers who submitted  32 
the proposal, this is not the first time that the Ministry of the Interior  33 
announces the discovery of a cell – according to the claims of the Ministry  34 
of the Interior – intending to carry out some terrorist acts. We have  35 
already gone through a number of events and our council did not  36 
address those events and we did not issue any statements in the  37 
Council. I suggest that my brothers who made this suggestion express  38 
their point of view outside the framework of the Council through  39 
individual or joint statements because if we raise this issue now,  40 
we will then have a stance. We will have a reservation on the subject  41 
and we will express our point of view. We will also ask to highlight  42 
our point of view. I would not like this council to get now into a  43 
state of disagreement. I would like to keep the position of the work  44 
done and keep the position of Gaza,53 so I ask my brothers to take  45 
this proposal and declare it through the parties, through individuals  46 
with independent statements; otherwise I will be obliged to  47 
intervene to illustrate my point and I will come up with another  48 
statement representing my party and I will try to publish it. I think  49 
this is an argument the Council should keep itself away from. Thank  50 
you very much. This is the first intervention. 51 
S:      Thank you. … 52 
 
In his statements with the exclusive ‘we’s, he is placing himself and his party 
in an opposing position to the statement group, or even the whole council, 
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e.g. ‘if we raise the issue now, we will then have a stance’ (line 40–41) and 
‘we will express our point of view’ (line 42). By the exclusive ‘we’, MP 
Salman narrows down his identity circle or role from that of a council 
member dealing with an interior issue to that of Al Wefaq, positioning 
himself and his party against the rest of the Council. Then, MP Salman stops 
using ‘we’ and shifts to ‘I’ instead (lines 43–50), e.g. ‘I will be obliged to 
intervene’ (lines 47–48), and ‘my point’ (line 48). By showing what steps he 
is individually ready to take in support of the party’s ‘stance’, he reinforces 
his party’s view with his own voice as the head and the leader. The role of 
leader is activated in his demonstration of his ability to issue a statement 
illustrating his point of view: ‘I will be obliged to intervene to illustrate my 
point of view and I will come up with another statement representing my 
party’ (lines 47–49). Overall, there is a demonstration of power in MP 
Salman’s speech: power at the individual level and at the group level. 
As for self-definition and othering, there are some interesting 
instances in the following extract from MP Al-Miz’al’s intervention: 
 
MM:  –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be  98 
fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair,  99 
and for this council to enhance fair judiciary, to enhance justice.  100 
The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the  101 
homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind  102 
charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven  103 
by the judiciary. There are allegations made by lawyers of torture – 104 
AA:   Allow us to take over from here, Brother MP Mohammed Yusif  105 
Al-Miz’al. 106 
MM: This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued  107 
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by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement. 108 
S:  All right, we stop here. 109 
MM: If you want to issue a statement, do it yourselves. …110 
 
MP Al-Miz’al uses the exclusive ‘we’ when he represents the stance of Al 
Wefaq in lines 98–99: ‘We want this judiciary to be fair. We want this trial... 
No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair.’ The exclusion of the other council 
members can be understood from his previous reference to the Council in 
lines 91–93: ‘The Council has no right to issue a statement condemning 
someone who is innocent under the Constitution unless a fair trial in which 
all –.’ In these and following mentions of the Council, MP Al-Miz’al is 
criticising the stance of the Council and considering it wrong. When he uses 
‘we’, however, he mentions what he considers righteous stances of him and 
his party, and is thus excluding other members, as in lines 98-99. The 
exclusion gets clearer in line 110: ‘If you want to issue a statement do it 
yourselves.’ The use of the second person plural, ‘you … yourselves,’ versus 
the exclusive ‘we’ constructs an image of two groups and two stances, Us and 
Them, othering the statement group and anyone who may vote for their 
proposal as ‘them’, and the ones who want to vote against it as ‘us’. The 
othering is clear from the following uses of the second person plural 
pronoun, you, in the rest of MP Al-Miz’al’s intervention: 
 
MM: …        We do  120 
not want and do not accept and do not agree on this council having  121 
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a say against an innocent person. You may not do this, I say.  122 
Withdraw the statement, withdraw the statement. 123 
S:      It does not get withdrawn. 124 
MM: You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.  125 
Be intent on the security of the homeland. 126 
S:      This is a start; this is a statement – 127 
(MP Al-Miz’al moves to the middle of the chamber.) 128 
MM: Withdraw the statement. Have the statement withdrawn. …129 
 
 Examples of second person plurals are in line 122: ‘You may not do this;’ 
line 125: ‘You (second person plural) cannot do that. Be (second person 
plural) intent on the security of the homeland;’ and the other imperative in 
line 129: ‘Withdraw (second person plural) the statement. Have (second 
person plural) the statement withdrawn.’ The imperatives in the original 
text, the Arabic one, have a plural reflective suffix, which shows that these 
verbs are addressed to a plural.  
 
b. Rhetoric in suspecting the reliability of allegations 
Under the same strategy, i.e. corroborating by information, comes logical 
argumentation. The Al Wefaq MPs employ two discursive devices to argue 
the legality and objectivity of their stance logically: First of all, both 
speakers from Al Wefaq, MP Salman and MP Al-Miz’al, begin their speeches 
by contrasting the current incident with a previous one, as can be noted in 





AS:   Thank you, Mr Speaker. With respect to the brothers who submitted  32 
the proposal, this is not the first time that the Ministry of the Interior  33 
announces the discovery of a cell – according to the claims of the Ministry  34 
of the Interior – intending to carry out some terrorist acts. We have  35 
already gone through a number of events and our council did not  36 
address those events and we did not issue any statements in the  37 
Council. … 38 
 
MP Al-Miz’al also makes a comparison in lines 53–61. This move of 
contrasting the current incident with a previous one is a move that charges 
the proposed conviction statement suggesting, though not directly stating, a 
discrimination between the two groups of detainees. In other words, the Al 
Wefaq MPs are relying on what I would call ‘a duality of doubt and 
certainty’ pulled together to demand the withdrawal of this proposal. By 
employing doubt, the Al Wefaq MPs are diminishing the reliability of the 
outcome of the current investigations and, consequently, presenting their 
party’s perspective, if not for being convincing per se then for being 
relatively more trustworthy. By stating certainties, such as giving dates and 
mentioning facts and stating laws, the Al Wefaq MPs are emphasising they 
are well-informed and committed. The certainties presented by the Al Wefaq 
MPs are of two types: simple facts and deduced certainties. The simple facts 
are dates, constitutional law, and other past incidents. Deduced certainties 
are the illegality of the accusations and dismissing charges against others. 
Simon-Vandenbergen notes that the deduction technique in asserting an 
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opinion is often used in interviews carried out with politicians and he calls it 
‘the expression of cognitive certainty’ (1996: 392).  
The doubt that the Al-Wefaq MPs raise as opposed to the certainty 
they have mentioned is achieved by questioning, even impeaching, the 
integrity of the Ministry of the Interior and of the investigations. MP Salman 
does this in lines 33–38: ‘… this is not the first time that the Ministry of the 
Interior announces the discovery of a cell … intending to carry out some 
terrorist acts. … and our council did not address those events and we did not 
issue any statements in the Council.’ Calling the accusations made by the 
Ministry of the Interior ‘claims’ has the effect of casting doubt on the 
accusations, and to compare the reaction of the Council to the earlier 
accusations also questions the rightfulness of the Council in issuing a 
statement now and not then.  
MP Al-Miz’al also makes the move of suspecting the legality of the 
procedures in two parts of his interventions: first, by spotlighting a probable 
breach of constitutional law. He uses aporia to raise this point (lines 67–73): 
 
MM: …          Does not  67 
Article 20 of the Constitution of the country (bilād), which you  68 
vowed to respect, states that "The accused is innocent until proven  69 
guilty in a court of law"? Has there been a conviction that allows  70 
you to state that they are not innocent?  71 
They are innocent according to the Constitution until fair  72 




and again in lines 89–93 when he associates the Speaker of the Council’s 
duty to not condemn the detainees by referring to the ‘vow’ he took when 
appointed in his position and then mentions the constitutional law again 
against condemning the detainees: 
 
MM: …               Respect  89 
your vow, Mr Speaker, the vow you took. Do not condemn someone  90 
whom the Constitution considers innocent. The Council has no right  91 
to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent under the  92 
Constitution unless a fair trial in which all … —93 
 
The second way in which MP Al-Miz’al employs logical-augmentation can be 
found in lines 74–85: 
 
MM: There must be a legal trial in which the accused one is guaranteed  74 
what the Constitution states. He has to be given necessary  75 
guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence. The necessary  76 
guarantees. I ask all the journalists, I ask all the people, I ask the  77 
MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask lawyers to provide them with the  78 
necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence at all  79 
stages of the investigation, and I draw ten lines under all stages of  80 
investigation. Before you stands an advisor who was formerly in the  81 
Military Judiciary. Let him tell us what the entire stages of the  82 
investigation are. Has there been a lawyer assigned for these  83 
defendants at all stages of the investigation? Or have they been  84 
interrogated without a lawyer? Lawyers have objected to that, Mr  85 
Speaker. … 86 
 
In the extract above, MP Al-Miz’al makes a rhetorical move by indicating 
that there is a suspicion that the routine procedure is not being followed 
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when he insists on the detainees being given ‘necessary guarantees for the 
exercise of the right of defence’ (lines 75–76). He again stresses the 
procedures, which again reflects his doubts, in lines 80–81: ‘I draw ten lines 
under all stages of investigation.’ The two rhetorical questions and the 
sentence that follow confirm his distrust: ‘Has there been a lawyer assigned 
for these defendants at all stages of the investigation? Or have they been 
interrogated without a lawyer? Lawyers have objected to that’ (lines 83–85). 
This rhetorical move is what Cosmides and Tooby (2000: 196) call the 
‘cheater-detection’ module. As cheating is a violation of some social rules, 
cheater detection module is a possible response to this violation (ibid). 
 
c. Framing and reframing of the defendants 
As mentioned earlier, the statement group framed the plot and the incident 
as ‘terrorist’, which implies that the defendants are terrorists, even without 
having to say so. While MP Salman does not frame the defendants or 
mention them at all in his intervention, the defendants are a focal point in 
MP Al-Miz’al’s intervention. Framing and reframing are important discursive 
devices that reveal a lot about a speaker’s stance, attitude and perspective. 
First, there is the shift in framing that MP Al-Miz’al uses when talking about 
the people who were arrested, the people whose act was described by the 
statement group described as ‘terrorist’ (lines 3, 6 and 10), something which 
consequently framed the indictees as terrorists. This way, the first framing 
was already done in the statement. MP Al-Miz’al objects to this framing and 
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reframes the indictees at two levels as he moves from a more reason-based 
approach to a confrontational stage as the following examples illustrate.  
When MP Al-Miz’al at first relies on the Speaker’s abiding by the 
Constitution and his vow as evidence of his objectivity, MP Al-Miz’al 
demands that the trial should take place before any convictions are made. At 
this stage, he does not confirm the innocence or the guilt of the defendants, 
who, he explains, are innocent by law: ‘The accused is innocent until proven 
guilty in a court of law’ (lines 69–70). This conditional innocence is the first 
frame that MP Al-Miz’al repeats: ‘Do not condemn someone whom the 
Constitution considers innocent,’ (lines 90–91) and ‘who are innocent under 
the Constitution’ (lines 92–93). The reference to the Constitution stresses the 
legitimacy of his reframing. The repetition that reinforces the frame. 
MP Al-Miz’al reframes the defendants one more time when he 
reframes them as victims, although he does not use that exact word, when 
he says: ‘There are allegations made by lawyers of torture’ (line 104). Then 
the framing of the defendants shifts to the unrestricted description of them 
as innocents, starting from line 120: ‘We do not want and do not accept and 
do not agree on this council to have a say against an innocent person’ (lines 
120–122), ‘Do not condemn the innocent’ (line 132). Such reframing in a 
political discourse is a use of what Bayley and Vicente call ‘semantic 
nuances’ (2004: 238). They explain that ‘cultures tend to develop a wide 
range of vocabulary to denote various semantic nuances where certain 
values may be in conflict, thus constructing different ways of looking at the 
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same thing’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, the argument of MP Al-Miz’al here is cut 
short, as it comes late and is amongst a considerable number of repetitions 
about following the constitution and innocence. This shift in framing is a 
shift in the purpose of MP Al-Miz’al’s speech from calling for the proposal to 
be withdrawn as being not a proper issue for the Council to discuss or 
interfere in to actually wanting to represent the defendants as innocent.  
 
d. Protesting through metaphors 
Looking at MP Al-Miz’al’s use of metaphors in this excerpt as a rhetorical 
device, there are several occurrences that reflect strong disapproval and 
denunciation. For example, he comments on a previous terrorist plan that he 
claims was contained differently and without as much fuss: ‘the issue has 
been concealed and dissolved. I do not know where, in which sea, the topic 
has been dissolved’ (lines 58–60). The metaphoric image that begins with an 
aporia. ‘I do not know’, which expresses a stimulated perplexity, reflects 
strong disapproval and despair simultaneously: a disapproval of what he 
considers to be the concealment of an issue, and despair in finding a thread 
to the issue to compare charges. Then, in lines 101–102, there is the 
metonymy in which ‘homeland’ is substituted for the nation, the people, as 
observers of the argument and representatives of public opinion: ‘The 
homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the home land and 
the whole homeland should not be dragged behind charges that have not 
been proven by law’ (lines 101-103). In the same sentences, a metaphor is 
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used of the people being ‘dragged’, something which adds a strong image of 
being forced to think differently from what they would normally do if they 
were not influenced by the charges: ‘The homeland, the whole homeland, 
should not be dragged, the homeland and the whole homeland should not be 
dragged behind charges that have not been proven by law, have not been 
proven by the judiciary.’ First, there is the use of an absolute: ‘the whole’, 
which is one of the features of foregrounded disagreement, as will be 
explained further below. Secondly, the metaphor of ‘dragging’ indicates a 
state of force and abuse while misleading public opinion. This is what 
evolutionary psychologists consider as one of the modular programmes that 
are ‘functionally responsible for solving a different adaptive problem’ 
(Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 91). By using the ‘dragging’ metaphor, MP Al-
Miz’al is attempting to activate ‘inferential procedures’ to catch or detect a 
cheater in a social environment (Cosmides 1989: 196). MP Al-Miz’al is 
applying what can be called cheater-detecting language, which Hart 
describes as ‘manipulative’ (Hart 2005: 191). It is, therefore, not an end in 
itself, but is an attempt to accuse MP Al-Miz’al of using ‘fictitious emotions’ 
(Bazzanella 2004: 67),MP Al-Miz’al is encouraging the audience to realise 
that they are being cheated or deluded into thinking something that is not 
true, to accept the conviction of the detainees. MP Khalid, in line 150, also 
activates a cheater-detecting module when he says: ‘Record the play.’ In 
both cases with the interventions of both MPs, the audience is not only the 
MPs but also the journalists attending the sitting, through whom the public 
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will get a picture of what happened. This alert is supposed to influence, even 
recruit, the audience, or public opinion in this case, against the cheater so 
that they become moral support for the speaker, if not by proving him to be 
right, then by proving the other person to be wrong. 
 
e. Foregrounded argumentation: from dispute to conflict 
Starting from line 98, the strategy of centralising pride and dignity comes 
into play. At this stage, MP Al-Miz’al stops adding input to his argument and 
moves from the reason-based and rhetorical repetition stage to the more 
emotional confrontational stage, with repetition failing to strengthen the 
argument. The lexical style he shifts to presents a foregrounded 
argumentation, which becomes empty of new input from line 98 onwards. At 
this stage, the speech has moved into a conflict.  
First I explain how a status of dispute is being constructed and what 
devices are used in creating it. Distinction should be made between the 
concepts of dispute, conflict and argument. The ‘key action’ in all three is 
disagreement (Argaman 2009: 516).  
Disputes are often about ‘controlling’ the ‘ownership of physical 
material and spaces’54 (Cobb-Moore et al. 2008: 597) and can be over 
legislative matters (see various legal uses of the term, e.g. custody dispute, 
dispute settlement, dispute resolution, etc.). According to this definition, the 
debate until this point has been based on a dispute, which is normal and 
expected in parliamentary debates. However, at this stage, it develops into a 
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conflict, which ‘lacks all interpersonal niceties and relies instead on the 
performance of hostile argumentation’ (Lorenzo-Dus 2008: 81). 
Lorenzo-Dus (ibid.: 89) explains that ‘[f]oregrounded disagreements 
are at the most explicit and hostile end pole of a disagreement style 
continuum, the opposite end pole of which is occupied by backgrounded 
disagreements.’ She lists a number of ‘linguistic strategies, grammatical 
categories and lexical items’ that identify a foregrounded disagreement: 
  
 absolutes (e.g. all, every)  
 negation 
 discourse markers (but, now and well)  
 emphatics (e.g. a lot)  
 floor bids (i.e. phrases that indicate an attempt to stop others from 
talking)  
 flow (i.e. confrontational latching and interrupting)  
 indexical second person pronouns (e.g. accusatory use of pronouns)  
 modals (necessity, prediction and semi-modals)  
 repetition  
 questions (challenging)  
 turn length (i.e. short turns as potential indexes of disagreement), and 





I am adding them under my list of discursive devices. Besides the absence or 
presence of these items, their strength (i.e. frequency) affects the strength of 
the foregrounded disagreement (ibid.). Interestingly, this stage of the 
argument proves to be a very strong foregrounded disagreement, as the 
employment of the following discursive devices reveals. 
 
 Absolutes 
MP Al-Miz’al employs a number of absolutes. One clear use is in the 
beginning of his interventions, far in advance, signalling a tendency to 
express strong disagreement, when he claims that another terrorist group 
was not brought to justice: ‘this topic has been dissolved and terminated 
without a trial and without the escalation that we see in the press, the 
media, in the street, everywhere’ (lines 59–61); ‘I ask all the journalists, I ask 
all the people, … the right of defence at all stages of the investigation, and I 
draw ten lines under all stages of investigation’ (lines 77–81); ‘Let him tell us 
what the entire stages of the investigation are. Has there been a lawyer 
assigned for these defendants at all stages of the investigation?’ (line 82–84); 
‘unless a fair trial in which all—… , in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, 
unless all guaranteed for a fair trial’ (lines 93–96) and ‘the whole homeland, 
should not be dragged, the homeland and the whole homeland should not be 
dragged behind charges that have not been proven by law’ (lines 101-103).  
While one would normally avoid absolutes in a preplanned debate or 
argument, they become more common as the disagreement becomes more 
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hostile and more confrontational as seems to happen in the interventions of 
MP Al-Miz’al in this excerpt. 
 
 Negations and indexical second person pronouns 
Negation, which is another prominent discursive device that signals 
foregrounded argumentation, becomes the most prominent item of 
foregrounded disagreement in MP Al-Miz’al’s speech, with it being used 
repeatedly. Many examples of negation can found in this stage of the 
excerpt, too, as the argumentation builds up towards a conflict: ‘It is not 
right to do this’ (line 73); ‘Do not condemn someone whom the Constitution 
considers innocent. The Council has no right to issue a statement 
condemning someone who is innocent’ (lines 90–92). It is, however, 
intensified in the following section, in which the instances of negation are 
underlined: 
 
S:  MP Sheikh Adel Abdulrahman Al-Mu’awdah, please. 94 
MM:  –No, in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, unless all guarantees  95 
for a fair trial– 96 
JDF:  Mr Speaker 97 
MM:  –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be  98 
fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair,  99 
and for this council to enhance fair judiciary, to enhance justice.  100 
The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the  101 
homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind  102 
charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven  103 
by the judiciary. There are allegations made by lawyers of torture– 104 




MM: This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued  107 
by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement. 108 
S:      All right, we stop here. 109 
MM:  If you want to issue a statement do it yourselves. Condemn the  110 
innocents before a trial. I will not allow this. I will not allow this  111 
council, and there is no good in this council if it condemns an  112 
innocent person before his trial. This council must not, this council  113 
must not interfere in what is not its business. You are not a judicial  114 
council, you are a parliamentary council, the Council of  115 
Representatives, you are a council of legislation. You are an  116 
observation board. Watch the ministries in their work, watch the  117 
judiciary in its work, watch the Interior in its work. Yes, we have  118 
cooperated and we cooperate, and we are extremely intent on the  119 
security of this homeland, and the safety of this homeland. We do  120 
not want and do not accept and do not agree on this council having  121 
a say against an innocent person. You may not do this, I say.  122 
Withdraw the statement, withdraw the statement. 123 
S:      It does not get withdrawn. 124 
MM: You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.  125 
Be intent on the security of the homeland. 126 
S:      This is a start; this is a statement– 127 
(MP Al-Miz’al moves to the middle of the chamber.) 128 
MM: Withdraw the statement. Have the statement withdrawn. I will not  129 
sit. This council has no right to intervene, it is not right to do so, Mr  130 
Speaker. The Council has no right to intervene, the Council has no  131 
right to intervene. Do not condemn the innocent. I will not move  132 
from this place until you withdraw the statement. There is no  133 
good in the Council. There must be a fair trial. You^ may not, you^56  134 
may not, Mr Speaker. I will not move. Arrest me. Evict me.  135 
You have no right– 136 
S:      Mohammed Al-Miz’al, I will get you out myself– 137 
MM:  You have not the right to. As a council you have no right.  138 
You have no right. 139 
MK:  ʿala kaifuk? 57 [i.e. Is it up to you?] 140 
MM:  Shut up— 141 
MK:  Iṭlaʿ 58 [i.e. Get out.] 142 
S:      Sitting adjourned for ten minutes. 143 
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There is an instance of interrupting negation which seems to be in response 
to either unrecorded opposition or interruptions in line 99: ‘No, no, we want 
this judiciary to be fair.’ Here, the Speaker responds with a negation, a 
response that displays a shift made by the Speaker to become more 
foregrounded after a few attempts to stop MP Al-Miz’al less 
confrontationally (as explained under the section above on floor bids): ‘It 
does not get withdrawn’ (line 124). Still, MP Al-Miz’al keeps loading his 
intervention with negations, and the use of negation becomes particularly 
intense from line 129 onwards. 
Simultaneously, MP Al-Miz’al is intensifying the use of the second 
person pronouns (the singular ‘you’ and the plural ‘you’) in an accusatory 
way, starting with the second person plural pronouns. As can be noted from 
the extract above, the second person becomes more intense in MP Salman’s 
speech, shifting from plural to singular ones as he proceeds. MP Al-Miz’al’s 
final line of defence is placing himself, both audibly and physically, as an 
obstacle to the progress of the proposal, when he gets up from his seat and 
walks to the middle of the hall, shouting (lines 128 onwards). As he is 
interrupted again by the Speaker, he shifts to a sit-in position with an 
intense use of negation: ‘I will not sit’ (lines 129–130), ‘I will not move from 
this place until you withdraw the statement’ (lines 132–133). Now all the 
speakers seem to have grown impatient, and there are some harsh exchanges 
that get most hostile in lines 136-142. In lines 140 and 142, MP Khalid shifts 
to Bahraini dialect, a shift suggesting losing composure as a reaction to the 
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foregrounded disagreement: ‘ʿala kaifuk? [i.e. Is it up to you?]’ and ‘Iṭlaʿ [i.e. 
Get out.]’  
  
 Discourse markers 
Discourse markers, such as oh, actually, well, now, I mean, but and other 
linking words, are normally used to link ideas and add coherency to a 
discourse. Stenstrom believes that a conversation becomes ‘much less lively 
and less “personal” without [discourse markers] signalling receipt of 
information, agreement and involvement’ (1994:17). However, when they 
become intensively used, they signify that an argument has become more 
foregrounded. Nonetheless, there is no notable intensity of the use of 
discourse markers in the part in which MP Al-Miz’al becomes more 
confrontational. This could be mainly because the pace of his objections and 
protests is accelerating and because, as noted above, he is not putting 
forward new ideas, something that makes his speech less coherent and, 
therefore, less dependent on discourse markers. There is also a chance that 
many discourse markers, especially ones like oh, well, and I mean were not 
transcribed in Hansard due to their being perceived as interjections.  
 
 Emphatics 
Showing emphasis in a conversation can be achieved through intonation and 
stress, both of which are beyond the scope of this research (see Scope of 
Research in Section 1.4). However, there are expressions that can convey 
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emphasis, such as intensifiers and other wordings that can convey stress and 
forcefulness.  
 As MP Al-Miz’al gets more confrontational in this stage of the sitting, 
he does use some verbal emphatics: ‘On what basis are the defendants 
described –and I emphasize and draw ten lines under the word defendants – 
as guilty, as criminals, as khārijites, takmīīrriyyūn as stated by some MPs?’ 
(lines 61–64); ‘There must be a legal trial’ (line 74); and also when he says 
‘and I ask lawyers to provide them with the necessary guarantees for the 
exercise of the right of defence at all stages of the investigation, and I draw 
ten lines under all stages of investigation’ (lines 78–81). 
 
 Floor bids and flow 
I present these two devices together, as floor bids and flow are simultaneous 
in the examples I provide from this argumentation. While the Speaker of the 
Council is supposedly the one who has the power to stop an intervention in 
the parliamentary sittings, this excerpt presents an example of when this 
power is lost, or at least challenged, when an argument becomes 
foregrounded. There are several examples of floor bids in this excerpt and 
they get closer as we advance. The first attempt was after MP Al-Miz’al made 






MM is MP Mohammed Al Miz’al from Al Wefaq. 
S is the Speaker. 
JDF MP Jawad Fayrooz from Al Wefaq. 
MK is MP Mohammed Khalid from Al Asalah. 
AA is MP Adel Al-Mu’awdah from Al Asalah. 
 
MM: …     The Council has no right  91 
to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent under the  92 
Constitution unless a fair trial in which all – 93 
S:      MP Sheikh Adel Abdulrahman Al-Mu’awdah, please. 94 
MM:  –No, in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, unless all guarantees  95 
for a fair trial– 96 
JDF:  Mr Speaker 97 
MM: –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be  98 
fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair …  99 
 
The Speaker in line 94 gives the floor to MP Al-Mu’awdah from Al-Asalah 
but before the latter can speak, MP Al-Miz’al continues and then Jawad 
Fayrooz, who is also from Al Wefaq, tries to take the floor. Nevertheless, he 
is also interrupted by MP Al-Miz’al, who continues his speech ignoring the 
three other interlocutors. MP Al-Miz’al succeeds in winning more time until 
MP Adel Al-Mu’awdah unsuccessfully attempts to get his turn but in a very 
lenient way: 
 
MM:  …  There are allegations made by lawyers of torture– 104 




MM: This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued  107 
by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement. 108 
S:      All right, we stop here. 109 
MM: If you want to issue a statement, do it yourselves. … 110 
 
With ‘allow us’ (line 105), MP Al-Mu’awdah sounds as if he is asking for 
permission to get his turn although MP Al-Miz’al has taken more than his 
rightful space and time and no longer speaking during his turn. The Speaker 
then signals the end of MP Al-Miz’al’s turn again, but this time more 
directly: ‘All right, we stop here’ (line 109).The use of inclusive ‘we’ serves 
as a soother to sound less hostile, but MP Al-Miz’al still does not respond 
and goes on and again wins more space and time (lines 110-123). The 
speaker tries to stop him for a third time but this time by negating the 
possibility of MP Al-Miz’al’s demand being approved: 
 
MM: …    withdraw the statement. 123 
S:      It does not get withdrawn. 124 
MM: You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.  125 
Be intent on the security of the homeland. 126 
S:      This is a start; this is a statement– 127 
(MP Al-Miz’al moves to the middle of the chamber.) 128 
MM: Withdraw the statement…. 129 
 
As can be noted above, the overt and direct rejection by the Speaker of MP 
Al-Miz’al’s demand in line 124 does not stop the latter. The Speaker tries a 
fourth time to take over the floor in line 127, but MP Al-Miz’al interrupts 
and takes over very briefly. The floor bids have now become very tense and 
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the other interlocutors are not as tolerant of MP Al-Miz’al any longer; the 
floor bids and interruptions are made in the form of short turns as will be 
shown below under the device of ‘short turns’. 
 
 Modals of necessity and prediction 
Some modals and semi-modals can indicate necessity, such as ‘should’, 
‘must’, ‘have to’ and ‘be supposed to’; other indicate prediction, such as 
‘will’, ‘assume’ and ‘should be’ etc. There are some examples of these modals 
and semi-modal in MP Salam’s intervention and they are instances all of the 
modal of prediction ‘will’, a group of which are part of conditional 
statements predicting what will happen if the statement was not withdrawn: 
‘if we raise this issue now, we will then have a stance. We will have a 
reservation on the subject and we will express our point of view. We will 
also ask to highlight our point of view’ (lines 40-43), ‘I will be obliged to 
intervene to illustrate my point and I will come up with another statement 
representing my party and I will try to publish it.’ (lines 47-49). MP Al-
Miz’al’s foregrounded argument also contains several modals. One example 
is in lines 101-103: ‘The homeland, the whole homeland should not be 
dragged, the homeland, the whole homeland should not be dragged behind 
charges that have not been proven by law,’ another in line 107: ‘We will not 
allow this statement to be issued’ and more in lines 111-114: ‘I will not 
allow this. I will not allow this Council,… This Council must not, this 
Council must not interfere in what is not its business.’ In the interventions of 
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both MPs, Salman and Al-Miz’al, the modal of prediction ‘will’ functions as a 
form of warning, a threat to a certain extent, which makes it a device of 
foregrounded argumentation. The modal of necessity ‘must’ indicates that 
the interlocutor, i.e. MP Al-Miz’al, is not willing to negotiate that certain 
point and thus is attempting to impose it as an obligatory requirement for 




Repetition is a strong rhetorical device. Young explains that repetition of 
one’s stance or opinion is a technique used by politicians for ‘staying on 
message’ (Young S. 2010: 629). In her analysis, Young refers to repetition of 
the same idea on separate occasions, but here repetition appears to be 
happening within the same debate. The effect may, therefore, be different, if 
not reversed. While the more scattered repetition of the message can have 
‘important effects in fending off scrutiny and analysis’ (ibid.: 629), repetition 
in the same discourse or speech may reinforce an idea at a certain point, but 
may then cause it to have a reverse effect, that is, losing the listener’s trust. 
It seems that MP Al-Miz’al crosses this boundary in line 98 onwards. 
There are many instances of repetition in MP Al-Miz’al’s speech, 
repetition of words, phrases and ideas, as ‘I ask all the journalists, I ask all 
the people, I ask all the MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask the lawyers’ (lines 
77–78); the repetition in ‘We want this judiciary to be fair. We want this 
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trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair’ in lines 98–99; ‘The 
homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the homeland and 
the whole homeland should not be dragged behind charges’ (lines 101–102); 
‘I will not allow this. I will not allow this council’ (lines 111–112); ‘You are 
not a judicial council, you are a parliamentary council, … you are a council 
of legislation, you are an observation board. Watch the ministries…, watch 
the judiciary…, watch the Interior…’ (lines 114–118). 
Going back to lines 77–78, when MP Al-Miz’al says: ‘I ask all the 
journalists, I ask all the people, I ask all the MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask 
the lawyers,’ there is an awareness of an audience that is not the major or 
direct addressee: the journalists, the public, the judges and the lawyers are 
not part of the exchanges in parliamentary debates, and yet MP Al-Miz’al is 
conscious of their having an opportunity to convey his message to a wider 
audience. Therefore, if he fails to convince the Council, he will still have 
reached other people whose opinion can influence and put pressure on 
parliamentary attitude.  
The repetition of ‘I ask’ in lines 77–78 and the repetition of ‘watch’ in 
lines 117–118 are much more effective than if the addressees in the former 
and the objects in the latter had been listed immediately and without such a 
repetition, for example: ‘I ask all the journalists, all the people, all the MPs, 
the judges and the lawyers’ and ‘Watch the ministries, the judiciary and the 
Interior.’ The repetition adds individual emphasis and, consequently, is 
putting each group in a spotlight by itself. 
255 
 
One thing to draw attention to is that although repetition by itself is a 
second rhetorical device that he uses frequently, as will be discussed in the 
following section, the repetition of a frame in particular reinforces it. The 
statement repeats ‘terrorist’ three times to enforce the idea. However, even 
when one repeats what he or she condemns, a frame that has been made by 
an opponent, this repetition still reinforces the idea of the opponent. This is 
something that MP Al-Miz’al has mistakenly done, reinforcing a frame while 
trying to negate it. He did this earlier when he complained in lines 61–67: 
 
MM: …       On  61 
what basis are the defendants described –and I emphasise and draw  62 
ten lines under the word defendants – as guilty, as criminals, as  63 
khārijites,59 takmīīrriyyūn60 as stated by some MPs? On what basis  64 
does any member of this council, the Parliament, participate in a  65 
TV programme to describe the defendant as a criminal, as hateful  66 
and a killer? On what basis are they described as such? ...67 
 
In the extract above, MP Al-Miz’al repeats the negative frame of guilty, 
criminals, khārijites, Takmīīrriyyūn and hateful, all of which he is trying to 
condemn and deny. This is because by mentioning a frame, whether to 
confirm it or deny it, is an act of reinforcement of an idea or an image. This 
idea or image gets summoned upon, reminded of if forgotten and made 
present if unknown; I consider this to be unintentional destructive framing.  
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However, the other two stages of reframing are more constructive and 
it would have been more constructive to frame the act name-calling, e.g. 
sectarian act, discriminatory word choices. 
 
 Challenging questions 
Challenging questions in foregrounded argumentation will normally be 
rhetorical questions. In this argument, MP Al-Miz’al poses a few; there are 
five successive ones in the following lines: 
 
MM: …        On  61 
what basis are the defendants described –and I emphasize and draw  62 
ten lines under the word ‘defendants’ – as guilty, as criminals, as  63 
khārijites61, takmīīrriyyūn62 as stated by some MPs? On what basis  64 
does any member of this council, the Parliament, participate in a  65 
TV program to describe the defendant as a criminal, as hateful  66 
and a killer? On what basis are they described as such? Does not  67 
Article 20 of the Constitution of the country (bilād), which you  68 
vowed to respect, state that “The accused is innocent until proven  69 
guilty in a court of law”? Has there been a conviction that allows  70 
you to state that they are not innocent? 71 
72 
and again in lines 83–85: 
 
MM: …  Has there been a lawyer assigned for these  83 
defendants at all stages of the investigation? Or have they been  84 




The other challenging rhetorical question is posed by MP Mohammed Khalid 
(MK) much later during the most hostile exchanges in the excerpt and it is 
posed in a Bahraini dialect, making it more of a personal challenge and 
showing intolerance of MP Al-Miz’al’s (MM) long and seemingly unstoppable 
dispute: 
 
MM: You have no right to. As a council you have no right. 138 
You have no right. 139 
MK:  ʿala kaifuk?63 [i.e. Is it up to you?] 140 
MM:  Shut up—141 
 
MP Khalid’s question, Is it up to you?, receives a more hostile response, Shut 
up, bringing the argument to a climax.  
 
 Short Turns 
As MP Al-Miz’al gets more and more confrontational, and other MPs, 
including the Speaker, are less prepared to tolerate his behaviour, turn 
taking becomes shorter and shorter. It particularly gets shorter in lines 124–
143 (see above). 
The Speaker of the Council becomes impatient and converses with 
him at a personal level: ‘Mohammed Al-Miz’al, I will get you out myself’ 
(line 137), but MP Al-Miz’al continues his protest: ‘You have not the right to. 
As a council you have no right to. You have no right’ (lines 138–139). This is 
when a short but hostile and personal exchange between MP Mohammed 
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Khalid, and MP Al-Miz’al takes place: MP Khalid asks in condemnation: ‘ʿala 
kaifuk? [i.e. Is it up to you?]?’ (line 140), only to infuriate MP Al-Miz’al even 
more, and he responds with: ‘Shut up’ (line 141). The sit-in atmosphere 
continues when the Speaker demands that the microphones be turned off to 
force the adjournment of the sitting (lines 143–144), but Al-Miz’al does not 
want to stop and instead confronts the Speaker, now using the singular 
second person pronoun: ‘Turn off the microphone. As you like. Turn off what 
you want’ (lines 145–146). At this stage the Speaker also has a quick 
personal exchange with MP Al-Miz’al: ‘Stop acting. Enough, stop talking’ 
(line147), which MP Khalid picks up and scorns: ‘Record the play. Is this 
proper behaviour?’ (line 150). The hostile short turn exchanges urge the 
Speaker of the Council to put an end for the debate.  
The sitting was then supposed to be adjourned for ten minutes but did 
not resume for 50 minutes. Apparently, more than ten minutes was required 
to calm down the heated debate outside the parliament hall. According to 
Hansard, after the adjournment, the Speaker decided to complete the 
remaining topics on the agenda and to leave the controversial proposal to 
the end of the sitting. However, Hansard does not report the topic as having 
been brought up again. Akhbar Al-Khaleej newspaper (Nasr and Jaber, 31 
Dec. 2008: 10), on the other hand, mentions that the Council agreed that 
each party could issue its own statement in this case.  
This excerpt in particular, beside other parts of other excerpt, has shown 
how the strategy of corroborating by information can get very emotive and 
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confrontational, and how using facts and information is not necessarily 
objective. To understand the incentive of the tension and emotions, it is 
useful to examine the topic beyond what this excerpt provides. 
 
 Beyond the text 4.3.4.2
 On the background to the conflict 
In the previous year, 2007, riots and vandalism took place during the same 
period in December to coincide with the National Day holiday and 
celebrations. Among the casualties of that year was a policeman on duty, 
who was burnt to death in his police car. At the time, the Council had 
proposed issuing a statement condemning the vandalism and violence that 
had taken place. The Al Wefaq Party and one other MP, Abdul Aziz Abul, 
refused to issue this statement and voted against it. The riots resulted in 
twelve MPs for and exactly the same number against the proposal, but as the 
voice of the Speaker equals two voices, the proposal was approved and the 
Council issued the statement (Jaber 2007).  
After the 2008 riots, which the statement group is referring to, 
however, Al Wefaq did not allow the same scenario of voting to signal a 
similar condemnation. After the ‘terrorist plot’ of December 2008, none of Al 
Wefaq MPs made any statements through Akhbar Al-Khaleej about the plot, 
either for or against, until the parliamentary sittings on 23 and 30 December 
2008. In the parliamentary sitting held on 23 December, only MP Adel Al-
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Mu’awdah, a Sunni MP from the Al Asalah Party, mentioned the incident at 
various points, suggesting a relevant addition in the response to the Royal 
Address of the King (Hansard Sitting 9, 23 Dec. 2008: MP Al-Mu’awdah: 66). 
MP Al-Mu’awdah started by suggesting an addition to an item on the 
legislative system. In his addition, he stressed that riots and vandalism 
should not be dealt with as ‘childish niggling’ and should be taken seriously 
as acts of terrorism (ibid.). He called for ‘drying up the sources of terrorism 
by monitoring them and draining them to prevent sedition in the country’ 
(ibid.). He then moved on to other items in the response to the Royal 
Address, mainly economic criticism, but he was interrupted by the Speaker 
for having used up his assigned time (bid. 67). MP Al-Mu’awdah briefly 
returned to the riot incident in the single statement with which he closed his 
speech: ‘We should not forget under the topic of Rights: the rights of the 
ones whom the incidents harmed; we have duties towards them too. Thank 
you’ (ibid.).  
 
 Paving the way for expressing points of view 
According to Hansard, no further direct discussion of the riots came up 
during the sitting held on the 23 December. However, when MP Jalal 
Fayrooz, from the Al Wefaq Party, suggested his additions to the letter in 
reply to the Royal Address, he first demanded three amendments to the 
response to the Royal Address (Attachment to Sitting 9, pp. 334–345). MP 
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Fayrooz required an addition under the section entitled ‘Sixth: the Level of 
Rights,’ as follows (Fayrooz, Sitting 9, 23 Dec 2008): 
 
 There should be adherence to the International Covenant Against Torture 
and preventing any form of torture and coercion against detainees in 
detention centres.  
 The government should cooperate to amend laws restricting freedom, which 
must be amended to comply with the covenants and conventions signed by 
the Kingdom.  
 The government should cooperate to form a body of justice and equity to 
resolve the outstanding issues from the pre-reform era.  
(Hansard, 25 Dec. 2008: 56). 
 
In this sitting, several MPs from Al Wefaq brought in the topic of 
naturalisation and the demand to employ Shiites in the Armed Forces. These 
two topics which were off the agenda and not relevant to the discussion are 
major conflicts between Al Wefaq and the government and had been the 
main causes of the riots in the country in the few days previously.64 MP 
Fayrooz mentions both topics as he resumes with his recommendations. He 
asks for amendments on the Armed Forces item in the response to the Royal 
Address as follows: ‘I have two proposals: first, [to add] at the end of the 
paragraph “to comply with Article 16 of the Constitution by not employing 
foreigners in public offices except on a temporary basis, and that is to be 
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achieved by Bahrainising the Defence Force jobs in Bahrain” – and I do not 
mean naturalisation when I say Bahrainisation, but [I mean] employing 
Bahrainis – Secondly: “and allowing all Bahrainis including those belonging 
to the doctrine of Ahl al-Bayt to serve in the Bahrain Defence Force”’ (ibid.). 
MP Fayrooz’s first additions are about detainees’ rights, and they 
seem to be timed well after the arrest of the instigators of the riots and the 
defendants accused of killing the policeman. His additions to the item on the 
Armed Forces are directly linked to his first amendments; this is because the 
riots and vandalism that had happened in the previous days were motivated 
by conflicts with the government, mainly over the issues of naturalisation. 
Many Shiite parties, and mainly Al Wefaq, have in the last twenty years 
strongly objected to the process of naturalisation. However, historically 
speaking, the vast majority of Bahraini citizens are of other origins, such as 
Central and East Arabia, Southern Iraq and Iran. This is very much reflected 
in the variety of cosmopolitan ethnicity, customs and dialects that this small 
country encompasses. Only a few families, most of whom are Sunni, can be 
said to have lived for generation in Bahrain at least since Islam came in year 
629. This means that the negative attitude towards naturalisation is directed 
only at certain groups, while the naturalisation of other groups is overlooked 
by the same protesters. If Van Dijk’s definition of prejudice is taken as 
‘mental representations in social memory consisting of structured schemata 
of general opinions shared by a group’ (1993b:39), then the attempt to argue 
logically that a certain group is less Bahraini than others does not stand up 
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to scrutiny, as the attempt to differentiate between the ones who were 
naturalised more recently than those who have been naturalised earlier is 
actually based on prejudice rather than logic. 
In his additions to the item regarding the Armed Forces, MP Fayrooz 
demands two contradictory requirements: on the one hand, he is objecting to 
what he sees as a type of discrimination against Shiites when the Armed 
Forces are being selective about whom to accept. The fact is that the current 
system of enrolment in the Armed Forces has been preventing the 
employment not only of Shiites, but also of any Bahrainis from non-Arab 
origins, like Holis (mixed Arab Persian Sunnis). However, MP Fayrooz is not 
concerned about who does not join but more about whom he wants to join, 
and therefore he focuses on Shiites’ right to join. Thus, his statement ‘and 
allowing all walks of life65… to serve in Bahrain Defence Force’ is only a 
legal and constitutional covering for a specific demand: to allow Shiite in 
particular in. It also contrasts with his immediately previous demand that a 
certain group of Bahrainis not be allowed to serve in the Armed Forces if 
gained citizenship relatively recently.  
The label that MP Fayrooz gives the Shiites here generates a quarrel. 
He calls them, according to Hansard, Ahl Al-Bait, and according to Akhbar 
Al-Khaleej ‘Āl Al-Bayt’. Both names refer to the descendants and the family 
of the Prophet Mohammed, and within the Shiite doctrine, this is more 
restricted to the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin Imam Ali 
bin Abi Talib from his wife Fatima Al-Zahra’, the daughter of the Prophet 
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Mohammed. This is an incorrect label for two reasons: first, although a 
number of Shiites trace their roots back to Imam Ali and Fatima Al-Zahra’, 
the vast majority of Shiites do not. MP Fayrooz probably wanted to give the 
Bahraini Shiites a prestigious religious halo, but he failed to include most of 
the Shiites in his call. This attempt at self-definition, therefore, was not 
successful even in the Shiite context. Secondly, there are many Sunnis who 
are descended from the Prophet Mohammed, and even from Imam Ali and 
Fatima Al-Zahra’. After all, the division between Shiite and Sunni did not 
exist in the Prophet’s day, not even during the era of Imam Ali’s reign. This 
sectarian division is the result of a complicated historical and political 
transformation.  
 
 Individual comments and total ‘silences’ 
While there are no newspaper statements in Akhbar Al-Khaleej by Al Wefaq 
MPs about the riots and the murder of the policeman, other MPs issued 
statements to Akhbar Al-Khaleej condemning the incident. For example, on 
the 19th of the same month, MP Jassim Al Sa’eedi, an independent Sunni MP 
proclaimed that he had ‘repeatedly warned against terrorist cells with 
political, economic, religious and military divisions. They are fully fledged 
organisations supported by foreigners’ (A-Sa’eedi quoted in Nasr and Jaber 
19 Dec. 2008a: 8). MP Hassan Al-Dosseri, a Sunni MP and the Head of the 
Al-Mustaqbal Party, not a religious party, demanded the law of terrorism be 
employed against those condemned (ibid.). On the 22nd, MP Mohammed 
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Khalid called for the prohibition of a demonstration against naturalisation 
that was organised in Madinat Hamad, a city that falls within his 
parliamentary area. This demonstration was scheduled for Friday 26th of the 
same month and was organised by six political blocs66 (Nasr and Jaber 22 
Dec. 2008: 10). MP Khalid requested that people stay away from violence 
and ‘not … politicise more issues for sectarian and group related interests’ 
(ibid.).  
 
These events that were concurrent with the debate over condemning a 
terrorist act should clarify some of the incentives behind the riots and should 
shed light on the stances of the sectarian political parties and their 
relationship to riots on the one hand and the process of naturalisation on the 
other. 
 
4.3.5 Excerpt 5 on the Arrest of Political Activists 
From sitting 2:3:13, 27 Jan. 2009 
In this excerpt the discussion is about the process of arresting political 
activists. MP Al-Marzooq, from Al Wefaq, employs the strategy of 
corroborating by information (see Table 28). On behalf of his party, MP Al-
Marzooq in lines 10–12 makes an intervention while Hansard of the previous 
sitting is being reviewed – a routine step on the agenda that does not contain 
anything relevant to the topic of the arrest – and he demands the release of 
two detainees. The two detainees are Bahraini political activists from the 
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Haq Movement, an unauthorised political movement in Bahrain whose main 
demand is that the ruling system be replaced with a republican system. Haq 
leaders were originally members of the Al Wefaq Party and split off from the 
main party later. The detainees whom MP Al-Marzooq is talking about are 
Shiites. 
 
Table 28: Strategy of MP Al-Miz’al in Excerpt 5 





 rhetoric: periphrasis: 
negotiation through 
embedded messages 
 rhetoric: discourse 
markers ‘of course’, ‘then’ 
 lexical style: word order 
 rhetorical move: starting 
with a mutual convention 
 speech act: predicting 
reactions 
 rhetoric: metaphors 
 rhetoric: understatement 
 repetition 
 periphrasis 
 speech act: exhortation 
 
S is the Speaker. 
KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     Thank you. Are there any other comments on Hansard of the  8 
regular twelfth sitting? Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.  9 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker, Assalāmu alaykum wa rahmatu Allah.67  10 
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Of course, I will comment for a couple of minutes on the  11 
current situation in the country ...  12 
S:      Let us finish the ratification first! 13 
KM:  A few minutes, Mr Speaker, out of interest to our security. 14 
S:      Let us first finish the ratification.  15 
KM:  So allow me to speak after the ratification. 16 
S:      Are there any comments on Hansard of the twelfth sitting? 17 
(No comments)18 
 
MP Al-Marzooq starts his sentence with ‘of course’, which does not 
linguistically fit in since the associated phrase whose validity ‘of course’ 
should acknowledge does not relate to what has just been said. The 
discourse marker ‘of course’ may seem not to serve as more than an 
expression as, besides this inappropriate use of the expression, there are 
other linguistic problems in MP Al-Marzooq’s speech. There are a number of 
incomplete sentences as will be noticed in the extract below: a clause that 
does not fit into a sentence in lines 23–24: ‘As a result of our concern over 
safety and security in Bahrain’; wrong collocations: ‘security mazes’ twice in 
line 27 and ‘increase charge’ in line 28; and some wrongly structured 
sentences,68 However, many ideological encodings are present in his speech, 
and these are demonstrated in the analysis below. 
MP Al-Marzooq is stopped by the Speaker of the Council in line 13: 
‘Let us finish the ratification first.’ Al-Marzooq tries to negotiate presenting 
his intervention, but the Speaker restates what he has just said with the 
words reordered: ‘Let us first finish the ratification’ (line 15). Moving ‘first’ 
forward is used by the Speaker to insist on his position. At the same time, his 
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choice of words indicates that he has not rejected the intervention, but is 
rescheduling it. This, therefore, means MP Al-Marzooq has won permission 
to speak afterwards. Al-Marzooq’s reply in line 16: ‘So allow me to speak 
after the ratification’ signifies an unstated understanding, and thus 
agreement, between MP Al-Marzooq and the Speaker in the exchanges in 
lines 13 to 16. The use of  ,ithan (i.e. then or so), another discourse marker  إذن
signals this understanding. In this way, MP Al-Marzooq has secured himself 
a slot in a business-like manner by bartering: he stops interrupting and 
arguing, but in return he gets an ‘official’ chance later on to bring up this 
topic that is not on the agenda: 
 
S:      …   . Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq,  21 
please. 22 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. As a result of our concern over safety and  23 
security in Bahrain, what has happened in the previous two days has  24 
serious implications. Matters are not addressed in this manner. We  25 
believe that there are many ways to address political situations  26 
without getting into security mazes*. Security mazes* complicate  27 
the situation, they do not offer solutions but increase charge* and  28 
increase the complexity of the accumulated files that can be solved  29 
politically rather than being solved through security measures. The  30 
arrest that took place was unjustifiable. The way the arrest was made  31 
is unjustifiable. Al Wefaq demands an immediate release of  32 
detainees Mr Hassan Mushaime’ and Sheikh Mohammed Habib  33 
Miqdad. There are procedures that we respect, but with this  34 
mechanism there are complications. And complications lead to  35 
complications. There are issues now, and there are double  36 
measures. I know now that some of the brothers have reservations,  37 
but if treatment is based on double measures. There are people who  38 
are prosecuted while they stay at home, and others are said not to  39 
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have complied with the orders of the prosecution. But there are  40 
procedures that if one does not comply, one gets sent for once and  41 
twice and thrice, and they quietly go to him at his house. But to arrest  42 
the brothers at night at 3 a.m. in this unjustifiable manner! … 43 
 
When MP Al-Marzooq gets the chance to present his intervention, he starts 
by providing a setting for the demand in lines 23–24: ‘As a result of our 
concern over safety and security in Bahrain, ... .’ There are two observations 
about this opening. First, the demand is opened by a convention, a point 
about which it is difficult to disagree: that the security of the country 
matters. This opening, ‘our concern over safety and security in Bahrain’ 
(lines 23–24), sets up what can be considered ‘the more specific mental 
model based on these general social representations’ (Van Dijk 2009a: 71). 
An argument is more likely to be accepted if points of agreement are 
presented first as the basis of, or the motivations behind, what may be less 
agreeable. Secondly, MP Al-Marzooq expresses concern over ‘the safety and 
security in Bahrain.’ Although choosing safety and security concerns over 
justice concerns could have been simply random and unplanned, it can also 
be read as an indirect warning. This is because, if the choice made was ‘our 
concern over justice,’ then the intervention would only be looking back and 
evaluating the legality and acceptability of the procedures the Attorney 
General has followed in executing the warrant of the arrest. However, ‘our 
concern over safety and security in Bahrain’ is a statement that looks 
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forward and predicts the outcome of this arrest. The indirect warning is that 
the arrest is expected to cause chaos and instability.  
MP Al-Marzooq comments on the arrests in line 25 saying: ‘Matters 
are not addressed in this manner.’ I would have expected him to say ‘matters 
should not (or could not) be addressed in this manner’ to express the view 
that the arrest did not follow police procedure. However, MP Al-Marzooq’s 
sentence is an informative statement, as if he is telling the Attorney General 
something he does not know. This has a covert sense of ridicule. The use of 
‘should not’ or ‘could not’ would have sounded more implicative and more 
of an exhortation. The informative statement emphasises the ‘wrongness’ of 
what is proposed here. 
Then, MP Al-Marzooq uses the metaphor ‘security mazes’ in line 27, 
which is not a common collocation in Arabic. This subtly points to the lack 
of directness and predictability in the security procedures followed by the 
Attorney General, something which, in turn, signals a lack of integrity in 
these procedures. This is again a covert accusation presented in such a way 
as not to be confrontational.  
MP Al-Marzooq explains that these security mazes ‘increase charge’. 
Here there is a vocabulary-use problem. He should have used the better 
wordشحناء shaḥnāʾ, i.e. hostility; instead, the word he actually uses is  شحن
shaḥn, which means the action of charging, filling, or loading (or it can 
mean ‘cargo’). This is a poor linguistic choice of vocabulary, but it seems to 
be understood as it was intended. The word was even reported uncorrected 
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in Akhbar Al-Khaleej the following day (28 Jan. 2009: 10). This time, the 
warning MP Al-Marzooq is making is more explicit, but it is a warning 
against a disturbance in feelings and attitude, not actions, at least not 
directly. This makes it safer to warn openly against any possible disturbance. 
After that, MP Al-Marzooq makes another embedded attack when he 
explains that this would ‘increase the complexity of the accumulated files’ 
(line 29). The reference to the accumulated file is an assertion of the belief 
that there is a huge number of other cases and detentions to which Al Wefaq 
objects and which the party considers illegal.  
In lines 30–32, MP Al-Marzooq sums up Al Wefaq’s objection: ‘The 
arrest that took place was unjustifiable. The way the arrest was made is 
unjustifiable.’ This is the third time he uses indirectness. This time he uses 
understatement as a rhetorical device to tone down his stance. What Al 
Wefaq wants to convey is the illegality of both the arrest and the procedure 
of the arrest. However, MP Al-Marzooq uses the less legal adjective  غير مبرر
ghayr mubarrar i.e. unjustifiable or inexcusable. This adjective has a more 
logical perspective than a legal one.. MP Al-Marzooq repeats the word 
‘unjustifiable’ to add more stress to the idea of the arrests being wrong, and 
this repetition partially compensates the understatement. The same word, 
‘unjustifiable’, is used again in line 43 to describe the arrest of the detainees 
at 3:00 a.m. Specifying the time is likely to be more provocative to the 
families and supporters of the detainees than if it were merely described as 
unjustifiable, although the timing could not be described as illegal. 
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After demanding in lines 32–34 that the detainees be released, MP Al-
Marzooq states in line 34: ‘There are procedures that we respect.’ The 
procedures are issued by the government, and here he refers to Al Wefaq 
respecting the procedures. MP Al-Marzooq stops here, but what is left out in 
this instance, after having been mentioned previously, is that from Al 
Wefaq’s perspective, these procedures were not followed when the detainees 
were arrested. This is another indictment wrapped in politeness and 
ambiguity, employing periphrasis. MP Al-Marzooq continues: 
 
KM:  …       If we are  43 
a state of institutions and law, then we should move gradually in the  44 
proceedings. If we want all citizens to respect the law, then the  45 
government and security forces should also respect the law and not  46 
bypass it. These matters are being complicated. There is someone  47 
who blasphemes the sect, and every week he intervenes in these  48 
matters and no one questions him ...  49 
S:      I have given you the requested two minutes, and this is off-topic.  50 
KM:  I believe we need to calm down. We calmly say that we demand  51 
the release of the detainees immediately, and thank you.  52 
S:      Thank you. … 53 
 
Another rhetorical device employed by MP Al-Marzooq is his use of two 
conditional sentences in lines 43–47: ‘If we are a state of institutions and 
law, then we should move gradually in the proceedings. If we want all 
citizens to respect the law, then the government and security forces should 
also respect the law and not bypass it.’ These two conditional sentences can 
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have three rhetorical readings. First, the conditional may have been used to 
‘cloak’ or ‘soften a rebuke and make it more respectful’ (Young, 1989: 39). 
This use tallies with the other less confrontational objections above. A 
second reading of the function of these conditionals can interpret them as 
laments. Softened rebukes and laments share two conditions: that the event 
referred to happened in the past and that the interlocutor believes that it 
was not in his or her favour or in favour of the hearer (ibid.: 40–41). 
However, in the case of a softened rebuke, the speaker feels and expresses 
anger at the event, while in the case of a lament he or she feels and 
expresses grief (ibid.: 40–41). Whether the function of this illocutionary act 
is, to soften a rebuke or to express lament, the purpose of the conditional 
sentences is equivalent to saying: ‘We are not a state of institutions or law 
because we are not moving gradually in the proceedings. Citizens will not 
respect the law because the government and security forces are not 
respecting the law and are bypassing it.’ While a rebuke is accompanied by a 
feeling of dissatisfaction and a lament is accompanied by a feeling of regret, 
the two feelings can coincide without causing any ambivalence. This means 
that the conditionals can simultaneously embed rebuke and express lament. 
A third possible function of the illocutionary act is exhortation. Young 
defines exhortation as ‘an attempt to urge a hearer to do something he 
recognizes is proper’ (ibid.: 45). This can be the sole function or can concur 
with either or both of the other rhetorical functions. All these rhetorical 
readings of the conditionals are possible since, after all, and according to 
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CDA, the process of interpreting the text is as important as the process of 
producing it. Thus, how the other MPs interpret the function of the 
conditionals matters too. In any case, whether interpreted as a softening 
rebuke, a lament or an exhortation, an important part of MP Al-Marzooq’s 
and Al Wefaq’s message is conveyed via these conditionals.  
After building up his argument, MP Al-Marzooq shifts to another topic 
in lines 47–49: ‘There is someone who blasphemes the sect, and every week 
he intervenes in these matters and no one questions him.’ This is an attempt 
to bring another controversial topic into the discussion. Although no names 
are mentioned, and normally it is expected to mean that this person is 
someone from the other sect, i.e. a Sunni, and then the mention of ‘every 
week’ is an understood reference among Bahrainis to the weekly sermon of 
 Ṣalāt Al Jumʿa (Friday Prayers). This narrows down the accusation صالة الجمعة
to someone among the Sunni clerics. Perhaps MP Al-Marzooq is willing to 
give further description, but at this point he is stopped by the Speaker (line 
50).  
The analysis of the next excerpt will help understand whom and what 
MP Al-Marzooq is referring to here (see Section 4.3.6.2). This interruption 
brings MP Al-Marzooq back to his topic and he concludes it in lines 51 and 
52 by stressing the ‘calm’ stance of the Al Wefaq Party, their desire to 
address the matter without acceleration. What is unsaid here by emphasising 
the idea of calming down is the request to the Attorney General in turn to 
respond to Al Wefaq’s ‘calmness’ by responding to their request. This is one 
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more covert confrontation, which MP Al-Marzooq uses to end his speech. 
While the last sentence ‘We calmly say that we demand the release of the 
detainees immediately’ means to encourage the authorities to cooperate with 
Al Wefaq, the statement also implies that there are other ways in which Al 
Wefaq can react to the arrest. There is a sense of anger, opposition and 
dissatisfaction towards the Attorney General, but it is expressed in a ‘calm’ 
way.  
According to the report about the sitting that appeared the following 
day in Akhbar Al-Khaleej (Nasr and Jaber, 28 Jan. 2009: 10), the detainees 
mentioned in the excerpt are Hasan Mushaime’ and Muhammad Al-Miqdad. 
These are the two whose release the Al Wefaq Party is demanding, However, 
the day before the sitting the same newspaper reported that there were three 
detainees: the two mentioned above, and in addition, Dr Abdul Jalil Al-
Singace. The police had brought three charges against the three of them, 
while an additional fourth charge was brought against Al-Miqdaq (Abdul 
Qadir, 27 Jan. 2009: 11). The major charge was of conspiring to overthrow 
the regime (ibid.) However, for health reasons, Al-Singace was only 
interrogated and then put under house arrest,69 which is why he is not 
mentioned in Al Wefaq’s demands. 
Hasan Mushaime’ has been the leader of the Haq Movement, an 
unauthorised political opposition in Bahrain. Muhammad Al-Miqdad was its 
General Secretary and Al-Singace, a university lecturer, was a spokesperson 
for this movement. A large number of the leading figures of Haq were 
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previously leaders in Al Wefaq. Back in 2002, Al Wefaq boycotted the 
parliamentary elections because it considered the Constitution of the country 
illegal. However, Al Wefaq decided not to boycott the second legislative 
period starting in 2006, instead participating and winning seats in the 
parliament. Nevertheless, a number of Al Wefaq leaders insisted on the 
illegality of the parliament and broke away from the party to form a 
movement of their own, Haqq. The three detainees, who were all released 
soon, became leading figures in the unrest Bahrain has been witnessing since 
February 2010. 
Another point to make about this sitting is how Al Wefaq managed to 
make headlines silently, using writing as a more powerful way to highlight a 
political demand. In the sitting from which the above excerpt is taken, all of 
Al Wefaq’s MPs attended with large badges on their chests that said:  بحرينيون
 baḥrayniyyūn ḍidd al tajnīs al siyāsī, i.e. Bahrainis against ,ضد التجنيس السياسي
political naturalisation. These badges had a red background and the text was 
in white, the two colours of the Bahraini flag. The text on the badges created 
polarised stances: ‘Bahrainis’ and ‘political naturalisation.’ In turn, this 
created many polarised pairs: legal and illegal, righteous citizenship holders 
and unrighteous citizenship holders, true and fake, and Us and Them. This is 
what Van Dijk calls ‘polarising the mental model’ (2009a: 70), and here it is 
a mental modal of the Bahraini citizen. Such polarisation is ‘the familiar 
form of the negative other-presentation, and the positive self-presentation’ 
(ibid.). The polarisation these badges made has two parallel constructs: the 
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first is the polarisation between Bahrainis who, according to Al Wefaq, 
deserve their citizenship, including the badge carriers, and the unwelcome 
naturalised immigrants; the second is the polarisation between ‘righteous’ 
MPs and the government.  
The topic of naturalisation was not brought up in the sitting, but the 
large badges were reported in the newspaper headlines. The badges could 
not be dismissed, especially as their size was considerably larger than that of 
average badges, something that made the text clearly legible even in the 
average sized photographs published in the newspapers. As the issue of 
naturalisation had been a common major issue for Al Wefaq and Haq, the 
badges were a form of support shown to the detainees while, at the same 
time, they were meant to touch upon a sensitive issue of concern to Al 
Wefaq. A message conveyed through a published photo is likely to reach 
more people than if it is reported in a long article among many other points. 
Readers flipping through the pages will grasp the message even if they do 
not wish to read the article. In this way, Al Wefaq managed to bring up this 
controversial topic and express its stance without uttering a word about it. 
Besides making the headlines, this action by Al Wefaq irritated many 
other MPs. MP Al Sa’eedi, for example, made a statement to the press in 
reaction to this move on the day of the sitting. He stated: ‘While some MPs 
hung on their chest a sign against naturalisation in the last sitting, I had 
completed collecting information about some of the parliamentary members 
and their families who obtained Bahraini citizenship in illegal ways, through 
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forging official documents and certificates. This [allegation] is supported by 
evidence and proof that I have and I will present them to the Attorney 
General to look into it. … Once [they have been] found guilty, the law 
provides for imprisonment, the withdrawal of their citizenship and their 
deportation from the country’ (MP Al-Sa’eedi quoted in Nasr and Jaber, 28 
January 2009, my translation). Here, MP Al-Sa’eedi is using the topic of 
naturalisation itself as his counter-attack, or what can be described as 
‘fighting fire with fire.’  
This tension and mutual disrespect between Al Wefaq party and MP Al-
Sa’eedi will still elaborate every now and then, either as direct or indirect 
comments, and the next excerpt shows one of these instances of the swift 
hint.  
 
4.3.6 Excerpt 6 on Big and Small Thieves 
From sitting 2:3:23, 7 April 2009 
In this short excerpt, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security 
Committee is reading its decision about a proposal made by MP Jassim Al-
Sa’eedi, a Sunni MP. The proposal suggested increasing security measures 
against thefts, as the extract below illustrates. I present a discursive analysis 





 Political wit 4.3.6.1
In this excerpt, MP Abdulhussain Al-Mitghawi, the Rapporteur of the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee is given the floor to read 
the committee’s decision. The committee itself consists of members from 
both Sunni and Shiite backgrounds; the Rapporteur is a member of Al 
Wefaq, which has always maintained a tense relationship with MP Al-Sa’eedi 
in particular, more than with any other MP.  
 
SDS  is the Second Deputy Speaker. 
GS is the General Secretary. 
AM is MP Abdulhussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, the Rapporteur, 
member of Al Wefaq. 
SDS:  … Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of the  1 
Council, please. 2 
GS:   Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) Item 9: Proposals, Sixth: 3 
The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 4 
National Security on the proposal for increasing security  5 
measures to reduce incidences of theft in the Kingdom of Bahrain,  6 
presented by MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa’eedi. Thank you,  7 
Mr Speaker. 8 
SDS: Thank you. Brother Rapporteur. Please. 9 
AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. I request having the committee’s report  10 
inserted in Hansard. 11 
SDS:  Who agrees on inserting the report in Hansard? 12 
 (Majority agree.) 13 
SDS:  Then the report is inserted in Hansard.  14 




In his very short intervention, MP Abdulhussain Al-Mitghawi wittingly 
makes use of him being given the floor to express a point. MP-Al Mitghawi is 
asked to read the recommendation of the committee, employing mockery in 
the form of political wit to serve the strategy of centralising pride and 
dignity (see Table 29). The pride and dignity that is served here is slightly 
different than it in other excerpts. This difference is better understood by 
understanding the relationship between MP Al-Sa’eedi and Al Wefaq was 
explained, something which I explain in the next subsection. 
 
Table 29: Strategy of MP Al-Miyghawi in Excerpt 6 







 humour (political wit) 
 discourse marker: ‘but’ to preface a 
reaction, shifting to another focus 
 rhetoric: irony 
 sarcasm: rhetoric 
 
 
SDS is the Second Deputy Speaker. 
AM is MP Abdulhussain Al-Mitghawi from Al Wefaq. 
 
SDS:  Thank you. Brother Rapporteur, please. 16 
AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. The committee is confused. The Brother MP  17 
Sheikh Jassim Al Sa’eedi mentioned that this is to reduce theft and  18 
asked for strict security measures, but did not specify if he meant  19 
theft by the big or small– 20 
SDS: Read the recommendation. 21 
AM:  (Reading) Crmmittee’s recrmmendatirn: Amter reviewing the Crnstitutirn  22 
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and the Bylaws of the Parliament, and after discussions and deliberations,  23 
the committee recommends approving the proposal, due to the validity  24 
of its justifications. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 25 
SDS: Thank you. 26 
Who agrees on the recommendation about the proposal  27 
submitted to your council?  28 
(Majority agree.) 29 
 
When it is time to read the recommendation as expected from the 
committee’s Rapporteur, MP Al-Mitghawi takes advantage of his ability to be 
heard and makes a cunning joke about corruption. He starts with ‘The 
committee is confused’ in line 17. Of course, the committee had not reached 
a decision without actually discussing the recommendation made by MP Al-
Sa’eedi, so they are not really confused. The intervention of MP Al-Mitghawi 
starts with a phrase that sounds serious, and this automatically attracts 
attention and requires him to clear up the so-called confusion before moving 
on. Had he started more openly with something like: ‘I/we have a 
comment/an intervention’ he would not have got the chance to express this 
idea and he would have been interrupted and asked to read only the 
recommendation. MP Al-Mitghawi prefaces his own and his committee’s 
reaction using ‘but’, which indicates a shift to presenting something else, in 
this case, their reaction. He comments: ‘but [MP Al-Sa’eedi] did not specify 
if he meant theft by the big or small’ (lines 19–20). This political wit uses 
mock-seriousness as a rhetorical device; MP Al-Mitghawi starts by 
pretending to be serious and then makes an unexpected joke that twists the 
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meaning of the previous part that sounded serious at the beginning. The 
choice of the two words صغار ṣighār, i.e. ‘small’ or ‘young’ and the antonym 
 kibār, i.e. ‘big’ or ‘old’ is clever, too. For a moment, it possibly sounds as كبار
if he is comparing theft by adults and juveniles, a not very perceptive 
question, but then the question is reinterpreted and the pun becomes clear. 
Speier (1998: 1353) mentions two sources of political wit: jokes ‘“from 
above,” from those of higher status’ and ‘“from below,” that is, jokes born 
from triumph rather than resistance.’ He explains that a joke from below 
does not necessarily target certain people but can instead target a group or 
‘strata’ in society (ibid.), which is what MP Al-Mitghawi is doing here. Speier 
(ibid.: 1354) maintains that one of the purposes of political wit is making 
the ‘arrangements or the precautions of an opponent seem ridiculous.’ This 
serves as an act of derision: direct derision of the ‘big’ thieves, the people in 
power who get away with big thefts and with corruption, and then there is 
less direct derision of MP Al-Sa’eedi, which will be made more explicit in the 
upcoming section on the relationship between Al Wefaq and MP Al-Sa’eedi. 
When MP Al-Mitghawi derides the people ‘above’, he is positioning 
himself ‘below’. Parliamentary members are actually at the top of the social 
and authoritative hierarchy, but MP Al-Mitghawi is now stressing the role of 
‘the representative of the people’, the role of voicing their dissatisfaction and 
anger. Accordingly, he is placing himself and his party closer to the public, 
further from the ‘corrupted’ people in the upper strata. Speier (ibid.: 1357) 
explains that ‘[l]aughter forges ties between people, bringing those who 
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laugh together to one another.’ Humour, as seen in this example, helps 
minimise barriers between politicians and the public, and politicians can 
consequently win more trust from the public. With his opening, MP Al-
Mitghawi is applying the devices of shielding oneself with wordiness in a 
way that the irrelevance of the additional utterances, ‘but the committee is 
confused’ (line 17), works as a ‘soother’ that serves to bring the interlocutors 
closer to each other. Speier (ibid.: 1356) maintains that ‘[h]umour weakens 
an audience’s defences and makes it more amenable to persuasion.’ He 
explains: 
 
Certain political jokes also reconcile antagonists with each other. 
Politics not only revolve around the battle of power; it also serves the 
public spirit, the social order, the sense of legitimacy in a society, 
harmony and indeed peace (ibid. 1357–1358). 
 
 
Speier explains that while political jokes can be used as a weapon to hurt, 
they can also be used in a reflective way to soothe (ibid.: 1358). 
Additionally, by deriding financial corruption in some senior authorities, the 
Al Wefaq Party gets a chance to make an attack for which it cannot be held 
accountable. This attack cannot be taken seriously at the legal level, but is 
understood to be serious by all listeners and readers. Hinting and joking 
about corruption has a further intended suggestion: to create an image of 
oneself that opposes the ridiculed person or group. Therefore, MP Al-
Mitghawi is suggesting that he or his party are not corrupt, implying 
284 
 
polarisation of the ‘good ones’ and the ‘bad ones’. Using the terms 
Zuckermann (2006: 244) presented, they are ‘othering’ the corrupt 
authorities and, consequently, uniting themselves with the public to win 
their sympathy and thus their support. 
 
 Background to excerpt 4.3.6.2
I classified this political wit under the strategy of centralising pride and 
dignity. To justify this choice, it is useful to understand the relationship 
between MP Al-Sa’eedi and Al Wefaq, as the relationship between them had 
reached a confrontational level before this sitting. The month preceding this 
sitting, i.e. March 2009, witnessed a harsh confrontation between Al Wefaq 
and MP Al-Sa’eedi in the most open and legal way, after a long period of 
hints and indirect personal recriminations. The March event, presented 
below, was not the first time conflicts between MP Al-Sa’eedi and the Al 
Wefaq Party had risen to the surface; in that month, there were two 
incidents that revealed this relationship more than ever: the first incident 
was the demand for the withdrawal of the immunity of MP Jassim Al-
Sa’eedi, and the second was the demand for the withdrawal of that of MP Dr 
Jassim Hussain from Al Wefaq. 
The demand for the withdrawal of the immunity of MP Jassim Al-
Sa’eedi, came, in brief, after thirteen people had accused him of insulting the 
Shiite sect in his sermons and of calling them Zionists and other names, such 
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as ‘the descendants of monkeys and pigs.’ They also claimed that MP Al-
Sa’eedi had accused the Shiites of causing riots and chaos in the country and 
that he had advocated killing them. The prosecution was passed to the 
Committee of Legislative and Legal Affairs at the parliament, which decided 
at the end of the meeting, held on 8 March 2009, to withdraw parliamentary 
immunity from MP Al-Sa’eedi in order to present him to the court. A total of 
four committee members, all Shiites from Al Wefaq, agreed to the demand; 
the two other members, Sunnis, both from the Al Minbar Party, disagreed. 
The decision was then passed on to the agenda of the next parliamentary 
meeting to be voted on. On the same day, MP Al-Sa’eedi held a press 
conference in which he explained that the accusations were fabricated and 
that the case was malicious. He mentioned that there was no recorded 
evidence of the accusations and said that the criticisms of chaos he made 
were not addressed to the Shiites. He also maintained that none of the 
prosecutors had attended any of the religious sermons mentioned; the 
evidence they presented was based either on anonymous witnesses whose 
names were not revealed to the prosecutors or on discussion forums on the 
Internet (my summary and translation, Nasr and Jaber 9 Mar. 2009: 8).  
In his comment on the decision of the committee, the Chairman of the 
Committee of Legislative and Legal Affairs, MP Khalil Al-Marzooq, said: 
‘What happened yesterday regarding withdrawing immunity from MP Al-
Sa’eedi was conducted according to the law. I speak on behalf of the Al 
Wefaq Party and say that there were trespasses committed by the MP and 
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the people are not deaf or blind to what Al-Sa’eedi is saying’ (ibid.). This 
statement from MP Al-Marzooq suggests that Al Wefaq had adopted a 
decision in advance of the committee meeting on the basis of input they had 
received prior to the meeting.  
Around the same time, MP Dr Hussain was deplored by a number of 
citizens for accusing the Bahraini political system of discrimination and 
sectarianism at a conference held by the Congress in the USA on 16 October 
2008. In his turn, MP Hussain made a statement to the newspapers saying 
that the Attorney General did not carry out investigations in a professional 
way and did not do his job when investigating the claims made by the 
prosecutors (Nasr and Jaber 23 Mar. 2009: 8). He also maintained that the 
case made against him was malicious and that the prosecutors’ accusations 
were not credible. MP Hussain added that some of the prosecutors were 
friends of MP Al-Sa’eedi and that one of them had delivered a religious 
sermon in which he praised MP Al-Sa’eedi. MP Hussain also pointed out that 
the Bahraini Ambassador in Washington was among the audience and she 
did not comment on the statistics presented by the participants at the 
conference. He also linked the request for the withdrawal of his immunity 
with that of the withdrawal of MP Al-Sa’eedi’s, saying that the former was a 
response to the latter. He described MP Al-Sa’eedi as ‘a danger to society and 
national unity’ who should get life imprisonment because he wished for 
death for a sect (ibid.).  
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In the sitting held on 24 March 2009, the parliament voted on the 
recommendation of the Committee for Legislative and Legal Affairs about 
withdrawing MP Al-Sa’eedi’s immunity. The recommendation was rejected, 
as 19 voted against it (all Sunnis) while 14 voted for it (all Shiites); three 
were absent from the sitting (all independent Sunni MPs). However, three Al 
Wefaq MPs, among whom was MP Al-Marzooq himself, were absent at the 
time of the vote despite attending the sitting of that particular day (Nasr and 
Jaber 25 Mar. 2009: 13). This was described in the newspapers as a 
‘parliamentary deal’ and it was said that Al Wefaq was expecting the Sunni 
members to ‘reciprocate’ in the following sitting when it came to voting on 
the demand to withdraw the immunity of the Wefaq MP Hussain (ibid.). In 
the sitting held on 31 March 2009, the parliament voted in favour of the 
decision made by the Committee for Legislative and Legal Affairs against 
withdrawing the immunity of MP Hussain (Nasr and Jaber 1 April 2009: 10) 
and thus the ‘parliamentary deal’ was kept by both sides and the exchange of 
harsh accusations then ceased. 
The two immunity withdrawal conflicts alongside Excerpt 5 above 
dated 27 January 2009 can reveal the identity of the person indicated by MP 
Al-Marzooq, who is accused of blaspheming the Shiite section every week. 
MP Al-Marzooq was referring to a Sunni cleric, and MP Al-Sa’eedi is the only 
one who fits the description. This brings us back to the second level of 
derision meant by the mock-serious statement made by MP Al-Mitghawi in 
this excerpt. By this sitting, the tension between Al Wefaq and MP Al-Sa’eedi 
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has not eased at all; it has only lessened the probability of the legal 
confrontational alternative. The withdrawal of the immunity failed, or was 
probably deliberately foiled to save the two MPs. Preceding this sitting, a 
number of riots and acts of vandalism had taken place at a number of 
locations in Bahrain, and while other Sunni parties expressed their 
disapproval, Al Wefaq kept quiet and did not condemn these acts, as they 
did in siting 2:3:10 in response to the attack plot (Excerpt 4).  
The Al Wefaq Party considers MP Al-Sa’eedi a pro-government MP 
and the party describes itself as the opposition. In this sitting, MP Al-
Mitghawi is taking advantage of the opportunity of him being the 
Rapporteur and making fun of the recommendation made by MP Al-Sa’eedi. 
Accordingly, this act of mockery, unlike many short and quick jokes, is not 
meant to ‘soften the blow’ in the parliamentary atmosphere. Instead, MP Al-
Mitghawi is indirectly ridiculing MP Al Sa’eedi’s recommendation, 
suggesting that the proposal is turning a blind eye to ‘big thefts’, to 
corruption and to abuse of public money, and is instead focusing on smaller 
problems. The action of ridiculing creates a gap, a kind of a ‘scale’ of how 
much respect one deserves. Here comes the idea of reflecting the pride of Al 
Wefaq in the actual action of ridiculing the proposal of Al-Sa’eedi. In this 
way, this method of using the strategy of centralising pride and dignity 
differs from the more direct and overt use of the same strategy seen in other 




4.3.7 Excerpt 7 on Eavesdropping 
From sitting 2:4:3, 20 Oct. 2009 
In this excerpt, MP Nasser Al-Fudhalah, a member of the Al Minbar Party, 
objects to the government’s eavesdropping on phone calls in Bahrain, which 
he considers an issue of political (and personal) freedom. MP Al-Fudhalah 
employs the strategy of corroborating by information in his short 
intervention. The strategy and the devices used are summarised in Table 30. 
 
Table 30: Strategy of MP Al-Fudhalah in Excerpt 7 







 speech act: backgrounded 
disagreement 
 framing recording calls as 
eavesdropping 
 use of inclusive ‘we’ to establish 
rapport with the listeners 
 speech act: comparing the situation 
to that of the U.S. and Europe 
 rhetorical question 
 lexical style to evoke sense of 
responsibility 
 rhetoric: procatalepsis 
 
NF is MP Nasser Al-Fudhalah from Al Minbar. 
 
NF:   Thank you, Mr Speaker. Bismillāh arraḥmān arraḥīm.70 Letter No.  1 
18 on eavesdropping on phone calls, is in fact not clear to me.  2 
I inferred from the answer that, and we have heard so often that,  3 
problem the records are taken out and used. This is a kind of  4 
eavesdropping. … 5 
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MP Al-Fudhalah first indirectly reproves the response and indirectly depicts 
it as unclear in line 2: ‘is in fact not clear to me’; and in line 3 when he says: 
‘I inferred from the answer,’ something that criticises the style of the 
response. By referring to indirectedness, the MP is making a hint: he makes 
the point clear enough to be taken note of but not stressed or 
straightforward enough to be confrontational. This is an instance of 
backgrounded disagreement. This style of disagreement recurs a few times in 
several Sunni MPs’ participations in the excerpts of debates in the analyses 
in this research (see Section 4.3.1.1 for more on dispute and disagreement). 
After the indirect expression of dissatisfaction with the vagueness of the 
response, MP Al-Fudhalah, in lines 5–6, frames the procedure of recording 
all calls as eavesdropping: ‘This is a kind of eavesdropping.’ By framing the 
procedure as such, he is framing it as it eligible to criticise it and disapprove 
it; he is classifying it as immoral and unethical, which is again an indirect 
criticism that is embedded in this framing: 
 
NF: … We must speak clearly about this issue, guided  6 
by some European countries and by the U.S. There are many  7 
objections in those countries to the issue of eavesdropping. There  8 
are very big problems that have occurred because of this intervention  9 
in the privacy of people and recording them, even if declared.  10 
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When MP Al-Fudhalah says in line 6: ‘We must speak clearly about this 
issue,’ he is actually demanding that the institution be clear. The use of the 
inclusive ‘we’ here aims at establishing a rapport with the addressee and the 
listeners. The addressee here is the institution and the listeners are the other 
MPs. This device is similar to that used also by MP Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 5, 
but the instance in MP Al-Fudhalah’s speech does not seem to have a 
tutoring role like that of MP Al-Marzooq. The latter repeated the inclusive 
‘we’ a few times in a row and this repetition helped build this tutoring role. 
MP Al-Fudhalah’s approach to demanding clarity is less direct, and ‘we’ 
supports the devices above in building this indirectness. 
To justify his request and support it with information, he compares 
what he is demanding to what is being applied in some European countries 
and the U.S. (lines 6–7), whom he offers as role examples for security 
procedures. He would probably mean Western Europe in particular when 
saying ‘some European countries,’ as they are the ones whom Bahrain tends 
to see as models for security measures that do not contradict human and 
civil rights. The mention of some European countries and the U.S. serves to 
set a realistic and respected benchmark, and to stress that criticising 
eavesdropping is a logical and civilised procedure.  
Another indirect criticism can be read in his illustration of objections 
in the aforementioned countries in lines 7–10: ‘There are many objections in 
those countries to the issue of eavesdropping. There are very big problems 
that occurred because of this intervention in the privacy of people and 
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recording them.’ In these lines, while he is illustrating objections in those 
countries, he is simultaneously suggesting and concurring with a similar 
reaction from telephone users in Bahrain. He is thus suggesting something 
like: ‘Do not expect the people to accept, and if they object and cause 
problems, then it is a normal consequence.’ He then immediately follows it 
with ‘even if declared’ (line 10), an employment of procatalepsis, 
anticipating a reply and responding to it. He is here removing the possibility 
of any response attempting to legalise the procedure of recording telephone 
calls by stating it beforehand. Again, this move is linked in a single sentence 
to the objections and problems that have occurred in the ‘model’ countries.  
 
NF: Who gives authority to who records my calls? And the calls of the  11 
Council and the rest of the figures in the country, and the average  12 
citizen as well? We want an explanation from this institution, to tell  13 
us if there is an ongoing recording of all phone calls. This matter  14 
needs to be considered and approved by this council, because we  15 
consider it a kind of eavesdropping and an interference in people’s  16 
privacy. Sometimes people talk with their wives and have their own  17 
secrets, so why does this institution keep recordings of all calls in the  18 
country? We want to know a very clear response* about this issue  19 
because it is demanded that this council stop this matter if it exists.  20 
Thank you, Mr Speaker. 21 
 
In the extract above, MP Al-Fudhalah moves to demanding the Council to be 
given the authority to permit the procedure of recording telephone calls or 
not, and involving it in the decision making in relation to this matter. He 
does so using three discursive devices: first, a rhetorical question in lines 11–
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13: ‘Who gives authority to who records my calls? And the calls of the 
Council and the rest of the figures in the country, and the average citizen as 
well?’ He later gives the answer he wants to this question (lines 14–15): 
‘This matter needs to be considered and approved by this Council.’ Secondly, 
not directly after the demand, he justifies the involvement of the Council by 
showing that it is its responsibility: ‘it is demanded that this Council stop 
this matter if it exists’ (line 20). Saying ‘it is demanded’ signals this 
responsibility, and is most likely to mean that the people of Bahrain, whom 
the MPs represent, demand it. The final addition of ‘if it exists’ works as a 
shield just in case the listening-in was denied or unproven, so that MP Al-
Fadhel would not be blamed for fabricating an accusation, a cautionary 
action and a step away from being confrontational.  
 
4.3.8 Excerpt 8 on the Arrest of A. Hassan (a) 
From sitting 2:4:10, 22 Dec. 2009 
This Hansard excerpt and the following one are taken from two consecutive 
parliamentary sittings, one week apart. In both cases, the topic of MP Abdali 
Hassan (Al Wefaq), who had been detained by the police, is not on the 
agenda, but MP Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq successfully brings it up and 
argues his point of view. In this excerpt, as in the one that follows, he 




Table 31: Strategy of Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 8 






 reframing the Speaker as the 
guardian of the MPs 
 ingroupness: involving the Speaker in 
the issue.  
 framing MP Hassan as a citizen 
 emotive speech 
 rhetoric: sarcasm 
 rhetoric: procatalepsis 
 
S is the Speaker. 
KM is MP Khalil Marzooq from Al Wefaq. 
 
KM:  Mr Speaker, if I may, I will speak on another topic. 1 
S:  Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 2 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, you are the chief figure in this 3 
Council and you care about the safety of the Council and the safety  4 
of its members. …5 
 
From the beginning of his speech, MP Al-Marzooq involves the Speaker of 
the Council in the issue, presenting him as one who is, as the head of the 
Council, responsible for its members: ‘Mr Speaker, you are the chief figure in 
this council and you are interested in the safety of the Council and the safety 
of its members’ (lines 3–5). By doing so, MP Al-Marzooq is shifting the frame 
of the Speaker from that of the listener and organiser of speeches to that of 
the ‘guardian’ of the MPs when he describes him as ‘the chief figure,’ a term 
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of praise, but one which consequently establishes responsibility. MP Al-
Marzooq then moves to describing the arrested MP.  
 
…        The vicious attack on the citizen Dr Abdali  5 
Mohammed Hassan is unjustified. I say “the citizen” because he was  6 
beaten as a citizen, not as an MP. It is not reasonable that as soon as  7 
the so-called Riot Control Forces, as soon as they see a citizen, and  8 
this citizen is not young and whose traits do not suggest 9 
burning a tyre or doing something similar, this is a citizen. Does he  10 
look as if he burnt a tyre in the street? Assaulting citizens in such a  11 
manner. We want you— and since he presents the people, and since  12 
you are responsible for this council... 13 
S:      Thank you. 14 
KM:  I will finish Mr Speaker. … to ask the Ministry of the Interior when  15 
MP Dr Abdali Mohammad Hassan was beaten, was he beaten because  16 
he was an MP? This is a disaster ... 17 
S:      A letter should be submitted. 18 
KM:  And if he was beaten because he was a citizen? Are there any orders  19 
to beat citizens? Because he went out?! If Riot Control Forces, and  20 
regardless of the current security crisis, can address—but they cannot  21 
address the security crisis by attacking any citizen leaving his house  22 
and getting him beaten. Or does the Ministry of the Interior want the 23 
citizens to raise white flags as soon as they come out of their houses  24 
or from their cars?! Mr Speaker, tell them: no. And I say: do not  25 
say no in a calm voice. Tell them: no, because the people of Bahrain  26 
are not accustomed to kneeling except before God. These attacks and  27 
assaults cannot continue. There are security incidents dealt with at  28 
their level*. And we reject any sabotage or the like, but not this way.  29 
Thank you, Mr Speaker. 30 
S:      Thank you, …31 
1 
In this excerpt, MP Hassan is simultaneously framed as a citizen and as an 
MP, a representative of the people. However, there is more emphasis on his 
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role as a citizen: ‘The vicious attack on the citizen Dr Abdali Mohammed 
Hassan is unjustified. I say “the citizen” because he was beaten as a citizen, 
not as an MP’ (lines 5–7); ‘as soon as the so-called Riot Control Forces, as 
soon as they see a citizen, and this citizen is not young and whose traits do 
not do not suggest burning a tyre or doing something similar, this is a 
citizen’ (lines 7–10); ‘Assaulting citizens in such a manner,’ (lines 11–12); 
and for a fifth time in lines 19–20: ‘And if he was beaten because he was a 
citizen? Are there any orders to beat citizens?’ The two roles that are 
stressed in framing MP Hassan as both a citizen and an MP aims to provide 
him with all possible sympathy and support: for his being one of the citizens 
on the one hand, and for his being a person of prestigious status in the 
government and a representative of the people on the other hand. MP Al-
Marzooq is stressing the fact that the way MP Hassan was treated was wrong 
either way, and thus he demands all his possible rights. In this way, MP Al-
Marzooq appears to be trying to secure sympathy and support for at least 
one role, if not both: the dignity of a citizen or the dignity of an MP. This 
framing of MP Hassan is to be later on compared with his framing in the 
following excerpt, which is from a sitting week later. 
Another rhetorical device which MP Al-Marzooq employs in this 
excerpt to fulfil his strategy of centralising pride and dignity is the use of 
emotive speech. Examples are when he describes the attack as ‘vicious’ (line 
5) and the situation as ‘a disaster’ (line 17). He employs sarcasm when he 
asks: ‘Or does the Ministry of the Interior want the citizens to raise white 
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flags as soon as they come out of their houses or from their cars?!’ (lines 23–
25). He even asks the Speaker to respond emotively to the insult when he 
says: ‘Mr Speaker, tell them: no. And I say: do not say no in a calm voice’ 
(lines 25–26). In doing so, he is again presenting it as a case that concerns 
and involves the Speaker too, an insult on the Council and the Speaker as 
well as on MP Hassan. MP Al-Marzooq reaches the climax of his emotive 
speech as he involves the pride of the whole Bahraini nation in the matter 
when, in lines 26–27 he says: ‘Tell them: no, because the people of Bahrain 
are not accustomed to kneeling except before God.’ Instead of worrying 
about the verdict, in his speech, MP Al-Marzooq has initiated a state of 
resistance without grovelling for forgiveness.  
MP Al-Marzooq closes his speech saying: ‘And we reject any sabotage 
or the like, but not this way’ (line 29). This rhetorical device is known as 
procatalepsis. MP Al-Marzooq is expecting an objection that condemns 
sabotage, so he mentions it before the Minister of Shura does, and MP Al-
Marzooq immediately responds to it, showing that the Council, or Al Wefaq, 
rejects sabotage as well. However, Al Wefaq refuses to accept the way riot is 
being handled and does not accept leaving the topic unresolved, so they 





4.3.9 Excerpt 9 on the Arrest of A. Hassan (b) 
From sitting 2:4:11, 29 Dec. 2009 
This is the second time MP Al-Marzooq attempts to defend MP Abdali 
Hassan, his fellow member of Al Wefaq. The first attempt was in the 
previous sitting, a week earlier. In the previous week, in Excerpt 8: the 
Arrest of Abali Hassan (a), the focus of MP Al-Marzooq’s speech was the 
illegality of the detention, while in this excerpt he shifts to the accusations 
against MP Hassan after his detention. MP Hassan had been accused of using 
abusive words. Here, the major difference is speaking of the arrested MP as 
an MP with rights and a reputation to protect, while in the previous week, 
the stress was on his being a citizen.  
In this excerpt, MP Al-Marzooq employs the strategy of centralising 
pride and dignity as the rationale behind his complaint (see Table 32).  
 
Table 32: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 9 







 emotive speech 
 change of tone: using kinyah 
 rhetorical questions: erotesis 
 lexical style to put MPs on a par with 
ministers 
 speech act: contrasting arrested MP’s 
behaviour with that of Riot Control 
Forces 
 rhetoric: apophasis 
 othering, attempt to blame others 
whose interests are being protected 
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S is the Speaker. 
KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq. 
 
S:     … Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 1 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Assalāmu alaykum. Mr Speaker, on page  2 
7 in Hansard, I spoke on the topic of the criminal attack against  3 
an MP. I hope Bu Nayif (Mr Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel,  4 
the Minister of Shura and Representatives Council) allows me. On  5 
Thursday, the Interior Ministry declared: “The MP is lying” and they  6 
say that the MP uttered abusive words. Do you, Bu Nayif, allow an  7 
MP to be said to be using abusive words and lying? You do not allow  8 
this with the Ministry of the Interior or any of the ministries. Is it  9 
allowed for the Council to have people who lie or are accused of  10 
uttering abusive words? …11 
 
The first discursive device used here to build this strategy is emotive speech. 
After introducing the topic, i.e. the assault against an MP, which was carried 
out by the Riot Control Forces, MP Al-Marzooq briefly implores the Minister 
of the Interior, who was present at this sitting employing Bu Nayif in line 4 
and again in line 7; this is known in Arabic as kinyah, defining oneself as the 
father of so and so, and with an intonation characteristic of caretaker speech 
(explained in the analysis of MP Sultan’s second intervention in Excerpt 1). 
The use of kinyah suggests that MP Al-Marzooq presents himself as of a high 
and prestigious rank parallel to that of the Minister, something which in turn 
gives space for the criticism and complaint which follows.  
In his speech, however, MP Al-Marzooq does not deny that the arrested 
MP used abusive words, but he denounces the fact that such an accusation 
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could be addressed to an MP. Although this excerpt and the previous one are 
both on the same issue and both employ the strategy of centralising pride 
and dignity, the major difference between the two excerpts, 8 and 9, is in 
the way the MP Hassan is framed. Here, the frame emphasised is that of an 
MP, something which provokes a feeling of pride and hence requires the 
strategy of centralising pride and dignity to defend it.  
MP Al-Marzooq uses the kinyah once again within a rhetoric device: a 
rhetorical question: ‘Do you, Bu Nayif, allow an MP to be said to be using 
abusive words and lying?’ (lines 7–8). This use of erotesis implies a strong 
affirmation of the contrary, that the Minister of the Shura Council and the 
Representatives Council does not allow such an accusation to be addressed to 
an MP. The question used here functions as a negative assertion. Although 
the original argument is weak, since MP Al-Marzooq cannot deny the 
accusation that the arrested MP used abusive words, something that is a 
critical ethical issue, MP Al-Marzooq is strengthening his position by 
accentuating pride and dignity. He continues this strategy when he puts the 
Council and MPs on a par with ministries and ministers respectively by 
saying: ‘You do not allow this with the Ministry of the Interior or any of the 
ministries’ (lines 8–9). Now the MPs are on a par with the ministers and, 





KM:   …          Is it  9 
allowed for the Council to have people who lie or are accused of  10 
uttering abusive words? Only to protect certain individuals... 11 
S:      Enough ... 12 
KM:   I, Mr Speaker, I see the cars of Riot Control Forces go out and skid  13 
[their cars] like adolescents. We do not want to talk more here.  14 
There are excesses. These excesses must be addressed. 15 
 
MP Al-Marzooq follows this with a second rhetorical question functioning as 
a negative assertion in lines 9–11: ‘Is it allowed for the Council to have 
people who lie or are accused of uttering abusive words?’. He begins to use 
othering; he tries to explain that there are others whose interests and 
reputations are being protected by the attack on the arrested MP. MP Al-
Marzooq starts this in lines 11–12 by saying: ‘Only to protect certain 
individuals...’ but he is immediately interrupted by the Speaker in line 12: 
‘Enough’. 
Since whole argument fails, and apparently does not even attempt, to 
deny the fact that the arrested MP used abusive words, something that in the 
world of politics in particular is disreputable and shakes trust, MP Al-
Marzooq therefore, in order to stress the arrested MP’s dignity and pride as 
an issue, tries to create a behavioural gap between the arrested MP and the 
Riot Control Forces who arrested him. He says: ‘I see Riot Control Forces go 
out and skid [their cars] like adolescents’ (lines 13–14). MP Al-Marzooq is 
trying here to illustrate that Riot Control Forces are not mature enough to be 
given authority or to be trusted to deal with the people. MP Al-Marzooq 
302 
ends his intervention with an apophasis, a rhetorical device in which one 
mentions something by claiming that he or she does not want to talk about 
it: ‘We do not want to talk more here. There are excesses. These excesses 
must be addressed’ (lines 14–15). By doing so, he is suggesting that there is 
more that he can say. 
 
4.3.10 Excerpt 10 on Censoring a Speech 
From sitting 2:4:24, 30 March 2010 
In this excerpt, MP Mohammed Khalid from Al Minbar argues with the 
Speaker about his speech being censored, and objects to limiting his political 
freedom. MP Khalid has talked about corruption and abuse of authority in 
the government and local ‘big’ institutions. The argument he uses in his 
speech being censored using the strategy of intensifying grievance. He 
presents censorship as an unjust act, unfair to him, and implores the Speaker 
to insert his speech uncensored in Hansard. Table 33 summarises his strategy 









Table 33: Strategy of MP Khalid in Excerpt 10 






 rhetoric: repetition 
 rhetorical questions 
 rhetoric: mitigation 
 shifting to local dialect in order to 
implore 
 turn-taking: short exchanges 
 irony 
 speech act: from imploring to protesting 
 speech at: threatening or warning 
 
SDS  is Second Deputy Speaker. 
MK  is MP Mohammed Khalid from Al Minbar. 
 
SDS: Thank you. Jazāk Allah khair. I do not know how long it took you  1 
to prepare this speech, but no doubt some of the utterances  2 
will be removed from your intervention, honestly. 3 
MK:  Mr Speaker, no, no, excuse me, excuse me, why will you remove  4 
them? They will not be broadcast on the radio and His Excellency  5 
the minister was laughing all the time. Why remove them? 6 
SDS:  We will remove them, and you can demand them in the next sitting. 7 
  
Although the topic of corruption is a recurring topic in the parliamentary 
sittings and is always addressed viciously, the Speaker is upset about some 
of the expressions and descriptions used by MP Khalid. The Speaker starts 
with an ironic, rather sarcastic, statement (line 1–2): ‘I don’t know how long 
it took you to prepare this speech.’ By doing so, showing that he finds this 
speech unnecessarily elaborate, and he immediately follows his comment 
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with: ‘but no doubt some of the utterances will be removed from your 
intervention, honestly’ (lines 2–3), which donates that there are rude or 
unacceptable utterances. The use of the discourse marker ‘but’ indicates a 
tone shift, a cancellation of the positive response the Second Deputy Speaker 
has put forward; after thanking MP Khalid as a routine procedure, the 
Speaker shifts to emphasise his disapproval. He stresses his point of 
censoring the speech by the intensifier ‘honestly’. At this point, MP Khalid 
protests, demanding that his speech be reported in its entirety in Hansard. 
While the Speaker sees the expressions as improper, MP Khalid sees them as 
a right to express himself freely.  
MP Khalid moves to a defensive position, confronting the decision to 
censor the speech. He uses repetition: ‘Mr Speaker, no, no, excuse me, 
excuse me’ (line 4). Repetition is one of the devices that are used in 
foregrounded disagreement, but here the disagreement comes in the form of 
imploring. MP Khalid defends himself by underestimating, or mitigating, the 
severity of the expressions to which the Speaker is objecting. MP Khalid 
says: ‘why will you remove them? They will not be broadcast on the radio 
and His Excellency the minister was laughing all the time. Why remove 
them?’ (lines 4–6). The first and the last sentences are rhetorical questions 
expressing MP Khalid’s opposition. The two points he makes between these 
two questions, i.e. ‘They will not be broadcast on the radio and His 
Excellency the minister was laughing all the time’ (lines 5–6), are meant to 
reframe rejected expressions he has used as harmless and not offensive: the 
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first one was that the attending minister, the Minister of Finance, had been 
laughing, which is a sign of him taking MP Khalid’s speech light-heartedly. 
The second point was that MP Khalid’s speech will not be broadcast (i.e. 
there are no worries about publicity). MP Khalid wants his speech to be 
recorded fully in Hansard. He is thus using these two facts as a way of 
illustrating that censoring of his speech is unjustified. This, however, does 
not appear to convince the Speaker, who replies: ‘We will remove them, and 
you can demand them in the next sitting’ (line 7). MP Khalid still does not 
want to risk his demand being rejected in the next sitting and wants to make 
sure his full speech will be inserted in Hansard. The argument continues: 
 
MK:  Why will you remove them, Mr Speaker? Why? We have had  8 
enough of removing. 9 
SDS:  Bu Ammar (MP Sheikh Mohammed Khalid Ebrahim). 10 
MK:  They are all right, leave them – Allah yisalmuk – Do not remove  11 
anything. 12 
SDS: We will remove– 13 




MP Khalid poses more rhetorical questions expressing disapproval in line 8: 
‘Why will you remove them, Mr Speaker? Why?,’ and then complains about 
previous removals: ‘We have had enough of removing’ (lines 8–9). MP 
Khalid is now accumulating previous removals to strengthen his stand, to 
initiate a sense of guilt and uneasiness about censoring any further speeches. 
This, however, does not seem to work either. The Speaker insists on his 
position, and he addresses MP Khalid with his kinyah, ‘Bu Ammar’ (line 10). 
MP Khalid keeps pleading: ‘They are all right, leave them – Allah yisalmuk – 
Do not remove anything’ (lines 11–12). The expression Allah yisalmuk means 
‘May God protect you’ and is normally used either as an interjection or a 
way to implore the addressee to agree or accept a request or a demand. In 
this context, it is the latter use. The short exchanges between the Speaker 
and MP Khalid (lines 8–14) signify a development of a foregrounded 
disagreement between the two. 
 The Speaker then continues: 
 
SDS:  No, we will delete— I do not think— when you say that Bahrain is the  15 
land of the raven and the ravens. You should choose your words  16 
properly. When you say that the thieves and the thief—why do you  17 
say these words? You say that Bahrain was ‘given away like a freebie’  18 
(biblāsh). You say that Bahrain was sold cheaply. 19 
MK:  No problem. Delete what you want to delete and I will post it on  20 





The Speaker insists on his stance. In lines 15–19, he condemns the words MP 
Khalid has used. The Speaker quotes some of the censored expressions: ‘you 
say that Bahrain is the land of the raven and the ravens. … the thieves and 
the thief… that Bahrain was ‘given away like a freebie’ (biblāsh). You say 
that Bahrain was sold cheaply’ (lines 15–19). He instructs MP Khalid to 
‘choose [his] words properly’ (line 16–17). The Speaker apparently makes 
MP Khalid angry, as he shifts from the imploring to the defiant tone: ‘No 
problem. Delete what you want to delete and I will post it on the Internet 
and announce it. I will pass it to the brothers in Al Wefaq. No problem’ 
(lines 20–22). The use of the conventional reply ‘no problem’ is ironic. MP 
Khalid does have a problem with this decision, but he is now angry and 
disappointed, and with this move, he is trying to show that he is unaffected 
or untouched by the Speaker’s stance. This defiant tone is more 
confrontational, as if he is saying: ‘I don’t care what you do or think and I 
will get my point across.’ He mentions two ways in which he intends to 
publicise his speech in full: by publishing it online on his homepage and by 
passing it to Al Wefaq. It is interesting that MP Khalid threatens with using 
Al Wefaq, the Shiite party, while he is a member of Al Minbar, a Sunni party 
that is strongly disliked by Al Wefaq for their being closer to the Muslim 
Brotherhood trend (for more on Islamic political movements, see Section 
2.2.3); this is beside MP Khalid’s being in a particularly tense relationship 
with Al-Wefaq. This interesting reaction may indicate MP Khalid’s 
expectations or understanding of his party’s opinion about his speech. 
308 
 
Despite being a member of Al Minbar, he does not say that his party would 
publish his speech as he seems to expect his approach is not acceptable to 
his party while he expects that content and style would be more appealing to 
Al Wefaq’s MPs, who present themselves as being in opposition to the 
government. 
  
4.3.11 Excerpt 11 on Activating a Punishment Decision 
From sitting 2:4:28, 27 April 2010 
In this excerpt, the Council is supposed to vote on a proposal made by MP 
Naser Al-Fudhalah from Al Minbar. The proposal is to activate a decision of 
the Civil Service Bureau to punish government sector employees in the 
Bureau who are convicted of participating in unauthorised rallies and sit-ins 
or in riots and vandalism. MP Hassan Al-Dosseri, an independent MP, 
indicates an objection in his intervention: 
 
HD is MP Hassan Al-Dosseri, independent MP. 
DS is Deputy Speaker. 
 
HD:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have a technical comment. The  33 
proposal was for activating the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau,  34 
but the committee’s report is on a proposal for punishing  35 
employees. The proposal did not come to punish. “Activation of  36 
the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau”. I think that the  37 
committee has erred in this matter, and the members have voted  38 
on something other than the proposal that was made by MP  39 
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Abdullah Khalaf Al-Dosseri. 40 
Thank you, Mr Speaker. 41 
DS:   Thank you. … 42 
 
MP Hassan Al-Dosseri objects to the fact that the committee studying the 
proposal has returned with a refusal, which has not been regarding 
activating the decision but regarding the decision itself. Employing the 
strategy of corroborating by information (Table 34), the Chairman of the 
Committee, MP Khalil Al-Marzooq intervenes. 
 
Table 34: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 11 








 lexical style: shielding oneself with 
wordiness 
 illusion: referring to wrong page numbers 
 wordiness: quoting (wrong sources) 
 
KM is MP Khalil Marzooq from Al Wefaq. 
DS is Deputy Speaker. 
MHM is MP Makki Hilal Makki, the Rapporteur from Al Wefaq. 
 
KM (Chairman of Committee): Thank you, Mr Speaker. What came to us  54 
is like this, that the committees have reached, and even the reports*:  55 
on page 696 in regard to the proposal for punishing government  56 
sector employees under the Civil Service Bureau. Do you want to  57 
return it to the committee so that we present it in the next term?  58 
We request correcting the procedures ... 59 
DS:   Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, the proposal— brothers,  60 
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let us talk a minute – is available with the attachments actually,  61 
on pages 709 and 710 ... 62 
MHM (Rapporteur): 696, this proposal … 63 
DS:   This is the signature of MP Abdullah Al-Dosseri on pages 709 and 64 
710. The proposal for the activation of the decisions of the Civil  65 
Service Bureau. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 66 
 
Although MP Al-Dosseri has clearly pointed out the mistake made, the 
committee attempts to employ a number of devices for shielding oneself 
with wordiness to pass the committee’s decision. MP Al-Marzooq first tries 
to justify their reading and response by referring to the proposal and 
mentioning page numbers: ‘What came to us is like this, the committees 
have reached, and even the reports*: on page 696 in regard to the proposal 
for punishing government sector employees under the Civil Service Bureau’ 
(lines 54–57). Besides the quoting of page numbers, the statement is 
interrupted by an unclear and badly structured phrase – the part that is 
underlined and followed by an asterisk – as another attempt to add lexical 
richness to his speech by adding terms that can make the listener think 
they are hearing something professional. MP Al-Marzooq stops and asks if 
the Council would return the proposal to the committee (lines 57–59). It 
sounds as if he has realised the mistake. The Speaker corrects him in lines 
60–62: ‘the proposal … is available with the attachments actually, on pages 
709 and 710.’ 
The Rapporteur of the committee, MP Makki Hilal Makki, interrupts 
and refers to the page MP Al-Marzooq mentioned (line 63), on which the 
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decision of the Civil Service Bureau is mentioned, rather than the proposal 
to activate it, trying to show that they based their decision on the document 
provided, but the Speaker interrupts MP Makki too, and corrects him: ‘This 
is the signature of MP Abdullah Al-Dosseri on pages 709 and 710. The 
proposal for the activation of the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau’ (lines 
64–66). Here, the pointing to the signature puts an end to the discussion, 
and there can be no further argument about the purpose of the proposal. 
Thus, the weaker version of the strategy of corroborating by information, 
which relies on filibustering and shielding oneself with wordiness, fails to 
justify the decision of the committee, and, on the contrary, demonstrates a 
mistreatment of information. 
 
4.4 Discursive Devices and Strategies: a Synthesis  
Having analysed each excerpt separately, I now describe the general use of 
the strategies and devices and present a synthesis of their employment in the 
excerpts. The deductions below were made possible by linking, comparing 
and contrasting the findings of the analysis of all the excerpts. The purpose 
of this step is constructing an understanding of how sectarian political 
parties employ the identified discursive devices and strategies in 
parliamentary debates over the topic related to dissent control and to 
political freedom. This understanding will meet the first objective of this 
research (restated in the Introduction to this chapter). The findings 
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presented in this section also form the foundation of the following chapter, 
Chapter Five, which will meet the second objective of the research. 
 
4.4.1 Employment of discursive strategies 
It is clear that whenever there are facts and information to present, MPs 
attempt to employ the strategy of corroborating by information, or at least 
to begin with this strategy before shifting to another. While there are several 
instances of using this strategy in most of the excerpts, Excerpt 1 in 
particular provides a number of examples of speakers beginning with this 
strategy and then, after exhausting the available information, moving to 
other strategies. In Excerpt 1 the interventions of MP Al-Marzooq (Tables 13, 
16 and 21), MP Ebrahim (Table 14), MP Al-Miz’al (Table 17), MP Al-Sitri 
(Table 18), and MP Sultan (Table 15) represent corroborating by 
information. The other strategies surface later on, either as a shorter 
intervention (see Table 15 of MP Sultan), or as in the later interventions 
when no more information or details can be presented (see Tables 19 and 20 
of MP Abul and MP Al-Miz’al respectively). The strategy of corroborating by 
information appears to be the most ‘confident’ strategy; hence, it is most 
expected from MPs, whose electorates presume them to be knowledgeable 
and aware of the local and international laws and events and of the people’s 
needs and prospects. The strategy of corroborating by information comes in 
the form of ‘evidence’ to prove the viability of the MPs’ objections and 
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demands. This is frequently the case in the interventions of Al Wefaq, as 
they tend to object more than do the other parties to the dissent control in 
Bahrain.  
There are several instances in the analysed excerpts in which, once the 
law is clear-cut and there is no chance of discussing the legality of 
something with which the MPs disagree, the MPs move to the strategy of 
intensifying grievance as their second option. Some examples are found in 
Excerpt 1; see Table 14 of MP Ebrahim; Table 20 of MP Al-Miz’al’s third 
intervention in the same excerpt after two interventions employing the 
strategy of corroborating by information; and Table 15 of MP Sultan’s 
intervention. There is, however, one example in which another strategy 
comes first then a shift is made to that of corroborating by information as 
stated above. This is found in Excerpt 1 in an intervention by MP Abul (see 
Table 19) in his reservations on using teargas against local riots. The 
strategy of centralising pride and dignity is used first then a shift is made to 
the strategy of corroborating by information. This reverse use does not seem 
to be random; on the contrary, MP Abul seems to make the issue of the 
image of Bahrain a priority, and hence starts with the strategy of centralising 
pride and dignity. The use of the strategy is therefore rather different in MP 
Abul’s intervention, which is talking about the pride of the country, 
presumably a common interest of all MPs and Bahrainis. This can explain 
why the combination of the strategy of centralising pride and dignity and 
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the strategy of corroborating by information came in the opposite order from 
all the other combinations of these two strategies.  
In addition to its combination with the strategy of corroborating by 
information, there are also instances of the strategy of intensifying grievance 
being used independently by some MPs, such as in Excerpt 1: in MP Sultan’s 
first and third interventions (Tables 15 and 23), and in Excerpt 10 in MP 
Khalid’s intervention (Table 33). This indicates that the strategy of 
intensifying grievance is strong, and has viability in the Bahraini 
parliamentary setting and in Bahraini political discourse. 
When it comes to centralising pride and dignity, it is interesting that in 
these excerpts this strategy is specifically used in the contexts of arrest and 
detention. It can be found in Excerpt 2 on Bahraini Detainees Abroad (Table 
24 of MP Al-Mitghawi’s intervention). Other examples are the intervention 
of MP Al-Mitghawi in Excerpt 6 (Table 29) the interventions of MP Al-
Marzooq in Excerpt 8 (Table 31) and in Excerpt 9 (Table 32). The latter two 
are on the arrest of MP Hassan. However, although Excerpt 5 is also on the 
arrest of political activists, the strategy employed is that of corroborating by 
information. This seems to be the case because, unlike the case in Excerpts 8 
and 9, in this excerpt MP Al-Marzooq has an argument against the legality 
and the appropriateness of the arrest while there are no legal ‘flaws’ to 
address in the arrest of MP Hassan to condemn in Excerpts 8 and 9. Another 
use of the strategy of centralising pride and dignity is found in Excerpt 3 on 
Insulting the Government (Table 25 on MP Ebrahim’s intervention and Table 
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26 on MP Murad’s intervention.) Here, this strategy becomes the only 
appropriate one that can circumvent a need to defend oneself against the 
government accusation of the MPs insulting the government, something that 
also eliminates the need to apologise to the government. The only other use 
of the strategy of centralising pride and dignity is that of MP Abul in Excerpt 
1 (Table 19), which is combined with the strategy of corroborating by 
information. He gives priority to the international image of Bahrain, and 
hence the pride and dignity of Bahrain is what is being centralised in this 
intervention, not that of individuals as in the other interventions in Excerpts 
8 and 9 on the arrest of MP Hassan. The strategy of centralising pride and 
dignity in Excerpt 6, which is based on the relative appropriateness of the 
proposal if compared to major corruption issues in the country, is suspecting 
the value of the proposal, and hence indirectly suggesting that the MPs not 
who are taking the proposal seriously have a better political perspective of 
the issues needed to be addressed in the country.  
 
4.4.2 Employment of discursive devices 
When it comes to the employment of discursive devices, the first observation 
is that there are no strict uses of particular devices per strategy; 
nevertheless, some devices are used more frequently for certain strategies 
than are others. 
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 First of all, conditional statements are used more frequently in the 
strategy of corroborating by information: in Excerpt 1, there is seven by MP 
Al-Marzooq (Tables 16 and 21) and three by MP Al-Sitri (Table 18). There 
were also examples, but less frequent, of conditional statements used in the 
strategy of centralising pride and dignity: both in Excerpt 2, one by Al 
Mitghawi (Table 24) and another by MP Ebrahim (Table 25). This is because 
confirming the correctness or legitimacy of a discussed point or a stance can 
be achieved more easily if compared to a condition opposed to or different 
from the one being discussed.  
 The device of rhetorical questions, a second discursive device, is used in 
seven of the excerpts: Excerpts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 10. This device is used 
most intensively in the strategy of intensifying grievance and that of 
centralising pride and dignity. Rhetorical questions have a property similar 
to that of conditional statements, as both make assumptions and try to 
convince the listeners of the interlocutor’s correctness and legitimacy. This is 
because rhetorical questions do not require an answer but actually propose 
and direct the listener to a certain answer the interlocutor is provoking. As 
for emotive speech, a third intensively used device, it was found that it is 
used most in the strategy of intensifying grievance, but it is also notable in 
the strategy of centralising pride and dignity. This is demonstrated in many 
excerpts. Examples of emotive speech being employed in the strategy of 
intensifying grievance are found in Excerpt 1 (MP Ebrahim in Table 14, MP 
Sultan in Tables 15 and 23, and MP Abul in Table 19); in Excerpt 4 (MP Al-
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Miz’al in Table 27); and also in Excerpt 10 (MP Khalid in Table 33). There 
are emotive speeches in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity in 
Excerpt 3 (MP Murad in Table 26) and Excerpt 8 (MP Al-Marzooq in Table 
31). As for emotive speech in the strategy of corroborating by information, 
there is only one example, which is in Excerpt 1 (MP Al-Marzooq in Table 
21). Of course, it is possible to employ the device of emotive speech in the 
strategy of corroborating by information, especially when the intervention 
becomes confrontational (see MP Al-Miz’al’s later interventions in Excerpt 
4). While being more emotive in their nature, the two strategies of 
centralising pride and dignity and that of intensifying grievance remain 
independent of each other; on the one hand, with the strategy of centralising 
pride and dignity there is an assertion of righteous and fulfilled dignity that 
requires certain standards and procedures. On the other hand, the strategy of 
intensifying grievance involves a call for a claimed but unfulfilled dignity or 
need. 
The discursive device of framing and reframing is a strong and recurrent 
device in all strategies; it serves in constructing a stance or a perspective, 
and herein lies its strength. Bayley and Vicente (2004: 238) explain that the 
semantic nuances of a word ‘may reflect political orientations ... towards a 
phenomenon that has become socially problematic.’ Framing and reframing 
provide a definition of concepts and perspectives, but a definition that the 
speaker wants to adopt. Abstract concepts and controversial labels in 
particular are open to framing and reframing most of the time, if not all the 
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time. Labels and terms such as ‘terrorist’, ‘innocent’, ‘victim’, ‘rioters’, 
‘citizens’ are recurrent in Excerpt 1; ‘insult’ and ‘criticism’ in Excerpt 3; 
‘terrorist’ again in Excerpt 4; ‘thieves’ in Excerpt 6; ‘eavesdropping’ in 
Excerpt 7; and ‘citizen’ again in Excerpt 8. This openness to framing and 
reframing provides a leeway for proposing, and perhaps indirectly imposing, 
a specific ideological stance and a political and sectarian perspective on a 
matter, making framing and reframing a strong device in the ideological 
struggle over power if employed successfully. As for the difference between 
framing and reframing, framing is the less ‘daunting’ and challenging of the 
two. It is expected that each listener, as an individual and as a member of a 
group, has a mental ‘frame’ of a concept. However, when being the first 
person to propose the concept or label in a discourse, the interlocutor does 
not have to challenge a frame that has already been proposed. Reframing, on 
the other hand, involves a frame that has already been proposed by others, 
whether individuals, parties, organisations, or the government. The person 
reframing will then have to compete with the existing frame. Reframing 
aims to change or shift the listeners’ stance from the previously proposed 
frame to that of the interlocutor. In either case of framing and reframing, 
failing to frame or reframe one’s stance reduces the chances of finding 
common ground for discussion.  
Another interesting observation is that ridiculing devices, such as 
mockery and puns, are used more often in the strategy of centralising pride 
and dignity than in the other two strategies (see for example Excerpts 3 and 
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6). Perhaps this is because expressing pride can be stressed by expressing the 
inferiority of the ‘other’ person or idea. This is not to suggest that this is the 
only or the most proper way pride and dignity can be expressed, but it seems 
to be a way that is easy to use for stressing one’s pride – by degrading the 
others. 
It is noted that the device of shielding oneself with wordiness, which in 
the excerpts only occurs under the strategy of corroborating by information, 
is hardly used and seems to be a last resort. Shielding oneself with 
wordiness, a lexical style, is thus used when no good argument is available 
or when an MP needs to give an impression of being knowledgeable, if not 
an expert, in a certain matter, especially a legal one, to avoid counter-
arguments. However, shielding oneself with wordiness is risky and may 
position the MP using it in the circle of ignorance, ineloquence or, what 
would be worse, of cheating and deception; perhaps this is why it tends to 
be used less frequently than other devices and, if used, why it tends to 
continue only for a short period of time. The reason for the brevity of this 
strategy could be either that it is easy to detect, and hence ‘quick hits’ may 
be safer and easier to get away with; or that it is not easy to continue to 
construct difficult-to-detect ‘void’ phrases for a long period. 
The observations above indicate that the employment of the discursive 
devices is not completely random. Instead, most of the choices follow a 
pattern, of which an MP may or may not be conscious. However, the 
findings and observations can be either of individual or group strategies. If 
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the choices have any group traits, then they reflect the ideology of that 
specific group or party. To be able to decide if there are group features, it is 
useful to verify if there are findings specific to political groups. 
 
4.4.3 Strategies and devices among political parties 
Having presented my observations about the general ‘patterns’ and usage of 
the three discursive strategies and the discursive devices employed to 
implement them, I now examine how the strategies and devices are used by 
the political parties in the excerpts analysed above.  
In the examined legislative period, three parties managed to dominate 
the Council, the three of which are religious with a sectarian affiliation: Al 
Wefaq, Al Minbar and Al Asalah. The first is Shiite and the last two are 
Sunni. Unfortunately, there are only a few interventions from Al Minbar and 
Al Asalah, and one from an independent MP. The intensity of participation 
and involvement in the discussion of the topic of dissent control, however, 
appears to relate to the differences in the ideological and political goals and 
prospects of the parties, something that is elaborated in Chapter 5.  
 The strategies I propose in this research are deduced from the analysis 
of the excerpts, which are on the topic of dissent control and political 
freedom. The major comments and objections to dissent-controlling laws and 
measures come from Al Wefaq. Al Wefaq employs all three strategies in the 
examined excerpts. The tone of the strategy of corroborating by information 
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can range between being confrontational to being ‘soft’. The discussion of 
dissent control and, in particular, the ‘softer’ tone tends to be used more 
often by Al Asalah and Al Minbar than by Al Wefaq. I must stress, 
nevertheless, this is an observation made on the excerpts from specific 
settings and a specific topic and it is not necessarily, or likely, the case with 
all topics and in all settings. I assume that the same strategies can be found 
in excerpts on other topics. I do not propose that these three strategies are 
inclusive or comprehensive, hence here might be other strategies in other 
excerpts. However, the frequency, length and usage of the devices may differ 
among different topics, settings and users. 
There are three discursive devices that Al Wefaq MPs use frequently: 
conditional statements, mockery and reframing. Interestingly, the 
conditional statements found in the research data are used only by Al Wefaq, 
and mockery, a device which appeared only in the strategy of centralising 
pride and dignity, is also used only by Al Wefaq. Framing and reframing are 
crucial devices in political language. The data analysis shows that framing is 
used to indicate stance and to orient listeners with the interlocutor’s stance, 
and reframing to enforce a new or different stance or perception. Al Wefaq 
uses more reframing than framing in order to diverge from the stance and 
perspective of the ‘others’, i.e. the government and the Sunni parties. The 
Sunni parties, on the other hand, tend more toward framing than reframing. 
This can indicate that Al Wefaq’s ideological stance on the topic of dissent 
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contrasts more with what the Bahraini law and the norms in Bahrain 
propose.  
On the other hand, the ideological stances of Al Asalah and Al Minbar 
are more in accordance with the laws and norms in Bahrain, in relation to 
dissent control in particular. In Excerpt 4, for example, the statement group 
MPs are implying in their statement that they approve of punishing the 
detainees. On the whole, agreeing with what is already implemented under 
the law does not require becoming confrontational. However, on the few 
occasions when any of the Sunni MPs, particularly MP Mohammed Khalid in 
Excerpt 10 and MP Hamid Murad in Excerpt 3, expressed strong and 
confrontational disagreement, it was on the specific topic of the freedom of 
expression when they sensed that their criticism of corruption in the 
government is being censured. When the Sunni parties choose a 
confrontational tone, they seem to usually avoid mockery, sarcasm and 
offence (see MP Murad in Excerpt 3 and MP Al-Fudalah in Excerpt 7). MP 
Khalid in particular brings in his own confrontational style. His individual 
style has always been unacceptable to his party and his unwillingness to 
maintain the style and the delimitations of the party eventually resulted in a 
breakup at the end of the Second Legislative Period. MP Khalid’s 
confrontational style was the crux of the disagreement and the local 
newspaper reported the conflict between MP Khalid and his party in 
November and December 2010.  
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This confirms that there are strategic differences among the political 
parties, something which consequently confirms that ideological differences 
are reflected in discourse. This conclusion, in turn, allows us to use the 
findings to move to the second objective of the research, reported in Chapter 
5. Based on the analysis I present in this research, although there are 
personal ‘styles’ and hence a tendency toward differences when it comes to 
choosing among strategies and devices, the ideological affiliation of the 
interlocutor enforces a group style. This group style, in turn, generates 
tendencies toward and preferences for certain strategies over others, and of 
particular devices over others; these mutual preferences reflect each group’s 
identity and ideology. To better understand how the findings in this chapter 
relate to identity and ideology, Chapter 5 critically examines them in the 
light of the specific political backgrounds and sectarian orientations of 
Bahraini society.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have identified a number of discursive devices that appear 
to serve three of the discursive strategies used by MPs in the analysed 
excerpts on dissent control and political freedom from debates held in the 
second legislative period of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. I have 
called these three discursive strategies corroborating by information, 
intensifying grievance, and centralising pride and dignity.  
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 The eleven excerpts in which the topics of dissent control and 
political freedom are discussed have been critically analysed. The analysis 
reflects which discursive strategies and devices each MP employs in his 
interventions in that excerpt. 
In a separate section, I have indicated how the strategies have been 
used and how they were associated with topics and devices; I have also 
demonstrated how most dominant discursive devices were implemented to 
achieve these strategies in the excerpts. I then showed that there were usage 
differences among political parties, which confirms that political affiliation 
of the interlocutors affected their choice of discursive choices. This in turn 
has confirmed that ideological struggle over power among political parties is 
reflected in discourse. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLORING THE IDEOLOGIES  
5.1 Introduction 
In this research, I have hypothesised that the Shiite party MPs in the 
Bahraini Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from the 
Sunni MPs. The previous chapter was essential in constructing a linguistic 
basis for the topic of the research, especially as there are no extensive 
academic studies on the political language of the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives upon which I could have built (as discussed in Section 1.5, 
in the Significance of my Research).Building upon the findings reported in 
the previous chapter, this chapter aims to fulfil the second objective of this 
research: exploring whether and how the use of discursive devices and 
strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. Adopting 
SCA’s proposition about cognitive mediating between society and discourse, 
I consider the discourses I analyse in this research as a space to manifest or 
practice, i.e. express and reproduce, the cognitively stored but group-shared 
ideologies. This chapter combines the background information collected in 
Chapter 2 and the findings of the linguistic analyses made in Chapter 4, 
bringing in theories, contexts and linguistic analysis of the excerpts to 
maintain intertextuality and a degree of interdisciplinarity in order to 
present a macro level analysis, which is concerned with ‘overall intergroup 
relations and institutional control’ (van Dijk 1993: 110). While the critical 
analysis in the previous chapter revolved around the textual data, the critical 
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analysis in this chapter will focus on the theological axis. This level of 
analysis fulfils the second objective of the research.  
Van Dijk maintains that ‘[a]lthough general properties of language 
and discourse are not, as such, ideologically marked, systematic discourse 
analysis offers powerful methods to study the structures and functions of 
“underlying” ideologies’ (2006: 115). Nevertheless, van Dijk mentions that 
‘discourse is not always ideologically transparent, and discourse analysis 
does not always allow us to infer what people’s ideological beliefs are’, as 
speaker may choose not to express these beliefs depending on the context 
(ibid.: 124).  
I here attempt to demonstrate if, and how, a political party’s ideology 
can be reflected in the linguistic choices the members make, how group 
identities are related to the ideologies, and how ideology is used as a form of 
struggle over power. I have illustrated in Chapter 4 that there are group-
based preferences of strategies and devices (see Section 4.4). The analysis is 
also based on the postulate that text and talk have properties that ‘allow 
social members to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs’ 
(van Dijk 1998: 192, emphasis in original). Thus, communication 
‘function[s] simultaneously as both as an expression and creation of 
organizational structure’ (Mumby & Clair 2004: 181). As a criterion of CDA, 
the same text and discourse are always open to new contexts and 
information, causing the results to change and, consequently, confirming 
that ‘the validity of CDA results is not absolute and immutable’ (Titscher, 
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Meyer, Wodak and Vetter 2007: 164). This, however, does not undermine 
the value and validity of any discourse analysis, including the one made in 
this research. Instead, this view is a positive one, allowing analyses and 
readings to congregate in order to construct a better and more profound 
understanding of a discourse. My reading is thus based on the available data 
and details and perhaps different data or details open the text to a different, 
though not necessarily contradictory, reading. 
 
5.2 Manifesting Power 
While two of the three identified discursive strategies, namely, corroborating 
by information and centralising pride and dignity, can be used to display and 
emphasise power, the third strategy, i.e. intensifying grievance, can be said to 
claim power (see Section 4.4.2). Thus, the strategies seem to complement 
each other. However, the ideological struggle over power, as evidenced from 
the excerpts, can be represented differently according to whom the struggle 
is with or against. On this basis, in the excerpts analysed in this research, the 
instances of MPs’ struggle for power can be categorised into three types of 
‘battlefield’: first is the battlefield against government bodies, institutions 
and individuals, to confirm MPs’ status as high, if not the highest, and most 
independent government figures. The second is the battlefield in which MPs, 
often as parties, congregate against each other. The third is that of MPs 
attempting to force a law or a decision against a category of people or an 
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action, or to change an existing law that would normally affect a specific 
group of people or action. Each of these battlefields contributes by being a 
setting for the discursive strategies used for the struggle over power.  
Examples of the first type of battlefield in the struggle for power, i.e. 
against the government, can be found in Excerpt 3 on Insulting the 
Government, when both MPs Ebrahim and Murad challenge a minister in a 
tone stressing being on a par with him. MP Ebrahim says: ‘I am afraid that if 
I talk the Brother Minister for Shura and Representatives Councils will 
withdraw ...’ (lines 18–19) and MP Murad comments on the departure of the 
minister by saying: ‘The minister says that the MPs insult the government. 
The minister leaving the Council this way, is not this an insult to this 
Council?’ (lines 24–26); another example is found in Excerpt 7 when MP Al-
Fudhalah tries to demonstrate power over a government institution by 
demanding to have the Council consulted over eavesdropping: ‘We want an 
explanation from this institution, to tell us if there is an ongoing recording of 
all phone calls. This matter needs to be considered and approved by this 
council’ (lines 13–15).  
The second battlefield, in which MPs congregate in two groups, witnesses 
the most direct and most interactive struggle over power with the two 
opposing groups physically present. It is like a volley ball match: the two 
groups take ‘normal’ steady turns, with each group maintaining its ground, 
but it becomes more like a football match when it gets confrontational, with 
the MPs having shorter exchanges and more interruptions. Some examples of 
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the second type of battlefield occur in Excerpt 4 between MP Al-Miz’al and 
the statement group. It is true that there are no interventions from the 
statement group, but the statement itself, which is read out loud, defines 
their stance, which condemns the events of what the MPs signing the 
proposal defined as a ‘terrorist plot’. The proposal requests the Council to 
issue a statement conforming to their stance. However, MP Al-Miz’al takes 
an opposing stance and objects to the Council issuing the proposed 
statement. Another example of this type of battlefield is in the same except 
between MP Al-Miz’al on the one hand and both the Speaker of the Council 
and MP Khalid on the other. A further example is in Excerpt 6 between MP 
Al-Mitghawi and Al-Sa’eedi, the latter’s stance represented in his proposal. 
Again, one stance is that of MP Al-Sa’eedi wanting to fight robbery, but MP 
Al-Mitghawi hits at corruption in the government. By doing so, he is 
simultaneously signalling not taking MP Al-Sa’eedi’s opinion or relevant 
parliamentary views very seriously seeing it addressing a minor problem and 
overlooking a major one. A third example can be found in Excerpt 5 with 
MP Al-Marzooq taking the role of the tutor as he objects to how an arrest 
was made; and a fourth example is in Excerpt 10 when MP Khalid protests 
against the decision of the Speaker of the Council to censor his speech and 
when he, MP Khalid in lines 20–22, sounds as if he is ‘threatening’ to 
congregate with Al Wefaq, a party with which MP Khalid normally strongly 
disagrees. An interesting example of manifestation of power against a group 
is the intervention of MP Ali Salman in Excerpt 4. This is because in lines 
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43–51 he shifts from the inclusive ‘we’ to the exclusive ‘I’. He shifts from his 
party being against issuing a statement condemning ‘terrorist’ attacks to 
standing alone as an individual against the statement being issued. In the 
same excerpt, when MP Al-Miz’al uses ‘I’, it is simply an expression of an 
immediate individual reaction. However, MP Salman’s ‘I’ manifests a high 
degree of authority and power at the individual level. This demonstration of 
personal or individual power is uncommon among MPs; it reflects the level 
of authority the party leader of Al Wefaq has within his own party. 
As for the third type of battlefield, that of MPs attempting to force or 
change a law against a particular category of people or an action, one example 
is that of the statement proposing condemnation of what the party 
considered a ‘terrorist’ act in Excerpt 4; others are the bill for activating 
punishment in the civil sector in Excerpt 12, and a third is the debate 
against allowing the use of tear gas in local riot control in Excerpt 1.  
In efforts to win or maintain power, the three battlefields may allow 
diplomatic options when the struggle takes a calmer and less confrontational 
form. Examples of this diplomatic struggle are that of independent MP Abul 
and that of MP Al-Mu’awdah’s reproach in in Excerpt 1. These two examples 
fall into the first and second types of battlefield respectively but share a 
calm diplomatic tone. The third battlefield, i.e. that of MPs attempting to 
force or change a law against a specific category of people or action, can 
develop into either of the other two battlefields, i.e. against the government 
or congregate in two groups when there is a resistance of the idea being 
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proposed. Thus, the battlefields can concur and can also change from one 
type to another as the discourse develops. 
  
5.3 Marking Identities 
People represent themselves as being ‘members of several categories and 
groups’ (van Dijk 1998: 118). As noted in the analysis of the data for this 
research in Chapter 4, the two identities most explicitly and deliberately 
emphasised by MPs were their identity as Bahrainis, i.e. as citizens, and their 
identity as MPs, i.e. as representatives of the people. These two identities 
were emphasised most in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity. Al 
Wefaq MPs, however, have an additional identity that keeps coming to the 
surface under the theme of the dissent control, in particular when relevant 
laws are discussed, and that is the identity of Bahrani, the Arab Shiite 
Bahrainis. The terms ‘Bahrani’ and ‘Shiite’, or related words, were not 
uttered or hinted at. Zubaida (1997: 103) states that, according to many 
Western writers, there is more ‘immediate solidarity of primary communities 
based on tribe, religion or sect’ than there is solidarity based on nationalism 
or socialism.71 The sectarian solidarity of Shiites in Bahrain has become 
stronger since the Iranian Revolution, as mentioned earlier. In the analysed 
excerpts, the word ‘sect’ was mentioned only once in Excerpt 5 in line 48 by 
MP Al-Marzooq: ‘There is someone who blasphemes the sect, and every 
week he intervenes in these matters and no one questions him ...’ (line 47–
48). However, by repeatedly employing the discursive devices of exclusion 
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and inclusion, othering, framing and reframing, and defining out-groups and 
in-groups (see examples in Chapter 4, excerpts 4, 5, 8 and 9), this 
unmentioned group has been represented as a distinct one with its own 
distinct ideology and political stance. The use of these devices is most 
prominent under the strategy of intensifying grievance, despite occasionally 
emerging in the other two strategies, those of centralising pride and of 
corroborating by information. In Excerpt 4, for example, the mentioning of 
the terrorist cell discovered in February (starting from line 54), is an 
example of expressing ideological affiliation by what van Dijk identifies as 
selecting a negative topic about Them (2006: 125). The same applies to all 
othering and ingrouping and outgrouping devices: they all either emphasise 
or de-emphasise positive or negative things about Us or Them, all of which 
help construct an understanding of ideology in discourse. Comparing and 
contrasting two groups or two events have also contributed to constructing 
an image of self, as in Excerpt 4 when MP Al-Miz’al mentions the ‘other’ 
terrorist cell comparing it to the one the statement group intends to 
condemn. 
Obviously, the topic of dissent-controlling laws is more provocative to 
a certain group, the Bahranis, the leading figures of whom share the idea of 
wilāyat al maqīh (i.e. the sovereignty of the Imām). This concept is political 
rather than religious and accepting it consequently means rejecting a non-
Shiite and non-religious government, and from this belief comes the need for 
combating the government and rising against it. Interestingly, in spite of 
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being prominent and fundamental in contemporary Shi’ism doctrine, the 
concept of wilāyat al maqīh was first applied to government by Khomaini. 
Zubaida (ibid.: 105) asserts that applying this doctrine to government ‘is a 
major departure from Islamic historical political thought and practice, 
including Shi’ism.’ A large number of Bahrain’s Shiites, both Bahraini and 
ʿAjams, firmly believe in it even if they themselves are not religious or 
practising Shiites. Thus, Al Wefaq’s Bahrani identity becomes more ‘present’ 
during such debates, resulting in a repeated shift to this sectarian and ethnic 
identity, something which result from the ideological rejection of the 
government. 
 As we move from the excerpts discussing political freedom beyond 
riots and demonstrations (i.e. in Excerpt 7 on eavesdropping and 3 on 
detainees abroad) to excerpts from debates on dissent control within riots, 
protests and sit-ins, two accompanying shifts can be observed: first, Sunni 
MPs become less opposing and, hence, less involved in the debates; and 
secondly, the boundaries of Al Wefaq’s group identity tighten to reflect a 
sector of Bahraini society rather than the whole society. When it comes to 
the first observation, the Sunni parties, Al Minbar and Al Asalah, do not 
show much desire to identify themselves and their sect distinctly in these 
discussions, although they clearly present rioters and protesters as an out-
group (see Section 4.4.2). Thus, the identity they repeatedly frame is that of 
the others rather than themselves, something which results in an indirect 
self-definition being provided. For example, if one person accuses another of 
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being irrational, it implies that the accuser believes that he or she is rational. 
This is what van Dijk considered to be a form of expressing ideology by 
negative presentation of Them when a speaker emphasises Their bad things 
(van Dijk 2006: 125). In the same way, at least in the examined excerpt, Al 
Asalah and Al Minbar do not show objection to the laws and rules opposing 
riots and punishing disobedience or vandalism and, when doing so, they 
define themselves as disciplined and nonviolent. In Excerpt 4, for example, 
the statement group frame the plot as a ‘terrorist’ one, and the people who 
could be hurt in the attack as ‘innocent’, by which they emphasise Their bad 
things and Our good things.  
 The Al Wefaq MP’s use of the exclusive ‘we’ that excludes MPs other 
than those from Al Wefaq becomes more frequent in discussions related to 
riots, protests and sit-ins. Al Wefaq becomes a separate body, with a sense of 
detachment from the Council as a whole. The line between individual 
identity and the group identity of Al Wefaq becomes blurred, and the more 
emotive the interventions, the more blurred the line (as in the interventions 
of MP Salman and MP Al-Miz’al in Excerpt 4 on condemning terrorism). On 
the whole, Al-Wefaq group identity tends to persists most of the time despite 




5.4 The Ideology of Protest 
As seen from the analyses made in this chapter and the previous one, it is 
difficult to compare and contrast in depth the strategies used by the Sunni 
and the Shiite MPs simply because the interventions made by the former in 
the chosen extracts are considerably fewer than those made by the latter. 
This automatically increases the focus of the analysis to the discursive 
strategies and devices employed by Al Wefaq, the Shiite party. Nevertheless, 
some comparison is essential, although I am obliged to base it on the limited 
existing data.  
It is worth noting that the reason why there are fewer interventions 
by the Sunni MPs in the research data is not that the Sunni parties or MPs 
make fewer interventions in parliamentary debates on the whole, but that 
the theme I chose for the excerpts proved to be more controversial and more 
troubling to the Al Wefaq party than to the others. This is due to the 
political attitude of a number of Shiite political movements in Bahrain, one 
of which is Al Wefaq, towards the government. The divergence in attitude 
between Sunnis and Shiites can be better comprehended if we consider the 
relationship between the government and the Shiites, particularly since the 
1980s. On the other hand, Sunni MPs, including independent ones who do 
not have Islamic or religious tendencies, have been less disturbed by strict 
law and order measures against riots and vandalism, and they are thus less 
likely to protest against related laws or verdicts. 
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SCA confirms that ideologies are cognitively stored while being 
socially shared. Discourse is, thus, a place to express, display and reproduce 
ideology. The analysis made in the previous chapter has shown that the 
strategy of intensifying grievance has been dominant and most intensely 
used by the Al Wefaq Party in the excerpts on laws controlling dissent. This 
strategy can reflect a type of what van Dijk called ‘ideologies of opposition 
or resistance’ (1998: 11). Taking into account the historical and cultural 
roots of Shi’ism, the ideology can be better called the ideology of protest and 
it seems central to the Shiite construction. This ideology can be traced back 
to a series of historical disappointments to the history of Shi’im, starting 
when Ali bin Abi Talib, the cousin of the Prophet Mohammed and Shiite’s 
first Imam, was not appointed as successor to the Prophet Mohammed, and 
running though the injustice felt at the killing and decapitation of Al 
Hussain, the son of Imam Ali, in the Battle of Karbala. It is important to 
stress here that members of an ideological group ‘are able to speak or act on 
the basis of the acquired ideology, but are not always able to formulate its 
beliefs explicitly’ despite that every ideological group has its experts who 
can explain and reproduce its ideology (van Dijk 2006: 119). This applies to 
the ideology of protest in Shi’ism too. The notion of injustice and the urge to 
avenge is historically rooted and called upon repeatedly in Shi’ism and 
manifested in different fields and areas of creed and daily life alike. From 
the point of view of the Shiite leaders and key figures both inside and 
outside Bahrain, the current Sunni Royal Family, Al Khalifa, should not be in 
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power for political and theological reasons. At the political level, the 
Bahranis claim to be ‘the original residents’ of the western coast of Arabia, 
and say that Al Khalifas arrived later; according to the Shiite version of the 
story, Al Khalifas ‘took over’ the country, and hence should not be the 
rulers.72 At the theological level, Shiite doctrine underwent a major shift 
with the Iranian Revolution, maintaining that Shiite communities cannot be 
ruled by someone who is not Shiite (see Section 2.3.3). In the Shiite political 
state structure, as seen in both Iran and Iraq, there are two parallel 
leaderships, with power shifting between them: the religious leadership and 
the political one; both have to be Shiite. The president is publically elected 
for a four-year term while the supreme religious leader is appointed for life 
by the Assembly of Experts, which is an assembly of high-ranking Shiite 
clerics. For example, the current political leader in Iran is President Ahmadi 
Najad, while the religious leader is Ali Khamenei. The relationship between 
these leaderships is direct and strict in the Shiite doctrine. The parallel 
political-religious duality in Bahrain is represented by Shaikh Ali Salman, 
the leader of Al Wefaq Party, and Shaikh Issa Qassim respectively. However, 
since this leadership is not part of the formal structure of government in 
Bahrain, the political structure is considered invalid according to Shiite 
doctrine. Thus, both the historic and theological beliefs make and maintain 
the tense relationship between the religious and political Shiite leaders on 
the one hand and the current Bahraini government on the other. It also 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to reach a state of political and 
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economic reform that can be considered acceptable and satisfactory to the 
Shiite dogma as long as the Al Khalifas, or even any non-Shiites, eoa ruling 
the country.  
The theological foundation affects the perception of the acts, the 
people involved and, consequently, the perception of relevant laws. The 
feeling of injustice feeds into and fortifies the ideology of protest in Shi’ism, 
making strikes, riots and sit-ins essential in the praxis of Shi’ism. Of course, 
this belief is not put forward in public discussions or arguments, as it cannot 
be defended, justified or accepted by international and national standards 
and laws. Nevertheless, even when it is not the direct source of objection or 
disagreement, this ideology can create a constant feeling of suffering from 
oppression and injustice, a feeling that always persists at least at 
unconscious levels. This in turn makes the strategy of intensifying grievance 
a central strategy in Shiite arguments and debates, a strategy that has 
become prominent in parliamentary settings too, as the excerpts analysed in 
this research have revealed.  
Both inside and outside the parliament, while the essence stays the 
same, the style of protest among Shiite politicians in Bahrain has changed. It 
used to tend more towards being linked with weakness and complaining of 
humiliation before the democratic shift that took place in Bahrain in 2000, 
but after that a number of these politicians have become MPs and have 
gained officially acknowledged power in the government. Since then, their 
strategy of intensifying grievance has become more confrontational and 
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loaded with anger, something which can again be related to the theological 
construction of Shi’ism.73 The change in the democratic nature of Bahrain in 
2000 (for more details, see Section 2.3.4) provided a change to more 
openness in expressing oneself, something that was previously unfamiliar to 
both Sunnis and Shiites in Bahrain. However, reform would not solve the 
fundamental protest of Shiite political figures against the government: who 
they are, rather than how they run the country. Thus, the vast majority of 
protests, riots and sit-ins in Bahrain over the last twenty years have been 
carried out by Shiites, while being supported by an extremely small number 
of liberals; most of the liberals and other non-Islamic movements and 
activists welcomed the democratic shift despite most having their 
reservations about one thing or another in relation to the government. This 
explains why Shiite MPs, who happen to have been represented only in Al 
Wefaq in the Second Legislative Period,74 took the topics relating to control 
of dissent and political freedom very critically, as if the rules referred only to 
their sect and movement. There are a considerable number of laws and 
punishments that conform to international conventions in relation to local 
riot control and standards which are often rejected by Al Wefaq, such as Al 
Wefaq’s strong objection to the use of tear gas, discussed in Excerpt 1.  
I came across other examples of Al Wefaq’s reservations about laws 
and regulations that may criminalise what they view as freedom of 
expression. These examples are not in the analysis section because there 
were no parliamentary debates about them in the sittings; they were draft 
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laws by MPs other than Al Wefaq demanding stricter measures, to which Al 
Wefaq objected. In contrast, there were draft laws by Al Wefaq demanding a 
loosening of restrictions, such as their request to allow carrying sticks and 
white weapons in rallies and demonstrations and their request to cancel a 
part of an article that demands getting the approval of the Head of Public 
Security about the time and venue of gatherings and limiting his role to 
being notified without having the authority to refuse or change the venue or 
time (mentioned in Attachment 5 of Exceptional Session 7, 14 May 2009: 
481-584). The draft laws were not discussed during the sittings and were 
only voted on; since my research scope limited my data to debates (i.e. 
spoken and then transliterated in the Hansard) taking place in the Council, I 
could not use the attachments to Hansard as data for analysis. However, it is 
worth referring to them here to demonstrate the point I am making. Another 
interesting stance of Al Wefaq against laws controlling dissent is the Al 
Wefaq MPs’ initial refusal of a bill proposal for issuing a cybercrime law. The 
bill proposal was voted on in the sitting of 29 January 2009, but the Al 
Wefaq MPs abstained from voting (Akhbar Al-Khaleej Newspaper, 2009 Jan. 
28: 6). However, Al Wefaq justified its abstention by viewing the law as 
imposing a challenge to religious legitimacy (Bu Eeda, 2008 Feb. 6: 6).  
The examples demonstrate that, on the one hand, the Sunni MPs see 
such laws and decisions as being against ‘others’, whom they frame as 
‘terrorists’ rather than ‘activists’ or ‘freedom fighters’. For the Sunni MPs, 
people breaking the law, causing chaos and rioting should be punished as 
341 
‘wrong-doers’ and as ‘outlaws’ whose actions need to be first of all 
controlled, and when out of control, to be rectified and punished. To the 
Shiite MPs, on the other hand, dissent-controlling laws appear to restrict 
their in-groups, freedom fighters and political activists and whom they view 
as human rights activists. This is what their reactions to such laws and 
proposals in the analysed excerpts suggest (most evidently in Excerpts 1, 4, 
8, 9 and 11). 
The strategy of corroborating by information, on the other hand, has 
less of an ideological quality about it, and is more of a ‘default’ that most 
MPs would ideally aim at using in order to display knowledge and to justify 
stances and demands. However, since the strategy of corroborating by 
information can appear in a more deceptive style when it employs 
wordiness, jargon or vague structures, it can be more manipulative than 
transparent. By whom and when this lack of transparency are used is worth 
tracking and analysing. Nevertheless, in my excerpts, there were insufficient 
occurrences to make generalisations or to note a pattern, and the three 
examples I found of this use are by Al Wefaq (MP Al-Mitghawi in Table 24; 
MP Ebrahim in Table 25; and MP Al-Mitghawi again in Table 29.) 
Another interesting observation in relation to the ideology of protest 
is that of employing the discursive device known as reframing. In the 
excerpts examined here, reframing is used only by Al Wefaq. This again can 
be explained by the ideological conflict between the government and some 
Shiite Bahrainis, something which is again related to the construction of 
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injustice and grievance in the doctrine of Shi’ism (in Excerpt 1 reframing 
rioters affected by tear gas as residents and citizens, then as families, a third 
time as women and children, and a fourth time as victims; in Excerpt 3 
reframing the government letters to MPs as an ‘insult’ and what the 
government called insult as ‘criticism’; in Excerpt 4 shifting the frame 
‘terrorist’ to another group; in Excerpt 6 shifting the frame ‘theft’ from 
robberies to corruptions in the government; and in Excerpt 8 reframing an 
arrested MP as a ‘citizen’). In the examined excerpts, the Sunni MPs did not 
need to reframe concepts or people. They did use framing (in Excerpt 1, 
framing the planned attack as ‘terrorist’ and the country as ‘our Kingdom’, 
and framing recording phone calls as ‘eavesdropping’ in Excerpt 7), but 
hardly any reframing (MP Murad reframing the government letter of 
complaint as an ‘insult’ in Excerpt 3). This again can be because the Sunni 
MPs are not challenging the norms or the perceptions of the rioters and 
protesters or the stance that the government and international law had 
adopted in relationship to this issue, while the objections and proposals of Al 
Wefaq suggest that to validate their opposition or objection, they need to 
evaluate people, laws and incidents from a different perspective.  
Additionally, it is also noted that all the conditional statements with 
rhetorical purposes that occur in the excerpts are used by Al Wefaq (see 
excerpts 1 through 5), and this elucidates an important role of conditional 
statements as a device to help justify opposing and confronting norms, laws 
and decisions.  
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 Accordingly, Al Wefaq would like the Bahraini laws and practices to 
be amended, so that (a) they give more leeway to the protesters and 
demonstrators, (b) it becomes more difficult to indict arrested people 
regarding riots and protests, and (c) there would be less severe punishment 
for those prosecuted and found guilty. The ideological incentive behind the 
need for this change is not as simple as it may seem. To understand this 
ideology, we must bear in mind the other participants in this discourse. As 
explained in Section 2.4.2 on Power, Ideology and Language, participants in 
a discourse are not only the speakers and listeners but also the other ‘social 
actors’ who share discourse norms and rules with the speaker and/or the 
listener (van Dijk: 1998: 6). The discourse of Shi’ism in Bahrain links us to 
the system of the Iranian Republic and its ideology. Since Shi’ism was 
revived by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, it has moved from being a 
religious practice and has become a key political ideology and praxis with 
expansionist goals. Iran has become a point of reference and a centre for 
what Khomaini called ‘exporting’ the Islamic revolution. Joyer explains that 
the revolution was not perceived by Khomaini and other religious leaders as 
‘an Iranian event but the beginning of a world revolution’ (1990: 31). Joyer 
also explains that Khomaini believed that the oppression of Muslims and in 
the developing world needed to be fought and that fiqh, ‘the supreme 
jurisprudent’, should pave the way for the return of the Mahdi (ibid.). Sunni 
Islamic doctrines and governments, however, have never been perceived by 
the Iranian regime as part of this revolution, as the tense and confrontational 
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relationship between the two groups reflects. The Sunni doctrine, on the 
other hand, despite a belief in the Mahdi,75 does not believe that anyone has 
to pave the way for the Mahdi or take any actions to increase the likelihood 
of his appearance and that he will arrive when it is time. Joyer (ibid.: 11) 
mentions that Bahrain, of all the Gulf countries, is the most vulnerable to 
what he called ‘Shi’ite radicalism’.76 However, this means that the change 
required to the laws should be ‘temporary’ and should serve the process of 
exporting the revolution. Meanwhile, there seems to be no fear of the Sunnis 
using the leniency of the law to their advantage. The Sunni parties and 
independent MPs thus benefit from keeping the dissent-controlling laws 
strict, while loosening them would be beneficial for Al Wefaq, but only until 
the Islamic Revolution has been successfully exported to Bahrain. After that, 
Bahrain would be another state with another system, which would be 
unlikely to demand similar lack of restrictions.  
 
5.5 A Step toward Overt Criticism 
Until recently, until March 2011 to be more precise, the Sunni public was 
known as ‘the silent sector’ of the Bahraini community.77 The few instances 
we have in the excerpts reflect how the Sunni politicians in Bahrain, 
generally speaking and as a norm, tend to be less confrontational. MP 
Mohammed Khalid’s style, which was the most confrontational among Sunni 
MPs, was not received well by his own Sunni party, Al Minbar. Other Sunni 
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MPs could get emphatic and emotional but kept a ‘ceiling’ for the level of 
‘toughness’ (e.g. MP Al-Mu’awdah in Excerpt 1 and MP Al-Fudhalah in 
Excerpt 7). The strategy of corroborating by information can get 
confrontational (e.g. All Al Wefaq MPs in Excerpt 1, and MP Al-Miz’al in 
Excerpt 4) and this version of this strategy seems to be better applauded by 
many of the advocates of Al Wefaq. This perspective can be confirmed by 
how different local newspaper with different policies and political stances 
report such encounters. The way newspapers report them is a research study 
in itself, but I provide only one example here to explain. In relationship to 
the Al Wefaq’s objection to the use of tear gas, Al Wasat newspaper, which is 
an Al Wefaq advocate, reports the that Al Wefaq MPs and MP Abul ‘attacked’ 
the bill on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction, ‘something which obliged the Chairman of the Committee for 
Foreign Affairs and National Security to request it being withdrawn in order 
to receive suggestions in this regard’ (Al Wadi and Abdulla: 13 Feb. 2008, p. 
14, my translation and my emphasis). The lexical choices made here suggest 
that Al Wefaq succeeded in forcing the bill to be withdrawn, something 
which in returns suggests that the ‘attack’ was productive. The same 
encounter was reported in Akhbar Al-Khaleej, another newspaper. However, 
no ‘attack’ or ‘obligation’ was reported. Instead, the report mentioned that 
‘the MPs called for the deletion of articles on the use of what can be 
detrimental to the lives of individuals’ and the reaction was reported as 
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follows: ‘The Council decided to return the report to the Committee upon the 
request of Chairman of the Committee for further study and to allow the 
deputies to make observations and amendments’ (Akbar Al-Khaleej: 13 Feb. 
2008, my translation and my emphasis). Al Wasat, thus, is attributing the 
success of stopping the bill from being approved to the ‘attack’ of Al Wefaq 
MPs and MP Abul, something that is indirectly applauding the embraced 
confrontational style while Akhbar Al-Khaleej is making it sound like a 
consented decision of the Council.  
After the strategy of corroborating by information, the strategy of 
centralising pride and dignity was the second most frequently used among 
the Sunni parties, more frequently than the strategy of intensifying 
grievance. This can be better understood if we realize that sermons and 
teachings under the Sunni doctrine, at least in Bahrain, put more emphasis 
on strength, pride and gratefulness. Historical instances of failure or conflicts 
are less emphasized than are successes. Although this might sound optimistic 
and positive, I believe that this can and does have a negative effect when 
overdone and in the long run. This is because this attitude can lead to a 
habit of ignoring obstacles and problems, creating an exaggerated, even 
elusive, sense of confidence and reassurance, something that can defer, and 
even obstruct, the ability to prepare for and react to potential threats, 
dangers and drawbacks in the same way that concentrating on protest and 
grievance can obstruct the ability to perceive or accept positive inputs or 
changes. Additionally, this attitude gradually creates a gap between the 
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laypeople and their representative MPs who might from time to time tone 
down the laypeople’s agony as they present them in the parliament. Even if 
this periphrasis happens occasionally, the laypeople affected by the problem 
being presented in the Council may lose confident in their representative 
and hence, the party may lose popularity.78 I, however, would hesitate to 
call this attitude ‘ideology’, as it seems, at least according to the data I 
examined, less consented to among the ideological group of Sunnis and less 
structured, with a significant and growing number of Sunni activists and 
politicians adopting harsher and more direct criticism.  
  
5.6 Ideological Manifestations in the Unrest of 2011 
 In this section, I show how the analysis of the parliamentary debates, which 
is the initial focus of this research, can help better understand the most 
recent unrest, which began in Bahrain in February 2011. I briefly 
demonstrate how linguistic analysis made in Chapter 4 and the ideological 
analysis made in this chapter correlate with the recent unrest. This topic 
could be extensively elaborated, but this short section is a ‘coda’ to the 
thesis, which was nearing completion at that time; it simply describes what 
happened and how it relates to the strategies and ideological readings 
reached in my analysis. This section also shows how the tensions in the 
analysed excerpts have played themselves out in the coup attempt in 
Bahrain.  
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 I have mentioned in my analysis (see Section 5.4) that Al Wefaq’s 
notable interest in loosening the rules and restrictions on protests and sit-ins 
seemed to be paving the way for its advocators to carry out further protests 
and sit-ins, seeing themselves among those most likely to be affected and 
obstructed by stricter measures. The attempt at a wholesale coup had not 
occurred to me as a possibility at that time, and I had assumed that only 
occasional riots and protests would benefit from more space being given for 
freedom and self-expression. Apparently, the success of the revolutions in 
Egypt and Tunisia had provided the some political movements in Bahrain 
with an opportunity to present the unrest in Bahrain as yet another national 
revolution, especially at the international level, as the Arab world is viewed 
as a corrupt region with corrupt regimes, a view that has little 
understanding of the variations and differences among the regimes. A large 
section of the population opposed the idea of overthrowing the King and 
instead chose to demand reform under the current government. The 
opponents of the coup attempt joined forces in what became known later as 
the Al Fateh Assembly or the National Unity Assembly (NUA),79 consisting 
mostly but not exclusively of Sunni Bahrainis. Interestingly, though, the 
optimistic approach of the Sunni politicians, which I criticised in Section 
5.6, appears to have played a part in the failure of many, but not all, Sunni 
politicians to anticipate an upheaval, and in their slowness to address the 
potential incentives that had generated or fuelled this upheaval. It also 
showed that the stand of the Sunni parties was not very quick, and they 
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faced difficulty in finding proper local and international channels to convey 
their position as representing the stance of a large sector of the community. 
The implementation of the ideology of protest can be found even 
before the unrest itself occurred, in the video clips and posters calling for the 
unrest. The conveying of an exaggerated idea of ‘excessive’ political abuse 
and humiliation can be seen in the calls for rebellion. The ‘agony’ presented 
in these calls suggested widespread poverty on the one hand and excessive 
physical torture and oppression. They presented an image of severe 
malfunction and deprivation across the country, with photos and video clips 
of screaming, weeping and collapsing women, people being beaten, blood, 
and angry youths yelling and protesting. The unrest relied extensively on 
emotionally triggering a long-standing conviction of injustice activating the 
ideology of protest.  
The people who responded to the call for a coup were almost all 
Shiites, with a very small number of Sunnis; the latter were mainly members 
of the Wa’ad Party, a party that is better defined as secular than Sunni 
although its members come from Sunni families. During the events, several 
splits occurred within the demonstrators, resulting in a reduction in the 
number of supporters of the movement calling for the coup. This happened 
because of several disagreements and clashes on the ideology and/or the 
manner of the protestors or the politicians leading the protests. However, I 
do not explore these issues here.  
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It is worth mentioning a few brief facts about the economic and 
democratic status in Bahrain here. The levels of poverty in Bahrain are very 
low, even in comparison to the UK. Freedom of expression has improved 
notably over the last ten years of reform presented by King Hamad Al 
Khalifa. There are, of course, issues with bureaucracies, abuse of 
connections, and slow pace of progress, but there have also been constant 
developments and amendments that were made possible to the community 
by the freedom of expression given by the National Charter (see Section 
2.3.4.2). UNICEF statistics, for example, show that in 2009, the life 
expectancy was 76 years and that literacy among adults reached 91% in the 
period 2005–2008. The same statistics for Egypt are a 70-year life 
expectancy and 66% literacy rate, and for Syria, 74 years and 84%. 
Additionally, according to a report by the United Nations Development 
Programme, UNDP, there is no absolute poverty in Bahrain. The same report 
confirms that 91.5% of Bahraini families reside in a home of three rooms or 
more and that 77% of Bahrainis own their own homes (United Nations 
Development Programme: Kingdom of Bahrain [n.d.]: 3). According to the 
same report, the human development index (HDI) is very high in Bahrain: 
0.831 in 2000 (ibid.: 5). In fact, the report criticises the Ministry of Labour 
for the cash support it gives to needy families as this approach not only can 
create a climate of dependency, but also depletes resources which could 
otherwise be devoted to training, reorientation, and self-employment 
schemes, all of which would help to alleviate the unemployment that is a 
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major cause of economic hardship (ibid.: 5). This raises the question of 
whether the climate of dependency was actually created and oriented to the 
people so extensively in the society that welfare and financial assistance 
stopped being seen as additional help but instead were viewed as a right and 
a norm. If so, perhaps an ideological build-up of a feeling of suppression 
could take away the feeling of gratitude and replace it with a feeling of 
deprivation and dissatisfaction.  
The ideological basis of reform as claimed by the Shiite demonstrators 
was the claim of ‘mass’ injustice being done to them as a sect and as an 
ethnic group, and a feeling of distance and detachment from the nation as a 
whole and from the government as their representative. The fact is that 
social classes and economic power are an issue for all citizens from both 
sects alike. The widespread claims that ‘half’ of the Bahrainis are poor are 
invalid and unproven, despite the fact that employed Bahrainis have the 
lowest income of all GCC people. Interestingly, the Shiite Bahrainis have 
grown rapidly and in economic weight and make up a large sector of the 
country’s businesses. The government also appoints many Shiite constructors 
and importers to perform high-budget businesses for the government. 
The upheavals started with sit-ins at the GCC Roundabout, a large 
roundabout in a central location in Manama, the capital, and a critical 
passing point that is heavily used during weekdays and the weekend alike. 
This severely paralysed businesses, work and medical and educational 
services. The calls were made anonymously, with posters and video clips 
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being circulated via the Internet, especially via Facebook and Twitter, as in 
the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. The anonymous group, presenting 
themselves as the Youth of Bahrain, designated the 14 February 2011 as the 
day of revolution. That date coincided with the tenth anniversary of the 
National Charter issued by the King and voted for by the public. As the calls 
went public and the promised date got closer and closer, in the beginning, 
there was no government reaction to or interaction with the movement at 
any level: it was not mentioned by any government figures or spokespersons, 
and no local newspapers or TV news reports mentioned them. The public 
panicked, as they had neither any sources to rely on nor any authority with 
which to seek refuge; simultaneously, the announcement of a ‘revolution’ 
intensified over the Internet and was supported by a number of foreign 
Hizbullah television channels, mainly Al Alam, Al Anwar and Press TV 
among many. The international media also, at least at the beginning, 
expressed almost full sympathy toward the coup attempt. 
Al Wefaq was the largest of seven political societies leading and 
supporting the upheaval and calling for the overthrow of King Hamad; it 
was the strongest and most influential party in the seven-society alliance and 
with the vast majority of advocates, having won 18 out of 40 seats in the 
Council of Representatives with 26% of the votes. The other six societies 
were very small ones with very small number of members and advocates, 
one, for example, consisted of five members only. Al Wefaq presented itself 
as a follower and supporter of the youth-led movement. No one up to that 
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moment, however, had heard or recognised the leadership of this youth 
movement or heard from it directly; it was almost always Al Wefaq who 
spoke on behalf of the rioters. There were also figures and speakers from the 
unauthorised Haq bloc, which came second in the number of followers, and 
from another movement, based in London, called the Bahrain Freedom 
Movement; the latter has very few followers, although they used their 
presence in the UK to make themselves publicly known through the media. 
Within the country, however, the religious leader was that of Al Wefaq, its 
marji’ Shaikh Isa Qassim80 (see Section 2.2.3 on the concept of marji’ in 
Shi’ism). Another noteworthy bloc, although with a very small number of 
followers and without any decisive role, was the Wa’ad Party, a secular 
liberal party, whose president, Ebrahim Sharif, was also one of the 
representatives of the revolution but rarely a spokesperson for it. His party 
and his image were often used to stress that the revolution was national and 
not only Shiite, but his party was given no authority to declare a stance or 
make any decisions, neither before nor during the unrest.  
Nonetheless, accumulated data from parliamentary sittings and other 
undiscussed proposals and draft laws make one speculate that Al Wefaq was 
expecting the attempted coup and hence had been planning to protect rioters 
legislatively against any possible governmental dissent control measures, 
something that raises a question about the actual role and position of Al 
Wefaq in the unrest. Leaving aside the development of events, I would like 
to focus on how the discourse analysis I have presented in this research is 
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sustained throughout the positions taken and the declarations made by Al 
Wefaq in the recent unrest. At the beginning of the upheavals, Al Wefaq was 
quick to join the rioters. On Arabic and other international television and 
radio channels, MPs from Al Wefaq repeatedly declared that they had lost 
confidence in the government and that the government was obstructing 
progress in the country. This self-grievance reinforced the ideology of 
protest. While the other two revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia had a national 
character, the one in Bahrain in no time got politicised and ‘sectarianised’, 
and the protestors repeatedly stressed the claim that the Bahraini 
government had been discriminating against Shiites and that the Shiites 
were a majority and were the poorest of the people in Bahrain, none of 
which was based on evidence.81 
These claims were strengthened and circulated in the international 
media by a number of well-organised procedures, ranging from the 
distribution of claims and reports about injustice and corruption among 
NGOs in a well-organised manner, and from the choices made of leadership 
and spokespersons, to the revolution’s slogans and ‘rituals’. Professionally 
taken photo shots were carefully chosen and displayed to convey a message 
of agony and helplessness in front of government-armed forces; even when 
there had been no clashes at all and the protesters had been faced by these 
armed forces for days only on one side of the roundabout, but never 
surrounded, a lot of selective work was done to convey a different idea, e.g. 
the photo shot of a young man facing tanks with a naked chest and open 
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arms, as if he is standing in the way of the attacking tanks whereas, in 
reality, the tanks had not been moving at all and were not planning to move, 
having had orders not to engage with or even respond to the rioters stoning 
them. A still photo could not convey the fact that the trunks were not 
driving towards the bare-chested rioter.  
Such photo shots and many others reinforced the image of injustice, 
humiliation and physical abuse, something which was made to appear the 
central point at issue; in fact, the issue of how things should be and how 
corruption and the misuse of power should be treated were never seriously 
addressed or agreed upon by the protestors. A list of demands was put 
forward but there was a constant refusal from the leaders of the coup of 
discussing it with the government. It appears that the ideology of protest 
had been central to leading politicians to win the world’s sympathy. A 
message of agony and abuse would normally raise immediate sympathy and 
would prevent listeners and viewers from questioning how valid the 
allegations are.  
Until the unrest, Al Wefaq had been speaking proudly, locally and 
internationally, about its achievements since enrolling in parliament in the 
Second Legislative Period. Nonetheless, to validate the revolution, it denied 
having achieved any reform and any constructive results. It insisted that the 
parliament had failed to serve the country and that the efforts and time that 
the MPs had spent during their appointment were futile. All the statements 
of Al Wefaq, whether printed or broadcast, denied any progress in the 
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country and insisted that there had been a continuous regression. This is 
another example of an ideological need for total impedance and injustice.  
 It is beyond the scope of this research to collect or present instances 
about how the devices or strategies were employed in the unrest, but I here 
provide a general sketch of this employment based on my observations. 
During the unrest, the strategy of intensifying grievance was widely 
employed by Al Wefaq when addressing foreign channels and media. There 
are many examples, but I provide only one example of report by an 
anonymous doctor calling the BBC from Bahrain and reporting ‘hundreds of 
casualties’ and that ‘soldiers and police had seized ambulances and appeared 
to be firing on anyone in their path’ on the day of clearing the roundabout 
(BBC News, 15 Mar. 2011), numbers and claims which proved to be 
exaggerated. On the other hand, the strategy of centralising pride and 
dignity was vital to Al Wefaq when addressing the government, the other 
MPs and those Bahrainis who were against the upheavals. One example is a 
statement made by MP Hassan Sultan on 15th February 2011. His statement 
was published on the official webpage of Al Wefaq, and the opening 
paragraph of it states that ‘this era is the era of nations, and nothing will 
stand in the way of their rumbling ride’ and that ‘there are those who did 
not learn the lesson and still insist on facing the national will with 
intransigence of violence and bullying, without wisdom or intuition’ (Al 
Wefaq Islamic Society: 15 Feb. 2011). The strategy of corroborating by 
information occurred in both contexts, when addressing the government and 
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when addressing the foreign media. However, it became more detailed when 
Al Wefaq advocates were speaking to foreign media. A significant number of 
instances from Al Wefaq’s discourses in the two contexts can be found in 
video-, audio- and printed- news and press releases and these instances can 
elaborate how the strategies differed in these two contexts. 
 Moving the focus to examine the Sunni parties’ discourses and 
ideological stances in the recent unrest, it can be noticed that the majority of 
Sunni MPs left behind the backgrounded argumentation style. Several Sunni 
MPs became more assertive in addressing the government. One Sunni MP, 
however, namely, Al-Mu’awdah from Al Asalah, remained supportive of both 
the government and Al Wefaq in a very unusual way that stirred many 
people against him, without his being accepted or praised by Al Wefaq. MP 
Al-Mu’awdah’s stance and discourses are also worthy of individual critical 
analysis, as they diverge greatly from all other discourses: although he tends 
to participate in debates and discussion, he uses backgrounded 
confrontations when objecting to a point and an apologetic tone when 
justifying a stance. On the whole, the upheavals have created and still are 
creating a shift in the Sunni political discursive style and linguistic 




This chapter has used the findings of the discursive analysis of the excerpts 
and related them to the sectarian nature and the components of the political 
construct in Bahrain. By doing so, the chapter aimed to fulfil the second 
objective of this research: exploring whether and how the use of discursive 
devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. 
The critical analysis in this chapter has confirmed that ideologies are 
expressed in parliamentary debates and has shown how the same strategies 
can be found in other political settings and events. This means that the usage 
of discursive strategies and devices can demonstrate the ideological struggle 
over power among political parties and MPs.  
The excerpts have also shown that there are a range of identities from 
among which the MPs choose, depending on the ideological perspective 
from which they present their stance. Interestingly, the discursive analysis I 
made prior to the unrest Bahrain has been experiencing since February 2011 
has shown that the proposed discursive strategies are relevant to and evident 
in the political happenings and shifts that started in February. Accordingly, 
the findings of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 converge to provide a view of the 




CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 nIrtnudortnI 
This research has critically analysed political discourses from the Bahraini 
Council of Representatives to explore the sectarian ideological struggle over 
power in this institution. This chapter provides a summary of the ground 
covered by the research, followed by the conclusions reached about the 
objectives and hypothesis of the research. It then explains how the research 
contributes to knowledge in this field and outlines the study’s limitations. 
The chapter concludes with directions for further research within the field of 
parliamentary language and sectarian conflicts.  
 
6.2 Summary 
With the current bi-cameral parliamentary system having been established in 
2000, the Bahraini democratic system is still young. While members of the 
Consultative Council are appointed by the King himself, the Council of 
Representatives is elected by the people and is open to political parties’ 
candidates and to independent ones. One aspect that makes the Bahraini 
Council unique is the dominant and explicit presence of a sectarian division 
between the Sunni and Shiite political movements. 
In this thesis, I first presented the problem that the research 
addresses, which is the ideological struggle over power, something which 
can be conveyed through language in the debates of the Bahraini Council of 
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Representatives. I presented the Council as the scene of sectarian and 
political struggle in Bahrain and maintained that the sectarian identity is 
notably present in this Council. I then presented the research hypothesis and 
objectives (revisited in the following section).  
I offered a concise and yet comprehensive background to the 
research, exploring the variables affecting and related to the research 
problem, i.e. the ideological struggle over power that is conveyed through 
language in the debates of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. The 
chapter has shown that politics in Muslim World are entwined with Islamic 
theology, and that the sectarian division between Sunnis and Shiites has 
political essence to it. The research has also presented Bahrain social and 
sectarian structure and suggested that the struggle over power in Bahrain 
has a sectarian nature and that this is reflected in the composition of the 
Council and power relationships among the parties in the Council. I 
concisely explained that ethnic differences are very easily recognizable in an 
interlocutor’s dialect, and that these differences divide the Arabic-speaking 
Bahraini community into two major speech communities: the Bahraini and 
the Bahrani, often, although not always, Sunni and Shiite respectively. I also 
discussed the notions of individual identity and group identity and explained 
that the group identity conveys ideology through language. After that, I 
presented twelve linguistic indicators or moves that I tracked in the analysis 
of the excerpts. I called these indicators ‘discursive devices’. 
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The methodology was designed around the concept of power 
according to CDA, which presumes that in any discourse, the power 
relationships are unequal, something which makes discourse a scene of 
ideological struggle. I adopted SCA, which tries to relate discourse structures 
with cognitive structures (such as mental models) and social structures, in 
the case of this thesis, sectarian political structure. SCA advocates using 
many kinds of methods – among which I focus on textual analysis, 
ideological analysis, political analysis and context analysis. All these aspects 
are touched upon in the analyses whenever sounded relevant.  
The continuous feedback between the data collection and data 
analysis processes contributed to developing both the analysis and the 
research method simultaneously. Presenting the analysis was a challenge 
when it came to how to present the analysis in a coherent and approachable 
way without missing out contexts or intertextuality; I eventually succeeded 
in presenting the data, indicating discursive devices in the analysed extracts 
and showing how these devices were employed in the interventions.  
Interestingly, the vast majority of interventions were by MPs from the 
Al Wefaq Party, and the discussions were mainly against strict measurements 
against riots, demonstrations and sit-ins. The MPs from other parties were 
more likely to have intervention with the topic when it was more associated 
with freedom of expression and privacy, such as recording phone calls. 
Based on the overall analysis, I proposed that discursive devices were 
employed by interlocutors to fulfil three linguistic tactics that were 
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employed in the struggle over power among the political parties in the 
Bahraini Council of Representatives. I called these tactics ‘discursive 
strategies’ and identified three in the analysed excerpts: the strategy of 
corroborating by information, the strategy of intensifying grievance, and 
that of centralising pride and dignity. I showed which discursive devices 
were used in each excerpts and what functions these devices served, and I 
showed which discursive strategy or strategies each intervention employs. 
After the individual analysis of each excerpt, I presented a synthesis, in 
which I described the overall usage of discursive devices and strategies, and 
followed it with an overview of differences among political groups. The 
discursive devices I considered were the following: shift between local 
accents and classical Arabic, emotive speech, framing and reframing, 
quoting other sources, humour, discourse markers, lexical style, local 
semantic moves such as disclaimers, speech acts, rhetorical features, 
propositional structure and turn-takings. For example, among many devices, 
there was a significant number of conditional statements and rhetorical 
questions. I also detected that certain devices were used more often with 
certain strategies, though not exclusively. Additionally, a noticeable 
difference is that the instances of mockery and sarcasm were more likely to 
be used by the Al Wefaq Shiite party than by Sunni MPs. Also, the use of 
rhetorical conditional statements and rhetorical questions was significant in 
the interventions of Al Wefaq members. One further interesting finding was 
that the use of figurative speech was more prominent with the strategy of 
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centralising pride and dignity. I also found that very often, if a speaker used 
both the strategy of corroborating by information and that of intensifying 
grievance, the former almost always came first and then a shift to the second 
was made. 
As I identified the discursive devices by each speaker, I observed that 
they were being employed by the MPs participating in these excerpts to 
serve the three discursive strategies. I identified the three discursive 
strategies as being corroborating by information, intensifying grievance, and 
centralising pride and dignity. The strategy of intensifying grievance was 
very prominent and recurred often in interventions made my Al Wefaq MPs 
in their objections to security measures and arrests of rioters.  
Then, in order to test the research hypothesis, I took the findings one 
step further to interpret the ideological struggle for power to see if the 
strategies relate to any sectarian traits in Bahrain. I suggested three types of 
‘battlefields’ for debates, depending on against whom the debate is 
constructed. The critical analysis from the research to the most recent unrest 
in Bahrain reinforced the suggested ideological readings of the critically 
analysed the excerpts and their association with ideology. The recurrent use 
of the strategy of intensifying grievance by Al Wefaq in discussions related 
to dissent control appeared to be associated with the sectarian ideology of 
protest, an ideology that is deeply rooted in the Shiite praxis. I finally linked 
the sectarian split that was apparent in the discourses I analysed with the 
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recent unrest in Bahrain and suggested how the ideological difference 
between the Sunni and Shiite MPs was reflected in this unrest. 
 
6.3 Conclusions about Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
As stated in Chapter 1, I hypothesised that the Shiite MPs in the Bahraini 
Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from the Sunni MPs. To 
test this hypothesis, I set the following objectives: first, to observe whether, 
and if so how, the Sunni parties, Al Minbar and Al Asalah, and the Shiite 
party, Al Wefaq, employ discursive devices and strategies to achieve the 
following ideological goals: (a) attempting to gain political advantage 
discursively in the parliamentary debates on topics related to dissent control 
and political freedom; (b) manoeuvring the definitions of self and others in 
the contexts of dissent control and political rights; and (c) manipulating the 
law to support one’s party’s ideological stances about dissent-controlling 
laws and the definition of political freedom and political rights. The second 
objective was to explore whether and how the use of discursive devices and 
strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain.  
 
6.2.1 First Objective: Discursive Differences 
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 has identified a large number of 
discursive devices employed by both Shiite and Sunni MPs under three 
discursive strategies. The analysis of these devices and strategies helped 
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accomplish the three goals under the first objective. First, the analysis 
asserted that discourse was a scene of struggle for these parties, and that the 
discursive devices strengthened each speaker’s argument and stance. The 
analysis also has demonstrated that the topic of dissent control divided the 
MPs very often, though not always, between Sunnis and Shiites, making a 
considerate amount of the struggle over power in this setting between the 
two congregations rather than between the Council and the government.  
When it comes to the second goal, manoeuvring the definition of self 
and others, the analysis has shown that the devices of othering and framing 
were used by Sunnis and Shiite MPs to define the boundaries of the ingroups 
and outgroups. The MPs have repeatedly tightened these boundaries to limit 
the ingroup to those who share the same stances on dissent control. A 
tendency to define ingroups and outgroups appeared to have a sectarian 
structure even without the mentioning of sects in the excerpts. The devices 
of framing and reframing were also used very constructively by both the 
Sunni and the Shiite to achieve polarising: good Us and bad Them. A third 
device that was notably used in the excerpts for the purpose of self-
definition by Shiite MPs, but not Sunni MPs, was contrasting the point being 
discussed with a parallel example from the ‘other’ sect. This was done to 
claim discrimination.  
The third goal under the first objective was manipulating the law to 
support one’s group. The analysis has shown that Al Wefaq MPs were eager 
to loosen the laws about dissent control, as they considered them to be 
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against freedom of expression. Also, Al Wefaq MPs objected in general to 
arrests and how they were made in cases related to riot and dissent control. 
Moreover, the Shiite MPs were keener on loosening the security measures 
and releasing detainees in dissent control related indictments; in return, the 
Sunni MPs either showed (a) no reaction to these measures, (b) a sign of 
approval, or (c) insisted on law enforcement. Framing and reframing were 
used in portraying stances and perspectives, and thus reflected ideological 
perspectives of the speakers. Mainly, the Sunni MPs were more likely to 
frame, while Al Wefaq repeatedly needed to reframe. This is because Al 
Wefaq MPs often needed to present a perspective that differed from the one 
taken for granted or the one that conformed to the government’s points of 
view and the legal definitions. Contrasting verdicts and stances of the 
ingroups with those of the outgroups were employed too. 
 
6.2.2 Second Objective: Sectarian Conflict in Discourse 
When comparing and contrasting how discursive strategies and devices were 
employed on the basis of sectarian affiliation, I found that the strategies of 
corroborating by information and of centralising pride and dignity were used 
in similar ways by both Sunni and Shiite MPs. However, I noticed that the 
strategy of intensifying grievance was more frequently used by Al Wefaq 
MPs, a finding that was then used to fulfil the second objective of the 
research. This intensity and frequency were assessed to explore whether and 
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how the use of discursive devices and strategies can reflect the sectarian 
ideological conflict in Bahrain. The tendency to use the strategy of 
intensifying grievance more frequently and more elaborately seemed to be 
associated with the ideology of grievance and protest that has theological 
roots in the Shiite doctrine, a doctrine that is based on mourning the death 
of Imams Ali and Hussain and the extortion of the Imams’ right of 
sovereignty. This feeling of injustice has been carried down over the ages 
and casts its shadow over contemporary political perceptions. The analysis 
has, thus, shown that the Shiite MPs and party employ discursive devices and 
strategies differently from the Sunni MPs and parties, a finding that confirms 
the hypothesis of the research. 
  
6.2.3 Research Hypothesis 
The analysis has asserted that there is a struggle over power between the 
Sunni and Shiite parties in the Council of Representatives in Bahrain. It has 
illustrated some differences in the way the discursive devices and discursive 
strategies are employed by the two groups. From time to time, polarising is 
employed by Al Wefaq to distinguish oneself from the other group, 
something that has shown that the Shiite MPs and party employ discursive 
devices and strategies differently from the Sunni MPs and parties. This 
finding, accordingly, confirms the hypothesis of the research. 
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6.4 Contribution to the Field of Study 
This thesis has succeeded in providing academic data to identify discursive 
strategies in the language used in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. It 
also indicates the discursive devices used to fulfil these strategies. The 
findings were then used to interpret the ideological struggle for power 
between the Sunni and Shiite parties in the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives. This information can be a useful reference for studies in the 
fields of linguistics, theology, ideology, sociolinguistics, and even politics, 
since the topic and the analysis have taken these aspects into account.  
 The research methodology was developed to fit a relatively new 
theoretical perspective (CDA) and a theoretical approach that is still under 
development (SCA); this qualifies it to give those theoretical models a 
practical and reproducible methodology for use and further development in 
other studies using CDA and SCA. 
 The thesis is also relevant to the current political and sectarian 
disturbances in the Kingdom of Bahrain, specifically, the stage of unrest 
which began in February 2011, and can serve in providing political readings 
of these events, especially if combined and strengthened with historical and 
diplomatic studies of the Middle East in general, and the Shiite-Sunni history 
of the area in particular. Similar readings of political language and their 
ideological and sectarian indications can be useful to understand bases and 
incentives of political disturbances and instabilities so that they get 
addressed at early stages.  
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 One further contribution this research has made is to the field of 
political studies on Bahrain, as it has shown how the ideology of protest can 
affect and reflect the political struggle in the country, and how discursive 
discourse analysis can be used to predict the ideological directions of parties 
in a way that can affect the course of political events in the future. This can 
be noted in the readings this research made of ideology and identity, both of 
which were manifested clearly in the recent unrest in Bahrain, which started 
on 14 February 2011. However, as my research pre-dated these events, 
having started in October 2008, and because I was in the final stage of 
writing my analysis when the unrest took place, including them would have 
required more time and space than I had at the time to finish my research 
and more data than I had available. Interestingly, however, the analysis of 
the discursive strategies proved an existing ideological basis for the unrest of 
2011, and although my interest was in parliamentary debates, it has been 
proven that the proposed strategies are not specific to the analysed data and 
can apply to other political discourses.  
 
6.5 Study Limitations 
I faced several difficulties while conducting this research. First, despite the 
fact that CDA is interdisciplinary, this research was carried out by a single 
researcher and was centred on, but not restricted to, sociolinguistic and 
linguistic analysis. In an ideal situation, interdisciplinary research would be 
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done by a group of researchers who have different disciplinary backgrounds 
to maximise the profundity of the work and the results. For this reason, but 
also because of space and time limitations, it was beyond the capacity of this 
thesis to provide a comprehensive account of the ideology of politics in 
Islam, a historical account of political developments in Islamic countries, or 
a record of critical analyses of political religious movements. There is 
abundant literature regarding these issues and only information that is 
directly related to the analysis of the discourse examined has been included. 
The thesis focused on a number of excerpts from sittings that were held in 
the Bahraini Council of Representatives and used these excerpts as linguistic 
units or small interrelated case studies. One further difficulty of which I was 
aware was that Hansard excluded extra-linguistic content, something which 
can have some effect on the analysis of the linguistic content.  
Another difficulty at the theoretical level was applying an approach, 
something which proved challenging and intimidating. SCA was appropriate 
for the research hypothesis and objectives for it being directly concerned 
with power connections in society and for it urging to take into account 
relevant context, something which is important to understand a complex 
issue involving politics, language and sectarian praxis. However, the fact 
that SCA is willing to remain open all possible analyses made it difficult to 
set a scope or delimitations. Additionally, SCA is still in the process of 
development, and the notion of mental representations, which is an element 
of SCA, could not empirically be applied in the process of text analysis. 
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However, no theory, approach or methodology is ever complete or can 
entirely escape criticism, and thus I could adopt SCA despite the 
accompanying challenges. 
At the level of collecting data, I faced a difficulty with finding 
excerpts for my research. The ones to which I had access were difficult to 
search, and, unlike those in Hansard of the British Parliament, there were no 
precise agendas or indices to rely on in Hansard of the Bahraini Council of 
Representatives. I therefore had to skim through the records of full sittings 
to find suitable data, something which consumed more time than if the 
agendas and indices had been accurate. To make it more difficult, Hansard 
was not available online, although I was able to obtain some records from 
the beginning of the legislative period still in progress, on a number of 
separate CDs. However, toward the end of the third year of my research, I 
received a CD with full records, which made it easier to follow the sittings. 
Bahraini politics, after all, is a rich field that has not been studied deeply 
enough. This applies to publications on anthropological, cultural and 
political studies about Bahrain, and the scarcity of such references and 
statistics was a major obstacle as I constructed the background of my thesis. 
Additionally, I was aware that the topic of religious ideologies 
represented in the parliamentary sessions is too broad and complex to be 
covered comprehensively in one thesis, and that any aspects, categories, 
criteria, causes, or features I presented or discuss were only a small segment 
of the whole picture and, therefore, unlikely to be inclusive or decisive. 
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What made comprehensiveness more difficult is the fact that the political 
and religious language of the Bahraini Council of Representatives had not 
been studied in depth academically, leaving me with little to build upon. 
Although some similarity may be found between the examined data and 
other data or instances – indeed, it is even possible to find similarities with 
political debates in other parliaments – not all the analysis results would 
spontaneously be generalised to all political instances or parliamentary 
discussions. This is simply because I analysed one theme in a specific setting 
and a specific period of time, and thus there might be other matters and 
issues which I am not aware of that could affect other discourses. 
Additionally, I could not provide statistics or even simple percentages 
of the findings and observations simply because the data collected and the 
method of choosing extracts did not allow this for many reasons. One reason 
was that my research reported more interventions from Al Wefaq than from 
other parties, not necessarily because they normally intervened more often, 
but because the topic of dissent control and freedom seemed to have 
provoked or interested them more. 
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6.6 Directions for Further Research 
In this section, I present some suggestions and recommendations for further 
research within the field of political language and the ideological struggle 
over power. As I skimmed through the Bahraini Council of Representatives’ 
Hansard, I found that the level of engagement in the topic, style, and other 
aspects varied as the themes varied. A study of other individual themes is an 
interesting option; comparing a number of discursive devices and how using 
them may differ from one theme to another is another option. A third 
possibility is the study of the power relationship between certain political 
parties or political figures and the government through studying their 
language. In particular, the relationship between Al Wefaq, and particularly 
MPs Ali Salman and Mohammed Al-Miz’al, and the King and/or the Crown 
Prince, and how it developed over the four-year long second legislative 
period (which includes the period of local unrest that started in February 
2011) is intriguing, and may reveal more about the ideology of Al Wefaq as 
a religious political group. The same can be done with the interventions of 
Sunni MPs, especially leading figures. 
 I also suggest that a multi-disciplinary study of the political language 
in Bahrain by a network or a group of theologians, anthropologists, 
politicians and linguists would offer a better analysis of topics of interest 
after setting objectives of the research to be performed. This will guarantee 
that all the input in the research is verified by experts. There are many 
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political topics and issues in Bahrain awaiting academic research and 
analysis, especially as the recent disturbances have raised many questions 
and have drawn attention to the complex and multi-layered nature of the 
problem, which is deeply historically rooted. Applying CDA, each topic 
could focus on one or more sources of data: political debates in the Council 
of Representatives, political debates in the Shura Council, press releases 
from politicians, public speeches by politicians and interviews on local 
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Appendix B: The Excerpts 
 
 Underlined and followed with asterisk: the parts that are underlined 
and followed with an asterisk are the parts that are ungrammatical or 
unintelligible or are bad word compounds. This is because I, as explained in 
the methodology section, have tried to convey the same style and structure 
of the original excerpts in Arabic besides the conveying the content. There 
are still other incomplete sentences or phrases that I translate as such 
without marking them because they can be understood as imcomplete when 
read. I only marked the parts that may mistakenly be considered as typing 
mistakes or translation errors. 
 
 Use of Italic: I use italic in the following cases:  
o For the transilitrations of Arabic words or phrases. 
o For single English words to it indicates stress.  
o When within a speech, preceded by (reading), then it is an act or 
proposal that is being read. 
 
 For full speeches or intenventions if not of MPs or members of the 
Council: there are a few speeches of non-MPs that are fully italic, and this is 
to indicate that these speeches have the content translated without 
conveying any other hesitations or linguistic mistakes as I did with the 
speeches of the MP since I do not intend to analyse any non-MP speeches in 
this research. 
 
There are references to supplements or attachments in the original Arabic 
excerpts and I translate the texts or lines referring to them as they are but I 





The elevent excerpts are as follows: 
 
1. Teargas: from Sitting 2:2:16, 12th Feb. 2008, pp. 62–73 
2. Bahraini Detainees Abroad: from Sitting 2:2:25 a, 22nd April 2008, pp. 
19–20. 
3. Insulting the Government: from Sitting 2:2:25 b, 22nd April 2008, pp. 43–
44. 
4. Condemning a ‘terrorist’ plot: from Sitting 2:3:10, 30th Dec. 2008, pp. 95–
99.  
5. The Arrest of Political Activists: from Sitting 2:3:13, 27th Jan. 2009, pp. 
4–6. 
6. Big and Small Thieves: from Sitting 2:3:23, 7th April 2009, pp. 103–104. 
7. Evesdropping: from Sitting 2:4:3, 20th Oct. 2009, p. 15. 
8. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (a): from Sitting 2:4:10, 22nd Dec. 2009, pp. 
6–7. 
9. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (b): from Sitting 2:4:11, 29th Dec. 2009, p. 6. 
10. Censoring a Speech: from itting 2:4:24, 30th March 2010, pp. 78–79. 





From Sitting 2:2:16, 12th Feb. 2008, pp. 62–73 
: الرئيـــس  
.يليه الذي البند بقراءة ضلتف للمجلس العام األمين المحمود علي نوار األخ سعادة المقرر, األخ شكرا   
: للمجلس العام األمين  
 بشأن قانون مشروع بخصوص الوطني واألمن والدفاع الخارجية الشؤون لجنة تقرير ،الرئيس معالي شكرا 
 97 رقم الملكي للمرسوم المرافق األسلحة، تلك وتدمير الكيميائية األسلحة واستعمال وتخزين وإنتاج استحداث حظر
.وشكرا ,م7009 لسنة  
:الرئيـــس  
.المقرر األخ تفضل   
( :المقرر( إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.الجلسة مضبطة في اللجنة تقرير تثبيت أطلب الرحيم الرحمن هللا بسم الرئيس, معالي شكرا   
: الرئيـــس  
الجلسة؟ مضبطة في اللجنة تقرير تثبيت على الموافقون هم من  
(موافقة أغلبية(  
: الرئيـــس  
.الجلسة مضبطة في التقرير تثبيت يتم إذن  
(8 رقم الملحق انظر(  
: الرئيـــس  
.تفضل قمبر علي سامي الدكتور النائب األخ شروع؟للم واألسس المبادئ على مالحظات أي توجد هل   
: قمبر علي سامي الدكتور النائب  
 في الجلسة من سحب قد الموضوع هذا الموضوع, هذا بشأن عتب لي أنا الحقيقة في الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 النواب بعض رغبة وبسبب جاهزا, الوطني واألمن الدفاعو الخارجية الشؤون لجنة تقرير وكان الماضي, ديسمبر شهر
 الخارجية الشؤون لجنة أجرته الذي التعديل هو ما أدري ال الحقيقة في وأنا الوقت, ذلك في الموضوع هذا سحب
 رئيس من توضيحا وأريد تعديل, أي يطرأ ولم شهرين حدود في يبقى بأن األمر تطلب حتى الوطني واألمن والدفاع
.الموضوع هذا على الوطني واألمن والدفاع الخارجية لشؤونا لجنة  
( :المقرر( إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.الرئيس معالي يا توضيح عنده المقرر توضيح, عندي  
: الرئيـــس  
تعليق؟ لديك هل اللجنة رئيس معاودةال عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب األخ شكرا,  
( :المقرر( إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.الرئيس معالي يا تعليق عندي  
:الرئيـــس  





( :المقرر( إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
 103 صفحة في الوفاق, كتلة في اإلخوة رغبة على بناء - الرئيس يمعال - سحب المشروع طبعا الرئيس, معالي شكرا
 اآلراء ببعض تأخذ أال التصويت بعد اللجنة وارتأت اإلخوة, مع اللجنة وناقشته اإلخوة رأي 13 رقم هناك تالحظون لو
.وشكرا اللجنة, مع اتفق حسبما هو كما المشروع أرجع لذلك اإلخوة, مالحظات خالل من وردت التي  
:لرئيـــسا  
.تفضل اللجنة رئيس المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب األخ شكرا,  
( :اللجنة رئيس( المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب  
 أن إال واده,م أو القانون صلب في مالحظة تكن لم المالحظة أو التغيير الحقيقة في الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 لقانون مشابهة أخرى قوانين هناك وأيضا عمان, قانون في هو كما يرون اإلخوة فكان العقوبة, تقديرات في القضية
.وشكرا هللا, شاء إن الحقا وسأذكرها أذكرها, أن أريد نقطة هناك لكن البحرين,  
: الرئيـــس  
للمشروع؟ واألسس دئالمبا على الموافقون هم من شكرا,  
(موافقة أغلبية(  
: الرئيـــس  
.المشروع ديباجة بقراءة المقرر األخ تفضل  
( :المقرر( إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.بقانون المشروع في وردت كما الديباجة على بالموافقة اللجنة توصي: الديباجة الرئيس, معالي شكرا  
: الرئيـــس  
المشروع؟ ديباجة على مالحظات أي توجد هل  
(مالحظات توجد ال(  
: الرئيـــس  
اللجنة؟ أقرتها كما الديباجة على الموافقون هم من  
(موافقة أغلبية(  
: الرئيـــس  
.1 المادة بقراءة المقرر األخ تفضل  
( :المقرر( إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.بقانون المشروع في وردت كما المادة على بالموافقة اللجنة توصي أيضا, 1 المادة الرئيس, معالي شكرا   
: إبراهيم خليل عبدالجليل النائب  
.الرئيس معالي  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل المتغوي أحمد عبدالحسين النائب األخ  
: المتغوي أحمد عبدالحسين النائب  
 مادة أي ,3 السطر 111 الصفحة في كلمة سقطت ,111 صفحة 1 رقم المادة في الرئيس, معالي شكرا 





.تفضل اللجنة رئيس المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب األخ شكرا,  
( :اللجنة رئيس( المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب  
المفترض ومن الخارجية وزارة من رسمية رسالة وعندنا سقطت وهذه, القانون ألن, نعم الرئيس, معالي كراش  
".مدرجة غير هي كيمائية مادة أي" تكون أن   
: الرئيـــس  
سقطت؟ الكلمة المتغوي؟ أحمد عبدالحسين النائب األخ به تفضل الذي هذا   
( :اللجنة رئيس( المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب  
.وشكرا ذلك, تبين الخارجية وزارة من رسمية رسالة وهناك سقطت, الكلمة نعم,   
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ شكرا,   
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 وغير الدولية االتفاقية في موجودة أنها أساس على كانت المالحظة هذه على التأكيد الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 القانون أحكام بتنفيذ المتصلة األغراض: "تقول) د( ,"المحظورة غير األغراض من) "د( البند أو المادة لكن مدرجة,
 المحلي الشغب مكافحة ألغراض كان إذا نقول بأن مناسب غير أنه أعتقد" المحلي الشغب مكافحة أغراض ذلك في بما
 نجيز أن, المحلي الشغب لمكافحة نجيز كأنما منها يستثنى أن – الكيميائية األسلحة اتفاقية – االتفاقية هذه أن" نستخدم أن
 مكافحة أغراض ذلك في بما" تحذف أنها فأعتقد اإلخوة, عنه قال الذي الدموع مسيل أقصد المطحون الفلفل استخدام
 ألنه شبهة, يشكل وجودها ألن" المحلي الشغب مكافحة أغراض ذلك في بما" بحذف هو اقتراحي ,"المحلي الشغب
.وشكرا المطحون, الفلفل منها الشغب مكافحة في المحظورة في تدرج لم أو أدرجت سواء مواد نستخدم أن باإلمكان  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل إبراهيم خليل بدالجليلع النائب األخ شكرا,   
: إبراهيم خليل عبدالجليل النائب  
 وأنا المحظورة, غير األغراض تستثني 1 المادة طبعا ,)د( البند نفس على تحفظي أنا الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 من أيضا تحفظ هناك الصحة وزارة رأي خالصة 106 صفحة في تالحظون لو ,)د( الفرع بحذف المادة تعديل أطلب
 خالل من يعني وتخوفا, مالحظة هناك أن يعني الشغب, مكافحة في الكيميائية األسلحة استخدام أن على الصحة وزارة
 حالة يعطيك قاتل, شبه الدموع مسيالت استخدام – الرئيس معالي – فقط لكن طبعا أشاغب الذي أنا ليس, عملية خبرة
 السكنية األماكن إلى الدموع مسيالت توجيه تم إذا خصوصا تموت, وقد تقتل قد) فيها تروح( قد لدواروا االختناق من
 استخدام فيها أرى ألنني) د( مادة بحذف أطالب أنا أخرى, قانونية أدوات هناك األماكن, بعض في موجود وهذا المكثفة
 نساء وعندنا أطفال وعندنا الدوار, إلى يؤدي الوفاة, ىإل يؤدي قد ألنه محظور, هذا الشغب مكافحة في كيميائية أسلحة
 ضمن استخدامه يتم بحيث يقنن أن يجب قانون هناك أصال, أماكنها غير في حتى الدموع مسيالت توجه األوقات بعض
.وشكرا ,)د( الفرع حذف وأطلب المادة هذه على أتحفظ فأنا القانون, إطار  
:الرئيـــس  
 والحياة والبيئة البحرية الثروة لحماية العامة الهيئة في البيئية الرقابة إدارة مدير علةالش عفاف الدكتورة شكرا, 




: الفطرية والحياة والبيئة البحرية الثروة لحماية العامة الهيئة في البيئية الرقابة إدارة مدير  
 جاءت المادة هذه ,1 المادة بشأن مالحظة عندنا دعوتكم, على نشكركم عليكم, السالم الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 في حظر ما كل ,4 المادة في جاء ما يعرف هنا ذكر ما القانون, هذا في المستخدمة المصطلحات بعض لتعرف
 غير األغراض وبعض الوقائية واألغراض العلمي للبحث محدودة ولكنها تغطيها 4 مادةال المحظورة غير األغراض
.وشكرا التعريف, يعدل أو 4 المادة تعدل أن إما فلذلك التعريف, هذا في المذكورة  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل سلطان علي حسن الشيخ النائب األخ شكرا,   
: سلطان علي حسن الشيخ النائب  
 االحتمال ولكن, الجزم سبيل على هذا أسوق وال, تجربة من إنه أقول أن يؤسفني أنا الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 مباشرة, ليس للدموع المسيل الغاز استخدام ضوء على حدثت – دقيقا أكون حتى – وفاة حاالت هناك أن جدا الكبير
 وهناك السن كبار هناك ولكن عامة, لحسابات معينة, لمصالح إليها رقنتط لم مختلفة لحيثيات نحن ربما, مدة بعد ولكن
 وكل وفاة حاالت تمت فترة بعد الشغب, مكافحة في يستخدم الذي للدموع المسيل الغاز استخدام من فترة بعد صغار,
 الوفاة سبب أن لىإ يشيرون األهالي – موضوعيا أكون أن أتمنى الجزم سبيل على هذا أسوق ال هنا أقول أنا – األهالي
.وشكرا المادة, هذه من الفقرة هذه حذف أطلب لذا للدموع, المسيل الغاز استخدام هو  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل الخارجية بوزارة القانونية اإلدارة مدير محمد عبدالكريم يوسف الدكتور شكرا,   
: الخارجية بوزارة القانونية اإلدارة مدير  
 أن يجب الحقيقة في القانون, مشروع من 1 المادة على التعليق أود فقط الحقيقة في الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 هذا بخصوص الكيميائية األسلحة حظر لمنظمة الفنية األمانة مع االتصال في وثيق تشاور حدث أنه تماما نذكر
 مع بالمراعاة تماما صيغ المنظمة, في القانوني المستشار مع مباشر الباتص الحقيقة في سنوات 3 استغرق المشروع
 القانون مشروع في االتفاقية وأهداف قلب عكسنا مادة, مادة الكيميائية األسلحة وتدمير وتخزين وإنتاج حظر اتفاقية
 غير باألغراض يتعلق ما وكذلك, الشغب مكافحة بعامل يتعلق ما وقراءة تفسير في لبس حصل ربما أنه أعتقد الوطني,
 التعريف تماما عرفت قد الكيميائية األسلحة حظر اتفاقية من 2 المادة أن إلى النواب السادة أنبه أن أريد أنا المحظورة,
 ثم االتفاقية, بموجب محظورة غير أغراض بمصطلح يقصد 9 الفقرة 2 المادة فتذكر القانون, مشروع في وضعناه الذي
 الشغب مكافحة ألغراض ذلك في بما القانون إنفاذ) "د( الوطني القانون مشروع في ضعناهاو كما) د( تماما تأتي
 المستطاع قدر نراعي أن يجب دولية التفاقية الحقيقة في استحقاق هناك, اتفاقية روح تماما عكسنا نحن ,"المحلي
 بعامل يتعلق فيما إعالنات الدولة تقدم أن إليه تلزم فيما تلزم االتفاقية كذلك أنه إال الدولية, االتفاقية مع والتشابه التقارب
.الرئيس معالي وشكرا المذكور, التعريف في الوارد الشغب مكافحة  
: الرئيـــس  
.تفضل المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ أخرى؟ مالحظات أي توجد هل شكرا,   
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 بتنفيذ المتصلة األغراض إن نقول عندما بمنطقية, األمور نأخذ الرئيس معالي دعنا الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 ينص قانون في ندرجها أن إلى نحتاج ال أننا أي المحظورة, الكيميائية األسلحة من تماما خالية الشغب ومكافحة القانون
 الكيميائية األسلحة من تماما خالية القانون تنفيذ أدوات - للتأكيد وهذا - كانت إذا لكيميائية,ا األسلحة استخدام حظر على
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 تنفيذ أحكام بعض تكون ربما أنه شبهة هناك كانت وإذا تستثنى, أن, القانون هذا في عليها ننص أن إلى نحتاج ال فنحن
 تكون أن يمكن المليون من واحدة ذرة شبهة ولو فيها قانونال بتنفيذ المتصلة األغراض المادة بنص يتطلبه ما أو القانون
 فيها ستستخدم التي المواد هذه تكون أال أما دقيقة, تكون العملية ألن المادة, هذه تسقط أن فيجب كيميائية مواد فيها
 معالي وشكرا وجب,أ فإزالتها شبهة فيها كانت وإذا نضيفها, أن إلى نحتاج ال فبذلك محظورة, كيميائية مواد أو كيماوي
.الرئيس  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل مزعل يوسف محمد النائب األخ شكرا,   
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
 واستحداث وإنتاج وتخزين وبيع تصنيع حظر عن نتكلم عندما يعني, مع نحن طبعا الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 العاصمة في التجمعات فيها تكثر البحرين مثل صغير بلد على هذا مثل عمل هيجر أن يمكن ما ندرك الكيمائية األسلحة
 كيمائية معادلة إلى توصلت لو فيما, وأذنابها وأمثالها القاعدة شر من هللا شاء إن الجميع هللا وأجار, العاصمة غير وفي
 معالي - أريد فقط, إلى رجعنا إذا ,)د( قطةالن لهذه قانونية كمناقشة لكن باهلل, والعياذ التجمعات هذه أحد في واستخدمتها
 عن يتكلم الذي - الرئيس معالي - هـ البند الثالثة للمادة نذهب أن ممكن نفهمها, حتى النقطة هذه بين أربط أن - الرئيس
...جدا مهمة النقطة ألن صاغية آذانا أحصل أن ممكن الرئيس معالي استعمال,  
: الرئيـــس  
.الثالثة للمادة تذهب ال 1 المادة في اآلن نحن   
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
 عوامل استعمال" تقول هـ 3 المادة ألن هناك, من نصا أستورد أن بحاجة أنا تفسيرها أفهم حتى فقط ال ال, 
 ذلك يكن لم لو - أن معناه ,"للحرب كوسيلة الشغب مكافحة عوامل استعمال يحظر للحرب, كوسيلة الشغب مكافحة
 البلد سيادة يهاجم أن يريد حينما العدو للحرب, وسيلة تكون أن يمكن الشغب مكافحة عوامل - عليه نص لما ممكنا
 مكافحة عوامل باستخدام يسمح القانون نفس ولكن الشغب, مكافحة عوامل ضده تستخدم أال العدو لذلك يضمن القانون
 كان أيا المواطن, ضد باستخدامها ونسمح مادة استخدام من سيادتنا يهاجم الذي الخارجي العدو نحمي حلي,الم الشغب
 للبلد ويشار لنا يشار جدا, خطرا موضعا القانون منفذي ستضع - الرئيس معالي - الكبيرة المفارقة هذه المواطن, خطأ
 في هـ والبند 1 المادة في د البند بين والمفارقة والمقارنة ظرالن في التدقيق أرجو حين, كل في باالتهام للحكومة ويشار
 أن يمكن الشغب مكافحة عوامل من عامل هي التي المادة أن على ننص حينما هنا خطر األمر الرئيس معالي ,3 المادة
.الرئيس معالي وشكرا غزانا, أو هاجمنا لو فيما الخارجي العدو ضد استخدامها ونمنع للحرب أداة تكون  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل الداخلية بوزارة العسكرية المحاكم إدارة مدير حمود سعد حمود الرائد األخ شكرا,   
:  الداخلية بوزارة العسكرية المحاكم إدارة مدير  
  ذلك في بما القانون أحكام بتنفيذ المتصلة باألغراض ةالمتعلق د الفقرة على لتعقيبنا بالنسبة الرئيس, معالي شكرا
 هي الداخلية وزارة تستخدمها التي الشغب عوامل جميع بأن أوضح أن أحب - الرئيس معالي - الشغب مكافحة أغراض
 لها تأثير ال طبيعية مواد من مصنعة وكلها الصحة, على تأثيرها أو الموانع من مانع أي فيها وليس دوليا مصرحة
 مكافحة وعوامل المادة, ذات في معرفة الكيميائية واألسلحة المادة ذات في معرفة السامة الكيميائية العوامل إطالقا,
 الفقرة هذه حذف حالة في واضح, - الرئيس معالي - فالتعريف سامة, كيميائية مواد أو بأسلحة لها يتطرق لم الشغب
 نفضل - الرئيس معالي - فنحن اإلنسان بحياة تودي قد وفتاكة قوية أسلحة الستخدام الشغب مكافحة أفراد يضطر سوف
 أن وأحب -الرئيس معالي - وللعلم المتجمهرين, بعض على قسوة أشد أسلحة الستخدام تحاشيا الفقرة هذه على اإلبقاء
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 على األسلحة هذه باستخدام الشغب مكافحة لقوات توجيهاته أصدر الداخلية وزير معالي بأن الموقر لمجلسكم أؤكد
.الرئيس معالي وشكرا نطاق, أضيق  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل الستري حسن حيدر السيد النائب األخ شكرا,   
: الستري حسن حيدر السيد النائب  
 ,جدا الخطيرة الموضوعات هذه مثل في جادة وقفة نقف أن علينا يجب أتصور أنا الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 حرب الحرب, وفي العدو مع استخدامه يحظر هذا أن جدا, واضح مزعل يوسف محمد النائب الزميل قاله الذي الكالم
 وال كبير, تفسير إلى تحتاج فال المواطن, مواجهة في باستخدامه يسمح هذا وقتال, قتل وفيها سالح وفيها عسكرية
 أن إلى لزوم يوجد ال إذن طبيعية, مواد هي تستخدمه ما بأن لتقو المعنية والجهة جادين لنكن طويل, جدال إلى تحتاج
 هنا؟ نضعه لماذا الشغب, مكافحة في الكيميائية المواد استخدام إلى نحتاج ال نحن القانون, هذا في المادة هذه في نضعه
 هذا وإذا لمعنية,ا الجهات قالته الذي هذا مطحون, فلفل وهو طبيعية مواد هي نستخدمه الذي نحن له, نحتاج ال نحن
 الجهات كالم - فالكالم القانون هذا في جعلناه وإذا صحيح, غير فالتفسير سنجعله, إذا صحيحا, وليس خطأ التفسير
.الرئيس معالي وشكرا طبيعية, مواد وليست كيميائية مواد وهي الحقيقية المواد على تغطية وهو صحيح غير - المعنية  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل أبل حسن عبدالعزيز الدكتور النائب األخ شكرا,  
: أبل حسن عبدالعزيز الدكتور النائب  
 هذا وضع على يعترض من كل صوت إلى صوتي أضم أنا الحقيقة في الرئيس معالي الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 الكيميائية, األسلحة عن نتحدث أن بمجرد نحن الرئيس معالي - هللا سلمك - ألن المحظورة غير األغراض تحت البند
 اليوم الحديث أن وأعتقد الخصم, إبادة ألغراض أو عسكرية ألغراض األسلحة تعني الحال طبيعة في الكيميائية األسلحة
 إلى نشير ثم لنا قانون في نضعه عندما بإبادة, تتصف إنسانية, غير بصفات تتصف دائما هي الكيميائية األسلحة عن
 نرسل نحن! البحرين صورة يشوه هذا محظور, غير الكيميائية باألسلحة الشغب مكافحة أن ونعتبر الشغب افحةمك
 ليسيء هذا يكفي مكوناتها, عن النظر بغض كيميائية أسلحة سنستخدم شغب عندنا خرج لو غدا أننا كله للعالم إشارة
 معه نستخدم قد شغب أي أن بمعنى حسنة غير نوايا هناك أن إلى سلبية إشارة يشير هو: أوال أن أعتقد أنا للبحرين,
 حول تساؤالت ويثير هنا اللغط يثير أساسا الذي الوضع بهذا أنفسنا نضع فلماذا كيميائية, مسمى أو عليها ينطبق أسلحة
 دولة رئيس يحاكم وبعدها حلبجة في صار مثلما أسلحة؟ معهم نستخدم المواطنين أن الدولة وضع حول الحكومة, وضع
  مبرر, غير بابا تفتح ألنها المادة, هذه ونشطب الباب هذا نغلق أن الضروري من أنه أعتقد وأنا السبب, بهذا ويعدم
 كيميائية أسلحة ننتج ال لنا, ليس باب أنه أعتقد البحرين في الكيميائية األسلحة عن أوال نتحدث عندما مطلقا بحاجة لسنا
 أن ولكن يستخدمونها, المجانين بعض هناك يكون أن من خوفا أولى, باب من فمنعها لها, سنحتاج - هللا شاء إن - وال
 فلماذا البحرين, شعب ضد كيميائية أسلحة تستخدم بأنها غدا تتهم أن األمن لقوى نتيح أن معناها الشغب قضية فيها ندخل
 نسمح ال حتى ,3 المادة من هـ الفقرة وشطب شطبها اإلخوة يقول كما أقترح أنا بابا؟ علينا ونفتح الموضوع هذا نضع
 ضد كيميائية أسلحة الستخدام تحضر البحرين حكومة بأن اإلنترنت في تخرج ثم واالتهامات, البحرين لصورة باإلساءة
. الرئيس معالي وشكرا به, يقوم الذي الشغب كان مهما المواطنين  
:الرئيـــس  
.النظام نقطةل تفضل المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ شكرا,  
 : المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب
 حمود سعد حمود الرائد األخ الداخلية ممثل قاله الذي ألن استيضاح, فقط نظام نقطة الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 إذا أنه نقول أن أساس على ,الشغب مع التعاطي ينظم ال كله القانون أو تنظم ال أوال المادة هذه إن وقفة, إلى يحتاج
: أوال جديد, قانون هذا قانونيا أو دستوريا واضحة, ليست فالعملية بزيادة, فتاكة أسلحة نستخدم سوف المادة هذه حذفت
 النقطة: ثانيا توضيح إلى يحتاج هذا شابه؟ ما أو مقننة ليست الممارسة هذه هل اآلن ممارسة فيه جديد قانون هذا إذا
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 مواد جميع أن - األخ كالم بداية - التأكيد مع المادة هذه حذفنا إذا أننا لفظة استخدام: هي الموضوع ذاه في الثانية
 فال خالية أنها بما األولى المداخلة في إليه واستندنا قلناه والذي المحظورة الكيميائية المواد من خالية الشغب مكافحة
 أن نضطر سوف رفعها حالة في أنه اآلن أحدثه الذي القلق ستوجبي التأكيد هذا هنا, الشغب بمكافحة نزج أن نحتاج
 أن تقول التي المادة هذه حذفنا إذا بأننا عنده, الشخص يتوقف أن يجب الموضوع هذا صراحة فتكا, أشد مواد نستخدم
 نستخدم ألن ضطرسن حذفناها إذا الممنوعة, الخطرة الكيميائية المواد من تماما والخالية الشغب مكافحة مواد استخدام
 .الرئيس معالي وشكرا صراحة, هنا أتوقف وأنا آخر, شيء أو بالعنقودي يهددنا فتاكة أسلحة
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل الدفاع لشؤون الدولة بوزارة القانوني المستشار النجدي عبدهللا عبدالرحمن العميد شكرا,  
: الدفاع لشؤون الدولة بوزارة القانوني المستشار  
 إنتاج بحظر القانون مشروع أو االتفاقية الرئيس معالي الرحيم, الرحمن هللا بسم الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 دالبن االتفاقية من األولى المادة في البند, هذا على نصت الدولية واالتفاقية دولية, اتفاقية على بني الكيميائية األسلحة
 أو دولة 145 ماذا؟ هي إذن" للحرب كوسيلة الشغب مكافحة عوامل استعمال بعدم طرف دولة كل تتعهد"  الخامس
 بخصوص نقول دائما ونحن كمادة, تستخدمها ولكن تقرها ال وهي االتفاقية, هذه على وقعت قد دولة 145 من أكثر
 على نص القانون ولكن الكيميائية, المواد حتى تستخدم وال أسلحة, تستخدم ال هي أسلحة, تستخدم أنها الداخلية وزارة
.الرئيس معالي وشكرا تستخدم, ولم خالية البحرين أن رغم الكيميائية المواد من ومعينة محددة كمية استخدام  
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل اللجنة رئيس المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب األخ شكرا,  
( :اللجنة رئيس( المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب  
 ولكن لهم, أصيل حق وهذا مالحظات من عندهم ما كل يبدوا أن النواب حق من طبعا الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 قضية على إال حظةالمال تصلنا ولم ثالثة, أخرناه ونحن أسبوعين كان أسابيع ثالثة منذ القانون راجعنا أننا يؤسفني الذي
 أطلب أنا اآلن ولكن المشروع, لسحب النهاية في وسنضطر مفرغة, حلقة في سندور أننا أتوقع أنا اآلن وأعتقد العقوبة,
 - القانون يقرؤوا وأن المالحظات, بكل يأتوا أن المالحظات كل عندهم الذين األخوة من أطلب ولكن المشروع, سحب
 أيضا ونحن مادة, مادة ونناقشه المعنيين ومع الداخلية وزارة مع لقاء أرتب وأنا - الجلسة قبل بل الجلسة في ليس
 من وأطلب أسحبه فأنا نريده, البلد ينفع شيء يوجد وإذا نريده ال بالناس يضر شيء يوجد وإذا الكل على حريصون
...األشخاص بعض ويوكل كلها بالمالحظات يأتوا أن اإلخوة  
: الرئيـــس  
 الدراسة من لمزيد للجنة المشروع سحب يطلب الوطني واألمن والدفاع الخارجية الشؤون لجنة رئيس شكرا, 
للجنة؟ إعادته على الموافقون هم من كتابة, يقدمه أن الموضوع حول رأي أو مقترح لديه الذي بأن ويشترط  
: سلطان علي حسن الشيخ النائب  
 المجلس في األول الشخص أنت خطير الكالم هذا) الظهراني أحمد بن خليفة الرئيس معالي( محمد أبا يا 
الكالم؟ هذا معنى ما هذا؟ ما فتاكة؟ بأسلحة الشعب يهدد كيف عنه, المسؤول  
: الرئيـــس  
للجنة؟ إعادته ىعل الموافقون هم من خيرا, هللا وجزاك النبي, على صل  
(موافقة أغلبية(  
:الرئيـــس  






:  الداخلية بوزارة العسكرية المحاكم إدارة مدير  
 أسلحة قلت فتاكة, ألسلحة أتطرق لم إنني أقوله أن أحب الذي سمحت لو الرئيس معالي الرئيس, اليمع شكرا 
 للدموع المسيلة العبوات - للدموع المسيلة األسلحة نستخدم لن الفقرة هذه حذف حالة في والمقصود قسوة, أشد تكون قد
 أن نود ال ونحن الرئيس, معالي تماما منع وهذا اطية,المط الطلقات كاستخدام أخرى ألسلحة للتطرق بنا يؤدي قد فهذا -
.استخدامه أو الجانب لهذا نتطرق  
 
 
Participants in conversation 
S  is the Speaker. 
GS is General Secretary, Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud. 
SQ  is MP Dr Sami Ali Qumber, a member of Al Minbar. 
MK  is MP Mohammed Ebrahim Khalid, a member of Al Minbar. 
AM is MP Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Muawdah, a member of Al Asalah. 
AHM is MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, a member of Al Minbar. 
AKE  is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, a member of Al Minbar. 
DEC  is the Director of Environmental Control in the General Authority for 
Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife, Dr Afaf Al 
Shu’la.  
HS is MP Sheikh Hassan Ali Sultan, a member of Al Wefaq. 
DLD is Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MM  is MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz’al, a member of Al Wefaq. 
DMC Director of Military Courts, the Ministry of the Interior, Major Hmoud 
Sa’ad Hmoud. 
HHS is MP Mr Haider Hassan Al-Sutri, a member of Al Wefaq. 
AA is MP Dr Abdul Aziz Hassan Abul, an independent MP. 
KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq. 
LC is the Legal Counsel, the Ministry of State for Defence, Brigadier-General 
Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi. 









S:  … Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of the  1 
Council, please read the next item on the agenda. 2 
 GS:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) The report of the Committee  3 
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security on the bill on the  4 
 of developing, producing, stocking and using chemical  5 
weapons and on destroying them, attached to the Royal Decree No.  6 
79 of 2007. Thank you. 7 
 S:  Brother Rapporteur, please. 8 
 MK:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Bismillāh Arraḥmān arrahīm82. I request to  9 
insert the committee's report in Hansard. 10 
S:  Who agrees on inserting the committee’s report in Hansard? 11 
(Majority agree.) 12 
 S:  So the report gets inserted in Hansard. 13 
(See Attachment No. 8.) 14 
 S:  Are there any comments on the principles and foundations of the  15 
bill? Brother MP Dr Sami Ali Qumber, please. 16 
 SQ:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have words of reproach on this  17 
topic. This topic was withdrawn from the sitting last December  18 
although the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence  19 
and National Security was ready. And to satisfy the wishes of some  20 
MPs, the issue was withdrawn at the time. I really do not know  21 
what amendments were made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  22 
Defence and National Security that have required almost two months;  23 
there have been no amendments. I demand an explanation from the 24 
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and  25 
National Security about this matter. 26 
 MK:  I have a clarification, the Rapporteur has a clarification, Mr Speaker. 27 
 S:  Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu’awdah,  28 
the Chairman of the Committee. Do you have a comment? 29 
 MK:  I have a comment, Mr Speaker. 30 
 S:  Brother Rapporteur, go on please. 31 
 MK:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course, the withdrawal of the bill, Mr  32 
Speaker, was made at the request of the brothers in Al Wefaq. On  33 
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page 103 if you notice, there is, number 13, the perspectives of the  34 
brothers. After discussing the matter and voting on it, the committee  35 
have decided not to take some of the views received through the  36 
feedback of the brothers. Therefore, the bill was returned in its  37 
original form as agreed upon with the committee. Thank you. 38 
 S:  Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu’awdah, the  39 
Chairman of the Committee, please. 40 
AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, the change or comment was not  41 
at the heart of the law or its articles. The issue was in the estimates  42 
of the punishment. The brothers wanted it as it is in the law of Oman.  43 
There are other laws similar to the law of Bahrain, but there is a  44 
point I would like to mention, and I will mention it later,  45 
inshāʾa Allah83. Thank you. 46 
 S:  Thank you. Who agrees on the principles and foundations of the  47 
project? 48 
(Majority approve.) 49 
 S:  Brother Rapporteur, please read the preamble to the bill. 50 
 MK:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) The preamble: The committee  51 
recommends approving the preamble as contained in the bill. 52 
 S:  Are there any comments on the preamble to the project? 53 
 (No comments.) 54 
 S:  Who agrees to the preamble as approved by the committee? 55 
(Majority agree.) 56 
S:  Brother Rapporteur, please read Article 1. 57 
 MK:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. (reading) Article 1, the committee  58 
recommends the approval of the article as contained in the bill. 59 
 AKE:  Mr Speaker. 60 
 S:  Brother MP Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, please. 61 
 AHM: Thank you, Mr Speaker. In Article 1, page 111, a word is missing  62 
on page 111, line 3. ‘Any chemical substance not listed in one of  63 
the tables’. I believe that this was dropped by the writer. So I request  64 
more attention. Riot Control Agent. 65 
 S:  Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu’awdah,  66 
The Chairman of the Committee, please. 67 
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 AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Yes. Because the law – and this was dropped  68 
and we have an official letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  69 
It is supposed to be "any chemical substance that is not mentioned." 70 
 S:  This is what brother MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi has  71 
mentioned? The missing word? 72 
AM:  Yes, it is missing, and there is an official letter from the Foreign  73 
Ministry clarifying that. Thank you. 74 
S:  Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 75 
 KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Emphasis on this observation has  76 
been based on the fact that it exists in the International Convention  77 
and it is not included. But article or Item d "some non-prohibited  78 
purposes", d says: "those related to implementing the provisions of  79 
the law, including purposes of local riot control." I believe it is  80 
inappropriate to say that this agreement is to be used for controlling  81 
local riots. This agreement – the Chemical Weapons Convention – to  82 
make an exception is as if to condone domestic riot control to, to  83 
permit the use of ground pepper, I mean teargas, about which the  84 
brothers have talked. I believe that "including purposes of local riot  85 
control" should be deleted. My suggestion is to delete "including  86 
purposes of local riot control" because it is suspicious. This is because  87 
it makes it possible to use riot control agents whether included or not  88 
in the banned substances, such as pepper spray. Thank you. 89 
 S:  Thank you, Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please.  90 
AKE:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have reservations about the same item, d.  91 
Of course Article 1 excludes non-prohibited purposes. I request  92 
amending the article by deleting section d. If you notice, on page  93 
106 there is a summary of the views of the Ministry of Health. There  94 
are also some reservations from the Ministry of Health about the use  95 
of chemical weapons in fighting riots. That means that there is  96 
an observation and fear*. I mean, from practical experience – of course  97 
not that I participate in riots – Mr Speaker, using teargas is  98 
semi-fatal. It causes suffocation, dizziness and you may trūḥ mīhā84.  99 
You may be killed and could die, especially if teargas is directed  100 
 at dense residential areas. This is happening in some areas. There  101 
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are other legal instruments. I demand the deletion Article d because  102 
I perceive it as a prohibited use of chemical weapons in riots as it  103 
may lead to death, lead to dizziness. We have children and women. 104 
Sometimes teargas is even used in wrong places in the first place.  105 
There is a law that must be codified so that it is used within the  106 
framework of the law. I have a reservation about this article and ask  107 
for the deletion of section d. Thank you. 108 
 S:  Thank you. Dr Afaf Al Shu’lah, the Director of Environmental  109 
Control in the General Authority for the Protection of Marine  110 
Resources, Environment and Wildlife, please. 111 
 DEC:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Assālmu ʿalaikum85. Thank you for the 112 
 invitation. We have a note on Article 1. This article aims at defining 113 
 some of the terms used in this law. What is stated herein defines what  114 
comes in Article 4. All that are prohibited in the non-prohibited purposes  115 
are covered by Article 4. However, they are limited to scientific research,  116 
preventive purposes and other purposes that are not listed in this definition.  117 
Hence, Article 4 should be amended or the definition should be modified.  118 
Thank you. 119 
S:  Thank you. Brother MP Sheikh Hassan Ali Sultan, please.  120 
HS:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. I regret to say that, from experience, and  121 
I do not assert this, but there is a huge possibility that there are 122 
 deaths – to be precise – that happened in the light of* using teargas.  123 
Not directly, but after some time. Maybe on different grounds we  124 
did not mention, for specific interests and for public accounts*, but  125 
there are elderly people and there are youngsters, after a period of  126 
using teargas in riot control, after some time fatalities occurred*.  127 
All the relatives – I say that I do not assert this and I am trying to  128 
be objective – the relatives point out that the cause of death was  129 
the use of teargas. I therefore request the deletion of this passage from  130 
this article. Thank you. 131 
S:  Thank you. Dr Yousuf Abdul Karim Mohammed, the Director of the 132 
Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, please. 133 
DLD:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact I would just like to comment on Article  134 
1 of the bill. In fact, we must mention that there has been an in  135 
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depth discussion with the Technical Secretrait of the Convention  136 
on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, regarding this national bill.  137 
The discussion took three years and was based on direct contact with  138 
the counsel in the convention. The law was constructed in accordance  139 
with each single article in the Conventionof the Prohibition,  140 
Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their  141 
Destruction. The national bill, however, has reversed the core and  142 
the objectives of the convention. I assume that the section on riot  143 
control substance has been misunderstood. The same applies to the  144 
non-prohibited purposes. I would like to draw the attention of the  145 
MPs to the fact that Article 2 of the Chemical Weapon Convention  146 
defines the term that we use in the bill. Article 2, paragraph 9,  147 
defines the non-prohibited substances in accordance with the  148 
convention. Then comes Article d as mentioned in the bill and  149 
includes local riot control purposes. The core of the convention  150 
has been totally reversed. We are trying to follow an international  151 
agreement as closely as possible, but the same convention demands  152 
the country to support riot control as mentioned in the given definition.  153 
Thank you, Mr Speaker. 154 
S:  Thank you. Are there any other comments? Brother MP Khalil  155 
Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.  156 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, let us take things logically.  157 
When we say that law enforcement-related purposes and riot  158 
control agents are completely free of banned chemical weapons,  159 
something which means that we do not need to list them in the  160 
law that prohibits the use of chemical weapons, if –and this is a  161 
confirmation*– if the tools of implementing the law are totally free  162 
of chemical weapons, then we do not need to mention them in this  163 
law, [they do not need to] be excluded. If there is any suspicion that  164 
there may be any articles in the law, or in what is required by any  165 
article in relation to law enforcement, even a suspicion that is equal  166 
to a single atom out of a million that there are chemicals, then this  167 
article must be nullified. That is because the process should be  168 
accurate. But not prohibiting agents that contain chemicals or  169 
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chemicals that are banned*, then we do not need to add it. If there  170 
is any suspicion, then removing it is a must. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 171 
S:  Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz’al, please. 172 
 MM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course we are with— I mean when we  173 
talk about banning manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing  174 
and developing chemical weapons – we are aware of the consequences  175 
of such an act on a small country such as Bahrain, where there are  176 
dense gatherings in both the capital and other areas. May God  177 
protect all, by His will, from the wickedness of Al Qaeda and  178 
anyone similar or any of their followers should they get access to  179 
a chemical formula and use it in one of these gatherings, God forbid.  180 
But when it comes to discussing the legality of this point, d, if we  181 
go back to, I just want to, Mr Speaker, to link this point so we  182 
understand it. Can we, Mr Speaker, go to Article 3 Item e, which  183 
speaks about the use of— Mr Speaker, can everyone pay heed to me  184 
because this is a very important point...  185 
 S:  We are now in Article 1. Do not go to Article 3. 186 
 MM:  No, no. In order to understand this I need to import a text from  187 
there, because Article 3 e states that “the use of riot control agents  188 
as a means of war: It is prohibited to use riot control agents as a  189 
 of war”. If this was not possible, then the law would not have  190 
issued something about it. This means that the means of fighting  191 
riots can be a means of war. When an enemy wants to attack the  192 
sovereignty of the country, the law guarantees that no means of riot  193 
control is used against them. However, the same law allows the use  194 
of means of riot controldomestically. We protect external enemies  195 
 attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be  196 
used against a citizen, whatever was the mistake made by the citizen.  197 
This big paradox, Mr Speaker, will place the people who are in  198 
charge of law enforcement in a very critical position. The country,  199 
the government and we will all be indicted all the time. I request  200 
scrutinising, comparing and contrasting Item d in Article 1 and  201 
Item e in Article 3. Mr Speaker, the risk here is when we issue that*  202 
a substance that is a used in riot control can be an instrument of war,  203 
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while we prohibit using it against an external enemy attacking or  204 
invading us. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 205 
S:  Thank you. Brother Major Hmoud Sa’ad Hmoud, the Director of  206 
the Military Courts, the Ministry of Interior, please.  207 
DMC:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. When it comes to our comments regarding  208 
the implementation of the provisions of the law, I would like to clarify  209 
that all the riot control substances used by the Ministry of Interior are  210 
permitted internationally and there is no objection to them or to their 211 
 impact on health. They are all made from natural substances and have 212 
 no effect at all. Toxic chemical agents and chemical weapons are defined 213 
 in the same article. The definition is hence clear. Riot control agents do  214 
not include chemical weapons or toxic chemicals. If you delete this item  215 
it will mean that Riot Control Police would be forced to use powerful  216 
and lethal weapons and that may be fatal. We, Mr Speaker, we prefer  217 
to retain this item in the article in order to avoid the use of weapons that 218 
 are more cruel to gatherings. It must be stressed that the Minister of  219 
Interior issued directives to the Riot Control Police to only use these  220 
weapons on a very narrow range. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 221 
 S:  Thank you. Brother MP Mr Haider Hassan Al-Sitri, please. 222 
HHS:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. I think we should seriously consider such  223 
critical topics. What my colleague MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz’al  224 
has said is very clear, that this is forbidden to be used with an enemy  225 
in war, a war with military weapons, killing and fighting. It is allowed  226 
to be used in encountering citizens. Therefore no need for a large 227 
explanation* or a long argumentation. Let us be serious. The concerned 228 
party says that what is being used are natural substances and that thus  229 
there is no need to mention it* in this article of this law. We do not  230 
need to use chemicals in riots, so why do we mention it* here? We  231 
do not need it. What we are using is a natural substance, which is  232 
ground pepper; this is what the concerned authorities said. If this  233 
interpretation is wrong and not true, if we will place it*– then the  234 
explanation is incorrect. If we place it in this law*, then the remarks  235 
of the concerned party are incorrect and are a concealment of the  236 
real substances, which are chemicals and not natural substances.  237 
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Thank you, Mr Speaker.  238 
S:  Thank you. Brother MP Dr Abdul Aziz Hassan Abul, please. 239 
AA:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, in fact, I join everyone  240 
objecting to adding this item under the non-prohibited purposes.  241 
That is because, sallamkallah86, Mr Speaker, as soon as we talk  242 
about chemical weapons, chemical weapons by nature mean  243 
weapons used for military purposes or for the purpose of  244 
exterminating an opponent. I think that chemical weapons are  245 
always characterised with anti-humanitarian qualities, associated  246 
with genocide. When we insert this in our law, and then we mention  247 
them in fighting riots and consider that fighting riots with chemical 248 
weapons is unprohibited, this will tarnish the image of Bahrain! We  249 
send a message to the whole world tomorrow that whenever we  250 
have a riot, we will use chemical weapons, regardless of their  251 
components. This is enough to offend Bahrain. I believe that first:  252 
it sends a negative message indicating that there are bad intentions,  253 
that for any disturbance we may use weapons to which we apply the  254 
title ‘chemical’. So why do we put ourselves in this situation that  255 
essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about the  256 
status of the government, about the status of the state, and about  257 
citizens being dealt with using weapons? As it happened in Halabcha87  258 
and then the ruler of the country was indicted and executed for that  259 
reason. I believe it is necessary to shut this door and delete this  260 
article because it opens an illegitimate door for no good reason.  261 
First of all, we do not need at all to talk about chemical weapons in  262 
Bahrain. I believe that the issue is not our concern. We neither  263 
produce chemical weapons, nor, hopefully, will we need them. They  264 
should, a fortiori, be prohibited for fearing that some outrageous  265 
people may use them. However, to get into the issue of riots means  266 
to allow security forces to be accused in future of using chemical  267 
weapons against the people of Bahrain. Why put this topic forward  268 
and open a door? I suggest, like the brothers said, that we write it  269 
off and delete Item e from Article 3, so as not to allow the distortion  270 
of the image of Bahrain or [allow] accusations. Then it will emerge  271 
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on the Internet that the government of Bahrain is preparing for the  272 
use of chemical weapons against the citizens whatever disturbance  273 
they are causing. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 274 
S:  Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please, a point  275 
of order. 276 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. A point of order, only a clarification. That  277 
is because what the Representative of the Home Office, Brother  278 
Major Hmoud Sa’ad Hmoud, has said needs to be considered. First,  279 
this article does not regulate— or this whole law does not regulate  280 
dealing with riots, so as to say that if you omit this article then  281 
more deadly weapons will be used. The process is then not clear.  282 
Constitutionally or legally, this law is new. First: if this new law now  283 
included practising*, is not this practice codified or something?  284 
This needs to be clarified. Secondly. The second point in this topic  285 
is the use of the word* that if we removed this article while stressing  286 
that, according to what the brother has mentioned at the beginning  287 
of his speech, that all riot control agents being free of prohibited  288 
chemicals, something that we have mentioned and referred to in  289 
the first intervention, if they were free [from prohibited agents]  290 
then we would not need to involve [the topic of] anti-riot here. This  291 
assertion requires the anxiety* that it has caused now, so that its  292 
 would necessitate the use of more lethal materials.  293 
Honestly, this topic requires consideration. To say that if we drop  294 
this article that states that the use of riot control agents and that are  295 
completely free of dangerous and prohibited chemicals*, if we drop it  296 
then we will have to use lethal weapons, this is threatening us with  297 
a cluster bomb or something similar. I stop here honestly. Thank you,  298 
Mr Speaker. 299 
S:  Thank you. Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi, Legal Counsel,  300 
the Ministry of State for Defence, please. 301 
LC:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Bismillāh arraḥmān arraḥīm88. Mr Speaker, 302 
  the convention banning the production of chemical weapons was based  303 
on an international convention, which provided for this item in the first  304 
article of the convention, Item 5: "Each country undertakes not to use  305 
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riot control agents as a means of war." So what is it? One hundered  306 
and forty five countries or more have signed this convention, and they  307 
do not approve it, but use it as an article. It has always been said  308 
that the Ministry of Interior uses weapons, but the ministry does  309 
not use weapons, not even chemical substances. Still, the law  310 
provided for the use of specific amount of chemicals despite the fact  311 
that Bahrain does not own and have not ever used any. Thank you,  312 
Mr Speaker. 313 
 S:  Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu’awda, the  314 
Chairman of the Committee, please. 315 
 AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course, it is the right of MPs to share  316 
the comments they have and this is an inherent right for them. But  317 
I regret that we reviewed this bill three weeks ago. It was [supposed  318 
to be] two weeks and we postponed till three, and yet we had not  319 
received any comments except on the issue of punishment. I think  320 
now I believe that we will be locked in a vicious circle, and we will 321 
eventually be obliged to withdraw the bill, but now I am asking for  322 
the withdrawal of the bill, but I ask the brothers who have all the  323 
comments to come with all the comments, and to read the law – not  324 
during the sitting but before the sitting. I will arrange a meeting with  325 
the Ministry of the Interior and discuss this, article by article, with those  326 
involved. We are also concerned about the good of everyone and if  327 
there is anything that harms people then we do not want it. If there  328 
is something that benefits the country then we want it. I withdraw  329 
the bill and I ask all the brothers to come with all their observations,  330 
and to authorise some people...  331 
S:  Thank you. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,  332 
Defence and National Security has requested the withdrawal of the  333 
project in order to carry out further study, and he requests that everyon 334 
who has a proposal or an opinion on the subject offer it in writing.  335 
Who agrees to returning it to the committee? 336 
HS:  Abu Muhammad (Mr Speaker), this is a critical thing to say. You  337 
are the first person in the Council to be responsible for it. How can  338 
the people be threatened with deadly weapons? What is this? What  339 
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does this mean? 340 
S:  Șalli ʿannebi [i.e. Stay calm], and jazaka Allah khair [i.e. thank you]89.  341 
Who agrees with returning it to the committee? 342 
(Majority agree.) 343 
S:  Thank you. Brother, Major Hmoud Sa’ad Hmoud, the Director of the  344 
Military Courts, the Ministry of Interior. Do you have any  345 
clarifications? Please. 346 
DMC: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, if I may, what I would like to say 347 
  is that I did not touch upon lethal weapons. I said weapons that may be 348 
 more cruel. What I intend to say is that in the case of deleting this  349 
section, we will not use teargas weapons – teargas canisters – and this  350 
may lead us to use other weapons, such as the use rubber shots, and this 351 
 is completely banned, Mr Speaker, and we do not wish to dwell on this  352 
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( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
تفضل المتغوي أحمد عبدالحسين النائب األخ .  … 
 
: المتغوي أحمد عبدالحسين النائب  
 والمقصود المعتقلين, إرجاع مسألة في برغبة المقترح على ورد الذي العجيب الرد الرئيس, سعادة شكرا
 أن والعجيب إنشائي, رد الرد ولكن قدم, أيضا اآلن ثان مقترح هناك وكان قديما, المقترح هذا وكان معروف
 المرباطي األخ الخارج, في يهان أن األولى فمن بلده داخل يهان كان إذا - أشعر أنا - البحريني المواطن
 روابط معها تربطنا شقيقة دولة في موجود وهو أجله, من بالمقترح المقصود وكان معتقل سنوات خمس
 اآلخر والجانب مرة, السنة في ولعلها زيارته على يحصلون بالكاد أو يحصلون ال أهله اآلن وإلى أمنية,
 يلتق ولم تماما وغيبوا السبب يعرف وال الشقيقة الدول إحدى في موقوفين أو اآلن البحرين من معتقلين ثمانية
 وسفارتنا زيارة, على يحصلوا لم والباقي لقاء على وحصل للزيارة ذهب فقط, واحد شخص التقى بهم, أهلهم
 أمريكي أو اليوم أجنبي مواطن المعقول من هل! هي ما تعرف ال) اتصال( كلمة اتصال, على نحن: تقول
 جامعيين أشخاص مانيةث نحن! تخرجه؟ أن دون من للحظة األمريكية السفارة وتبقى البحرين في يعتقل
 يتصل أحد ال أخرى, دولة سجون غياهب في يبقون اآلن سنوات خمس المرباطي بجانب ثانوي ومدرسين
 نواب يا تصنعون؟ ماذا نواب يا عملتم؟ ماذا نواب يا النواب, على والضغط شيئا, عنهم يعرف أحد وال بهم
 وال تخرجوا ال: لهم ونقول لتخديرهم األبر طيناهمأع الشارع في يخرجوا أن أرادوا ما وكل معتقلون؟ أوالدنا
 ماذا نواب يا أنتم: لنا وتقول الحكومة لنا تتجه الفوضى خرجت إذا ذلك بعد الشارع, في الفوضى تسببوا
 الخارجية وزارة من أرجو التكيف؟ كيف إذن نصنع؟ ماذا لنا تقول والناس نصنع؟ ماذا تقولون أنتم تصنعون؟
 ما يوما الوفاق كتلة رئيس يهان, البحريني المواطن السريع, التحرك األمر بهذا لمعنيينا الداخلية ووزارة
 لهذه هل بالدخول, له يسمح الذي الخاص الجواز يحمل وهو الدخول من ويمنعونه يدخل أن يريد ما دولة وفي
.الرئيس سعادة وشكرا! يكرم؟ واألجنبي منطقة كل في مهانا البحريني يبقى الدرجة  
 
 
Participants in conversation 
DS  is the Debuty Speaker. 
AHM  is MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, a member of Al Wefaq. 
 
The Excerpt 
DS:  … Brother MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, please. 1 
AHM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. The wondrous response to the proposal for  2 
returning prisoners – and the purpose is well-known and this proposal  3 
was long time ago. There was a second proposal, which has also  4 
become outdated*. But the response is a descriptive essay, and  5 
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surprisingly, the Bahraini citizen – I feel – if he gets disgraced in his  6 
own country, then, a fortiori, he gets disgraced abroad. Brother  7 
Al-Mirbati has been under arrest for five years, and the proposal  8 
was intended for him. He is now in a country with which we have  9 
security links. Up to now, his relatives have not got or barely get to 10 
visit him, perhaps once a year. Additionally, there are eight  11 
detainees from Bahrain who are now either under arrest in the country  12 
or in one of the neighbouring countries and the reasons for their arrest 13 
are still unknown. They are totally neglected and their families have  14 
not met them. One person met them; he went and got the chance to  15 
meet them but not the rest. And our embassy says: we are in contact.  16 
The meaning of the word ‘contact’ is unknown! Is it possible today  17 
that a foreign citizen or an American gets arrested in Bahrain and  18 
the U.S. Embassy waits for a moment without releasing him?! We  19 
have eight people, university graduates and secondary school  20 
teachers beside Al-Mirbati. It has been five years now. They are  21 
staying in the midst of other countries’ prisons, no one contacts them  22 
and no one knows anything about them. The pressure is on the  23 
MPs. MPs, what have you done? MPs, our children are arrested.  24 
Every time they want to go out in the streets we opiate them and say:  25 
Do not go out and cause chaos in the streets. Then if chaos starts,  26 
the government will say to us: What are you, MPs, doing?  27 
Do you ask us what we are doing? And the people are asking  28 
us what we are doing? So how to cope? I request the Ministry of  29 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, who are involved in  30 
this matter, to make a fast move. Bahraini citizens are disgraced.  31 
One day in a specific country the Head of the Al Wefaq Party wants  32 
to enter, but gets stopped while he is carrying his authorised passport.  33 
Do Bahrainis stay disgraced in every region while foreigners are  34 
honoured?! Thank you, Mr Speaker. 35 
417 
 
3. Insulting the Government  
From Sitting 2:2:25 b, 22nd April 2008, pp. 43–44 
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.النظام لنقطة تفضل إبراهيم خليل عبدالجليل النائب األخ...   
 
: إبراهيم خليل عبدالجليل النائب  
 مجلسي شؤون وزير الفاضل محمد بن عبدالعزيز سيدال سعادة من إيضاح أريد أنا الرئيس, سعادة شكرا 
 إساءة هذا يكون بانتقاد النائب تقدم إذا لحكومتهم, يسيئون نواب هناك اآلن قالها التي العبارة والنواب, الشورى
! للحكومة؟  
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
 فعال وتمس النطاق, خارج تكون اليوم وغير اليوم نسمعها فعال كلمات يقصد هو لي, اسمح لي, سمحا ال, ال, 
...نبهت وأنا الحكومة, هيبة  
 
: إبراهيم خليل عبدالجليل النائب  
 النائب يتعمد عبارة وبين يث,الحد أثناء في تصدر عبارة من فرقا هناك أن - الرئيس سعادة - تعليق أنا ال, 
...لحكومته اإلساءة  
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.هللا إال بها يعلم ال النوايا وهللا   
: إبراهيم خليل عبدالجليل النائب  
 عنه يعلمون ال المرباطي عبدالرحيم هزيلة, اقتراحات للنواب؟ إساءة أليست إلينا أرسلت التي الرسائل اليوم 
 وزير األخ وسعادة أتكلم أخاف أنا وهللا المجلس, يتعامل هل يعني إساءة, هذه أليست سجن, أي في موجود, هو أين
...ينسحب والنواب الشورى مجلسي شؤون  
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.ينسحب ال ال, ال,   
 
: إبراهيم خليل عبدالجليل النائب  
.الرئيس سعادة يا الحكومة وبين بيننا الحوار ندير كيف نعرف ال فنحن   
 
(:للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  




: مراد عبدهللا عبدالحليم النائب  
 هذا من الشكل بهذا الوزير خروج الحكومة, إلى يسيئون النواب بأن الوزير يقول الرئيس, سعادة شكرا 
 من بتوقيع تأتي التي الخاطئة الردود ثم. الأو هذا كله, البحرين لشعب إهانة وبالتالي المجلس؟ لهذا إهانة أليست المجلس
 خليل حمد النائب األخ كالم على أثني أنا المجلس؟ لهذا إساءة هذه أليست بالماليين, فادحة أخطاء فيها الوزراء, رئيس
.الرئيس سعادة وشكرا وقت, يوجد ال ألنه الجلسة هذه ومن يستجوب أن يجب الوزير هذا المهندي,  
 
( :للرئيس األول ائبالن( الجلسة رئيس  
 … شكرا, 
 
The Participants in this conversation 
DS is the Deputy Speaker. 
AKE is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, a member of Al Wefaq. 
HM is MP Halim Murad, a member of Al Asalah. 
 
The Excerpt 
DS:  …. Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please. A point of order. 1 
AKE:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. I need a clarification from Mr Abdul Aziz  2 
bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel, the Minister of Shura and the House of  3 
Representatives. He is saying that there are MPs who insult their  4 
government. If an MP puts forward a criticism then this is an insult  5 
to the government?! 6 
DS:  No, no. Excuse me, excuse me. He really means the words we are  7 
hearing today and days other than today and which are out of range*,  8 
and that actually impinge on the prestige of the government. I have  9 
alerted the... 10 
AKE:  No, I— a comment, Mr Speaker, that there is a difference between  11 
something said during a conversation and something that an MP  12 
says to deliberately insult his government... 13 
DS:  Actually, intentions are not known except by God. 14 
AKE:  The messages that were sent to us today, were not they an insult  15 
to the MPs? Poor proposals, Abdul Rahim Al-Mirbati they do not  16 
know where he is, in which prison, is not this an insult? I mean,  17 
does the Council deal— actually I am afraid that if I talk the Brother  18 
Minister for Shura and Representatives Councils will withdraw ... 19 
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DS:  No, no, he will not withdraw.  20 
AKE:  We do not know how to manage a dialogue between us and the  21 
government, Mr Speaker. 22 
DS:  Brother MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad, please. 23 
HM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. The minister says that the MPs insult the  24 
government. The Minister leaving the Council this way, is not this  25 
an insult to this council? And therefore an insult to all the people  26 
of Bahrain? This is first. Then the wrong responses that come signed  27 
by the Prime Minister, responses with millions of serious errors, is  28 
not this an insult to the Council? I commend the speech of Brother  29 
MP Hamad Khalil Al-Mohannadi. This minister should be  30 
interrogated, starting at this sitting, because there is no time. Thank  31 
you, Mr Speaker.  32 
DS:  Thank you… 33 
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4.  Condemning a ‘terrorist’ plot 
From Sitting 2:3:10, 30th Dec. 2008, pp. 95–99  
 
: الرئيـــس  
 المشاركات في الشورى في اإلخوة على نزد لم إن أننا لك أؤكد المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب األخ 
.تفضل للمجلس العام األمين المحمود علي نوار األخ سعادة فيك, هللا بارك وتأكد, علي سجله هذا نقل, ال  
 
: للمجلس العام األمين  
 صاحب اإلرهابي، للمخطط واستنكار شجب بيان بإصدار مستعجلة بصفة اقتراح الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 بصفة اقتراح بطلب نتقدم أن يسعدنا الموقر، النواب مجلس رئيس ورعاه هللا حفظه الظهراني أحمد بن خليفة المعالي
 األمن زعزعة إلى ويهدف مملكتنا يستهدف كان الذي اإلرهابي للمخطط نكارواست شجب بيان إصدار بشأن مستعجلة
 التي وإجراءاتها األمنية األجهزة بجهود ذاته الوقت في إشادتنا مع فيها، واألبرياء اآلمنين وترويع فيها واالستقرار
 مقدمو. والتقدير يةالتح فائق بقبول وتفضلوا اإلرهابيين، مخططات وإفشال اإلرهابي الحادث وقوع دون حالت
 النائب الرميحي، حمد خميس النائب الدوسري، سالم حسن النائب السعيدي، أحمد جاسم الشيخ النائب: االقتراح
 عبدالحليم النائب البحيري، محسن سامي النائب الشيخ، أحمد عبداللطيف الدكتور النائب الفضالة، عبدهللا ناصر الشيخ
 النائب المهندي، خليل حمد الشيخ النائب الدوسري، خلف عبدهللا النائب القعود، دمحم لطيفة النائب مراد، عبدهللا
 محمد الشيخ النائب الحادي، محمد إبراهيم الشيخ النائب أبوالفتح، أحمد عيسى النائب بوصندل، محمد إبراهيم الشيخ
.وشكرا إبراهيم، خالد  
 
: الرئيـــس  
 إدراج على الموافقون هم من الجلسة؟ أعمال جدول على المقترح هذا إدراج على لمجلسا يوافق هل شكرا, 
الجلسة؟ أعمال جدول على المقترح هذا  
(موافقة أغلبية(   
:الرئيـــس  
.تفضل أحمد سلمان علي الشيخ النائب األخ شكرا,   
 
: أحمد سلمان علي الشيخ النائب  
 تعلن التي األولى المرة هذه ليست االقتراح, بهذا تقدموا الذين اإلخوة إلى التقدير مع الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 وسبق اإلرهابية, األعمال ببعض القيام تنوي – الداخلية وزارة ادعاءات بحسب – خلية اكتشاف عن الداخلية وزارة فيها
 إخواني على أقترح أنا المجلس, من بيانات نصدر ولم حداثاأل تلك إلى مجلسنا يتصد ولم األحداث من بعدد مررنا أن
 ألننا مشتركة, أو فردية بيانات خالل من المجلس إطار خارج نظرهم وجهة عن يعبروا بأن األمر هذا المقترح مقدمي
 جهةو بإبراز وسنطالب نظرنا وجهة وسنبدي الموضوع على سنتحفظ نظر, وجهة عندنا نحن اآلن األمر هذا طرحنا إذا
 تم الذي العمل موقف أبقي أن أحب نظر, وجهات في اختالف حالة في اآلن يدخل أن المجلس لهذا أحب ال وأنا نظرنا,
 ببيانات المستقلين خالل من الكتل, خالل من ويعلنوه المقترح هذا يأخذوا بأن إخواني من أرجو لذا غزة, موقف ونبقي
 أن وأعتقد أنشره, أن وأحاول كتلتي عن يعبر آخر ببيان وسأخرج رينظ وجهة لتبيان للتداخل سأضطر وإال مستقلة,
.األولى المداخلة هي هذه جزيال, وشكرا نفسه, على المجلس يتجنبه أن أرجو جدل هذا  
:الرئيـــس  




: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
 في تدربت إرهابية خلية عن البلد هذا في أعلن أن م2003 فبراير 2 في سبق رئيس,ال معالي شكرا 
 مخازن رصاص, عبوات, ,)كالشينكوفات( األسلحة من مجموعة عن كشفت التحقيقات لبنان, في تدربت أفغانستان,
 تغطيته تمت قد لموضوعا أن ذلك من أكثر بل المحاكمة, تتم أن قبل إدانة في كلمة المجلس لهذا يكن لم كلها أسلحة,
 له يكون أن دون ومن محاكمات دون من وإنهاؤه الموضوع هذا إذابة تمت بحر أي في مكان أي في أعلم, ال وإذابته,
 وأركز المتهمين وصف يتم أساس أي على مكان, كل في الشارع, في اإلعالم, في الصحافة, في نراه الذي التصعيد هذا
 على جاء كما تكفيريون بأنهم خوارج, بأنهم مجرمون, بأنهم مذنبون, بأنهم ينالمتهم كلمة تحت خطوط 10 وأضع
 ليصف تلفزيوني برنامج في النواب مجلس في المجلس, هذا في عضو يشارك أساس أي على النواب, بعض لسان
 أليس إدانته؟ تتثب حتى بريء المتهم أليس بذلك؟ وصفهم يتم أساس أي على قاتل؟ وبأنه حاقد وبأنه مجرم بأنه المتهم
 تثبت حتى بريء المتهم" تقول أال – 20 المادة – المادة هذه احترامه على أقسمتم الذي البالد دستور في 20 المادة
 القضاء يثبت حتى الدستور بحكم أبرياء إنهم أبرياء؟ ليسوا إنهم تقول حتى اإلدانة ثبتت هل ؟"قانونية محاكمة في إدانته
 الدستور نص هو كما فيها للمتهم تؤمن قانونية محاكمة هناك تكون أن يجب ذلك, لكم يجوز ال ذلك, غير أنهم النزيه
 جميع أسأل الضرورية, الضمانات الدفاع, حق لممارسة الضرورية الضمانات فيها له تؤمن عليه, أقسمتم الذي
 الضمانات فيها لهم تؤمن أن المحامين, أسأل القضاة, أسأل النواب, أسأل الشعب, أبناء جميع أسأل الصحفيين,
 مراحل جميع كلمة تحت خطوط 10 وأضع جميع في التحقيق, مراحل جميع في الدفاع حق لممارسة الضرورية
 محام تأمين تم هل التحقيق؟ مراحل جميع هي ما لنا فليقل العسكري, القضاء في سابقا وكان مستشار أمامكم التحقيق,
 اعترضوا المحامون محام؟ هنالك يكون أن دون من معهم التحقيق تم أنه أم التحقيق؟ مراحل جميع في المتهمين لهؤالء
 يقولون لينوون, أسلحة, تهريب ينوون أنهم وليس أسلحة فيها كان التي هذه أدنتم قد كنتم إذا الرئيس معالي ذلك, على
 – يا القسم احترم الصحافة, في وضعتهاو الوزارة صورتها) كالشينكوفات( أسلحة هذه وفعلوا, والتقوا وكذا ذهبوا إنهم
 بريئا ليدين بيانا يصدر أن المجلس هذا حق من وليس الدستور, بحكم بريئا تدن ال عليه, أقسمت الذي – الرئيس معالي
...جميع فيها التي العادلة المحاكمة تتم لم ما الدستور بحكم  
 
:الرئيـــس  
...تفضل المعاودة بدالرحمنع عادل الشيخ النائب   
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
...العادلة للمحاكمة الضمانات جميع توفر لم ما الرئيس معالي الضمانات, جميع فيها توفر التي ال,   
 
: غلوم فيروز جالل النائب  
.الرئيس معالي   
 
: مزعل وسفي محمد النائب  
 لهذا نريد ال, ال... القضاء لهذا نريد نزيها, قضاء يكون أن القضاء لهذا نريد القضاء, نحترم نعم النزيهة, 
 كل الوطن ينساق أن يجب ال للعدالة, المعزز النزيه, للقضاء المعزز هو المجلس هذا يكون وأن نزيها يكون أن القضاء
 هناك القضاء, بحكم تثبت لم القانون, بحكم تثبت لم اتهامات وراء الوطن وكل الوطن ينساق أن يجب ال الوطن,





: المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب  
.مزعل يوسف محمد النائب األخ عنك نكمل دعنا   
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد ئبالنا  
...بيان المجلس هذا من يصدر أن يجوز ال بيان, المجلس هذا من يصدر بأن نسمح لن يمكن, ال   
: الرئيـــس  
.نكتفي طيب   
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
 لهذا أسمح لن أسمح, لن يحاكموا, أن قبل األبرياء أدينوا بأنفسكم, فأصدروه نابيا تصدروا أن أردتم إن 
 يجوز ال المجلس, لهذا يجوز ال المجلس, لهذا يجوز ال يحاكم, أن قبل بريئا أدان إذا المجلس هذا في خير وال المجلس,
 أنتم تشريع, مجلس أنتم نواب, مجلس مأنت شعب, مجلس أنتم قضاء, مجلس لستم أنتم يعنيه, ال فيما التدخل المجلس لهذا
 ونتعاون, تعاونا نعم عملها, في الداخلية راقبوا عمله, في القضاء راقبوا أعمالها, في الوزارات راقبوا رقابة, مجلس
 أن المجلس لهذا أبدا نرضى وال نقبل وال نريد ال الوطن, هذا سالمة وعلى الوطن, هذا أمن على الناس أحرص ونحن
... البيان اسحبوا البيان, اسحبوا: أقول أنا ذلك, لكم يجوز ال بريء, على لمةك له تكون  
 
: الرئيـــس  
...يسحب ال   
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
.الوطن أمن على حريصين كونوا الوطن, أمن على حريصين كونوا ذلك, لكم يجوز ال   
 
: ــسالرئيـ  
... بيان هذا بداية, هذه   
(القاعة وسط واقفا مزعل يوسف محمد النائب انتقل وهنا(  
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
 الرئيس, معالي حقه من ليس التدخل, المجلس هذا حق من ليس أجلس, لن البيان, فليسحب البيان, اسحبوا 
 حتى المكان هذا من أتحرك لن األبرياء, تدينوا ال يتدخل, أن المجلس حق من ليس يتدخل, أن المجلس حق من ليس
 معالي يا لك يجوز ال لك, يجوز ال عادلة, محاكمه هناك تكون أن يجب المجلس, في خير ال البيان, هذا تسحبوا
... الحق لكم ليس اطردوني, احبسوني أتحرك, لن الرئيس,  
 
: ـــسالرئي  





: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
...لكم يجوز ال الحق, لكم ليس نواب كمجلس الحق, لكم ليس   
 
: إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.كيفك على   
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
... اخرس   
 
: إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.اطلع   
 
: الرئيـــس  
).المايكروفون( أغلق دقائق, عشر لمدة الجلسة ترفع   
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
.تريد ما أغلق تريد, مثلما) المايكروفون( أغلق  
 
: الرئيـــس  
).اسكت بس( علينا, تمثل ال   
 
: مزعل يوسف محمد النائب  
...بريئا يدين أن المجلس حق من ليس تفعله, أن تريد ما افعل  
 
: إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
!أسلوب؟ هذا هل. المسرحية سجلوا   
 
: الرئيـــس  
.دقائق عشر لمدة الجلسة ترفع   
( ظهرا 5:51 الساعة تمام في استؤنفت ثم ظهرا 57:71 الساعة تمام في الجلسة رفعت(  
: الرئيـــس  
 عددها يكن لم إذا الواقع في مواضيع 4 يوجد جلستنا, نواصل منه وبعون هللا بسم م,الرحي الرحمن هللا بسم 
 وأبدأ المجلس وافق إذا موضوع كآخر نتركه بسببه الجلسة ورفعت الخالف عليه الذي الموضوع العدد, يحضرني ال ,5
 شاء إن نختلف وال حل, وضوعم لكل هللا شاء إن موضوعنا وعن اآلخر, تلو واحدا نتلوها وسوف المواضيع, بقية في
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 األخ الموضوع, الحتواء الفرصة لهم مازال والعقالء هللا, شاء إن نختلف لن المجلس, هذا في وحدتنا مصلحة في هللا
.الثاني الموضوع بقراءة تفضل للمجلس العام األمين المحمود علي نوار  
 
: عبدهللا أحمد علي الدكتور النائب  
.التأجيل على التصويت   
 
: للمجلس العام األمين  
.األول البند تأجيل على التصويت   
 
: الرئيـــس  
 لسللمج العام األمين المحمود علي نوار األخ التصويت, إلى نحتاج ال المواضيع هذه من وننتهي دقائق كلها 
.تفضل  
 
The Participants in the conversation 
The three major Participants in this conversation 
S  is the Speaker, Khalifa Al-Dhahrani. 
MM  is MP Mohammed Al-Miz’al, member of Al Wefaq. 
AS  is MP Sheikh Ali Salman, Head of Al Wefaq. 
 
Other participants 
GS  is the General Secretary, Nawwar Al-Mahmoud. 
JDF  is MP Jawad Fayrooz, a member of Al Wefaq. 
AA  is MP Adel Al-Mu’awdah, a member of Al Asalah. 
MK  is MP Mohammed Khalid, a member of Al Minbar.  




S:  …Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary, Please. 1 
GS: Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) A proposal to urgently issue a  2 
statement condemning and disapproving of the terrorist plot. Your highness  3 
Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Dhahrani, may Allah guard and protect, we  4 
are pleased to put forward our proposal to urgently issue a statement  5 
condemning and disapproving the terrorist plot that targeted our  6 
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Kingdom, and that aimed at upsetting security and stability, and  7 
startling secured and innocent people. We would like to simultaneously  8 
praise the efforts of security services and procedures that prevented  9 
the terrorist incident and the plots of the terrorists.  10 
Suggestion proposed by: 11 
MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa’eedi 12 
MP Hassan Salim Al-Dossari 13 
MP Khamis Hamad Al-Rumaihi 14 
MP Sheikh Nasir Abdillah Al-Fudhalah 15 
MP Dr Abdul Latif Ahmed Al-Sheikh 16 
MP Sami Muhsin Al-Buhairi 17 
MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad 18 
MP Latifa Muhammed Al-Qu’rrd 19 
MP Abduallah Khalaf Al-Dossari 20 
MP Sheikh Hamad Khalil Al-Muhannadi 21 
MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Bu-Sandal 22 
MP Essa Ahmed Abu-Almat’h 23 
MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Hadi 24 
MP Sheikh Muahmmed Khalid Ebrahim 25 
Thank you. 26 
S:  Thank you. Does the Council agree on inserting this suggestion in  27 
the agenda of the sitting? Who are the ones who agree on including  28 
this suggestion in the agenda? 29 
(Majority agree.) 30 
Thank you. Brother MP Sheikh Ali Salman Ahmed, please. 31 
AS:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. With respect to the brothers who submitted  32 
the proposal, this is not the first time that the Ministry of the Interior  33 
announces the discovery of a cell – according to the claims of the Ministry  34 
of the Interior – intending to carry out some terrorist acts. We have  35 
already gone through a number of events and our council did not  36 
address those events and we did not issue any statements in the  37 
council. I suggest that my brothers who made this suggestion express  38 
their point of view outside the framework of the Council through  39 
individual or joint statements because if we raise this issue now,  40 
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we will then have a stance. We will have a reservation on the subject  41 
and we will express our point of view. We will also ask to highlight  42 
our point of view. I would not like this council to get now into a  43 
state of disagreement. I would like to keep the position of the work  44 
done and keep the position of Gaza,90 so I ask my brothers to take  45 
this proposal and declare it through the parties, through individuals  46 
with independent statements; otherwise I will be obliged to  47 
intervene to illustrate my point and I will come up with another  48 
statement representing my party and I will try to publish it. I think  49 
this is an argument the Council should keep itself away from. Thank  50 
you very much. This is the first intervention. 51 
S:  Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yusif Miz’al. 52 
MM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Previously on 2 February, 2003  53 
a terrorist cell was discovered in this country (balad). It was  54 
trained in Afghanistan, trained in Lebanon. The investigations  55 
revealed a range of weapons: Kalashnikovs, explosives, bullets,  56 
weapons stores, all this and the Council did not use a word to condemn  57 
it prior to the trial. Moreover, the issue has been concealed and  58 
dissolved. I do not know where, in which sea, this topic has been  59 
dissolved and terminated without a trial and without the escalation  60 
that we see in the press, the media, in the street, everywhere. On  61 
what basis are the defendants described –and I emphasize and draw  62 
ten lines under the word ‘defendants’ – as guilty, as criminals, as  63 
khārijites91, takmīīrriyyūn92 as stated by some MPs? On what basis  64 
does any member of this council, the Parliament, participate in a  65 
TV program to describe the defendant as a criminal, as hateful  66 
and a killer? On what basis are they described as such? Does not  67 
Article 20 of the Constitution of the country (bilād), which you  68 
vowed to respect, state that “The accused is innocent until proven  69 
guilty in a court of law”? Has there been a conviction that allows  70 
you to state that they are not innocent?  71 
They are innocent according to the Constitution until fair  72 
administration of justice proves otherwise. It is not right to do this.  73 
There must be a legal trial in which the accused one is guaranteed  74 
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what the Constitution states. He has to be given necessary  75 
guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence. The necessary  76 
guarantees. I ask all the journalists, I ask all the people, I ask the  77 
MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask lawyers to provide them with the  78 
necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence at all  79 
stages of the investigation, and I draw ten lines under all stages of  80 
investigation. Before you stands an advisor who was formerly in the  81 
Military Judiciary. Let him tell us what the entire stages of the  82 
investigation are. Has there been a lawyer assigned to these  83 
defendants at all stages of the investigation? Or have they been  84 
interrogated without a lawyer? Lawyers have objected to that, Mr  85 
Speaker. If you had condemned this one that had weapons, and not  86 
that they intend to smuggle weapons. They say they went and so,  87 
and met and did. These weapons (Kalashnikovs) of which the  88 
ministry took photos and published them in the press. Respect  89 
your vow, Mr Speaker, the vow you took. Do not condemn someone  90 
whom the Constitution considers innocent. The Council has no right  91 
to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent under the  92 
Constitution unless a fair trial in which all – 93 
S:  MP Sheikh Adel Abdulrahman Al-Mu’awdah, please. 94 
MM:   –No, in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, unless all guarantees  95 
for a fair trial – 96 
JDF:  Mr Speaker 97 
MM:  –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be  98 
fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair,  99 
and for this council to enhance fair judiciary, to enhance justice.  100 
The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the  101 
homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind  102 
charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven  103 
by the judiciary. There are allegations made by lawyers of torture – 104 
AA:  Allow us to take over from here, Brother MP Mohammed Yusif  105 
Al-Miz’al. 106 
MM: This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued  107 
by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement. 108 
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S:  All right, we stop here. 109 
MM: If you want to issue a statement, do it yourselves. Condemn the  110 
innocents before a trial. I will not allow this. I will not allow this  111 
council, and there is no good in this council if it condemns an  112 
innocent person before his trial. This council must not, this council  113 
must not interfere in what is not its business. You are not a judicial  114 
council, you are a parliamentary council, the Council of  115 
Representatives, you are a council of legislation. You are an  116 
observation board. Watch the ministries in their work, watch the  117 
judiciary in its work, watch the Interior in its work. Yes, we have  118 
cooperated and we cooperate, and we are extremely intent on the  119 
security of this homeland, and the safety of this homeland. We do  120 
not want and do not accept and do not agree on this council having  121 
a say against an innocent person. You may not do this, I say.  122 
Withdraw the statement, withdraw the statement. 123 
S:  It does not get withdrawn. 124 
MM: You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.  125 
Be intent on the security of the homeland. 126 
S:  This is a start; this is a statement – 127 
(MP Al-Miz’al moves to the middle of the chamber.) 128 
MM: Withdraw the statement. Have the statement withdrawn. I will not  129 
sit. This council has no right to intervene, it is not right to do so, Mr  130 
Speaker. The Council has no right to intervene, the Council has no  131 
right to intervene. Do not condemn the innocent. I will not move  132 
from this place until you withdraw the statement. There is no  133 
good in the Council. There must be a fair trial. You^ may not, you^93  134 
may not, Mr Speaker. I will not move. Arrest me. Evict me.  135 
You have no right – 136 
S:  Mohammed Al-Miz’al, I will get you out myself – 137 
MM:  You have not the right to. As a council you have no right.  138 
You have no right. 139 
MK: ʿala kaimuk?94 [i.e. Is it up to you?] 140 
MM:  Shut up — 141 
MK:  Iṭlaʿ 95 [i.e. Get out.] 142 
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S:  Sitting adjourned for ten minutes.  143 
Turn off^ the microphone. 144 
MM:  Turn off^ the microphone. As you^like.  145 
Turn off what you^ want. 146 
S:  Stop acting. Enough, stop talking. 147 
MM: Do what you^ want to do. The Council has no right to condemn an  148 
innocent person.  149 
MK: Record the play. Is this proper behaviour? 150 
S:  Sitting adjourned for ten minutes. 151 
(Sitting adjourned at 12:25 p.m. and then resumed at 13:15 pm.) 152 
S:  Bismillāh arraḥmān arraḥīm96, in the name of Allah and with  153 
His support we continue our sitting. There are four issues in fact, if  154 
not five. I do not recall the number. The issue causing disagreement  155 
and because of which the sitting got adjourned, we leave it until the  156 
end if the Council agrees, and I will start with the rest of the issues,  157 
one after the other. As for our issue, inshā Allāh97, there is a solution  158 
for every matter. We do not disagree about our interest in our unity  159 
as a council. We will not disagree by the will of God. Brother Nawwar  160 
Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary, please read the next topic. 161 
DS:  Voting on postponement. 162 
GS:  Voting on postponing the first item. 163 
DS:  It is only a matter of minutes and we will finish these issues. We do  164 
not need voting. Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, General Secretary,  165 
please. 166 
(The Council moves to the other items. The transcription does not  167 
mention the topic again. It is not clear if they actually discussed it  168 
or not.) 169 
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5. The Arrest of Political Activists 
From Sitting 2:3:13, 27th Jan. 2009, pp. 4 –6 
 
:  الرئيـــس  
 الحضور اإلخوة أيها أجمعين, وصحبه آله وعلى محمد ونبينا سيدنا على والسالم والصالة الرحيم, الرحمن هللا بسم
نبدأ وبركاته, هللا ورحمة عليكم فالسالم اإلسالم بتحية أحييكم . والتوفيق العون وتعالى بحانهس هللا سائلين هذه جلستنا 
 سلمان علي الشيخ النائب سعادة اعتذر حيث الجلسة حضور عدم عن المعتذرين اإلخوة أسماء تالوة: وهو) 1( البند
 الجلسة مضبطة على التصديق: وهو) 2( البند. الدوسري خلف عبدهللا النائب سعادة الجلسة هذه عن تغيب كما أحمد,
 الدكتور النائب األخ ؟ عشرة الثانية االعتيادية الجلسة مضبطة على مالحظات أي هناك هل ة,عشر الثانية االعتيادية
.تفضل حسن محمد عبدعلي  
 
: حسن محمد عبدعلي الدكتور النائب  
 كلمة استبدال األسفل, من مسوالخا الرابع السطر ,19 الصفحة في الرئيس معالي. عليكم السالم الرئيس, معالي شكرا
.وشكرا ,)نظيف( وليست) نضيف( الصحيحة الكلمة ,)نظيف(  
 
:  الرئيـــس  
 المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ عشرة؟ الثانية االعتيادية الجلسة مضبطة على أخرى مالحظات أي توجد هل شكرا,
.تفضل  
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
..البلد في الحاصل الوضع على دقيقتين أعلق سوف أنا طبعا. وبركاته هللا ورحمة عليكم السالم الرئيس, معالي شكرا  
:  الرئيـــس  
!أوال التصديق ننهي دعنا  
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
.األمن استتباب على منا حرصا الرئيس معالي يا دقيقتان  
 
:  الرئيـــس  
.التصديق ننهي أوال دعنا  
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
.التصديق بعد الكلمة أعطني إذن  
 
:  الرئيـــس  
عشرة؟ الثانية الجلسة مضبطة على مالحظات أي توجد له  
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(مالحظات توجد ال(  
:  الرئيـــس  
 الدكتور النائب األخ له أشار الذي التعديل إجراء مع عشرة الثانية االعتيادية الجلسة مضبطة على التصديق يتم إذن
.تفضل زوقالمر إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ. حسن محمد عبدعلي  
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 له السابقين اليومين في جرى الذي األمر البحرين, في األمن واستتباب السالمة على منا حرصا الرئيس, معالي شكرا
 غير من السياسية األوضاع لمعالجة كثيرة طرقا هناك أن نعتقد ونحن الكيفية, بهذه تعالج ال واألمور خطيرة, تداعيات
 تعقيدات من وتزيد الشحن من تزيد وإنما حلوال تقدم ال الوضع, تعقد األمنية المتاهات. أمنية متاهات في ندخل أن
 االعتقال طريقة مبرر, غير اعتقال جرى الذي االعتقال.أمنيا تحل أن بدل سياسيا تحل أن يمكن التي المتراكمة الملفات
. المقداد حبيب محمد والشيخ المشيمع حسن األستاذ المعتقلين عن فوري إفراج يكون بأن تطالب الوفاق مبررة, غير
 وهناك اآلن, قضايا هناك. تعقيدات إلى التعقيدات هذه وتجر تعقيدات, هناك اآللية بهذه ولكن نحترمها إجراءات هناك
 في تحاكم أناس هناك بازدواجية, المعاملة تمت إذا كنول يتحفظون اإلخوة بعض اآلن أدري أنا التعامل, في ازدواجية
 وتذهب وثالث, ومرتين مرة له تبعث يمتثل لم إن إجراءات هناك لكن النيابة, ألمر يمتثلوا لم أنهم يقال وآخرين بيوتهم,
 دولة كنا اإذ! المبررة غير الطريقة بهذه فجرا 3 الساعة عند الليل في اإلخوة تعتقل أن أما. بهدوء البيت إلى له
 واألجهزة الحكومة على القانون احترام المواطنين كل من أردنا إذا. اإلجراءات في نتدرج أن علينا وقانون مؤسسات
 هذه في يتدخل أسبوع كل وفي الطائفة, يشتم من هناك تعقد, األمور هذه. تتجاوزه وال القانون تحترم أن أيضا األمنية
... يسائله أحد وال األمور  
:  ــسالرئيـ  
.الموضوع خارج وهذا المطلوبتين, الدقيقتين أعطيتك  
 
  : المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب
.وشكرا فورا, المعتقلين عن باإلفراج نطالب إننا نقول هدوء وبكل لتهدئة, محتاجون أننا أعتقد  
 
:  الرئيـــس  
الثالث البند إلى ننتقل شكرا,  
 
The Participants in this conversation 
S  is the Speaker, MP Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Dharani. 
AAH  is MP Abdali Mohammed Hassan, a member of Al Wefaq. 
KM  is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq. 
 
The Excerpt 
S:  ... Item 2: approving Hansard of the regular twelfth sitting. Are  1 
there any comments on Hansard of the twelfth regular sitting?  2 
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Brother MP Dr Abdali Mohammad Hassan, please.  3 
AAH:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Assalāmu alaikum wa raḥmat Allah98. 4 
  Mr Speaker, on page 19, fourth and fifth lines from the bottom,  5 
replacing the word nadhīm, [i.e. clean], the correct word nudhīm  6 
[i.e. we add] and not nadhīm. Thank you.  7 
S:  Thank you. Are there any other comments on Hansard of the  8 
regular twelfth sitting? Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.  9 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker, Assalāmu alaykum wa rahmatu Allah.99 10 
Of course, I will comment for a couple of minutes on the current  11 
situation in the country ...  12 
S:  Let us finish the ratification first! 13 
KM:  A few minutes, Mr Speaker, out of interest to our security. 14 
 S:  Let us first finish the ratification.  15 
KM:  So allow me to speak after the ratification. 16 
S:  Are there any comments on Hansard of the twelfth sitting? 17 
(No comments.) 18 
S:  So Hansard of the twelfth regular sitting is approved with the amendment 19 
that has been made by Brother MP Dr Abdali  20 
Mohammad Hassan. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq,  21 
please. 22 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. As a result of our concern over safety and  23 
security in Bahrain, what has happened in the previous two days has  24 
serious implications. Matters are not addressed in this manner. We  25 
believe that there are many ways to address political situations  26 
without getting into security mazes*. Security mazes* complicate  27 
the situation, they do not offer solutions but increase charge* and  28 
increase the complexity of the accumulated files that can be solved  29 
politically rather than being solved through security measures. The  30 
arrest that took place was unjustifiable. The way the arrest was made  31 
is unjustifiable. Al Wefaq demands an immediate release of  32 
detainees Mr Hassan Mushaime’ and Sheikh Mohammed Habib  33 
Miqdad. There are procedures that we respect, but with this  34 
mechanism there are complications. And complications lead to  35 
complications. There are issues now, and there are double  36 
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measures. I know now that some of the brothers have reservations,  37 
but if treatment is based on double measures. There are people who  38 
are prosecuted while they stay at home, and others are said not to  39 
have complied with the orders of the prosecution. But there are  40 
procedures that if one does not comply, one gets sent for once and  41 
twice and thrice, and they quietly go to him at his house. But to arrest  42 
the brothers at night at 3 a.m. in this unjustifiable manner! If we are  43 
a state of institutions and law, then we should move gradually in the  44 
proceedings. If we want all citizens to respect the law, then the  45 
government and security forces should also respect the law and not  46 
bypass it. These matters are being complicated. There is someone  47 
who blasphemes the sect, and every week he intervenes in these  48 
matters and no one questions him ...  49 
S:  I have given you the requested two minutes, and this is off-topic.  50 
KM:  I believe we need to calm down. We calmly say that we demand  51 
the release of the detainees immediately, and thank you.  52 
S:  Thank you. …  53 
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6. Big and Small Thieves 
From Sitting 2:3:23, 7th April 2009, pp. 103 –104 
 
(:للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.تفضل للمجلس لعاما األمين المحمود علي نوار األخ سعادة شكرا,   
 
: للمجلس العام األمين  
 والدفاع الخارجية الشؤون لجنة تقرير: سادسا: برغبة االقتراحات: التاسع البند ،الرئيس سعادة شكرا 
 مملكة في السرقات حوادث من للحد األمنية اإلجراءات تشديد حول برغبة االقتراح بخصوص الوطني واألمن
.الرئيس سعادة وشكرا ,السعيدي أحمد جاسم الشيخ النائب سعادة من والمقدم البحرين،  
 
(:للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.المقرر األخ تفضل شكرا,    
 
( :المقرر( المتغوي أحمد عبدالحسين النائب  
.الجلسة مضبطة في اللجنة تقرير تثبيت أطلب الرئيس, سعادة شكرا    
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
الجلسة؟ مضبطة في اللجنة تقرير تثبيت على الموافقون هم من    
(موافقة أغلبية(    
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.الجلسة مضبطة في التقرير تثبيت يتم إذن    
(51 رقم الملحق انظر(    
(:للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.المقرر األخ تفضل شكرا,    
 
( :المقرر( المتغوي أحمد عبدالحسين النائب  
 من للحد هذا أن ذكر السعيدي أحمد جاسم الشيخ النائب األخ محتارة, اللجنة الرئيس, سعادة شكرا  
...الصغار أو الكبار عند السرقات يحدد لم لكن مشددة, أمنية إجراءات فيطلب السرقات  
 
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  




( :المقرر( المتغوي أحمد عبدالحسين النائب  
 المناقشة وبعد النواب لمجلس الداخلية الالئحة وعلى الدستور على االطالع بعد: اللجنة توصية  
.الرئيس سعادة وشكرا مبرراته, لوجاهة كوذل برغبة االقتراح على بالموافقة اللجنة توصي والتداول  
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
مجلسكم؟ على المعروض برغبة االقتراح بشأن اللجنة توصية على الموافقون هم من شكرا,   
(موافقة أغلبية(    
 
The Participants in this conversation 
SDS  is the Second Deputy Speaker. 
GS is the General Secretary. 




SDS: … Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of the  1 
Council, please. 2 
GS:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) Item 9: Proposals, Sixth: 3 
 The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 4 
 National Security on the proposal for increasing security  5 
measures to reduce incidences of theft in the Kingdom of Bahrain,  6 
presented by MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa’eedi. Thank you,  7 
Mr Speaker. 8 
SDS: Thank you. Brother Rapporteur. Please. 9 
AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. I request having the committee’s report  10 
inserted in Hansard. 11 
SDS:  Who agrees on inserting the report in Hansard? 12 
 (Majority agree.) 13 
SDS:  Then the report is inserted in Hansard.  14 
(See Attachment No. 15.) 15 
SDS:  Thank you. Brother Rapporteur, please. 16 
AM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. The committee is confused. The Brother MP  17 
Sheikh Jassim Al Sa’eedi mentioned that this is to reduce theft and  18 
asked for strict security measures, but did not specify if he meant  19 
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theft by the big or small – 20 
SDS: Read the recommendation. 21 
AM: (Reading) Committee's recommendation: After reviewing the Constitution  22 
and the Bylaws of the Parliament, and after discussions and deliberations,  23 
the committee recommends approving the proposal, due to the validity  24 
of its justifications. Thank you, Mr Speaker. 25 
SDS:  Thank you. Who agrees on the recommendation about the proposal  26 
submitted to your council?  27 
(Majority agree.) 28 
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7. Evesdropping 
From Sitting 2:4:3, 20th Oct. 2009, p. 15 
 
: الفضالة عبدهللا ناصر الشيخ النائب  
الرحيم الرحمن هللا بسم الرئيس, معالي شكرا   في أنا المكالمات, على التنصت بشأن 18 رقم الرسالة.  .…
 حصلت إذا ذلك بعد ثم المكالمات, كل تسجيل يتم أنه كثيرا وسمعنا أنه, الرد من واستشففت ,لدي واضحا ليس الواقع
 هذه في بوضوح نتكلم أن فيجب التنصت, من نوع هذا واستخدامها المكالمات هذه إخراج يتم مشكلة حصلت أو شبهة
 وهناك التنصت, قضية على الدول تلك يف كثيرة احتجاجات هناك وبأمريكا, األوروبية الدول ببعض االسترشاد المسألة,
يعلن, ولو حتى وتسجيلهم الناس خصوصية في تدخل هذا ألن حدثت جدا كبيرة قضايا  يسجل لمن الصالحية يعطي من 
 هذه من توضيحا نريد أيضا؟ العادي والمواطن البلد, في الموجودة الشخصيات وبقية النواب ومكالمات أنا؟ مكالماتي
 المجلس, هذا من إقرار وإلى نظر إلى يحتاج أمر هذا المكالمات لكل مستمر تسجيل هناك كان إذا الن تقول أن الهيئة
 عندهم ويكون زوجاتهم مع يتكلمون الناس أحيانا الناس, خصوصيات في والتدخل التنصت من نوعا نعتبره ألننا
 في واضحا فعال ردا نعرف أن ونريد لبالد؟ا في المكالمات لجميع بتسجيالت الهيئة هذه تحتفظ فلماذا الخاصة, أسرارهم
. الرئيس معالي وشكرا موجودة, كانت إذا المسألة هذه يوقف بأن مطالب المجلس هذا ألن المسألة, هذه  
 
Participants in this conversation 
NF is MP Al-Sheikh Nasser Abdullah Al-Fudhalah, a member of Al Minbar. 
 
The Excerpt 
NF:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Bismillāh arraḥmān arraḥīm100. Letter No.  1 
18 on eavesdropping on phone calls, is in fact not clear to me.  2 
I inferred from the answer that, and we have heard so often that,  3 
all phone calls are recorded. After that, if there is a suspicion or a  4 
problem the records are taken out and used. This is a kind of  5 
eavesdropping. We must speak clearly about this issue, guided  6 
by some European countries and by the U.S. There are many  7 
objections in those countries to the issue of eavesdropping. There  8 
are very big problems that have occurred because of this intervention  9 
in the privacy of people and recording them, even if declared.  10 
Who gives authority to who records my calls? And the calls of the  11 
council and the rest of the figures in the country, and the average  12 
citizen as well? We want an explanation from this institution, to tell  13 
us if there is an ongoing recording of all phone calls. This matter  14 
needs to be considered and approved by this council, because we  15 
consider it a kind of eavesdropping and an interference in people’s  16 
privacy. Sometimes people talk with their wives and have their own  17 
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secrets, so why does this institution keep recordings of all calls in the 18 
country? We want to know a very clear response* about this issue  19 
because it is demanded that this council stop this matter if it exists. Thank 20 
you, Mr Speaker. 21 
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8. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (a) 
From Sitting 2:4:10, 22nd Dec. 2009, pp. 6 –7 
 
  :المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب
. آخر موضوع في سأتكلم لي تسمح إذا الرئيس, معالي  
: الرئيـــس  
.تفضل المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ  
:المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 وسالمة المجلس سالمة وتهمك المجلس هذا في األولى الشخصية أنت الرئيس معالي الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 وهو ضرب ألنه المواطن أقول وأنا مبرر, غير حسن محمد عبدعلي الدكتور المواطن على اآلثم واالعتداء أعضائه,
نائب, وهو يضرب ولم مواطن  مواطنا يرى أن مجرد أن الشغب بمكافحة يسمى ما قوات أن المعقول من ليس 
 في سيارة إطار قحر شكله هذا هل مواطن, هذا شابه, ما أو سيارة إطار بحرق توحي ال وسماته شابا ليس والمواطن
 هذا عن مسؤول أنك وبما الشعب يمثل أنه وبما منك نريد األسلوب, هذا بمثل المواطنين على االعتداء الشارع؟
...المجلس  
: الرئيـــس  
.شكرا   
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 ألنه ضرب حسن محمد عبدعلي الدكتور النائب ضرب ماعند الداخلية وزارة تسأل أن الرئيس, معالي أكمل 
...مصيبة هذه نائب؟  
 
:  الرئيـــس  
.رسالة يقدم   
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 وبغض الشغب تقوا كانت وإذا! خرج؟ ألنه مواطن؟ أي بضرب أوامر هناك هل مواطن؟ ألنه ضرب وإذا 
 يخرج مواطن أي على يعتدى بأن األمنية األزمات تعالج ال ولكن تعالج أن يمكن الموجودة, األمنية األزمات عن النظر
 من أو بيوتهم من خروجهم بمجرد بيضاء أعالم يرفعوا أن المواطنين من الداخلية وزارة تريد أم ويضرب, بيته من
 يتعود لم البحرين شعب ألن ال,: لهم قل هادئ, بصوت ال, له تقل ال: أقول وأنا ,ال: لهم قل الرئيس معالي! سياراتهم؟
 أي نرفض ونحن بمستواها, تعالج أمنية أحداث هناك واالعتداءات, الهجمات هذه تتواصل أن يمكن فال هلل, إال يركع أن
.الرئيس معالي وشكرا األسلوب, بهذا ليس ولكن شابه ما أو تخريب  
 
:الرئيـــس  





Participants in this conversation 
S is the Speaker. 
KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq. 
 
The Excerpt 
KM:  Mr Speaker, if I may, I will speak on another topic. 1 
S:  Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 2 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, you are the chief figure in this 3 
council and you care about the safety of the Council and the safety  4 
of its members. The vicious attack on the citizen Dr Abdali  5 
Mohammed Hassan is unjustified. I say “the citizen” because he was  6 
beaten as a citizen, not as an MP. It is not reasonable that as soon as  7 
the so-called Riot Control Forces, as soon as they see a citizen, and  8 
this citizen is not young and whose traits do not suggest 9 
burning a tyre or doing something similar, this is a citizen. Does he  10 
look as if he burnt a tyre in the street? Assaulting citizens in such a  11 
manner. We want you— and since he presents the people, and since you are 12 
responsible for this council... 13 
S:  Thank you. 14 
KM:  I will finish Mr Speaker. … to ask the Ministry of the Interior when  15 
MP Dr Abdali Mohammad Hassan was beaten, was he beaten because  16 
he was an MP? This is a disaster ... 17 
S:  A letter should be submitted. 18 
KM:  And if he was beaten because he was a citizen? Are there any orders  19 
to beat citizens? Because he went out?! If Riot Control Forces, and  20 
regardless of the current security crisis, can address— but they cannot  21 
address the security crisis by attacking any citizen leaving his house  22 
and getting him beaten. Or does the Ministry of the Interior want the 23 
citizens to raise white flags as soon as they come out of their houses  24 
or from their cars?! Mr Speaker, tell them: no. And I say: do not  25 
say no in a calm voice. Tell them: no, because the people of Bahrain  26 
are not accustomed to kneeling except before God. These attacks and  27 
assaults cannot continue. There are security incidents dealt with at  28 
their level*. And we reject any sabotage or the like, but not this way.  29 
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Thank you, Mr Speaker. 30 
S:  Thank you, … 31 
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9. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (b) 
From Sitting 2:4:11, 29th Dec. 2009, p. 6 
 
 الرئيـــس :
 ... .تفضل المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ   
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 موضوع عن تتحدث أنا المضبطة في 7 صفحة في الرئيس معالي عليكم, السالم الرئيس, معالي شكرا 
 الشورى مجلسي شؤون وزير الفاضل محمد بن عبدالعزيز السيد سعادة( بونايف لي وليسمح النائب, على اآلثم االعتداء
 هل نابية, بألفاظ يتلفظ النائب إن: وتقول يكذب, النائب إن: وقالت الداخلية وزارة صرحت الخميس يوم في ,)والنواب
 وزارة على تسمح ال أنت ويكذب؟ نابية بألفاظ يتلفظ بأنه النواب مجلس في عضوو نائب عن يقال بأن بونايف يا تسمح
 يتلفظون بأنهم يتهمون أنهم أو يكذبون به النواب يكون أن المجلس لهذا مسموح هل الوزارات, من وزارة أي أو الداخلية
...األفراد بعض لحماية فقط نابية؟ بألفاظ  
 
: الرئيـــس  
...يكفي   
 
: المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 أن نريد ال المراهقين, الشباب مثل) يفحطون(و يخرجون الشغب مكافحة سيارات أرى الرئيس معالي يا أنا 
.التجاوزات هذه تعالج تجاوزات, هناك زيادة, هنا نتكلم  
 
Participants in this conversation 
S is the Speaker. 
KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq. 
 
The Excerpt 
S:  … Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 1 
KM:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. Assalāmu alaykum101. Mr Speaker, on page  2 
7 in Hansard, I spoke on the topic of the criminal attack against  3 
an MP. I hope Bu Nayif (Mr Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel,  4 
the Minister of Shura and Representatives Council) allows me. On  5 
Thursday, the Interior Ministry declared: “The MP is lying” and they  6 
say that the MP uttered abusive words. Do you, Bu Nayif, allow an  7 
MP to be said to be using abusive words and lying? You do not allow  8 
this with the Ministry of the Interior or any of the ministries. Is it  9 
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allowed for the Council to have people who lie or are accused of  10 
uttering abusive words? Only to protect certain individuals... 11 
S:  Enough ... 12 
KM: I, Mr Speaker, I see the cars of Riot Control Forces go out and skid  13 
[their cars] like adolescents. We do not want to talk more here.  14 
There are excesses. These excesses must be addressed. 15 
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10. Censoring a Speech 
From Sitting 10, 30th March 2010, pp. 78 –79 
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
 بعض أن شك ال ولكن الكلمة؟ هذه تعد وأنت أخذت الوقت من كم أدري ال أنا – خيرا هللا جزاك – شكرا 
.صراحة مداخلتك من نزيلها سوف المصطلحات  
 
: إبراهيم دخال محمد الشيخ النائب  
 لماذا يضحك دائما حضرته والوزير اإلذاعة في تبث لم تزيلها؟ لماذا عفوا عفوا, ال, ال, الرئيس سعادة 
 تزيلها؟
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.القادمة الجلسة في ابه وطالب سنزيلها   
 
: إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.إزالة يكفينا لماذا؟ الرئيس؟ سعادة يا تزيلها لماذا   
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
).إبراهيم خالد حمدم الشيخ النائب( بوعمار يا   
 
: إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.شيئا تزل ال - يسلمك هللا - دعه خالص,   
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.سنزيل   
 
: إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
.خالص  
 
( :للرئيس الثاني النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
 حينما جيدا, األلفاظ نختار أن ينبغي والغربان الغراب ديرة البحرين تقول حينما أعتقد, ال أنا سنحذف, ال, 





: إبراهيم خالد محمد الشيخ النائب  
 توجد ال الوفاق, في لإلخوان وسأنقلها وسأذيعه االنترنت في وسأضعه حذفه تود الذي احذف مشكلة, توجد ال 
.مشكلة  
 
Participants in this conversation 
SDS is the Second Deputy Speaker. 
MK is MP Sheikh Mohammed Khalid Ebrahim, a member of Al Asalah. 
 
The Excerpt 
SDS:  Thank you. Jazāk Allah khair102. I do not know how long it took you  1 
to prepare this speech, but no doubt some of the utterances  2 
will be removed from your intervention, honestly. 3 
MK:  Mr Speaker, no, no, excuse me, excuse me, why will you remove  4 
them? They will not be broadcast on the radio and His Excellency  5 
the minister was laughing all the time. Why remove them? 6 
SDS: We will remove them, and you can demand them in the next sitting. 7 
MK:  Why will you remove them, Mr Speaker? Why? We have had  8 
enough of removing. 9 
SDS: Bu Ammar (MP Sheikh Mohammed Khalid Ebrahim). 10 
MK:  They are all right, leave them – Allah yisalmuk103 – Do not remove  11 
anything. 12 
SDS: We will remove – 13 
MK:  They are all right. 14 
SDS:  No, we will delete— I do not think— when you say that Bahrain is the  15 
land of the raven and the ravens. You should choose your words  16 
properly. When you say that the thieves and the thief— why do you  17 
say these words? You say that Bahrain was ‘given away like a freebie’  18 
(biblāsh). You say that Bahrain was sold cheaply. 19 
MK:  No problem. Delete what you want to delete and I will post it on  20 
the Internet and announce it. I will pass it to the brothers in Al Wefaq.  21 
No problem.22 
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11. Ativating a Punishment Decision 
From Sitting 2:4:28, 27th April 2010, p. 43 
 
(:للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.تفضل للمجلس العام األمين المحمود علي نوار األخ سعادة  
 
: للمجلس العام األمين  
 بخصوص والقانونية التشريعية الشؤون لجنة تقرير: أوال: برغبة االقتراحات السابع, البند الرئيس, سعادة شكرا
 الخاضعين الحكومي بالقطاع العاملين الموظفين معاقبة بشأن المدنية الخدمة ديوان قرارات تفعيل بشأن برغبة االقتراح
 الشغب أعمال في أو المرخصة غير واالعتصامات المسيرات في المشاركة بتهمة يدانون الذين يةالمدن الخدمة لديوان
 والعشرين السابعة العادية الجلسة من مرحل( الدوسري خلف عبدهللا النائب سعادة من المقدم القضاء, قبل من والتخريب
.وشكرا). م2010 أبريل 20 الموافق الثالثاء يوم عقدت التي  
 
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( لجلسةا رئيس  
 يناقش, لن المجلس أن المعاودة عبدالرحمن عادل الشيخ النائب مقترح إلى بالنسبة الحكومة من نتمنى صراحة شكرا,
  سيصوت,
 القرار على هيثهم بو معترض أنت اخالت,مد هناك كانت إن المداخالت, في يطيلوا أال الحكومة في اإلخوة من نتمنى
. تفضل اللجنة مقرر مكي هالل مكي النائب األخ هللا, شاء إن خيرا ,)الدوسري سالم حسن النائب(  
 
  ( :المقرر( مكي هالل مكي السيد النائب 
. وشكرا ,الجلسة مضبطة في اللجنة تقرير تثبيت أرجو الرئيس, سعادة شكرا  
 
(:للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
  الجلسة؟ مضبطة في اللجنة تقرير تثبيت على الموافقون هم من شكرا, 
(موافقة أغلبية(  
(:للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
.الجلسة مضبطة في اللجنة تقرير تثبيت يتم إذن   
( 9 رقم الملحق انظر(  
( :ئيسللر األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
. رفض ,704 صفحة في التوصية, بقراءة المقرر األخ تفضل شكرا,  
 
  ( :المقرر( مكي هالل مكي السيد النائب




( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
. تفضل الدوسري سالم حسن النائب األخ الكالم, حق له فواحد رفض إذا اتفقنا نحن الجدول, في واضحة المبررات  
 
: الدوسري سالم حسن النائب  
 اللجنة تقرير ولكن المدنية, الخدمة ديوان قرارات بتفعيل المقترح جاء فنية, مالحظة لدي الحقيقة الرئيس, عادةس شكرا
 الخدمة ديوان قرارات تفعيل" يعاقب, بأنه يأت لم المقترح الموظفين, معاقبة بشأن برغبة االقتراح بخصوص جاء
 النائب سعادة من أتى الذي المقترح غير على اللجنة أعضاء وصوت األمر, هذا في أخطأت اللجنة أن فأعتقد ,"المدنية
. الرئيس سعادة وشكرا الدوسري, خلف عبدهللا  
 
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
 اللجنة تقرير إن: يقول الدوسري لمسا حسن النائب األخ المقرر, من أو اللجنة رئيس من إما إخوان يا اإلجابة شكرا,
 معاقبة عن جاء والتقرير المدنية, الخدمة ديوان قرارات تفعيل هي األصلية الرغبة األصلية, الرغبة خالف أتى
  اللجنة؟ إلى يعاد أن تريدون هل الموظفين,
 
: الدوسري سالم حسن النائب  
. انلج توجد ال اآلن؟ لجان أي  
 
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
 المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ عليه, ونصوت مبرر, لديه ربما اللجنة رئيس نسمع لجان, توجد بل ذلك يقول من
. تفضل اللجنة رئيس  
 
:( اللجنة رئيس( المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب  
 بخصوص 696 صفحة في التقارير, وحتى اللجان, إليه وصلت الذي هكذا, جاءنا الذي الرئيس, سعادة شكرا 
 إرجاعه تريدون هل المدنية, الخدمة لديوان الخاضعين الحكومي بالقطاع العاملين الموظفين معاقبة بشأن برغبة االقتراح
... اإلجراءات تصحيح نطلب القادم؟ الفصل في به تينأ حتى اللجنة إلى  
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
 المرفقات, ضمن من عندك موجود – واحدة دقيقة نتكلم دعونا إخوان يا - المقترح المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ
... 710و 709 يصفحت في أمانة وبكل  
 
  ( :المقرر( مكي هالل مكي السيد النائب
... المقترح هذا ,696   
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( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
 قرار تفعيل بشأن برغبة راحاقت ,710و 709 صفحتي في الدوسري, خلف عبدهللا النائب توقيع هو هذا 
.تفضل المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب األخ المدنية, الخدمة ديوان  
 
( :اللجنة رئيس( المرزوق إبراهيم خليل النائب   
. وشكرا صحيح, غير إجرائيا ألنه التقرير أسحب أنا الرئيس, سعادة شكرا   
 
( :للرئيس األول النائب( الجلسة رئيس  
  اإلجراءات؟ في السالمة لعدم تقريرها اللجنة تسترد أن على الموافقون هم من شكرا, 
(موافقة أغلبية(  
 
 
The participants in this conversation 
DS is the Deputy Speaker. 
GS is the General Secretary, Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud. 
HD is MP Hassan Salem Al-Dosseri, an independent MP. 
KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq. 




DS:  Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of  1 
the Council, please. 2 
GS:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) The seventh item, proposals: 3 
First: The report of the Legislative and Legal Affairs on the proposal 4 
 made for the activation of the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau 5 
about the punishment of government sector employees under the Civil  6 
Service Bureau who are convicted by the judiciary of participating in  7 
unlicensed marches and sit-ins or in riots and vandalism. Made by MP  8 
Abdallah Khalaf Al-Dossari (carried over from the regular sitting of the 9 
 twenty-seventh sitting held on Tuesday, 20th April 2010). Thank you. 10 
DS:  Thank you. Truly, we hope that the government, when it comes to  11 
the proposal of MP Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu’awdah, that  12 
the Council will not discuss it, but will vote. We hope that the  13 
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brothers from the government do not prolong interventions, if there  14 
are any interventions. You are objecting to the decision, Bu Haitham  15 
(MP Hassan Salem Al-Dossari). Khayran inshāʾ Allah104. Brother MP  16 
Makki Hilal Makki, the Rapporteur, please. 17 
MHM (Rapporteur): Thank you, Mr Speaker. Please insert the report of  18 
the committee in Hansard of the sitting. Thank you. 19 
DS:  Thank you. Who agrees on inserting the report of the committee  20 
in Hansard of the sitting? 21 
(Majority agree.) 22 
DS:  So the report gets inserted in Hansard of the meeting. 23 
(See Supplement No. 7.) 24 
DS:  Thank you. Brother Rapporteur, please read the recommendation  25 
on page 704, a refusal. 26 
MHM (Rapporteur): Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) The committee  27 
rejecting the proposal due to the inadequacy of justifications. Thank  28 
you. 29 
DS:  The justifications are clear in the table. We had agreed that if it  30 
was refused then one will have the right to speak. Brother MP  31 
Hassan Salem Al-Dosseri, please. 32 
HD:  Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have a technical comment. The  33 
proposal was for activating the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau,  34 
but the committee’s report is on a proposal for punishing  35 
employees. The proposal did not come to punish. “Activation of  36 
the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau”. I think that the  37 
committee has erred in this matter, and the members have voted  38 
on something other than the proposal that was made by MP  39 
Abdullah Khalaf Al-Dosseri. 40 
Thank you, Mr Speaker. 41 
DS: Thank you. The response, my brothers, should come either from the  42 
Chairman of the Committee or from the Rapporteur. Brother MP  43 
Hassan Salem Al-Dosseri says the report of the committee came to*  44 
other than the original proposal. The original proposal is for  45 
activating the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau, while the report  46 
was on punishing employees. Do you want it to be returned to the  47 
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committee? 48 
HD:  Which committees now? There are no committees. 49 
DS:  Who says so? There are committees. Let us hear from the Chairman  50 
of the Committee. He may have a justification on which we can  51 
vote. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, the Chairman of the  52 
Committee, please. 53 
KM (Chairman of Committee): Thank you, Mr Speaker. What came to us  54 
is like this, that the committees have reached, and even the reports*:  55 
on page 696 in regard to the proposal for punishing government  56 
sector employees under the Civil Service Bureau. Do you want to  57 
return it to the committee so that we present it in the next term?  58 
We request correcting the procedures ... 59 
DS:  Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, the proposal – brothers,  60 
let us talk a minute – is available with the attachments actually,  61 
on pages 709 and 710 ... 62 
MHM (Rapporteur): 696, this proposal … 63 
DS:  This is the signature of MP Abdullah Al-Dosseri on pages 709 and  64 
710. The proposal for the activation of the decisions of the Civil  65 
Service Bureau. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please. 66 
KM (Chairman of Committee): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I withdraw the  67 
report because of the invalidity of the procedures. Thank you. 68 
DS:  Thank you. Who agrees on returning the proposal to the committee  69 





                                           
End Notes 
1 The pages covering Romanisation of Arabic are in pages 10–19 of the book. More 
details of the system are available in the document on Arabic Romanisation provided by the 
Library of Congress on http://www.loc.gov/ catdir/cpso/romanization/arabic.pdf .  
2 Al ‘Amal is more appealing to the followers of Iranian Shiite leaders in Najaf. 
3 The Al Wefaq Party won 43% of the seats with 26% of the total number of votes. 
4 The third legislative period started with the Al Wefaq Party dominating the 
Council with 18 seats and with the Sunni parties’ dramatic failure; they secured a total of 
only five seats between the two parties (two for Al Minbar and three for Al Asalah), leaving 
17 in total for independent Sunni candidates. However, all of the MPs from Al Wefaq 
resigned in March 2011 in protest at the government’s handling of riots in that period. This 
means the third legislative period is of a very different nature, and its ideological features 
deserve an individual study per se. 
5 Despite the fact that there are Islamic matters, stances and opinions with a strong 
extremist or fundamentalist link, I still avoid using ‘Islamist’ as a description for them, as it 
is a subjective and simplistic description that indicates a tendency to label people, thoughts 
or actions with little or no attention to contexts and inputs. Further, the term builds on the 
assumption that fundamentalism is motivated by Islamic ideology rather than resulting from 
complex political, social and economic factors. As for the common use of ‘Islamist’ to refer 
to the ideology or ideologies that hold that religion and political systems should both be 
represented in Islam, I still do not call them ‘Islamist’ because every ‘Islamic’ movement 
does, in essence, believe in Islam having a political role and aspects, regardless of the vast 
differences in views on how this should and can be implemented. This means that there is 
no need for the term ‘Islamist’ to define a group calling for Islam to be implanted in politics. 
The calls to separate religion from politics have been made only by ‘non-Islamic’ people, 
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with little or no interest in or understanding of Islamic teachings and legislation. This means 
that they themselves may not correctly be labelled as Islamic movements (see further 
explanation in 2.2.2 and 2.2.3). 
6 In this research, BHD is used as an abbreviation for Bahraini dialect instead of the 
initials BD, because BD in Bahrain is the symbol used for Bahraini Dinars, the local 
currency. 
7 Despite the conflict associated with ruling issues after the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed, Shi’aism actually emerged after the martyrdom of Hussain, the son of Ali, in 
the Battle of Karbala in 680 (Mandaville 2007: 39). The Sunni legal and religious 
background accepts the rulings and the teachings of the four caliphs succeeding the Prophet 
Mohammed (from 632 until 661). Sunnis as a distinct group emerged as the followers of the 
four Imams (Malik, Abu Hanifa, al-Shafi’i, and Ibn Hanbal) in the mid-ninth century (ibid.: 
34–35) as a contrast to Shiites. Sunnis currently compromise 90% of Muslims while the 
remaining 10% are Shi’a (ibid.: 11). 
8 One form of ijtihad is known as qiyas, ‘the method of analogical deduction’ 
(Mandaville 2007: 350). One example of an issue that required ijtihad is smoking. As there 
were no cigars or cigarettes in the era of the Prophet or his Caliphs, this issue was measured 
against the concept of ‘self-harming’ and ‘harming of others’ in the Hadith of the Prophet 
Mohammed: ‘ وال ضرر ال: ( قال وسلم عليه هللا صلى هللا رسول أن عنه هللا رضي الخدري سنان بن سعد سعيد أبي عن 
 i.e., ‘No harming [of others] and no . مسندا وغيرهما الدارقطني و ماجة ابن رواه , حسن حديث ,)  ضرار
harming [of self].’ (my translation) and the Qur’anic verse: التهلكةِ  إلى بأيديكم تُلقوا وال (chapter 2, 
verse 195). i.e. ‘And do not make your hands contribute to your destruction’ (my 
translation). According to these major sources, smoking was rejected, but there was a 
disagreement as to what extent. Many of the Sunni imams see smoking as a prohibited act, 
 makrūh. On the other hand, the ,مكروه ,ḥarām, and some look on it unfavourably ,حرام
overwhelming majority of Shiite scholars have opted to issue a dislike fatwa on smoking on 
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the basis mentioned above. However, recently, one marjiʿ, namely, Sayed Mohammed 
Hussain Fadhlallah (in Lebanon), issued a prohibition fatwa on smoking, which is 
considered a first in Shiite Islam. 
9 Pronounced asālah, but I quote it as mentioned in the source text. 
10 The political and religious standards and status of Saudi Arabia have gone 
through various stages and it is probably now an over-simplification to identify the Salafi 
principles, trends and motivations in present-day Saudi Arabia with those established by 
Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahab. 
11 Ismail Safavid conquered Iran, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the period from 1500 
to 1508 and then the Khurasan region and the city Heart in 1510 (Ward 2009: 43). 
12 Although it is common in Bahrain to label Bahrainis with Persian backgrounds as 
Huwala, not all Sunnis with Persian roots are Huwala, as the term ‘Holi’ (singular of 
Huwala) is supposed to indicate the Arabs who immigrated to Persia and then returned to 
the West coast of the Arabian Gulf. Thus, ʿAjams can be either Sunnis or Shiites. However, I 
will follow the looser definition that uses ethnic labels to identify religious affiliations: 
ʿAjam for Shiites and Huwala for Sunnis. 
13 Interestingly, the ‘black’ community in Bahrain, which is very small, has always 
been seen as part of the Arab community and are all Sunnis. 
14 The Huwala are mentioned as residents of the Gulf western cost in several books. 
See for example Farmanfarmaian (2008: 128), who briefly mentions the Huwala and their 
origins. Three families of Huwala ruled Bahrain, and they were Al-Mansor, Al-Haram and 
Al-Mathkoor. Slot (1991:72) who identifies the Huwala as the ones who possessed Bahrain 
for a period of time before the Utub tribe conquered Bahrain in 1736. 
15 Dubai and Sharja more specifically, and up to now a big percentage of the Emirati 
residents of these two cities are Holis. 
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16 Basically, but not exclusively, in Manama and Muharraq, and have been moving 
elsewhere within the country starting from the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
17 Being a Holi myself, I know that my father’s paternal grandfather had a house on 
the West coast of Iran, another in Bahrain and a third in Saudi Arabia, and these three areas 
were not seen as separate or independent at that time. The Holi community was spread 
throughout the area, so that many did not speak or need to speak Arabic. 
18 Qarmitians were Ismaili Shiites. The conversion to Twelver Shiism happened 
much later on.  
19 The issue of naturalisation and the discrimination against the so-called mujannasīn 
is a major and detailed topic that cannot be encompassed in this research. 
20 Even in the field of education, in government schools the textbooks, assignments 
and exams are in SA, while lessons, apart from Arabic language lessons, are almost always 
delivered in the personal dialect of the teacher. 
21 See note 6. 
22 Najd is the central area of Arabia. 
23 Khuzistan is a province in the South West of current Iran, bordering on Basrah 
province. 
24 Al-Hasa is the Eastern region of Arabia that is adjacent to the Arabian Gulf. 
25 Literally, the Coast of Arabs, is a coastal district in southeast Iraq, named after a 
river running in that district. The River of Shatt Al Arab itself is formed when the two rivers 
Tigris and Euphrates.  
26 Banānī (pl. of Bannāy) means builders, and Hiyāyīch (pl. of Hayyāch) means 
tailors. The titles refer to their ancient trades. Using trades as last names is very common in 
the Gulf and many families still keep these old names. 
27 Some ʿAjam in Bahrain speak Iranian and dialects of Persian, known in Bahrain as 
ʿIjmi. The Huwala, on the other hand, have a distinct language which is a spoken variant or 
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dialect of Persian; however, it shares more syntactical and phonological resemblance than 
semantic ones with Persian. As with Within the Holi language there are several dialects. 
Originally, the dialects of ʿIjmi and Holi used to be the first if not the only language of the 
ʿAjam and Huwala in Bahrain and the Gulf region for long. It is not the case for all ʿAjam 
and Huwala any longer. To many, these dialects have become either a second language or a 
total unknown foregine language. For information on Ethnic origins of ʿAjam and Huwala 
see Section  2.3.1. 
28 There is a tendency among younger people to pronounce this word in its classical form, 
qalīl, and the older pronunciation with the q converted into a j in this word is quickly 
disappearing. Shway is another synonym of this word, in greater use. 
29 Although the two together comprise the parliamentary system in Bahrain, it is 
common in Bahrain to use the term Parliament to mean the lower chamber. 
30 The same directorate is responsible for recording Hansard of the Al-Shura Council 
and the Bahraini House of Representatives. 
31 In Wodak and Meyer (2009: 28-29) they are called language indicators, which are 
what I call discursive devices in this research. Wodak and Meyer (ibid.) list fourteen 
language indicators and I only detect the five mentioned. More on creating the final list of 
discursive devices is in Section 3.9.1. 
32 Weigand (2004: 16–17) gives examples of speech acts: declarative speech act 
related to emotion: I love you. I regret it (in the court); statement/constructive: I love him, I 
regret it (in everyday talk), I am surprised. – I can believe it; expressive speech act: What a 
surprise! – Indeed.; accompanying emotion: You are playing the piano again. 
33 Ideological elements can be, for example, values of political affiliation, family, 
traditions, patriotism, prejudgments and prior knowledge of the topic. 
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34 Moscovici was not consistent or singular in his definition of definitions of social 
representations in different works, but this thesis does not have sufficient space to present 
or discuss them. 
35 Although the definition of a discourse unit is controversial and not homogenous, for 
convenience, where a discourse unit starts and where it ends is not relevant to my analysis, 
so I simply accept the definition that ‘discourse units are chunks of conversation which are 
clearly marked as different from the surrounding turn-by-turn talk’ by discourse markers 
and structural unity (Graumann and Kallmeyer, 2002: 326).  
36 Some other approaches focus on historical accounts, others on pragmatic features, 
and others on corpus linguistics, etc. 
 additional vowel determined by grammatical , حركة ḥarakāt, plural of ḥarkah حركات 37
function, without which a word is lexically complete and understood. 
38 Here, شحن shaḥn i.e. charge, is used instead of شحناء  shaḥnāʾ, i.e. dispute.  
39 There are a few instances of stress in Arabic that are based on word order and 
structure and can be ‘read,’ but cannot be conveyed in word order or structure in English. 
For those, I convey the idea by phonetic stress that is normally expressed in English writing 
by italics. The word order and structure of the original Arabic text have a similar effect to 
stress conveyed by word order and structure in English sentences like: ‘You do it yourself’ 
(addition of yourself) and ‘Security is what he is pursuing’ (instead of ‘He is pursuing 
security’). So whenever it is possible to convey emphasis in the Arabic text by word order or 
structure in English I do so, and I use italics only to indicate stress when this is not possible. 
40 The parties’ need to champagne their stance about dissent control and political 
freedom is better understood in the light of the political and sectarian conflicts in the 
country (see Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).  
41 See Table 1 in the Introduction. 
42 According to the Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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(same excerpt, lines 135 to 153), the law allowing the use of pepper spray itself conforms to 
what had been discussed for three years by the Interior Ministry with the Technical 
Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Ministry had 
also discussed the law with the Legal Counsels of the Organization in order to make sure 
that the law conformed to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The 
convention is available on line (See United Nations 2012). 
 trūḥ mīhā, literally: ‘go in it’, a Bahraini colloquial expression that is an فيها تروح 43
equivalent of ‘to be doomed’ or ‘to be a goner’. 
44 The three guest speakers in this sitting were the Director of Environmental Control 
in the General Authority for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife; 
the Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Director of the 
Military Courts, the Ministry of the Interior, The first and the last suggested amending 
Article 4 while the other defended it as it was. 
45 There were four guest speakers who spoke in this excerpt on teargas, and they 
were: the Director of Environmental Control in the General Authority for Protection of 
Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife, Dr Afaf Al Shu’la; the Director of the Legal 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Director of Military Courts, the Ministry of the 
Interior, Major Hmoud Sa’ad Hmoud; and the Legal Counsel, the Ministry of State for 
Defence, Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi. Their intervensions are provided in full 
in Excerpt 1 in the appendix (in italic).  
 
 .’sallāmkallah, literally meaning ‘May God protect you هللا سلّمكَ  46
47 Halabcha is a city in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The city was hit with chemical 
weapons during the reign of Saddam Hussain, who was convicted for this after the fall of his 
government.  
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48 An expression in Bahrain dialect. 
49 As above. 
50 The word used is غبية, ghabiyyah. 
51 Details are nineither given in Hansard nor in the Akhbar Al-Khaleej Newspaper. 
52 The singular and the plural can be used interchangeably to mean the same. The 
only difference is that the singular is grammatically treated as a masculine noun and the 
plural, as with all non-human nouns, is treated as feminine singular when adding adjectives 
or verbs. 
53 This is in reference to the other topics on the agenda of this sitting on which the 
Council wants to issue a statement. 
54 Cobb-Moore et al. (2008: 597) refer to ‘physical materials and spaces tr play’ (my 
emphasis) and I here extend the same fundamental notion to other disputes over other 
matters. 
55 The list above is directly quoted from the article, but in the article, they are 
presented in a continuous paragraph and not presented in a bullet-point list as I present 
them here. 
56 Unlike the other ‘you’s in MP Al-Miz’al’s speech in this excerpt, the ‘you’s and verbs 
with a ^ symbol in this excerpt are singular second person pronouns and verbs (since in 
Arabic verbs addressing a singular are different from those addressing a plural) addressing 
the Speaker. The remaining ‘you’s in his speech are plural. 
 .ʿala kaikuk, i.e. ‘Is it up to you?’, is in Bahraini dialect .كيفك على 57
 .iṭlaʿ, i.e. ‘Get out’, is in Bahraini dialect ,.اطلع 58
 khawārij. The خوارج :khāriji, the singular of the most commonly used plural خارجي 59
root of the word is خرج kh-r-j, to go out, to leave. Al-Aql defines a khārijī as one who rejects 
obedience to a legal leader and declares disobedience and pits himself against the leader 
(1989: 28, my translation). 
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 Takmīrīyyūn, the plural of takmīrī, which refers to the person who labels or تكفيريون 60
describes someone else, often some other groups or sects, as being kīmir, i.e. an infidel. 
61 See note 59. 
62 See note 60. 
63 See note 57. 
64 In this research, I do not elaborate on the discussion over naturalisation and the 
demand to employ Shiites in the Armed Forces as, despite it being a major source of dispute 
and a stimulus for riots, I am focusing on the legislative response of the parliament to 
handling political freedom and dissent, i.e. the legislative approach to the condition and not 
the causes or motivations. A total ignorance of the stimuli is not realistic, but an analytical 
and discursive approach to them is not possible in order to stay within the research scope. 
65 MP Fayrooz sounds contradicting himself when he mentions allowing ‘all walks of 
life’ after objecting to employing the newly naturalised citizens. 
66 There is no mention of the names of the parties in the newspaper article.  
وبركاته هللا ورحمة عليكم السالم 67  assalāmu alaikum wa raḥmat Allāh wa barakātuh, i.e. ‘Peace 
from God be up on you, and His mercy and His blessings’, an expression of greeting. It can 
be cut short and to only the first two words, to mean ‘peace be upon you’. 
68 I have tried to translate the structure into something of a similar linguistic 
competence, but sometimes it was difficult to keep certain sentences as they were uttered. 
Take, for example, line 42, which I have translated into ‘Al Wifaq demands an immediate 
release of detainees’; but the actual Arabic sentence is لوفاقا  ,المعتقلين عن فوري إفراج يكون بأن تطالب 
which has a problem of verb-noun matching. If I am to convey the structural error, it can be 
translated into ‘Al Wifaq demands to it be immediate release of the detainees’*. 
69 The sentence was subsequently reduced to a travel ban. 
الرحيم الرحمن هللا بسم 70  An Arabic phrase that means ‘in the name of God, the most 
merciful, the most gracious’, and it is often used as an opening of a treatise. 
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71 I, however, find such solidarity with theological and/or ethnic orientations stronger 
in most if not all communities, even when there is a tendency by the people themselves or 
the systems to deny its significance. 
72 This is a detailed debate that I will not enter into in this research. In short, most 
of Shiite families in Bahrain arrived after Al Khalifa, and most are originally from either 
Southern Iraq or Iran. There were only a few Shiite families in Bahrain when Al Khalifa 
arrived and a larger number of Sunnis, most of whom were, and still are, the Holis. More 
details can be found in Section 2.3.1 of this thesis. 
73 Several books on this topic can be referred to for further detail, such as The 
Theology of Discontent and Shi’ism, a Religirn rm Prrtest both by Dabashi (2006, 2011). 
74 There were independent Shiite candidates and members of other Shiite parties, 
who also ran for the Council for the Second Legislative Period in areas with a high density 
of Shiite residents, but none of them won and they received a low percentage of the votes. It 
is claimed that Al Wefaq fought unfairly against them and issued a fatwa that voting for 
them was not allowed and was punishable. However, Al Wefaq, who won all the 18 seats 
the party contested, denies this, and maintains to have won by being more popular.  
75 For the differences between the description of the Mahdi and his appearance in 
the two sects, see Section 2.2.3. 
76 Joyer attributes this to the high percentage of Shiites in Bahrain. He provides a 
ratio of 70% to 30% for Shiites and Sunnis. However, the source of this statistic is not 
provided and it seems, like most of the sectarian ratios, to be based on circulated 
information rather than any reliable statistics. As I explained earlier in Section 2.3.1, the 
percentage of Shiites was very low when the Al Khalifa dynasty began, and then many 
families were brought in and others allowed in from Iran, Southern Iraq and Al-Hasa (the 
ones from Al-Hasa are also originally from Southern Iraq). Nevertheless, they have not 
outnumbered the Sunni population and it is most likely that the numbers are now equal. 
461 
                                                                                                                       
What makes Bahrain more vulnerable to what Joyer calls ‘Shiite radicalism’ is that it is the 
smallest independent country in the Gulf region, open to access from the sea from all sides, 
with most of the coast uninhabited, and that it is the least militarily armed, all of which 
would make invading it and controlling it very easy in comparison to the other Gulf 
countries. The Shiite presence has its importance as well, especially as the percentage of 
Shiites is still the highest and most explicit in the western Gulf countries, with them being 
empowered and given much space to practise their faith. 
77 The recent political coup attempt that started on 14 February 2011 has shaken 
members of this sector and made them move, speak up and express their demands, which 
are mainly for reform under the current regime without having to overthrow the ruling 
system. The ‘silent sector’ has demonstrated a ‘mass’ political stance for the first time after a 
long period of reluctance during which only a few figures were outspoken and critical.  
78 I made this prediction during the Second Legislative Period, and after having 
finished writing this chapter the results of elections for the Third Legislative Period came 
out, and the Sunni parties made a great loss, with Al Minbar only securing one seat and Al 
Asalah only two. 
79 Also known as the Gathering of National Unity Assembly (TGONU). More 
information about its philosophy and goals were presented in two speeches by its head and 
are available on their webpage http://tgonu.org/languages/8  
80 Shaikh Isa Ahmed Qassim is a member of Ahl uhl Bayt World Assembly in Tehran. 
He is the appointed representative in Bahrain and the top religious reference, marji’, for the 
Shiites of Bahrain. Bahraini (Shiite) people are directed by Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Kazim 
Al-Haeri, a major Shiite marji’ in Qom, Iran. 
81 No statistics are available to measure the level of income among the two sects in 
Bahrain, nor their number (as records of sectarian affiliations do not exist), and the only 
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unbiased income statistics available are those of the UN; these show that there is a very low 
percentage of poverty in Bahrain and no absolute poverty in the country.  
82 See note 70. 
83  Inshāʾ Allāh, an expression very meaning ‘God willing’. The difference is هللا شاء نإ 
that in Arabic it is used for not only a high certainty but also wishes and hopes. There is a 
third use, which is more culturally bond and used by some people, and that is for not giving 
a definite yes or no to a request or question. The difference is mainly individual and is also 
noted in the intonation used when uttering inshaAllah, to reflect a certainty, hope or 
avoidance.  
84 فيها تروح  trūḥ mīhā, literally: ‘go in it’, a Bahraini colloquial expression that is an 
equivalent of ‘get doomed’ or ‘be a goner’. 
85 See endnote 71. 
86  ..’sallāmkallah, literally meaning: ‘[may] God protect you هللا سلّمكَ  
87 Halabcha is a city in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The city was hit with chemical 
weapons during the reign of Saddam Hussain, who was convicted for this after the fall of his 
government.  
88 See endnote 96. 
89 Although this phrase exisits in classical Arabic, in the context of this conversation, 
following an imperative, it would be in Bahraini dialect to mean ‘please’. 
90 This is in reference to the other topics on the agenda of this sitting, on which the 
Council wants to issue a statement. 
 khawārij. The root خوارج :Khāriji, the single of the most commonly used plural خارجي 91
of the word is خرج kh-r-j, to go out, to leave. Al-Aql (vv: 28) defines a Khārijī as the one who 
discards the obedience of a legal leader and declares disobedience and pits against the 
leader. 
 Takmīrīyyūn, the plural of takmīrī, which refers to the person who label or تكفيريون 92
describe someone else, often some other groups or sects, as being kīmir, i.e. an infidel. 
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93 Unlike the other ‘you’s in MP Al-Miz’al’s speech in this excerpt, the ‘you’s and verbs 
with an ^ symbol in this excerpt are singular second person pronouns and verbs (since in 
Arabic verbs addressing a singular is different than that addressing a plural) addressing the 
Speaker. The rest ‘you’s in his speech are plural. 
.كيفك على 94  ʿala kaikuk, i.e. ‘is it up to you?’, is in Bahraini dialect. 
.اطلع 95 , iṭlaʿ, i.e. ‘Get out’, is in Bahraini dialect. 
96 See endnote 71. 
97 As in endnote 83. 
98 As in endnote 68. 
99 As in endnote 98. 
100 As in endnote 96. 
101 As in endnote 71.  
102 Literally ‘[May] God reward you’, a common expression with religious origin that 
became a formaic expression used to say thank you. 
يسلمك هللا 103  Allah yisalmuk, literally ‘God keep you safe’ or ‘God protect you’, is an 
interjection.  
هللا شاء إن خيرا 104  Khayran inshāʾ Allah, literally ‘[May it be] good by the willing of 
Allah’. It is an interjection meaning ‘fine’ or ‘all right as in this instant. It can also express 
approval or the speaker’s willingness to consider what was has said.  
